

ABSTRACT

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS'S PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE: A COMMENTARY ON *MUTUA INHAESIO* AS THE MOST PROPER EFFECT OF LOVE IN IA IIAE, QQ 26-28 OF THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

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In the *Prima Secunda* of the *Summa Theologiae*, qq. 26-28 (the “*De Amore*”), St. Thomas Aquinas both analyzes the nature of love in its broadest and most metaphysical sense while defining it more specifically as a passion. In q26, he reviews the subject, genus, species and act of love. In q27, he reviews the causes of love as goodness (*bonum*), knowledge (*cognitio*) and likeness (*similitudo*), while in q28 he provides what might be called a “phenomenology of love,” where he enumerates love’s four proximate effects and five remote effects. This dissertation is a commentary on those three questions in the order that St. Thomas discusses them. This dissertation argues that *mutua inhaesio* is the most proper effect of *amor*, particularly when *amor* is *dilectio*, for numerous reasons: 1) metaphysically speaking, Thomas argues convincingly that love itself is a “being-in”; 2) psychologically speaking, *mutua inhaesio*, or mutual indwelling, is the only effect that virtually contains all the others; 3) theologically speaking, Thomas finds in *mutua inhaesio* an analogue to the supreme completeness and intimacy of the Trinity, usually referred to as the *perichoresis* or the *circumincession*. Over and above *mutua inhaesio*, it exists in an even more perfect form in the *via redamationis*, where friends love mutually and reciprocally. Chapter One recalls Thomas’s sources on love, particularly Pseudo-Dionysius, St. John the Evangelist, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and the theological tradition of the *perichoresis* in the patristic tradition. Chapter Two reviews

some of Thomas's own parallel texts on love as well as some of the literary and structural elements of the *De Amore*. Chapter Three begins a formal commentary on q26 on "Love Itself" followed by a commentary on Love's Causes (q27) in Chapter Four. Chapters Five and Six split the commentary on the effects of love, dealing first with *unio* and *mutua inhaesio*, followed by an analysis of *extasis* (ecstasy), *zelus* (zeal), *laesiva/perfective* (wounding/perfecting), *liquefaction* (melting), *fruitio* (enjoyment), *languor* (languor), and *fervor* (fervor). Finally, Chapter Seven indicates some fruitful avenues of research on what might be called a Thomistic "philosophy of intimacy."

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
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“...the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.”

St. Thomas Aquinas – *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c

“For by the fact that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the interior of the beloved and vice versa, so that nothing of the beloved remains not united to the lover, just as a form reaches to the innermost recesses of that which it informs and vice versa.”

St. Thomas Aquinas – *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1, ad4

“Because the love which a man has for others arises from his love for himself, inasmuch as a man looks upon his friend as his other self.”

St. Thomas Aquinas – *SCG IIIb*, cap. 153

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	i
INTRODUCTION.....	ii
The Problem of Intimacy in Aquinas.....	vi
The State of the Question.....	xviii
The <i>Dubitabilia</i> of Love.....	xxv
The Dissertation's relation to the Modern Thought on <i>Amor</i> in the Thought of Aquinas.....	xxxix
 CHAPTER 1: THE SOURCES OF AMOR	1
The Perichoresis	15
The Indwelling of All in All: The Dionysian Transformation of Love.....	24
The Augustinian Inheritance.....	35
Aristotelian Friendship	41
St. John the Evangelist, <i>Caritas</i> , and <i>Mutua Inhaesio</i>	49
Conclusion	57
 CHAPTER 2: “DEUS CARITAS EST”:.....	59
The Commentary on the Sentences	60
Preludes to the <i>De Amore</i> in the <i>Summa</i>	63
“ <i>De Caritate</i> ,” IIa IIae, qq23-46.....	72
The <i>De Amore</i> in its Structural Context.....	78
 CHAPTER 3: “DE IPSO AMORE”	91
Ia IIae, q26, A1: Is Love in the Concupiscible Power? or “What is the Subject of Love?”	98
The Meaning of Subject (Subiectum)	102
The Corpus	106
Natural Love.....	112
Connaturality	115
The Good.....	119
Ia IIae, Q26, A2: Is Love a Passion?	122
Ia IIae, Q26, A3: Is <i>Amor</i> the Same As <i>Dilectio</i> ?.....	135
Ia IIae, Q26, A4: <i>Amor Amicitiae</i> and <i>Amor Concupiscentiae</i>	143
Conclusion	153
 CHAPTER 4: THE CAUSES OF LOVE.....	158
Ia IIae, Q27, A1: The Good as Cause of Love.....	165
Ia IIae, Q27, A2: Knowledge as a Cause of Love	169
Ia IIae, Q27, A3: Similitude as a Cause of Love	178
Ia IIae, Q27, A4: Love as the Preeminent Passion.....	194
Conclusion: The “Missing” Material Cause?	197
 CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECTS OF LOVE I	203
Ia IIae, Q28, A1: Union as an Effect of Love.....	210

Ia Iiae, Q28, A2: Mutual Indwelling as an Effect of Love.....	223
Mutua Inhaesio Itself.....	227
Objection 1: The Idea of Mutual Containment.....	231
Objection 2: The Comparative Functions of Intellect and Apprehension.....	242
Objection 3: Introducing the Via Redamationis.....	248
Sed Contra.....	249
Substantial Union: The Subject of Mutua Inhaesio.....	254
The Corpus.....	260
The Intellectual Inhaesio of the Beloved in the Lover.....	261
The Intellectual Inhaesio of the Lover in the Beloved.....	263
The Appetitive Inhaesio of the Beloved in the Lover.....	268
The Appetitive Inhaesio of the Lover in the Beloved.....	275
The Via Redamationis.....	276
IA IIAE, Q28, A3: Ecstasy as an Effect of Love.....	287
 CHAPTER 6: The Effects of Love II.....	302
IA IIAE, Q28, A4: Zeal as an Effect of Love.....	303
IA IIAE, Q28, A5: The Wounding of the Lover and the Proximate Effects of Love...	309
IA IIAE, Q28, A6: Whatever the Lover Does as an Effect of Love.....	319
Conclusion.....	328
 CHAPTER 7: SELF-POSSESSION AND SELF-GIVING:.....	333
Conclusions about Intimacy in Dissertation.....	337
The Meaning of Intimacy.....	339
Amor Amicitiae & Substantial Union.....	344
“To Be” Is “To Be Interior”.....	348
Self-Possession.....	355
The Perichoretic Analogy of God and Man.....	361
Bibliography.....	366
Table of Contents.....	382

ABBREVIATIONS

CT	<i>Compendium theologiae</i>
DDN	<i>In Librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus</i>
De Vir.	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De virtutibus</i>
DP	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De potentiae Dei</i>
DV	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De veritate</i>
Ethic.	<i>Commentaria Sententia Ethicorum</i>
In Metaphys.	<i>In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio</i>
PG	<i>Patrologia Graeca</i>
PL	<i>Patrologia Latina</i>
Quodl.	<i>Quaestiones quodlibetales</i>
SCG	<i>Summa Contra Gentiles</i>
ST	<i>Summa Theologiae</i>

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INTRODUCTION

The modern confusion about the nature and meaning of love makes a medieval commentary on that concept valuable, for if we have forgotten the meaning of love, perhaps we may yet remember. Modern philosophy has become skeptical about merely *knowing* another person, so how can it truly explain one of the most sublime human experiences of all—*loving* another person? How did philosophy allow itself to come to such an impasse that it suddenly became a problem to commune with “other minds”?¹ St. Thomas Aquinas had not allowed truth and certitude to depend upon the “privacy of the cloistered self” — initiated by Descartes — as James McEvoy has so eloquently stated.² Combine the inaccessibility of the “cloistered self” with the imposition of Kant’s subjective categories on the whole of reality and we might be left to wonder if we can truly meet another human being at all. Romanticism sought to liberate love from the hands of a cold reason it found blasphemous to both the Christian God of love and Venus.³ If the former movement isolated reason from the unpredictability of love, the latter hid the heart where reason could not touch it. It is this attitude that prompted philosophers like Blaise Pascal to argue that “the heart has its reasons that reason does

¹ See, for example, A. Avramides, *Other Minds* (London: Routledge, 2001); C. McGinn, “What is the Problem of Other Minds?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. 58 (1984): 119–37.

² James McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself: Friendship and Love in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas,” In *Thomas Aquinas: Approaches to Truth*, James McEvoy and Michael Dunne, eds. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002), 19.

³ See Ernest Bernbaum, *Anthology of Romanticism* (New York: Nelson & Sons, 1930).

not know.”⁴ Modern philosophers such as Descartes methodologically doubt that the actual beloved even *exists*. Kant claims that the lover is doomed to impose his categories on the beloved, making a true intimacy with *her* impossible.⁵ The Romantics believe in intimacy, but claim that the philosophers cannot explain it. Moreover, materialists like Thomas Hobbes claim in Chapter Six of his famous *Leviathan* that the phenomenon that we call “love” or “intimacy” is but a thinly disguised self-interest if not raw animal desire, and so there is simply nothing to explain. Add to skepticism the rise of a much more mechanistic view of the emotions propounded by Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Hume – replacing the teleological, non-mechanistic view of Thomas Aquinas – and it is perhaps little surprise that the post-modern world either doubts that love exists or else is confused about its nature.⁶ Though these are generalizations, they set the stage for why a dissertation on some primary aspects of love might be useful. The individualism of post-modernity laments that true intimacy is not possible. It claims that we are all islands and that the best love can do is to build unsteady bridges between them. If a metaphysics of being is impossible, we are left with the definition of love as either a passion that may pass, or at best a random decision of the will based on self-interest.

The overwhelming experience of human love is one of union, togetherness, and harmony. But how can this oneness be explained when it is making a unity out of what is not a unity? If we emphasize the unity itself, we seem to dissolve the being of the

⁴ Blaise Pascal, *Thoughts, Letters and Minor Works*, trans. W.F. Trotter, The Harvard Classics 4 (New York: P.F Collier & Son, 1909), #277.

⁵ See Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁶ Miner, Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.

lovers. If we emphasize the lover and the beloved, we seem to make love some kind of weak relation or accident of their relationship, which flies in the face of human experience. Philosophy must ask the right questions. As we conclude this analysis, we might ask, "What makes true intimacy between human beings possible?" We claim that the *via redamtionis* form of *mutua inhaesio* is one of the best answers to this question.

The contemporary philosopher Jean-Luc Marion has lamented philosophy's conceptual "desertion of the question of love" with a kind of "sleepwalking obstinacy."⁷ This problem of intimacy is not a dead issue in modern scholarship, but as mentioned earlier, it does require more attention. Some scholars have attempted to give love the attention it deserves. Anders Nygren essentially claims that all love for Thomas is acquisitive love, thereby dissolving love's self-sacrificial nature.⁸ In other words, all love is *physical* or *Graeco-Thomist*. Diana Cates mentions in a recent article, "We must not picture either engulfment of the other by the self—or loss of the self to the other—although both of these extremes are dangers for people who have not yet achieved the self-definition that comes with a stable commitment to moral excellence."⁹ Obviously, notable thinkers have recognized that love is still a problem, and that the topic still merits attention by philosophers. Other thinkers like Bernard of Clairvaux demand that

⁷ Jean-Luc Marion, *Le phénomène érotique. Six Meditations* (Paris: Grasset, 2003), 10, 20.

⁸ Anders Nygren, trans. Philip Watson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 642-5.

⁹ Diana Fritz Cates, "Thomas Aquinas on Intimacy and Emotional Integrity," *Studies in Spirituality* 16 (2006), 119.

love be *ecstatic* — it must completely transcend the self to make a total gift of self to the other.¹⁰ But this view seems to dissolve the being of the lover himself.

The point of Aquinas is that though *amor* includes both of these phenomena, it also far surpasses them. The theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar expresses this alienated consciousness beautifully:

Prisons of FINITUDE! Like every other being, man is born in many prisons. Soul, body, thought, intuition, endeavor: everything about him has a limit, is itself tangible limitation; everything is a This and a That, different from other things and shunned by them. From the grilled windows of the sense each person looks out to the alien things which he will never be. Even if his spirit could fly through the spaces of the world like a bird, he himself will never be this space, and the furrow which he traces in the air vanishes immediately and leaves no lasting impression. How far it is from one being to its closest neighbor! And even if they love each other and wave to one another from island to island, even if they attempt to exchange solitudes and pretend they have unity, how much more painfully does disappointment then fall upon them when they touch the invisible bars — the cold glass pane against which they hurl themselves like captive birds. No one can tear down his own dungeon; no one knows who inhabits the next cell.¹¹

Is Von Balthasar truly correct that “no one can tear down his own dungeon” and “no one knows who inhabits the next cell”? Similarly, we are left to wonder how true Rainer Maria Rilke’s claim that love is characterized by “two *solitudes* [that] protect and border and greet each other”¹² or the *Song of Song’s* lament, “My sister, my spouse, is a garden enclosed, a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed up”¹³ Are we doomed to be “solitudes,”

¹⁰ See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Selected Treatises of St. Bernard of Clairvaux: De Diligendo Deo*, ed. W.W. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926).

¹¹ Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Heart of the World*, translated by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (Ignatius Press, 1980) [originally *Das Herz der Welt*, Arche Verlag, 1954], 19.

¹² Rainer Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, #7: “...der Liebe, die darin besteht, daß zwei Einsamkeiten einander schützen, grenzen, und grüßen.”

¹³ *Cant* 4.12 (Vulgate).

“garden[s] enclosed” and enclosed prisons separated by our individuality? St. Thomas Aquinas does not think so.

THE PROBLEM OF INTIMACY IN AQUINAS

How does a person know another person? Though St. Thomas writes an article concerning how the soul knows what is beneath it (I, q84), within it (I, q87), and above it (q88), there is no equivalent article on how the soul knows what is coequal to it.¹⁴ In other words, there is no equivalent article on how the soul knows other persons.¹⁵ There seems to be a missing question in the *Summa Theologiae* that could be entitled, “How Does a Soul Know It’s Equal?” This leads us quite naturally to question the intimacy of the knowledge of other persons. Are other persons simply other “objects” to St. Thomas? Moreover, the question of intimacy leads us to the manner in which love alters knowledge, for when we say that we are *intimate* with someone, it is generally recognized that we both know and love the person with whom we are intimate. After all, *ST Ia IIae q28, a2* mentions that the lover has a kind of intellectual *inhaesio* for a beloved. It is assumed that love has already stepped in and altered a mere known object into a known-and-loved object. Moreover, an object that is not merely an object, but a

¹⁴ In all the subsequent citations of the *Summa Theologiae*, simple Roman numerals will be used in the text (for example, I-II for the *Prima Secundae*), while in the footnotes, the traditional Latin enumeration will be used (for example, Ia IIae for the *Prima Secundae*). Thus, English is used in the text while Latin is used in the footnotes in order to maintain overall consistency.

¹⁵ Originally, I had imagined an entire dissertation on this very subject entitled “The Intellection of the Beloved,” which would focus on the fact that though St. Thomas writes an article concerning how the soul knows what is beneath it (I, q84), within it (q87), and above it (q88). There is no equivalent article on how the soul knows what is equivalent to it.

person. Without going too far afield in some very interesting speculations, this is the appropriate point to inquire into that mode of knowledge that pertains to one person knowing another person.

To better illustrate the problem of how one person knows another person, I will use the language of lover and beloved. This language is common in monastic commentaries on the *Song of Songs*, and used by Thomas himself in the *Summa*. My beloved *has* a body and to a certain extent *is* a body, but she is much more than a body. Therefore, I cannot understand her merely through an understanding of her body. My beloved is another self. She is not me – as Martin Buber has explained, she is thoroughly *thou* and not *I*.¹⁶ Therefore my self-understanding is not an understanding of her, though it seems to require my self-understanding in order to understand her; after all, she shares a soul like mine in its powers and in its nature. My beloved is not an immaterial substance, but there is something about her that is immaterial in that she has not only a soul, but a *spiritual* soul that is immortal, made in the image and likeness of God (as Thomas has taken pains to prove).¹⁷ There is something about her that “cannot be known by human investigation,” as Thomas eloquently writes.¹⁸ But philosophy is concerned with what *can* be known. How then, may I know her? Love is simply not satisfied with knowing *qualities*, but *persons*. Peter Kwasniewski notes very eloquently,

¹⁶ Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Touchstone, 1970).

¹⁷ See especially *ST Ia*, qq. 75-76.

¹⁸ *Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Fathers, 5 vols. (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1948) [originally published in English, 1911] (*ST I*, q88, a1, sed.).

Thomas speaks in context of immaterial substances, but we will soon see that there is certainly something immaterial about another human person.

“We are not speaking of a mere acquisition of distinct items of knowledge about the beloved, but something more like an approach to knowledge of the singular as singular, and not so far as it is a complex of parts or aspects, but so far as it is a personal unity, an incommunicable *suppositum*, a whole and a good in itself.”¹⁹

There are several media through which I know my beloved, prisms through which she is refracted like a lonely ray of light. A few of Thomas’ key principles will serve to give the broad outlines of this reflection:

“The soul understands *nothing* without a phantasm.”²⁰

“The soul senses *nothing* without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ.”²¹

“For the understanding *does not know* a singular as singular, but according to some common character....”²²

These are not idle proof-texts. They are constant refrains in the work of St. Thomas, comprising much of the foundation upon which his entire epistemological edifice is based. What, then, is the problem? What is disturbing about the relationship between

¹⁹ Peter Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” Ph.D Diss., (Washington: Catholic University of America, 2002), 152.

²⁰ *ST Ia*, q84, a7, sc.: “Nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima.” Following generally accepted practice, the Latin that is quoted in the footnotes will not be italicized for the sake of consistency and clarity.

²¹ *ST Ia*, q77, a5, ad3: “Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale.”

²² *DT II*, q10, a2, c.: “Sicut enim intellectus non cognoscit singulare ut est hoc, sed secundum aliquam communem rationem.”

On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican Fathers, (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1932).

these statements and the possibility of knowing other persons is how *impersonal* it is. If singulars cannot be known as singulars then it seems to follow that persons cannot be known as persons and the beloved seems but a canvass of common qualities known only to me by their particular admixture. My problem—love’s problem—is that it wants to understand the beloved immediately. Every man that looks upon a particular beloved sees only *one* intelligible species. For example, a man’s intellect apprehends his wife as a female member of the human race. But the lover wishes to grasp at what is *particular* in the beloved—not “what every man sees.” What is at issue is how the lover can understand his beloved *per se*. If he cannot do so, it seems to render *amor amicitiae* an impossibility.

Thomas writes, “As to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil 1:7, ‘For that I have you in my heart.’”²³ The following passages refer to a kind of “intellectual intimacy” that is mentioned in q28, a2, on *mutua inhaesio*:

And again, “...for all knowledge results from the likeness of the known in the knower.”²⁴

Because knowledge arises by the known thing being in the knower, from which the intellect extends itself in that which is outside itself, according

²³ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c: “Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, in quantum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Phillip. I, eo quod habeam vos in corde.”

²⁴ *SCG IIa*, cap. 77: “Omnis enim cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente.”

Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Chicago: Benzinger Brothers, 1924).

to that which through its essence is external to him, though born in some way to exist in it.²⁵

What seems apparent from the above passages are the following well-known points of Thomistic epistemology: 1) that knowledge itself is mediated by the likeness of the known which is in the knower, and 2) knowledge can come about in this way because the mind has converted what is outside it into what is in some way “within it.” What should be obvious is this: intellection and appetite are dynamic forces that constantly re-define and re-form each other; moreover, what is “inside” and “outside” the person is a dynamic reality, changing positions and perspectives as quickly as children playing the game of “musical chairs.” Intimacy is possible, but if viewed as some kind of static state of rest or pleasure, it is little wonder why we might find it difficult to conceive of it. Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of love makes intimacy possible, but it must be viewed as a philosophy of dynamic motion.

This dissertation is based upon the confidence that St. Thomas Aquinas has found concepts that could help resuscitate the wisdom about human intimacy. As Eric D’Arcy has aptly noted, the Angelic Doctor “was much more richly equipped than we are: and I suspect that these were conceptual, not merely verbal, riches.”²⁶ The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas gives us principles by which we can speak of a *form* of love because where there is no form there can be no concept, and therefore no explanation. Chief among the concepts that could contribute to a “wisdom of love” is

²⁵ ST Ia, 59, a2, c.: “Nam cognitio fit per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente, unde ea ratione se extendit eius intellectus in id quod est extra se, secundum quod illud quod extra ipsum est per essentiam, natum est aliquo modo in eo esse.” (My translation.)

²⁶ Eric D’Arcy, *The Emotions: Ia IIae, 22-30* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967/2006), xxxi.

mutua inhaesio.²⁷ It is about *mutua inhaesio* that Thomas writes, “The lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.”²⁸ This statement implies not only that Thomas believes intimacy is possible, but that it is also explainable. Though St. Thomas is not normally considered a doctor of human intimacy, this dissertation will argue that this should not be the case.²⁹

This dissertation will make a contribution to philosophical discourse by offering a commentary on a small, mostly neglected but extremely important aspect of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas—namely, the affective theory he presents in the *De*

²⁷ *Mutua inhaesio* is the key concept of this dissertation. *Inhaesio* is the Latin derivative of *inhaerere*—a verb much used in the Thomistic corpus. The verb is often used interchangeably with *adhaerere*. Much will be said about it in the pages to come. It is best translated as “mutual indwelling,” although some have translated it as “mutual inherence” and “mutual in-being,” and it refers to both to the appetitive and apprehensive of the lover in the beloved, and vice versa. It is only discussed systematically as the specific concept of *mutua inhaesio* in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, although there is a parallel text in *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1. It is likely that Thomas derived the concept from the idea of the mutual in-being of the persons in the Trinity which was itself derived from the Greek concept of the *perichoresis*—this will be discussed in detail in the first chapter of the dissertation. Though translated usually into Latin as *circumincessio*, Thomas never uses this word, preferring other less “technical” language.

²⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c. Please see the section on “Abbreviations” for the conventions used in citing the work of Thomas Aquinas. All of the Latin is cited from the Leonine Commission’s *Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia* (Rome, 1882–).

²⁹ R. Busa, *Thomisticus. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis operum omnium indices et concordantiae in quibus verborum omnium et singulorum formae et lemmata cum suis frequentis et contextibus variis modis referuntur, quaeque auspice Paulo VI Summo Pontifice, consociata*, 23 vols. The 23-volume *Index Thomisticus* (Roberto Busa, S.J.) for all Thomas’s writings has approximately 4,000 entries for the verb *amare* and 2,500 for the noun *amor*; forms of *desiderium* occur at least 2,500 times, and various forms of *amicitia* arise about 2,800 times.

Amore of the *Summa Theologiae*.³⁰ The argument of this dissertation is that *mutua inhaesio*—particularly in its form as *via redamationis*—is the most proper effect of *amor* as St. Thomas Aquinas discusses it in the questions of the *De Amore* of the *Summa Theologiae* in I-II, q26-28.³¹ An obvious question concerns the reason why this particular text is chosen to explicate both *amor* and *mutua inhaesio* as its most proper effect. The reason is clear: *ST* I-II, q28 is the only place where St. Thomas thematically deals with the concept of *mutua inhaesio* in his entire corpus, the relevant article being situated in the context of the *De Amore*—i.e., the three questions specifically devoted to nature of *amor* in the *Summa Theologiae*.

³⁰ Some of the commentaries, summaries and translations that are available for the larger section on the passions (which includes the *De Amore*) are the following: Thomas Pegues (*Commentaire Francais Littéral de la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas D’Aquin: VII – Les Passiones et Les Habitus* (Paris, 1926); M. Corvez, *Somme Théologique: Les Passions de L’Âme*, Questions 22-30 (Paris, 1949); M. Manzanedo, “Efectos y Propiedades de la Delectación,” *Studium* 29 (1989): 107-139; M Manzanedo, “El Deseo la Aversión según Santo Tomás,” *Studium* 27 (1987): 189-234; M. Manzanedo, “El Odio Según Santo Tomás,” *Studium* 26 (1986): 3-32; M. Manzanedo, “Propiedades y Efectos del Amor,” *Studium* 25 (1985): 423-443; M. Manzanedo, “El Amor y Sus Causas,” *Studium* 25 (1985): 41-69; M. Manzanedo, *Las pasiones o Emociones según Santo Tomás* (Madrid: Instituto Pont. De Filos. Santo Tomás, 1984); M. Manzanedo, “Las pasiones en Relación a la Razón y a la Voluntad,” *Studium* 24 (1984): 289-315; M. Manzanedo, *La Ambivalencia Afectiva*,” *Angelicum* 61 (1984): 404-440; M. Manzanedo, “La Naturaleza de las Pasiones o Emociones,” *Studium* 23 (1983): 47-56; M. Manzanedo, “La Clasificación de las Pasiones o Emociones,” *Studium* 23 (1983): 357-378; E. D’Arcy, *St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae* Volume 19, *The Emotions* (1a2ae. 22-30)) Latin text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Eric D’Arcy, University of Melbourne (1967); S.M. Ramirez, *De passionibus animae in IA IIAE Summa Theologiae divi Thomae expositio* (qq. XXII-XLVIII). *Obras completas de Santiago Ramirez*, V (Instituto de Filosofia Luis Vives, Madrid (1973): 97-8.

³¹ *ST* Ia IIAe, q26-28, will hereafter be referred to as the *De Amore* for purposes of clarity and style.

We will now articulate what is meant by the “most proper” effect of *amor*. The *Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* defines an effect as “the produced” and “the created.” It is the opposite of *causa* and *principium*.³² Thomas writes:

I answer that, demonstration can be made in two ways: one is through the cause, and is called ‘a priori,’ and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration ‘a posteriori’; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.³³

We know causes from their effects. It is logical for us to describe and analyze the parts, properties and relations of something that already exists. It is also logical to determine these parts, properties, and relations. Thomas analyzes the latter in q27 and the former in q28. Q28 is the answer to the question, “Once love has happened, how does it manifest itself?” What is first known to us are the effects. What is first *per se* are the causes.³⁴

³² Roy J. Deferrari, “Effectus,” *The Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Fitzwilliam: Loreto Publications, 2004), 351.

³³ *ST Ia*, q2, a2, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere.”

³⁴ Causes are first logically and temporally, but we should realize that with the passion of *amor*, the causes are often occurring simultaneously with their affects. Taking the example of zeal as an effect of love, it is produced in simultaneity with a perception of a good, which is a likeness to the lover in some way.

As in most things, there is order and hierarchy among causes and effects. Some causes are primary while others are secondary. Intermediate causes can intervene between the first cause and its effects. Thomas affirms, "When we have a series of causes depending on one another, it follows that while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes."³⁵ We should remember that Thomas calls goodness the "cause of causes," and so goodness stands as a "first cause," as mentioned above. There can also be effects which are more proper and essential than others. He also adds, "since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another."³⁶ Thus, Thomas affirms that one effect can produce another effect. In other words, some effects are more proper to certain causes than others. If it is true that some causes are primary³⁷ and that effects must follow the order of causes,³⁸ it follows that some effects are primary effects as well.

³⁵ *ST Ia*, q104, a2, c.: "Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae causae."

³⁶ *ST Ia*, q104, a2, ad2: "Cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus alterius."

³⁷ Thomas refers to one cause being the cause of another, as well as certain effects even proceeding from "middle causes." (See *ST Ia IIae*, q79, a1)

³⁸ *SCG II*, cap. 15; *III*, cap. 66; *DV I*, q5, a9, ad7.

Other than accidental effects which are incidental to their causes, the most important kinds of effects are those that are *proper*³⁹ and those that are *formal*. Thomas actually writes a kind of conclusion to a5 where he refers to those formal effects. Instead of replying to the objections in sequence, Thomas's reply is encapsulated in the corpus itself. Thomas writes, "And these are the *effects of love considered formally*, according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object."⁴⁰ All of the effects Thomas lists in q28 are formal effects of *amor*. They necessarily follow, in various modes, upon the passion of love. But what is "formal" is not necessarily "proper." The most proper effect of God as Creator is being itself. Though being is merely an effect in relation to God and not a cause, all other effects depend upon it.⁴¹ Thomas tells us that the proper effect (*proprius effectus*) of law is to dispose its citizens to be virtuous.⁴² The proper effect of fire is to ignite.⁴³ Thomas even informs us that certain passions have proper effects. The proper effect of sorrow is "a certain flight of the appetite."⁴⁴ The proper effect of anger is

³⁹ A proper effect is "that effect which is peculiar to its cause (Deferrari, "Effectus," 351)." Wuellner adds that a proper effect is "the immediate and particular kind of effect of a proper cause; the direct and specific effect of a specific causal ability (Wuellner, "Effect," 39)." A formal effect is "the effect of the substantial form of the thing (Deferrari, "Effectus," 351)." Wuellner adds that a formal effect is "an immediate and necessary result within a being because of the presence or communication of the formal cause in that being. Thus, spiritual powers are formal effects of the human soul; joy is a formal effect of perfect knowledge and love of God (Wuellner, "Form," 48-9).

⁴⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, c.: "Et isti quidem sunt *effectus amoris formaliter accepti*, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum." (Emphasis added.)

⁴¹ *ST Ia*, cap. 45, a5.

⁴² *ST Ia IIae*, q92, a1, c.

⁴³ *ST Ia*, q8, a1, c.

⁴⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q35, a8, c.: "Tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga appetitus."

fervor.⁴⁵ But our principal question is whether or not *amor* has a proper effect. It seems that the proper effect of a cause is that which most declares its primary activity. Our thesis is that *mutua inhaesio* is the proper effect of *amor*.

We might summarize what is meant by *mutua inhaesio* as the most proper effect by preliminarily concluding that *mutua inhaesio* is the only effect of love that necessarily implies and contains all the other effects of love. In other words, when *mutua inhaesio* is *in actu*, all the other effects of love are necessarily present, but not necessarily vice versa. Three other major effects of love, for example, are *zelus*, *extasis* and *unio*. We might say that *mutua inhaesio* “virtually contains” the other effects of love. Because Thomas himself does not explicitly argue this point, it remains an important question precisely *what* is the supreme effect of love and *why*. Considering that “love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty,”⁴⁶ Thomas’s anthropology and moral theory could only benefit from a deeper understanding of the nature of *amor*. To understand the supreme effect of any activity is to understand the activity itself, as Thomas himself often affirms, and to understand a thing’s preeminent activity is to understand its nature. The Angelic Doctor himself affirms, “Thus, each thing is most of all what is foremost in that thing.”⁴⁷ We claim that what is principle in *amor* is *mutua inhaesio*, and

⁴⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q48, a2.

⁴⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q20, a1, c: “Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor.”

⁴⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q29, a4 c: “Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso.” (My translation).

that *mutua inhaesio* is at its perfection specifically in its *redamationis* form.⁴⁸ What is meant can be intimated by a statement of Peter Kwasniewski: “Mutual indwelling is already implicit in the very definition of love, inasmuch as love is defined as the affective union of lover and beloved, i.e., the intentional presence of the loved in the appetite of the lover, informing it and causing him to desire the absent good or rejoice in the good possessed.”⁴⁹ Considering that preeminence implies *order*, we will endeavor as clearly as possible to expose the *ordino amoris* as St. Thomas Aquinas understands it in the *Summa Theologiae*. For these reasons, in addition to the relative lack of attention of contemporary scholarship to Thomas’s appetitive theory, a discussion of *mutua inhaesio* as the most proper effect of love should make a genuine contribution to philosophical discourse.

The method of this analysis is a commentary on the *De Amore*. Any scholar who attempts to analyze the Angelic Doctor’s teaching on love will encounter a constellation of related terms that are difficult to structure in a coherent way. This is not so much due to the fact that there is a lack of coherence to Thomas’s argument as to the fact that love itself is an elusive and complex concept. Our ultimate goal is a clear understanding of *amor* itself as it is discussed in the *De Amore*, and the virtual containment of all *amor*’s effects within the effect of *mutua inhaesio*, the highest form of which is a mutually reciprocal appetitive and apprehensive bond called the *via redamationis*. When two substances mutually inhere (i.e., when each substance contains the other

⁴⁸ *The via redamationis* is only possible in the various forms of dilectio, because it is only an intellectual love that can be properly returned: *caritas*, *amicitia*, and perhaps some forms of *benevolentia*.

⁴⁹ Peter Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 207.

simultaneously) – at least *apparently* a contradiction – it is difficult to provide a systematically logical analysis. Therefore, because of this systemic difficulty in logically structuring an argument on love, we propose that the best method is to analyze love and its related concepts in the order in which they appear in the *De Amore*. The assumption is that the genius of Thomas Aquinas should lead us to specific reasons why he orders his argument in the way it is presented. The commentary on the *De Amore* is not meant to be completely exhaustive, although it will be substantial. The reader should not expect a full treatment of the concept of *mutua inhaesio* until the latter part of the dissertation. Because of the commentary form, the majority of the sources are directly from St. Thomas, particularly the *Summa Theologiae*. Though other sources will be referenced, it is our contention that the way Thomas orders his discussion in *ST I-II*, q26-28 is crucial to understanding his thought on *amor* in general, and *mutua inhaesio* in particular.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

The eminent philosopher Jean-Luc Marion has lamented philosophy's conceptual "desertion of the question of love" with a kind of "sleepwalking obstinacy."⁵⁰ One might call this dissertation a contribution to the "metaphysics of love," which is sorely needed in this day and age. We have found the now 60 year-old observation of Bernard Diggs, the author of one these attempts at a Thomistic metaphysics of love, to be still largely accurate: "It is a curious fact that modern Thomist literature, voluminous as it is,

⁵⁰ Jean-Luc Marion, *Le phénomène érotique: Six Meditations* (Paris: Grasset, 2003), 10, 20.

gives relatively slight attention to St. Thomas's teachings on love."⁵¹ But more than these comparatively sparse comments, the relative silence of the majority of Thomistic scholars on these matters indicates the complexity of the concepts involved. Rather amusingly, in Walter Farrell's well-known *A Companion to the Summa*, he almost excuses himself from analysis on the effects of love by writing, "We cannot possibly treat the effects of love adequately in this chapter; indeed, they will never be adequately known and appreciated this side of heaven."⁵² Even James McEvoy's conclusion concerning *caritas* and *amicitia* ends rather enigmatically: "All human attempts to name the whirlwind, or to test by the hand the heat of the furnace, are in the very last analysis unavailing."⁵³ Though we agree with them on one point – that love is a mystery – we cannot as easily excuse ourselves from making an attempt to break that mystery open. Though we agree with Principe's statement that union (and therefore mutual indwelling) is located somewhat "in-between" the literal and figurative in-being of persons, we are not satisfied with dwelling in the metaphorical. We will attempt to understand as well as possible the nature of this "in-between."⁵⁴ One of the safest ways to navigate this complexity is to follow the commentary form according to the way that Thomas himself presented the material in *ST Ia IIae*, q26-28. Though love is a mystery that is difficult to riddle out, there are some scholars who have attempted to face the

⁵¹ Bernard Diggs, *Love and Being: An Investigation into the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: S.F. Vanni, 1947), preface (no page numbers given).

⁵² Farrell, *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1938-42), p. 99.

⁵³ McEvoy, "The Other as Oneself," 36.

⁵⁴ Walter Principe, "Loving Friendship According to Thomas Aquinas," In *The Nature and Pursuit of Love*, D. Goicoechea, ed. (Prometheus, Buffalo, 1995), 140, n.15.

challenge. We will proceed to review some of those works now, and situate our present thesis within the larger context of the *dubitabilia* of love. There are three general types of secondary sources on love that will be mentioned here in order to situate the present work in that scholarship: 1) studies on the “metaphysics of love,” 2) works that deal with some particular aspect of love in relation to some other concept, 3) works that consider special dilemmas and/or dichotomies in the nature of love. In treating this final category, we will make some indications about the problems of the present work.

The major works that are broadest in scope and similar in purpose are:

Raymond Ruthford McGinnis’s dissertation, *The Wisdom of Love: A Study in the Psycho-Metaphysics of Love According to the Principles of St. Thomas*, Michael Joseph Faraon’s *The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love*, Bernard Diggs’s *Love and Being: An Investigation into the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, and Robert O. Johann, S.J.’s, *The Meaning of Love: An Essay Towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity*.⁵⁵ They are similar insofar as a close reading of all four would give any reader a fairly detailed understanding of the “Thomistic synthesis of love” as a whole as well as the problems

⁵⁵ Raymond McGinnis, “The Wisdom of Love: A Study in the Psycho-Metaphysics of Love According to the Principles of St. Thomas,” (Rome: Angelicum, 1951); Michael Faraon, *The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love*, (Dubuque: WM. C. Brown Company, 1952); Robert O. Johann, S.J., *The Meaning of Love: An Essay Towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1954); Bernard Diggs has been cited above.

Mention should also be made of Frederick Wilhelmsen’s *Metaphysics of Love* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1962.) It is highly readable, perhaps brilliant. One will find Richard of St. Victor, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Paul Tillich and Xavier Zubiri discussed in some detail, but not much on Thomas Aquinas. Also important is Martin D’arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn, A Study in Eros and Agape* (New York: Henry Holt & Company), 1947.

with that synthesis.⁵⁶ McGinnis's dissertation, "The Wisdom of Love," bears directly on our topic insofar as he at least mentions the reality of *mutua inhaesio* as an effect of love.⁵⁷ It is more explicitly Thomistic than the work of both Diggs and Johann. Michael Faraon's book seeks to provide a systematic analysis of Thomas's philosophy of love dealing with the fundamental basis for the attraction of love, the attraction itself, and the term or purpose of the attraction.⁵⁸ Faraon attempts to show the ultimate unity of knowledge and love in the theory of Thomas Aquinas in a kind of existential framework. Though helpful, Faraon attempts to make a unity of the highly complicated Thomistic theory of love in less than one hundred pages with no definite scope or limit used. Bernard Diggs' work, though well-done, uses Thomas as a *guide* rather than an *object* of study.⁵⁹ This alone is enough to make his work somewhat tertiary, but his study grants perspective on the metaphysics of love, equating love with being and movement itself. He writes: "It [love] is that by which each and every being seeks to

⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that all four of these sources were written within seven years of one another – 1947-1954. We do not know enough about the modern Thomistic schools to understand the significance of this development. Raymond McGinnis was a student of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, and clearly claims that Garrigou-Lagrange has an understanding of the Thomistic theory of love much more "ad mentem sancti Thomae" than Pierre Rousselot or Etienne Gilson (See McGinnis, "Wisdom of Love," xi). Fr. Robert Johann appears to have been an expert on Teilhard de Chardin. His book takes more into account the modern philosophy of "intersubjectivity" and is quite engaged with the French school of thought – i.e., J. de Finance, N. Balthasar, Roland-Gosseilin, P. Rousselot, L.B. Gillon, H.D. Simonin, A.D. Sertillanges, M. Nedoncelle, and L.B. Geiger. Bernard Diggs was a student of Jacques Maritain. The method of his book is derived from the metaphysics questions of the *De Veritate*, and also by *ST I*, q39, a8, of the *Summa Theologiae*. He divides his books by topics according to the *exitus* of creatures from God and their *reditus* to God.

⁵⁷ McGinnis, 114.

⁵⁸ Faraon, "Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love," xx.

⁵⁹ Diggs, *Love and Being*, Preface.

become more than [it] is. It is through love as a principle that each thing that is overflows the bounds of its own nature and becomes more than itself, each in its own way dynamic, each reflecting the dynamism of every other.”⁶⁰

The most inspiring and useful of all of these was Robert Johann’s, *The Meaning of Love*. He claims at the outset that though his study is Thomistic, his approach is “by way of *subjectivity* and *interiority*,” inspired by thinkers such as Gabriel Marcel and Louis Lavelle.⁶¹ Thomas is his “chief inspiration and guide,” though Johann claims that Thomas is open to some inconsistencies and dilemmas that we will discuss shortly.⁶² His ultimate aim is to provide the framework for a philosophy of intersubjectivity.⁶³ The concepts of *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*,⁶⁴ exteriority and interiority and knowledge and love, are key to his study, and he concludes by discussing them.⁶⁵ We wholeheartedly agree with his conclusions, though we differ from him in method and scope.

⁶⁰ Diggs, *Love and Being*, 53. See pp. 31-54 to understand “Love as an Object of Metaphysics.” A similar view is also admirably expressed by W. Norris Clarke, “Action as the Self-Revelation of Being: A Central Theme in the Thought of St. Thomas,” in *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 45-64.

⁶¹ Johann, *The Meaning of Love*, 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶⁴ Johann renames *amor concupiscentiae* as “direct love” and *amor concupiscentiae* as “desire.” Since Thomas talks about “direct love” in the context of the appetitive power as a whole (and not merely *amor concupiscentiae*) and has another conceptual meanings for desire (*desiderium*, etc.), I find the terms Johann uses somewhat misleading.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, see 69-71.

We should also make special mention of Robert Miner's *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, which provides a commentary on *ST Ia IIae* 22-48. Though Miner recognizes many of the same problems that this study does with the modern, mechanistic, purely psychological or existential approach to the understanding of love, his commentary on the passions does not have a particular thesis other than that the passions as delineated by Thomas are far more rich and complex than what we would consider as "emotions" today. In his epilogue, Miner concludes, "The design of the *Ia IIae* is meant to provide a knowledge of the passions that promotes the ascent toward beatitude. As such, it treats the passions with the requisite particularity. Yet it remains that in the *Ia IIae*, Aquinas approaches morals *in universali*."⁶⁶ Though we agree with him on this point as well, there is not much mention of love, though Miner does not deny that love is the source of the passions and that grasping their order requires "constant recurrence to love." Love is simply not his focus.

There are several other works that deserve mentioning which, though not having the direct aim of sketching a "metaphysics of love," still deal with some specific aspect of the Thomistic theory of love while commenting a great deal about his general affective theory. The most important of these is Peter Kwasniewski's "The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas."⁶⁷ In many ways, the present dissertation can be viewed as a complement to his. He analyzes the Thomistic theory of love through the lens of *extasis* in much the same way that we view the same through the lens of *mutua inhaesio*. Kwasniewski focuses on Thomas's understanding of ecstasy in the commentary on the

⁶⁶ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 299.

⁶⁷ Peter Kwasniewski, "The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas," Phd diss., Catholic University of America, 2002.

Pseudo-Dionysius's *De Divinis Nominibus*, the commentary on the *Sentences*, and the same section of the *Summa* on which the present study focuses (Ia IIae, q26-28). Though he comments on this section, he locates the chief passage on ecstasy in the *Sentences* commentary rather than the *Summa*.⁶⁸ Kwasniewski recognizes that the twin effects of *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis* share a rich interplay which is likened to a "double-helix."⁶⁹ Understandably, however, his focus is on the ecstasy of love rather than the indwelling of love.

The primary aim of Arthur G. Vella, S.J.'s dissertation, *Love is Acceptance*, is to examine the basic nature of Christian maturity and perfection insofar as Thomas himself claims that Christian perfection consists in *affectu caritatis*. Vella stresses the passive and receptive nature of love in the theory of Thomas Aquinas.⁷⁰ Frederick Crowe's long, masterfully-written article, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," is similar to Vella's argument in this focus on the passive and the receptive.⁷¹ R. Mary

⁶⁸ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 219.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁷⁰ A.G. Vella, *Love is Acceptance: A Psychological and Theological Investigation of the Mind of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Malta: Malta University Press, 1959), 199. He writes: "In the mind of Aquinas, the receptive and passive role of love is more fundamental in human love, even if Thomas in his writings is more explicit about the tendential element. Love is fundamentally, first and foremost, an acceptance of the other person and affectivity corresponds to this loving acceptance."

In our opinion, Vella stresses the notion of passive acceptance too much. He does not pay close enough attention to the fact that the subject can only receive the beloved in its own mode, and that in order for love to be an aptitude or a connaturality, this implies a more active role to the part of the subject. Additionally, if the truly perfect must be in act, how can love be passive, particularly since Thomas relates what is passive to the defective. (See *ST Ia IIae*, q22)

⁷¹ Frederick Crowe, "Complacency and Concern," *Theological Studies* 20 (1959): 1-39, 198-230, 343-95. We will discuss Crowe's article in the text shortly.

Hayden's dissertation, *Love and the First Principles of St. Thomas's Natural Law* argues "that neither inconsistency nor a theological treatment of natural law was involved when Aquinas identified the obligations to love God above all and neighbors as oneself as the first principles of natural law."⁷² It deals, of course, with the relationship of love to law in the work of St. Thomas, but has large sections on natural love and self-love, which were relevant to the present work.

The scope and limits of the present work are much more defined than most of the general works mentioned above. Its commentary form provides a unique analytic method to arrive at the thesis that *mutua inhaesio* is the preeminent effect of love.⁷³ The overwhelming approach of the aforementioned works on love treat Thomas in a rather synthetic and conceptual way. Thus, Diggs progresses from the "Analogy of Love" to "The Movement of Love from God" to "The Movement of Love to God." Faraon, too, tries to first establish metaphysical principles of love (e.g., appetite) and then base psychological principles upon them (e.g., affective union, similitude, real union). The present dissertation, by dealing with the questions of the *De Amore* in their proper order, provides a unique insight into the nature of *amor* by demonstrating that there is a logical reason for that order.

⁷² Mary Hayden, "Love and the First Principles of St. Thomas's Natural Law," (PhD Diss., Houston: University of St. Thomas, 1988), abstract.

⁷³ There is a possible exception in Peter Kwasniewski's dissertation, but he comments on several texts and harmonizes them rather than focusing on a single section like the present work does.

The Dubitabilia of Love

Commenting on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, St. Thomas Aquinas writes, "...those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going."⁷⁴ Thomas also comments that if one wishes to loosen a knot, he must first inspect the way that it has been tied.⁷⁵ Taking Thomas's advice, we should raise those questions and problems that gave rise to this dissertation in the first place. The philosophy of love has a history of dilemmas and dichotomies.

The modern study of the problem of love in Thomistic thought begins with Pierre Rousselot's *Pour l'histoire du probleme de l'Amour au moyen age*.⁷⁶ Rousselot presented the "Problem of Love" in the Middle Ages as a dichotomy. Simply stated, Christian love should be a disinterested love— i.e., disinterested in its own interests. *Caritas* is by its very nature self-sacrificial.⁷⁷ But if the form of a creature necessarily inclines it to love itself, then it seems that all love is inescapably self-interested. This problem generates two distinct conceptions of love: the *physical* or *Graeco-Thomist* and the *ecstatic*. The proponents of the ecstatic school claim that a person must ignore his own self-interest to reach out of himself (ecstatically) or it is not truly love, while the

⁷⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Rowan, (New York: Henry Regnery, 1961). "...illi qui volunt inquirere veritatem non considerando prius dubitationem, assimilantur illis que nesciunt quo vadant." (In *Metaphys.* III.1, #340)

⁷⁵ In *Metaphys.* III.1, #177.

⁷⁶ In Clemens Baeumker, *Beitrage Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters* (Munster, 1908).

⁷⁷ Essentially, one of the main problems concerning love in the Middle Ages was to reconcile *caritas* with *cupiditas*. (See Rousselot, op. cit., p. 88, n1: "*Pes cordis, dicit Augustinus, amor est, qui si rectus est, dicitur caritas, si vero curvus, dicitur cupiditas*" [from Guillaume d' Auvergne, *De Moribus* c. 4, t. I, p. 207]).

proponents of the “physical” school claim that love of self and love for God are ultimately unified.⁷⁸ According to Rousselot, Thomas solves this problem with two principles. The first principle is that of the relation of the whole to the part. Martin D’arcy clarifies well this distinction when he writes, “In every unity or whole the part loves itself truly when it loves itself as a part and not as a separate individual.”⁷⁹ The second principle is that every being is “drawn by its very nature to its source and unity” and therefore loves God before any particular object or beloved.⁸⁰ The problem with Rousselot’s “solution” is that its first dimension (part vs. whole) seems to dissolve the individuality of the lover/beloved while the second dimension seems to transform all love ultimately into the love of God such that there no longer remain any particular loves. Rousselot’s dichotomy has been discussed by virtually every commentator on Thomas’s affective theory since Rousselot first proposed it.

Rousselot is more positive about Thomas’s supposed solution than Anders Nygren’s famous work, *Agape and Eros*.⁸¹ According to Nygren, all love for Thomas is basically acquisitive love. Nygren writes, “His basic idea can be summarized in two

⁷⁸ Absolutely key to this dichotomy is the distinction between *amor amicitiae* (love of friendship) and *amor concupiscentiae* (love of concupisence), which are two loves that play a major role in understanding *ST Ia IIae*, qq26-28. This distinction will be taken up in detail later in the dissertation.

⁷⁹ D’arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love*, 91. Etienne Gilson criticizes Rousselot for over-emphasizing the “whole-versus-part solution” of St. Thomas. Gilson prefers to make the psychological analogy between God and man a central element in Thomas’s philosophy of love. Gilson, Etienne, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A.H.C Downes (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, 1936), 283-8.

⁸⁰ D’arcy, 92.

⁸¹ Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. Philip Watson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 642.

sentences: everything in Christianity can be traced back to love, and everything in love can be traced back to self-love.”⁸² Nygren claims that Thomas tries to solve the basic dilemma of love through the idea of *amor amicitiae*:

It need hardly be said that this attempt was doomed to failure. Apart from the hopelessness of trying to express the meaning of Agape by the alien idea of “amicitia,” it is obvious that this external corrective is unable to neutralize the egocentricity that is bound up with the very first premise of the Thomistic doctrine of love. Further, when he adopts the idea of “friendship” from Aristotle, Thomas states with apparent satisfaction that Aristotle, too, derives friendship ultimately from self-love. For even if I love my friend for his own sake, I still only love what is for myself a “bonum.” In this way the unity of Thomas’s doctrine of love is preserved.⁸³

We might wonder if it is Thomas’s attempt to solve the dilemma of love that is doomed to failure or rather Nygren’s attempts to explain it. From what has been said previously about Rousselot—even if even Rousselot does not fully explain Thomas—Nygren does not understand the nuances of the Thomistic metaphysics of unity. Indeed, Etienne Gilson resolves the problem of love altogether on the basis of analogy. If it is true that the creature resembles the Creator and it is also true that one cannot love the image without loving the original, then “the antimony that troubled us so much is disposed of.”⁸⁴ Jordan Aumann claims emphatically that “the metaphysical foundations of love are the *concept of unity* and the relation of the *part to the whole*.”⁸⁵ He takes his point of departure from Thomas himself; specifically regarding the “part-to-whole solution” to

⁸² Ibid., 643.

⁸³ Ibid., 645.

⁸⁴ Etienne Gilson, trans. A.H.C. Downes, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 285-87. [Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936]

⁸⁵ Jordan Aumann, “Thomistic Evaluation of Love and Charity,” *Angelicum* 55 (1978): 554-5.

the problem of love, he follows P. Rousselot.⁸⁶ We maintain that *mutua inhaesio* is a key element to the solution of this “problem.”

There are other problems relating to the philosophy of love than that of the “physical” versus the “ecstatic,” although Rousselot’s formulation is a central one to the problem of love. What is the nature of the affective process itself? What are the causes and principles that make this process intelligible? Is this process actually philosophically intelligible, or should it be left to mystics and poets? Is there something that explains why we fall in love with one person and not another? These are questions that are not only interesting *per se*, but also existentially meaningful.⁸⁷

Frederick Crowe’s article “Complacency and Concern” treats the tension between the tendential (active) and passive elements of Thomas’s theory of love. Using Thomistic texts, he makes it clear that there is a “dual notion at work” in the fundamental aspect of love as the movement of the appetite toward the Good. On the one hand, Thomas appears to follow the *via motionis* in his analysis of love, and on the other hand, the *via receptionis*. Simply stated, “The good as perfective is the object of love as appetitive; the good as simply harmonious with affective will is the object of love as complacent.”⁸⁸ Though his article analyzes both tendencies of love, his basic conclusion is that these “two lines of thought” [“complacency and concern”] “run through the writings of St. Thomas, never contradicting one another outright but never

⁸⁶ See also P. Rousselot, *Pour l’histoire de problème de l’amour*.

⁸⁷ I am indebted to Faraon, “Principles of Love,” xviii, for raising some of these questions.

⁸⁸ Crowe, “Complacency and Concern,” 202.

fully integrated either.”⁸⁹ If it is true that there is a kind of dichotomy in Thomas’s philosophy of love that he himself never fully integrated, this would certainly explain why other philosophers have been reticent to analyze it—perhaps only fools rush in where the Angelic Doctor feared to tread.

Quoting St. Augustine, Thomas writes, “Further, according to Augustine, three things are required for love, the lover, the beloved and love itself.”⁹⁰ These three elements of love raise at least two other serious dilemmas. The first dilemma I will call the “Metaphysical Dilemma,” which I present as follows:

The philosopher can explain the reality of love either by over-emphasizing the terms of the relationship (the lover and the beloved) or by over-emphasizing the union of the love-relationship itself.

If the philosopher explains love by over-emphasizing the union of the love-relationship, he dissolves the terms of the relationship (the lover and the beloved) at the service of the union.

If the philosopher explains love by over-emphasizing the particular loves of the lover and the beloved, he dissolves the union of the love-relationship into an illusion.⁹¹

The second dilemma may be formulated as follows:

The origin of friendly relations lies either in ourselves or in the other—essentially, it lies either in the lover or the beloved.

If the origin of friendly relations lies in ourselves, then it seems we cannot break from the solipsistic prison of the self and truly love the other.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁹⁰ *DP III, a9, q9, c.*: “Praeterea, ad amorem tria requiruntur, scilicet amans, id quod amatur, et ipse amor, ut Augustinus dicit in VIII de Trinitate.”

⁹¹ Indeed, this “solution” would seem to negate the reality of love altogether into two separate and non-integrated tendencies.

If the origin of friendly relations lies in the other, then it seems we have no common principle or point of departure to base love upon.

Thomas's answer to this dilemma, at least on the surface, is clear: love neither focuses totally on the self or totally on the other, but attends to the other as an *alter ipse*. In many places, Thomas Aquinas affirms with Aristotle that, "if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that 'friendly things which approach another are from those that approach the self.'"⁹²

THE DISSERTATION'S RELATION TO THE MODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON AMOR IN THE THOUGHT OF AQUINAS

The present commentary on *ST Ia IIae*, qq. 26-28, with its thesis concerning *mutua inhaesio*, does not intend to solve all these problems. In fact, we hope that our analysis causes the dilemmas themselves to disappear. Regarding the Metaphysical Dilemma, it is our contention that Thomas need not emphasize *either* the terms *or* the union of love in order to explain the dilemma of love. In fact, the effect of *mutua inhaesio* explains that he may emphasize all three dimensions (lover, beloved, and love) simultaneously. We may wonder whether the phenomenon of *mutua inhaesio* is ultimately a mystery. For one who accepts hylemorphism as (apparently) wholly as Thomas Aquinas, it is hard to

⁹² *ST IIa IIae*, q25, a4, c: "Dicitur enim in IX Ethic. quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex his quae sunt ad seipsum." (Partially my translation)

Some classical formulations can be found in the following: *ST IIa IIae*, q26; I, q60, a3; *Ia IIae*, q27, a3.

imagine how he can justify the “being-in” of two distinct substances. How can one substance be so united to another that they are not precisely two, but one-and-two? How can one substance that contains another also be contained by it? The presence of *mutua inhaesio* as an effect of love in the sober and substantial philosophy of the Angelic Doctor can almost seem like a wistful, poetic nod to the oddly unitive, ecstatic and almost mystical experience of human love. But Thomas does not, in fact, surrender the experience of love to explanations of poets and mystics. As in everything else, he seeks wisdom and understanding. The fact that St. Thomas claims that two persons can be *mutually in* one another is not a purely literal or factual statement – but neither is it a metaphorical one. In the concept of *mutua inhaesio*, Thomas seeks nothing less than some kind of solution to the “problem of the One and the Many” on the level of human relationships – the relationship of love being the most pre-eminent of these.

We are not alone in recognizing the primacy of *mutua inhaesio*, as well as the importance of what might be called her two sister-effects, *unio* and *extasis*. There is little doubt that the prevailing scholarship, though sparse, recognizes that union, mutual indwelling and ecstasy hold the key to Thomas’s philosophy of *amor*. Kwasniewski rightly asserts that *ST Ia IIae*, q28 as a whole contains, “in condensed form, an entire phenomenology of friendship.”⁹³ He mentions succinctly in his abstract, “A remarkable interplay ensues between the article on *mutua inhaesio* and the article on *extasis*, yielding a picture of the dialectical or circulatory structure of love, its power to dominate multiplicity and shatter solitude while amplifying spiritual singularity in the gift of

⁹³ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 129.

self.”⁹⁴ McEvoy also recognizes this triumvirate, calling union, mutual indwelling and “self-transcendence” (i.e., *extasis*) “the three most striking experiences produced by love.”⁹⁵

Actually ignoring the importance of ecstasy, Farrell rightly recognizes that “all the other effects of love really follow from these *two* [union and mutual indwelling].”⁹⁶ Even more specifically, Walter Principe claims that q28, a2 (on *mutua inhaesio*) alone has “a rich discussion, which might be called Aquinas’ phenomenology of loving friendship.”⁹⁷ In other words, Principe recognizes *mutua inhaesio* as essentially including the other effects of love. Though Principe recognizes this point and thinks it important enough to summarize q28, a2, he does not develop his insight (which is correct, in our opinion) that *mutua inhaesio* really contains, in condensed form, Thomas’s entire theory of *amor*.⁹⁸ In his commentary on the passions, Miner appears to give preeminence to *mutua inhaesio* as well. He mentions that a2 suggests that “love, in its most intense form [emphasis added]⁹⁹ includes but goes beyond the mundane activities of togetherness

⁹⁴ Ibid., abstract.

⁹⁵ McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 23.

⁹⁶ Farrell, *A Companion to the Summa*, 101.

⁹⁷ Walter Principe, “Loving Friendship According to Thomas Aquinas,” 130.

⁹⁸ Principe links the notions of loving friendship and mutual inherence to Thomas’s discussion on *caritas*. We will cover this relationship more in our final chapter on the *via redamationis*.

⁹⁹ By recognizing the connection between *mutua inhaesio* and “love in its most intense form,” Miner affirms our thesis that *mutua inhaesio* is the preeminent effect of love.

noted in Article 1.”¹⁰⁰ Though not referring specifically to q28, a2, Vella affirms that an affective union that is *mutual* is “the most sublime form of love,” implying that *mutua inhaesio*—beyond mere union—is the preeminent effect of love.¹⁰¹ Precisely why *mutua inhaesio* is the most important effect of love is perhaps concluded more on the basis of intuition than reason in these various authors. Our aim is to explain the importance of *mutua inhaesio* on a level beyond the simply intuitive.

We should not be surprised that the concept of love is riddled with tensions: lover and beloved, self-love and other-love, unity and distinction, interior and exterior, rest and motion. These tensions merely follow from the basic truth that we are contingent beings, and there lay an unbridgeable gulf between what we *are* and how we *act*. According to Thomas Aquinas, it is in approaching the reality of non-contingent being—which consists of a mutual indwelling of Divine Persons—that the human person approaches the simultaneity of both total self-possession and total self-gift. With this analogy in mind, the effect of *mutua inhaesio* is that effect in which, as much as humanly possible, some of these tensions and dilemmas melt away in the mystery of love.

In Chapter One, I will establish the most important sources of the concept of *amor*, and particularly of *mutua inhaesio*, for Thomas himself. Such a broad study cannot possibly be exhaustive, but it is important to indicate at the beginning of the dissertation that the Angelic Doctor’s own theory of *amor* does not arise from a vacuum. We will find that Thomas himself indicates five sources as integral to his own theory of *amor*:

¹⁰⁰ Miner, *The Passions*, 135 (Emphasis added). Miner is referring to *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, on union as an effect of love.

¹⁰¹ Vella, “Love is Acceptance,” 200.

1) Pseudo-Dionysius – particularly from Book IV of *De Divinis Nominibus*, 2) the concept of the Trinitarian *perichoresis/circumincessio* from the Christian Tradition, 3) St. Augustine’s teaching on the psychological analogy between the human soul and the Trinity, 4) St. John the Evangelist’s writings, and 5) Aristotle’s notion of friendship. We will introduce the fact that Thomas masterfully synthesizes these sources into a concept of *amor* that is uniquely his own. Chapter Two examines some of Thomas’s parallel texts on *amor* so that we might gain a better understanding of the uniqueness of the *De Amore* as well as a literary and structural introduction to the *De Amore* itself. We will find that *amor* is a supremely analogous term that can be applied to the merely natural, sensitive, and intellectual dimensions of reality. Both the confusion and the richness of the concept of *amor* arises from the fact that love is a 1) metaphysical force, 2) both an “impression” and “movement” that exists in the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites, and 3) a supernatural virtue that has its roots in a Divine Person. The reader will emerge from Chapter Two with a greater appreciation of the multiple layers of meaning in the concept of *amor*. Chapter Three will introduce the commentary proper beginning with *ST I-II*, q26, where Thomas breaks down the nature of love itself. We will find that the four articles identify the subject, genus, species and act of love, respectively. The subject of love is the concupiscible power, its genus is passion, its species is variable depending on love’s subject and object, and the act of love is a twofold tendency of *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*.¹⁰² Chapter Four continues the commentary with an analysis of *ST I-II*, q27, on the causes of love. Thomas

¹⁰² The act of love can only be twofold if it is an act of *dilectio*, i.e. an act of love by a rational being. Though Thomas analyzes the metaphysical nature of love as the tendency of any substance towards its own Good, we will consistently find that Thomas is most interested in the nature of rational love.

progresses from the preeminent cause of love as the *bonum* to an analysis of *cognitio* and *similitudo* and ends with an article demonstrating that love is the foundation and cause for all the other emotions, and not vice versa. We will argue that according to Thomas himself the *bonum* is love's final cause, *cognitio* its efficient cause, *similitudo* its formal cause, and the lover-and-love's-object are simultaneously its material causes. Chapters Five and Six comprise a two part analysis of all the effects of love. Chapter Five will focus on the two primary effects of love—union and mutual indwelling and the *via redamtionis* as its perfection—while Chapter Six will discuss the remaining effects of ecstasy, zeal, wounding and the related proximate effects of melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. As already mentioned, *mutua inhaesio* emerges as that effect of love which virtually contains the rest. Finally, Chapter Seven will indicate the foundations of what we might call Thomas's "Psychology of Intimacy" as well as some new avenues of research opened by this dissertation.

This analysis might be referred to as an icon of Etienne Gilson's thesis that certain teachings of Christian *theology* provided very fertile ground for significant *philosophical* advances. Speaking of Saints Augustine, Anselm and Thomas (and others like them), Gilson urges: "Let us ask whether they were not often more original than they knew, innovating with unconscious boldness even there, where they thought themselves to be no more than faithful followers of Plato and Aristotle."¹⁰³ Far from being reduced to Aristotelian *philia* or Platonic *eros* (or even Christian *agape*), Thomas's teaching on *amor* both includes and exceeds these concepts in philosophical richness. The best indication of this richness is the Angelic Doctor's teaching on *mutua inhaesio*.

¹⁰³ Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 41.

CHAPTER 1: THE SOURCES OF AMOR

Though the biography of Thomas may be written with “extreme simplicity,”¹ a sketch of the richness of his source material cannot. There are seventy explicit citations to other sources in the context of the *De Amore* and this does not include the many implicit sources that Thomas drew upon to construct his thought. The problem, however, with writing an essay on the sources of love is that the tradition has a massive amount to say about it. Thus, we must restrict ourselves to those sources that Thomas specifically brings to bear upon the subject of love, the order of love, and more specifically *mutua inhaesio* as an effect of love as it was written in the *De Amore*.² The purpose of this chapter is to outline the sources that Thomas Aquinas drew upon to write the *De Amore*. This chapter on sources has the difficulty of being simultaneously precise and tentative simultaneously. It is precise because we can comment directly on the sources that Thomas himself cites but tentative because it is difficult to state with certainty how much Thomas relies on those explicit sources and how much his own genius transforms those various traditions into his own original insight. This chapter is meant only to give the reader some context for the *De Amore*. Thus, its conclusions must remain tentative.

Writing an essay on the sources of the Latin term *amor* is not the same task as writing the English term, “love.” Both share some common conceptual material, but the

¹ Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, trans. A.M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963), 13.

² For the background of Thomas’s work, see such admirable works as Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, “The Work in Its Milieu,” pp. 11-78; Martin Grabmann, *Thomas von Aquin. Persönlichkeit und Gedankenwelt* (Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1949).

contents of either concept are not precisely the same. In the context of the *De Amore*, Thomas writes:

We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love (*amor*), dilection (*dilectio*), charity (*caritas*) and friendship (*amicitia*). They differ, however, in this, that 'friendship,' according to the Philosopher³ 'is like a habit,' whereas 'love' and 'dilection' are expressed by way of act or passion; and 'charity' can be taken either way.⁴

In this passage alone, we find an array of source material pregnant with problems of translation and conceptual analysis. Thomas directly cites Aristotle on *amicitia* in the same Latin sentence where he attempts to identify the genus of *caritas* — a concept completely foreign to Aristotle. Thomas generally places *caritas* in the genus of *amicitia*, which was and is still controversial.⁵ His reference to *dilectio* recalls a question raised by St. Augustine in the *De Civitate Dei* concerning whether or not *dilectio* and *amor* are the same thing.⁶ We find added complications in multiplying terms for *amor*. First, *dilectio* can refer to any kind of intellectual love but not a merely natural love. Second, *amicitia*

³ See *Ethic.* VIII, 5.

⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, c. : "Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII *Ethic.*, est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi potest."

⁵ See L. Gregory Jones, "The Theological Transformation of Aristotelian Friendship in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas," *The New Scholasticism* 61 (1987): 373-399; James McEvoy, "Philia and Amicitia: the Philosophy of Friendship from Plato to Aquinas" in *Sewanee Medieval Colloquium Occasional Papers* (Sewanee: University Press, 1985), 1-23.

⁶ St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* XIV, 7. This will merit a fuller discussion in Chapter Three.

can refer to something base in a general sense though not in a proper sense.⁷ Third, *amor* can refer generally to any kind of love, extending even to what we would call the force of gravity.⁸ Moreover, there are disagreements between Aquinas and his sources on major points concerning love. For example, Thomas did not consider *amor*, *dilectio*, and *caritas* as synonymous while Augustine did.⁹ Further, Peter Lombard considered the *caritas* of the soul the Uncreated Holy Spirit while Thomas maintains it is a kind of cooperation of the soul with the Spirit.¹⁰ What we see at the outset of these reflections is that Thomas's variety of sources makes it difficult to define love. We are presented with love as an act, a passion, a habit, a natural force, and even God Himself. We must keep this constantly in mind as we struggle to see how Thomas synthesized this material. We see that the *De Amore* is concerned primarily with *amor* in its general sense. Indeed, the nature of *caritas* is not discussed at all with the small exception of mentioning that it denotes "a certain perfection of love."¹¹

It is logical that Thomas wants to lay the basis for the virtue of *caritas* in the *Secunda Secundae* by laying its foundation by discussing *amor* in the *De Amore*. The purpose of studying his sources is to begin to form an overall vision of what Thomas considers important when philosophizing about love. This will provide a point of

⁷ Friendship rooted in usefulness or pleasure is more base than a friendship rooted in virtue.

⁸ See *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.

⁹ McEvoy, "*Philia and Amicitia*," 13.

¹⁰ Thomas discusses this controversy, for example, in *ST IIa IIae*, q23, a2, ad2. We will discuss this controversy more fully later in this analysis.

¹¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a3, c.: "Perfectionem quandam amoris"

departure to make other relevant comments about Thomas's sources on love. Then general source breakdown is as follows:¹²

- 1) Scriptural references: (19)¹³
- 2) Aristotle: (22)¹⁴
- 3) Pseudo-Dionysius: (16)¹⁵
- 4) Augustine: (11)¹⁶
- 5) John Damascene: (1)¹⁷
- 6) Cicero: (1)¹⁸

At first glance, the general balance of references to Holy Scriptures, Aristotle, Augustine, and the Pseudo-Dionysius is impressive.

¹² The sources have been detailed from Eric D'Arcy, *The Emotions* (1967 repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹³ The specific sources for Scripture are as follows: Wis 8:2; Psalms 10:6; Prov. 13:10; Eccles. 13:19; Gal. 4:18; 1 John 4:16; Phil. 1:7; 1 Cor 2:10; 1 Cor. 3:3; Psalm 72:3; Exodus 20:5; Psalms 36:1; III Kings 19:14; John 2:17; Cant. 2:5; Song 5:6; Song 5:6 (twice); Hosea 9:10; *Glossa Ordinaria* V, 193 E.

¹⁴ The sources for Aristotle are as follows: *Topics* II, 7. 113b2; II. 3. 11a3; *De Anima* III, 10 (433b22); III, 10 (433a21); *Ethics* VIII, 5 (1157b28); VIII, 5 (1157b28); VIII, 5 (1157b28) (twice); VIII, 3 (1156a7); VIII, 2 (1155b29); IX, 5 (1167a4); VIII, 1 (1155a35); VIII, 3 (1156a12); IX, 4 (116a31); IX, 9 (1169b6); IX, 13 (1165b27); V, 8 (1135b21-1136a6); *Politics* II, 1 (1262b10); II, 1 (1262b11); *Rhetoric* II, 4 (1380b35); II, 4 (1381b29); II, 4 (1381b16); II, 4. (1381a3).

¹⁵ The sources for Pseudo-Dionysius are as follows: *De Div. Nom.* IV. PG III, 713; 4. PG III, 708; 4. PG III, 713; 4. PG III, 709; 4. PG III, 709; 4. PG III, 709; 4. PG III, 708; 4. PG III, 708; 4. PG. III, 79; 4. 13. PG III, 712; 4. 16. PG III, 713; 4. PG III, 712; 4. PG III, 708; 4. PG III, 708; 4. PG III, 708; *De caelesti hierarchia* 7 (PG III, 205).

¹⁶ The sources for Augustine are as follows: *Confessions* IV, 14. PL 32, 702; *De Civ.* XIV, 7. PL 41, 410; XIV, 7. PL 41, 410; XIV, 7. PL 41, 410; *De Trin.* VIII, 10. PL 42, 960; VIII, 3. PL 42, 949; VIII, 1. PL 42, 971; VII, 1. PL 42, 974; X, 1. PL 42, 973; *Lib. 83 quaest.* 35. PL 40, 24; 35. PL 40, 23.

¹⁷ The source for St. John Damascene is from *De Fide orthodoxa* II, 22. PG 94, 940.

¹⁸ The source for Cicero is from *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* III, 11. A good overview of the sources for the general teaching of q26-28 can be found in McEvoy, "Amitié attirance et amour," 392-400.

Like any religious of his day, many scriptural references are memorized and simply flow from his consciousness much like the ink from his pen. As for Aristotle, the single source that is quoted most often is the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁹ The book quoted the most is the Bible, with nineteen references. The second most quoted book is the fourth book of Dionysius's *De Divinis Nominibus* with fifteen references. All of the references to the *Ethics* are on Aristotle's well-known books concerning friendship, which is a predictable move on the part of Thomas. Augustine's influence on Thomas Aquinas is pervasive, though the number of times Thomas explicitly cites him here does not make this an overwhelming point. We will have an opportunity to review St. Augustine's influence on Thomas shortly. The most unpredictable source for the *Pars Prima Secundae* q26-28 is the rather pervasive influence of the fourth book of *De Divinis Nominibus*, which is cited fifteen out of the sixteen total references to Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.²⁰ Moreover, every *sed contra* in the *De Amore* is Dionysian except for the one specifically on *mutua inhaesio*, which is Johannine. Before elaborating on any one of these persons or sources, we will look more closely at some more obvious source material regarding *mutua inhaesio* itself.

There are some sources for *mutua inhaesio* that are more implicit but just as influential as the ones mentioned. Thomas's formulations about love, no less than any

¹⁹ Three references to VIII, 5; two to VIII, 3; and one apiece for VIII, 1; VIII, 3; IX, 4 and IX, 5.

²⁰ Hereafter, we will refer to the Pseudo-Dionysius – an awkward pseudonym – simply as “Dionysius.”

of his other topics, can be reduced to his leading sources.²¹ Regarding the specific sources of *mutua inhaesio*, we are confronted with some convincing evidence about Thomas's source material. First of all, the only place where Thomas analyzes the concept of *mutua inhaesio* systematically is in *ST I*, q28, a2. This sharpens our focus on the material at hand. Secondly, the text that is most associated with *mutua inhaesio* is 1 Jn. 4:16, which comprises the *sed contra* of the article: "On the contrary, it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): 'He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.' Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa."²² Thirdly, this is the only instance in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, where Thomas cites a scriptural passage rather than Book Four of *De Divinis Nominibus*. Fourthly, the only other place in the Thomistic corpus where the term *mutua inhaesio* is used is in the prooemium of *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1,²³ which is Thomas's commentary on

²¹ Jan A. Aersten, "Aquinas's Philosophy in Its Historical Setting," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 23.

²² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, sed.: "Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso."

²³ The following text is the prooemium for the entirety of distinction 19, not merely question 4 regarding whether the person's dwell within each other:

"Postquam determinavit Magister de personis divinis quantum ad earum distinctionem per relationes aeternas, hic incipit determinare de ipsis quantum ad earum aequalitatem. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas: in prima ostendit aequalitatem personarum; in secunda movet quamdam dubitationem quae oritur ex quibusdam locutionibus, quibus in sua probatione usus fuerat, 21 distinct., ibi: hic oritur quaestio trahens originem ex praedictis. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit secundum quid attendenda sit personarum aequalitas; in secunda secundum illa personarum aequalitatem ostendit, ibi: quod autem aeternitate, aliqua trium personarum aliam non excedat, supra ostensum est. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod aequalitas personarum attenditur quantum ad aeternitatem, magnitudinem, et potestatem; secundo ostendit qualiter ista tria se habent ad invicem, scilicet quod sunt idem secundum rem quod divina essentia, ibi: cumque enumerentur ista quasi diversa, in Deo

Lombard's understanding of the equality of the Trinitarian Persons (*De aequalitate trium personarum*). Thomas does not develop the concept of *mutua inhaesio* in this commentary, but its influence is apparent. What might we conclude from this evidence? The fact that Thomas takes his point of departure in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2 (on mutual indwelling) from the Johannine theology of indwelling, in addition to the fact the only other reference to the term *mutua inhaesio* is in a commentary on the equality of the Trinitarian Persons where Peter Lombard does not himself use the term, makes it at least highly likely that at least one of the primary sources for *mutua inhaesio* is the Christian Trinitarian Tradition of the *perichoresis*. We will have much to say about this shortly.

Another fact is that *mutua inhaesio* "may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power." Thomas's language of the lover and

tamen unum et idem sunt. Quod autem aeternitate, aliqua trium personarum aliam non excedat, supra ostensum est. Hic ostendit propositum; et dividitur in tres partes: in prima ex praedictis relinquit aequalitatem personarum quantum ad aeternitatem; in secunda ostendit earum aequalitatem quantum ad magnitudinem, ibi: nunc superest ostendere quod magnitudine vel potentia alius alium non excedat; in tertia quantum ad potestatem, 20 dist., ibi: nunc ostendere restat quomodo aliqua harum personarum aliam non excellat potentia. Nunc superest ostendere quod magnitudine vel potentia alius alium non excedat. Hic ostendit personarum aequalitatem quantum ad magnitudinem: et primo ostendit aequalitatem in magnitudine; secundo inducit quamdam conclusionem, ibi: praeterea cum Deus dicatur trinus, non tamen debet dici triplex. Prima in tres, secundum tres vias quibus probat aequalem magnitudinem trium personarum: primo ostendit *ex mutua inhaesione*; secundo ex remotione eorum quae inaequalitatem facere possent, ibi: sed jam nunc ad propositum redeamus; tertio ex ratione divinae simplicitatis et veritatis, ibi: sciendum est igitur, tantam aequalitatem esse in Trinitate et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo manifestat propositum; secundo proponit intentum, ibi: sciendum igitur est quia pater non est major filio; tertio ponit aequalitatis signum, ibi: et inde est quod pater dicitur esse in filio, et filius in patre, et spiritus sanctus in utroque. Hic quaeruntur duo. Primo de aequalitate. Secundo de illis in quibus attenditur aequalitas. Circa primum quaeruntur duo: 1 an in divinis sit aequalitas; 2 an ibi sit mutua aequalitas." (Emphasis added.)

Thomas merely mentions that Lombard demonstrates that the Trinity is equal in magnitude on account of each person being "ex mutua inhaesione." What is more noteworthy is that Lombard himself *does not* use the language of *mutua inhaesio* in this particular distinction.

beloved being conversely “in” each other’s powers of apprehension and intellection strongly recalls St. Augustine’s psychological analogy of the human person to the Trinity. There are many texts that substantiate this, or at least make it so likely that St. Augustine’s psychological analogy is very much active in Thomas’s formulation of the concept of *mutua inhaesio*. Note the following text:

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of love.²⁴

Thomas often compares the powers of the human soul to an image of the Trinity. Nearly as often as he does so, we see that the notion of in-being is significantly present. The article on *mutua inhaesio* is full of references to how the beloved is in the lover (and vice versa) according to the powers of appetite (analogous to the procession of love) and apprehension (analogous to the procession of Word). Recalling again the *sed contra* of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, Thomas makes the point that love causes the lover to be in the beloved (and vice versa) *for the same reason* as one abiding in God’s love abides in God. This

²⁴ *ST Ia*, q27, a3, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod in divinis sunt duae processionibus, scilicet processio verbi, et quaedam alia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in divinis non est processio nisi secundum actionem quae non tendit in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in ipso agente. Huiusmodi autem actio in intellectuali natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis. Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta, est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem verbi, ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris.”

statement makes the assumption that there is an analogy between human personal love and divine personal love. Following Augustine, St. Thomas draws this analogy as well: “Augustine proceeds²⁵ to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this.”²⁶ Here, Thomas states explicitly that he draws the psychological analogy. Regarding Thomas’s sources we offer the preliminary conclusion that using these two concepts (i.e., the Christian concept of the *perichoresis* and the psychological analogy) Thomas was able to make the analogy between the mutual indwelling of the Trinitarian persons (i.e., the *perichoresis*) and the mutual indwelling of a human lover and beloved, united by the bond that is love. We further conclude that in order to dissolve the boundaries of the human person enough to actually speak of a true mutual inherence of human persons that is analogous to that of the Trinitarian Persons, Thomas required two additional inspirations: 1) the Dionysian (and Augustinian) teaching on love as a unitive force that binds the lover to his beloved; 2) Aristotle’s teaching that a friend is an *alter ipse*.²⁷ Thus, Thomas uses the conceptual riches of *unio*, *perichoresis*, the friend as *alter ipse*, and Augustine’s psychological analogy to develop the philosophically rich idea of a human *mutua*

²⁵ See Augustine, *De. Trin.* X, 4, 11,12.

²⁶ *ST Ia*, q32, a1, arg2: “Augustinus vero procedit ad manifestandum Trinitatem personarum, ex processione verbi et amoris in mente nostra, quam viam supra secuti sumus. Ergo per rationem naturalem potest cognosci Trinitas personarum.”

²⁷ The source of “alter ipse” is Grosseteste’s translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. At *Ethic.* IX, 4 (1166a31-32) he renders “ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός) as “est enim amicus alius ipse” and at IX, 11 (1170b6) he renders “ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτος ὁ φίλος ἐστίν” as “alter enim ipse amicus est.” For the Grosseteste version see H.P.E Mercken (ed.), *The Greek Commentaries on the “Nicomachean Ethics” of Aristotle in the Latin translation of Robert Grosseteste bishop of Lincoln*, vol. III (*Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI, 3*), (Leuven, 1991).

inhaesio—a kind of “human Trinity” of lover, beloved, and love itself—that shares in the vitality of its First Cause. Realizing that some of this may be conjectural, we will develop the various dimensions of this source material in this chapter, also identifying other sources that Thomas drew upon to form his teaching on love.

Vital for understanding Thomas’s sources on *amor* is the general medieval mindset concerning *amor amicitiae* versus *amor concupiscentiae*.²⁸ We have already mentioned this problem in the introduction, but we are now in a position to look at it more closely in the context of Thomas’s source material. Generally speaking, the medieval mind assumed that God was the ultimate end of human life and love, the argument concerning the ultimate principle of *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* was far from settled in the 12th and 13th centuries. Etienne Gilson formulates this medieval dilemma with the following question: “Is there any way by which man can continue to love himself while loving God only for God’s sake?”²⁹ The “ecstatic” school of thought assumed that the two loves were ultimately contradictory and that one could be pursued only to the exclusion of the other, while the “physical” school of thought concluded that the two loves were ultimately the same.³⁰ The physical school ultimately recognizes that there is a “fundamental identity between love of self and love of God,” while the ecstatic school “postulates self-forgetfulness as the necessary condition of all

²⁸ For our present purposes, we need only understand that *amor amicitiae* means a love for the thing itself out of a kind of well-wishing or benevolence, and *amor concupiscentiae* means a love out of a selfish desire. This is certainly not the whole story concerning these loves. They will be clarified in greater detail in Chapter Three.

²⁹ Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 280.

³⁰ Hans Boersma, *Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 73.

true love” making it all the more necessary that the lover be ecstatically placed outside himself or beside himself.³¹ The centerpiece of the argument was “whether humans by nature love God more than themselves.”³² As one might imagine, the defenders of the ecstatic view answered this question negatively. If humans naturally loved God more than themselves, it would not require an ecstatic journey outside the self in order to rest in God’s love. Thus, the ecstatic school requires a true ecstasy—a truly disinterested love—to break beyond the bond of self in order to ascend to God.³³ Ultimately, according to Rousselot, this ecstatic view of love was violent, dualistic, irrational, and self-sacrificial to the point of denying personal happiness.³⁴ The ultimate mistake of the ecstatic view according to Rousselot is an exaltation of person over nature. The distance between person and person is emphasized without the concept of nature to bind them. Unity as a transcendental concept has priority over plurality for Thomas, and persons have their plurality rooted in their common nature, which in turn has its root in God.³⁵ Rejecting the ecstatic view of love, Rousselot posited the physical or Graeco-Thomist solution in which the love of self and God possessed a fundamental identity.³⁶ The three

³¹ Gilson, 283.

³² “*Utrum homo naturaliter diligit Deum plus quam semetipsum*” from Rousselot, *Problem of Love*, p. 76. (See ST Ia, q60; ST Ia IIae, q26.)

³³ Rousselot located the sources of this view primarily in Cistercian thought, the Victorine School, and the disciples of Peter Abelard (Boersma, 74).

³⁴ Rousselot, *Problem of Love*, 15-16, 79, 155-211.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 152.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 78. Rousselot found sources for this view in Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and the Neo-Platonic doctrines of Dionysius (Boersma, *Nouvelle Théologie*, 75).

essential aspects of this physical conception were: 1) the distinction and unity of the whole and the part, 2) the fact that altruism or even ecstasy was ultimately rooted in self-love and 3) the theological formulation that, if the part were for the sake of the whole and all love is an imitation of God, then every creature must love God more than itself.³⁷ The first two premises have their source in Aristotle, whereas the last has its root soundly in Christian theology, particularly the Dionysian/Neo-Platonic interpretation. Thus, there is a perfect continuity between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. The physical conception of love considers it inconceivable that we love the self more than God by nature. The ecstatic conception of God places itself in the untenable position that “the lover had to overcome nature by denying his personhood in favour of the personhood of the beloved.”³⁸ Rousselot chose to find the solution to the distinction between the whole (which is God) and the part (which is man): the self as a part of the whole, in loving itself, also loves God. The problem with this solution is that it seems to dissolve the individual in the sea of God’s love.

As noted in the introduction, Gilson believes that this dichotomy between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* has been taken too far, writing that “The ‘Graeco-Thomist’ conception of love is not inappropriately called ‘physical,’ on condition, however, that by this term we understand a nature in the Christian sense, made to the image of its Creator; that is to say a nature but little Greek and very strongly Thomist.”³⁹ We must remember that for St. Bernard and some of the other mystics, *similitudo* is one

³⁷ Rousselot, *Problem of Love*, 88. He takes this from Thomas, *Quodl.* 1, a8.

³⁸ Boersma, *Nouvelle Théologie*, 75.

³⁹ Gilson, *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 302.

with *caritas*: “Admirable and astounding that likeness assuredly is which brings with it the vision of God, or rather which is this vision itself. But I speak of the likeness and vision which are one and the same with charity.”⁴⁰ The antimony between the two loves is solved by the fact that the Christian conception of man’s nature is always concretely and existentially grounded in the fact of being created by God in His image. If God is *caritas* and man is created in His image and likeness, then similitude and *caritas* form a unity.⁴¹

Several other major medieval sources on friendship should be mentioned here. Torrell notes that neither Cicero’s *De Amicitia* nor Aelred of Riveaux’s works on love, particularly *Speculum Caritatis* and *De Spiritali Amicitia* (c. 1160) are mentioned by the Angelic Doctor. Considering their popularity in medieval tradition on love, these are among some of the works most conspicuously absent from Thomas’s thought. The work of Richard of St. Victor is also an important source of *amor* in relation to Trinitarian thought. Generally, Richard takes up Augustine’s development of ‘God-charity and the Spirit as the mutual love between the Father and the Son’ and creates what Ewert Cousins calls “A Theology of Interpersonal Relations.”⁴² Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, generally develops Augustine’s theme of the activities of the Spirit as understanding and love more concomitant with what we know as Augustine’s

⁴⁰ St. Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Cant. Cant.* 82,8, quoted in Gilson, *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 296.

⁴¹ Genesis 1:26 in the Vulgate reads, “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.”

⁴² Ewert Cousins, “A Theology of Interpersonal Relations,” *Thought: A Review of Culture and Idea*, Vol. 11:5 (1970): 56-82.

psychological analogy.⁴³ In many ways, Richard capitalizes on the idea of mutual love far more than Thomas Aquinas. Richard writes:

However it is a characteristic of love, and one without which it cannot possibly exist, to wish to be loved by the one whom you love much. Therefore, love cannot be pleasing if it is not mutual. Therefore, in that true and supreme happiness, just as pleasing love cannot be lacking, so mutual love cannot be lacking. However, in mutual love it is absolutely necessary that there be both one who gives and returns love. Therefore one will be the offerer of love and the other the returner of love.⁴⁴

Though Aquinas was clearly aware of Richard's *De Trinitate* when he developed most of his ideas on the relation of mutual love to the Trinity, there is far more evidence that he followed Augustine's model of the Trinity. Whereas Thomas derives absolute unity from the perfection of God, Richard sees plurality, for Richard concludes that if Goodness is perfect then it must be shared.⁴⁵ It is precisely such an emphasis on unity that perhaps prevented Thomas from developing the idea of "mutual love" in relation to the Trinity as much as Richard of St. Victor developed it.

⁴³ Dennis Ngien, "Richard of St. Victor Condilectus: The Spirit as Co-beloved," *European Journal of Theology* 12:2: 77-92. See also Nico Den Bok, *Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor* (Paris/Turnhout: Brepols, 1996).

⁴⁴ Ngien, "Richard of St. Victor Condilectus," 81-2 (From Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, Translated by Grover A. Zinn [New York: Paulist Press, 1979], 376.)

⁴⁵ Leslie J. Walker, S.J. "Great Thinkers: Aquinas," *Philosophy* 10:39 (July, 1935): 286. A typical axiom of Thomas is: "Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists."

ST Ia IIae, q36, a3, c.: "Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit eius perfectio".

THE PERICHORESIS

When we analyze St. Thomas's understanding of *amor ipse*, we also delve into the vast theological tradition of the *perichoresis* – the mutual indwelling of the Three Persons of the Godhead within the One God. If it is true that *Deus Caritas Est*⁴⁶, then it could not be otherwise.⁴⁷ There is no reason to believe that independently of the theological tradition on the *perichoresis* and the indwelling of the just in God, that Thomas would have posited the mutual indwelling of two human persons as an effect of love.⁴⁸ If the philosophical teaching of the mutual indwelling of human persons is theologically

⁴⁶ John 4:16. Thomas asserts that there is love in God very early in *ST Ia*, q20.

⁴⁷ Walter Principe recognizes that it is clear that Thomas drew an analogy between the mutual inherence of the Trinity and the mutual inherence of friends, specifically in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2. See Principe, "Loving Friendship," 128-141.

An offshoot of the idea of the *perichoresis* is the idea of the indwelling of God in the souls of the just. See Robert W. Gleason, S.J., *The Indwelling Spirit*, Staten Island: Alba House, 1966; See also Luigi Ciappi, O.P., "The Presence, Mission, and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in the Just," *The Thomist* 17 (April 1954): 131-144.

⁴⁸ This does not mean that positing mutual indwelling, however, as an effect of love is not logical in itself apart from the theological tradition. But in attempting to locate the source material or inspiration for his philosophy of mutual indwelling, there is no other source apart from this theological tradition.

Aristotle posits the following in the *Ethics*: "Friendship is an association or community, and a person has the same attitude toward his friend as he has toward himself. Now, since a man's perception that he exists is desirable, his perception of his friend's existence is desirable, too. But only by living together can the perception of a friend's existence be activated, so that it stands to reason that friends aim at living together. And whatever his existence means to each partner individually or whatever is the purpose that makes his life desirable, he wishes to pursue it together with his friends (*Ethic. IX* [1171b33-1172a3]." What is suggested here is part of the basis of what Thomas calls "real union (*unio realis*)" in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1. There is no sense in Aristotle that the two friends *mutually indwell*, other than the fact that they do so insofar as a man sees a friend as "another self."

One of the only sources that approaches touching on this concept is actually the famous speech of Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*, to which Thomas actually refers (through the authority of Aristotle, *Politics* 2.1) in the article on union directly before he discusses *mutua inhaesio* (See *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2). We will have the opportunity to analyze this article in detail.

inspired, Thomas is *not* satisfied to leave it purely on the theological level. If the *perichoresis* is an analogous term for *mutua inhaesio* (as we see in Thomas's prologue to *Super sent. lib. 1, d. 19, q. 1, pr.*), then we must briefly examine the basis of the analogy in the meaning of the *perichoresis*. The concept of the *perichoresis* was developed in order to understand the mutual relationships between the Trinitarian persons. The ideas of person and *perichoresis* are often found together in the Christian theological tradition. The nature of the Trinitarian Persons can be, and often is, discussed without reference to their *perichoresis*; but the *perichoresis* is never discussed without an attendant analysis of the concept of person. The reason for this is because *person* is a substantive term. *Perichoresis*, however, is a relative term. It cannot be understood without its substantial referents, or by explaining precisely *what* is indwelling. Walter Cardinal Kasper refers to the Church Father, St. Hilary of Poitiers, as producing the "classic formulation" of the relationship of the Father to the Son: "One from the Other, and the both are One; not One made up of Two, but One in the Other, because in the Both there is no otherness."⁴⁹ Augustine makes the following summary observation, which no doubt Thomas studied: that in the Trinity, "there is no mixture or confusion. Each person is in himself, and yet three are each wholly in the others; each of them in the other two or the other two in each of them, and thus all are in all."⁵⁰ The concept of *perichoresis* has referred to three different aspects of divinity, with various theologians stressing different aspects:

- 1) A way of attempting to express how unity and distinction are combined in the Trinity

⁴⁹ Hilary, *De Trinitate* III,4 (CCL 62, 75f), quoted in Walter Kaspar, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Matthew O'Connell (1982 repr., New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1986), 283-4.

⁵⁰ Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, 5 (CCL 50, 300f), quoted in Kaspar, 283.

- 2) A way of attempting to express unity and distinction in the Incarnate Logos
- 3) A way of attempting to express unity and distinction between God and his creation.⁵¹

These were thorny issues of early and medieval theology, and the concept of *perichoresis* was a major concept in the articulation of these issues.

Perichoresis is usually recognized as becoming a theologically technical term rather late in the Tradition. It was first used “theologically” by Gregory Nazianzen and then adopted by St. Maximus the Confessor who was a student of his writings.

According to Lars Thunberg, it was St. Maximus the Confessor who was the first Christian writer to give to the term *perichoresis* a central position within orthodox Christology.⁵² Buxton notes,

In the fourth century Gregory of Nazianzus employed the Greek verb *perichoreo* to refer to the process whereby life and death, though they appear to differ greatly from one another, “yet ‘reciprocate’ and resolve themselves into one another.” In one of his epistles, Gregory gives Christological significance to the verb. Referring to the two natures of Christ, he writes: “Just as the natures are mixed, so also the names pass reciprocally into each other by the principle of this coalescence.”⁵³

⁵¹ See Verna Harrison, “*Perichoresis* in the Greek Fathers,” *St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 35:1 (1991): 53-65.

⁵² Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor* (Chicago and La Salle ILL: Open Court Publishing, 1995), 26.

⁵³ See Graham Buxton, “On the Trinitarian Doctrine of the *Perichoresis*: the Spirit in the Divine, the Human and the Physical,” p. 3,

https://docs.google.com/a/sjasc.edu/viewer?a=v&q=cache:WkpHLnz14nEJ:www.taboradelaide.edu.au/downloads/downloads_about/staff_articles/On_the_Trinitarian_doctrine_of_perichoresis.doc+graham+buxton+perichoresis&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&scid=ADGEESHOM39mhqoP6ZWURxczTsAb56V7IjZ4SQoSG876PvJsMD-NjdwqDv-2PGkrXS3SFPH3isJ2EIJR1weMgPYnWgXomkkQ1KI7QaVgdQdONkX-DA8x9hHRpODZaHBE5WTCnhQCFIRk&sig=AHIEtbTmS64jBK0IvduzeDovrFq6ZOkrhg&pli=1 [No publisher given, accessed February 12, 2010]; G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (Society for Promoting Christian Thought, 2nd edition: 1986), 291. See

Consequently, the concept of *perichoresis* appeared in the treatise *On the Trinity* by an anonymous 7th century writer as Pseudo-Cyril of Alexandria. It was St. John Damascene who incorporated large portions of this treatise in his *De Fide orthodoxa*, which became standard reading in the West and was well-known by St. Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁴ In the twelfth century, St. John Damascene was translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa. He translated the Greek word *perichoresis* with *circumincessio* and *circuitio* (i.e., circulation).⁵⁵ St. John Damascene is the most often quoted Eastern Father of the Church in Thomas's Trinitarian section of *The Summa Theologiae*— an extremely important point for locating the Angelic Doctor's sources on the *perichoresis*.⁵⁶ The following is a representative text concerning *perichoresis* in the work of St. John Damascene with which Thomas would have been aware:

For, as we said, they are made one not so as to commingle, but so as to cleave to each other without any coalescence or commingling. Nor do the Son and the Spirit stand apart, nor are they sundered in essence according to the diarsis of Arius. For the deity is undivided amongst things divided, to put it concisely: and it is just like three suns cleaving to each other without separation and giving out light mingled and conjoined into one.⁵⁷

also, Quoted in Harrison, "Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers": 54, with reference to Gregory's *Epistle* 101.

⁵⁴ Harrison, "Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers," 53.

⁵⁵ Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas*, Trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 298-9. *Circuitio* is hardly ever used in the tradition and so it is irrelevant to discuss it here.

⁵⁶ Gilles Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas* (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2008), 237.

⁵⁷ Quoted from Michael O'Carroll, *Trinitas: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Holy Trinity* (Health Policy Advisory Center, 1986), 69 (From John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, 8, PG 94, 829; LNPF, IX, 11).

Pseudo-Cyril, who stands between Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene, appears to be the first to use the word *perichoresis* for the mutual inherence of the Trinitarian persons.⁵⁸

To complicate matters, there is not only a single term that refers to the concept of the Mutual Indwelling of the Trinitarian Persons. There are four primary terms used in the theological tradition: 1) *perichoresis*, 2) *circuminsessio*, 3) *circumsessio*, 4) *circumincessio*. *Perichoresis* is, of course, the Greek term. Between the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) and John Damascene, *perichoresis* usually refers to the fact that there is a mutual reciprocation between the natures of *Christ* rather than the co-inherence of the Trinitarian Persons. It is after Damascene that it comes to mean “the communal immanence, or the reciprocate interiority of the three persons [of the *Trinity*].”⁵⁹ Thus, *circuminsessio* is found from the thirteenth century onward.⁶⁰ The literal meaning of *perichoreo* is ‘to dance around.’ It can mean, ‘to interchange,’ ‘to reciprocate,’ or ‘to interpenetrate.’ Which of these meanings it had in the original Greek when used by writers such as Gregory of Nazianzus is debated in the scholarship. Prestige generally argues that earlier meanings are ‘alternation’ or ‘rotation’ while ‘interpenetration’ is a

⁵⁸ Harrison, *Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers*,” 59. There seems to be some dispute about this. Horrell claims, “it is John of Damascus who explicitly employs the term *perichoresis* to describe the coinherence or mutual indwelling of the members of the Trinity.” See J. Scott Horrell. “Toward Clarifying a Biblical Model of the Social Trinity: Avoiding Equivocation of Nature and Order” Published in *Global Missiology, Trinitarian Studies*, January 2004, [www.globalmissiology.nethttp://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:qw67iZTt_dk\]:www.globalmissiology.org/english/docs_html/trinitarian/horrell_toward_clarifying_social_trinity.htm+albert+circumincessio&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us&client=firefox-a](http://www.globalmissiology.nethttp://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:qw67iZTt_dk]:www.globalmissiology.org/english/docs_html/trinitarian/horrell_toward_clarifying_social_trinity.htm+albert+circumincessio&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us&client=firefox-a) [Accessed June 21, 2010].

⁵⁹ Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 300.

⁶⁰ Kaspar, 284.

later use.⁶¹ *Circuminsessio* is derived from the Latin, *circum-in-sedere*, meaning 'to sit around.' *Circum-in-cessio* is derived from *circum-incedere*, meaning 'to walk or move around.' According to O'Carroll, "*Circumin(s)ession* emphasizes the abiding reality: *circumin(c)ession* the dynamic circulation of Trinitarian life from each to the others."⁶² Regarding the Latin terms, the first (*circuminsessio*) appeals more to the Latin mind which thinks first of the divine essence, the second (*circumincessio*) to the Greek "which begins from the persons, borne to each other eternally, irresistibly, by their very identity as subsistent relations. It is infinitely more than community or participation as we understand in human existence."⁶³ Walter Cardinal Kaspar also gives a possible hint regarding Thomas's understanding of these terms:

The Greeks start with the hypostases and understand the *perichoresis* as an active reciprocal penetration; the *perichoresis* is as it were the bond uniting the persons; the Latin theologians, on the contrary, usually start with the unity of the divine nature and understand the *perichoresis* more as a reciprocal coinherence on the basis of the one nature. In the Latins the *perichoresis* represents not so much movement in God as repose in God. Here, too, Thomas Aquinas seeks a synthesis; he bases the *perichoresis* both on the one nature and on the relations of origin.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Prestige, 54.

⁶² O'Carroll, 69.

⁶³ O'Carroll, "*Circumincession*," in *Trinitas*, 69. Interestingly enough, the text that O'Carroll uses to illustrate the concept of *circumincession* in Thomas Aquinas neither mentions this term explicitly nor even the term of mutual indwelling.

⁶⁴ Aquinas, *ST Ia*, q42, a5, quoted in Kaspar, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 284. It should be noted that Kaspar, a noted theologian and cardinal, takes *ST Ia*, q42 as St. Thomas's opinion on the *perichoresis* although Thomas never uses the technical Greek or Latin terminology for it.

Interestingly enough, a number of scholars accuse Thomas of using the “static” *circuminsessio*.⁶⁵ This assertion is false and should be corrected. Not only is God fully act, but he is a tri-personal unity distinguished by subsistent relationality, which is itself characterized by knowledge and love. Nothing can be imagined that is more opposed to a “static” view of the Trinity. Even Thomas’s usage of terms to refer to the mutual inherence of the Trinitarian persons is not static. One of the primary problems with the application of this tradition to its usage in the work of Thomas Aquinas is that *he never uses any of these terms one single time in his entire corpus*. Gilles Emery writes:

In presenting the “in being” of the persons, Thomas rather uses *union* or *intrinsic conjunction*, *interiority*,⁶⁶ *intimacy*,⁶⁷ *existing in*,⁶⁸ *being in that which is the most intimate and the most secret*⁶⁹ (this is how the Son is in the Father), *reciprocal communality of ‘in-being’*,⁷⁰ *communal union*,⁷¹ etc. In every case, the communal presence of the persons excludes their confusion, because it is based in their real distinction.⁷²

Thus, when Thomas refers to the mystery of the reciprocal interiority of the Trinity, what we do *not* find is the technical language developed for it. Even *mutua inhaesio* appears to be too technical a term.

⁶⁵ Buxton, 4; Walter Kaspar, 284.

⁶⁶ *In Ioan* 1.1, 45: “conjunctio intrinseca”, “intrinsecum”

⁶⁷ SCG IV, ch. 11, 3461: “intimum”

⁶⁸ DDN I.1, 32.: “existential in Patre”

⁶⁹ *In Ioan*. 14.10, 1895.

⁷⁰ DDN II.2, 155: “Mutuo enim Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre.”

⁷¹ DDN II.2, 148: “unitio ad invicem.”

⁷² Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 302.

We might expect to find a philosophy/theology of *mutua inhaesio* in the *Prima Pars*, q42, a5, which deals specifically with the mutual inherence of the Son and the Father. If Thomas were to use the language of *perichoresis/circumincessio*, it would be here; but this is not the case. There are at least two scholars who agree with us on the point that the *concept* of *mutua inhaesio* is present while the *term* is missing. Specifically referring to q42, a5, Emery concludes that, “This question gives us a real synthesis of the whole of Trinitarian doctrine.”⁷³ Moreover, in the article on “Circumincession” in O’Carroll’s article in *Trinitas*, this same article is quoted at length as Thomas Aquinas’s opinion on the matter.⁷⁴ It remains ironic that Thomas never uses the language of *circumincessio*. The language that we *do* find is simply Johannine. The *sed contra* of ST I, q42, a5 reads, “On the contrary, ‘I am in the Father and the Father is in Me.’”⁷⁵

To sum up, the concept of the *perichoresis/circumincessio/circumincessio* originally referred to the union of the human and divine natures of Christ, and was later developed into a more mature theological speculation essentially regarding how the Godhead can be simultaneously one and three – essentially equal, inseparable, and distinct. Still later, more modern usages include the mutual indwelling of the Spirit in the soul, the soul in God, and the Church in Christ. Ultimately, the concept of the

⁷³ Ibid., 298. I disagree with Emery on this point. The one person that is conspicuously missing is the nature of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and his identity as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. He is perhaps referring to the fact that the concepts of essence, relation and origin basically summarize Thomas’s key points on the differentiation of persons. Emery’s statement can, however, be misleading. There is no pneumatology in the article at all – the central point of the Holy Spirit as the shared love of the Father and the Son.

⁷⁴ Michael O’Carroll, “Circumincession,” *Trinitas: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Holy Trinity* (Michael Glazier Books, 1986), 69.

⁷⁵ John 14:10.

perichoresis is a mature development of Trinitarian theology after a long struggle with the Trinitarian and Christological heresies of the early church. Emery writes, “it excludes Arianism or Trithetism, since each person is contained in the others, and it excludes Sabellianism, since the three persons remain distinct within their reciprocal immanence.”⁷⁶ The concept is, therefore, eminently orthodox.

After a long analysis of many Trinitarian accounts, Walter Cardinal Kasper writes, “All the Trinitarian concepts thus far examined *lead to a final, all-inclusive basic concept: the being-in-one-another and mutual penetration of the divine persons, or the trinitarian perichoresis.*”⁷⁷ Moreover, Charles Twombly, in his dissertation on *Person and Perichoresis in John of Damascus*, concludes: “What binds them together, inseparably, in common substance, action and so on, is ‘their existence in one another,’ their mutual indwelling which is *summed up by the single word, perichoresis.*”⁷⁸ Gilles Emery also writes, “The reciprocal presence of the divine persons (q42, a.5)...gives us a real synthesis of the whole of Trinitarian doctrine....”⁷⁹ With these things in mind, the connection between the concept of the *perichoresis* and the concept of *mutua inhaesio* is evident.

The whole point of the concept of the *perichoresis* is to establish a literal understanding of the mutual indwelling of the Divine Persons. Precisely how literally

⁷⁶ Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 300-301.

⁷⁷ Kaspar, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 283 (Emphasis added). This statement certainly lends credence to our argument that *mutua inhaesio* is, in a way, the ultimate effect of love.

⁷⁸ Charles Twombly, “Person and *Perichoresis* in the Thought of John of Damascus” (Ph.d Diss., Emory University, 1992), 51. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁹ Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 298.

Thomas Aquinas meant this mutual inherence to apply to *human* love is precisely what is in question in this dissertation; but there is a relationship between the theology of the Indwelling and the philosophy of St. Thomas. As Faircy writes,

St. Thomas's theology of the Indwelling [sic] is based on a metaphysics of being. The problem is to move beyond a metaphysics of being to an understanding of the Indwelling in a framework within which the personal growth of the Christian can be seen as dependent on interpersonal relationships of the Indwelling.⁸⁰

We agree that Thomas's theology of indwelling is supported by a metaphysics of being.⁸¹ Faircy obviously agrees with our argument above that Thomas yokes a metaphysics of being with the theological notion of the *perichoresis*. Dionysius is one of the primary architects of the synthesis of the concept of *perichoresis* with a metaphysics of being.

THE INDWELLING OF ALL IN ALL: THE DIONYSIAN TRANSFORMATION OF LOVE

It has been mentioned above that the Dionysian vision of the 'oneness of all things' is either partially or largely responsible in influencing Thomistic thought on love. One of the most characteristic examples that Thomas cites concerning this oneness is the following: "And Dionysius says: God exists not in any single mode, but embraces and

⁸⁰ R.L. Faircy, "The Trinitarian Indwelling," *The Thomist* 35 (1971): 401.

⁸¹ It would be a very interesting question to pursue precisely what is based on what—is Indwelling based on a metaphysics of being, or vice versa? The interplay between the theology of indwelling and a philosophy of being may, in fact, be the privileged locus of understanding where theology and philosophy both meet and diverge in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.

prepossesses all being within Himself, absolutely and without limit.”⁸² Specifically, we suggest that it is the Dionysian teaching on the union/connaturality of the cosmos that assisted Thomas in applying a strictly Trinitarian concept (i.e., the *perichoresis*) to the mutual indwelling of human persons.⁸³ The love of the whole universe, particularly human love, exists as an analogy of Divine Love. Gilson states this beautifully:

The being of creatures is but an image and imitation of the Divine being; just as reflections flicker round a flame, multiply, decrease and vanish without the flame itself being affected, so the likenesses freely created by the Divine substance owe all the being they have to this substance, subsist only in it, *and yet borrow nothing of a mode of being per se which is not theirs....* In this meaning of a hierarchy it is easy to see the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius on the mind of St. Thomas. This influence is *incontestable....*⁸⁴

Based on what has already been written, however, we will sketch the influence of Dionysius on the Thomistic philosophy of love.

There is no Dionysian source quoted more than *De Divinis Nominibus* IV. No single work surfaces more often in the *De Amore*.⁸⁵ Moreover, the section of the

⁸² Dionysius, *DDN* IV, quoted in *SCG* I, cap. 28.

⁸³ Whether or not this is absolutely the case cannot be demonstrated. It would require another historical dissertation to establish this as a fact; indeed, even if it could be done so at all. This chapter has been written simply to indicate from where Thomas derived his sources as well as where Thomas *may* have derived some ideas for *mutua inhaesio* and the wider concept of *amor*.

⁸⁴ Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 352-3. (Emphasis added.)

Oddly enough, Gondreau places Dionysius among the “marginal sources” of Aquinas. The evidence of the *De Amore* shows that Gondreau is completely incorrect. Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 128.

⁸⁵ It was John Scotus Eriugena who translated the Dionysian corpus into Latin in the mid-800’s, making it accessible to the West. It has already been mentioned that Maximus the Confessor was a major bridge between Gregory of Nazianzus and St. John Damascene regarding the development of the concept of the *perichoresis*. Maximus is also a key figure who made the work of the Pseudo-Dionysius not so much accessible as

Commentary on the Sentences that is equivalent to the *De Amore* is governed entirely by the Dionysian definition of love, which Thomas defends against all objections.⁸⁶ The passages to which Thomas most often refers are the following:

What is signified [by love] is a capacity to effect a unity, an alliance, and a particular commingling in the Beautiful and the Good. It is a capacity that preexists through the Beautiful and the Good. It is dealt out from the Beautiful and the Good through the Beautiful and the Good. It binds the things of the same order in a mutually regarding union. It moves the superior to provide for the subordinate, and it stirs the subordinate in a return toward the superior.⁸⁷

Dionysius continues only several paragraphs later:

From the Hymns of Yearning by the most holy Hierotheus: When we talk of yearning, whether this be in God or an angel, in the mind or in the spirit or in nature, *we should think of a unifying and co-mingling power which moves the superior to provide for the subordinate, peer to be in communion with peer, and subordinate to return to the superior and the outstanding.*⁸⁸

Considering that this passage is taken up by Thomas Aquinas as his definition of love in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and quoted in parts in his work, it is an absolutely vital source of our understanding of Thomistic *amor*.

The primary topic of the *Divinis Nominibus IV* is actually a discussion of the Good, as well as a related extended discourse on the non-being of evil. The connection

acceptable in the West. This was affected no so much by direct commentaries on the work of Dionysius as “the rescue of Dionysius through his [Maximus’] orthodox restatement and reinterpretation of the Dionysian structure both in his theology and even more in his spirituality (See George Charles Berthold, “Maximus Confessor,” in Everett Ferguson, ed., *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* [New York: Garland Publishing, 1997].)

⁸⁶ See *In III Sententiarum*, d27, q1, a1.

⁸⁷ *DDN IV (PG 709d)*, trans. Colm Luibheid, *Classics of Western Spirituality* (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 81.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 83 (PG 713a-713b.) (Emphasis added.)

of the Good specifically with *love* begins when Dionysius notes that the sacred writers call the Good “beautiful, beauty, love, and beloved.”⁸⁹ The Good is not only the beloved object, but insofar as it is both beloved and love itself, the Good is also the driving force of the very search to acquire the beloved. He then goes on to state the teaching on the transcendentals that the Good is convertible with Being.⁹⁰ It is the Good and the Beautiful that not only cause the being of all things, but the movement-in-unity of all things. This movement-in-unity is equated with yearning, desire, and love.⁹¹ We will cite one of the most relevant Dionysian texts for Thomas’s overall vision of love and its connection to being.

This One Good and Beautiful is in Its oneness the Cause of all the many beautiful and good things. Hence comes the bare existence of all things, and hence their unions, their differentiations, their identities, their differences, their similarities, their dissimilarities, their communions of opposite things, the unconfused distinctions of their interpenetrating elements; the providences of the Superiors, the interdependence of the Co-ordinates, the responses of the Inferiors, the states of permanence wherein all keep their own identity. And hence again the intercommunion of all things according to the power of each; their harmonies and sympathies (which do not merge them) and the coordinations of the whole universe; the mixture of elements therein and the indestructible ligaments of things; the ceaseless succession of the recreative process in Minds and Souls and in Bodies; for all have rest and movement in That Which, above all rest and movement, grounds each

⁸⁹ Ibid., (PG 701c.) Refer to 1 Jn 4:16; Is 5:1; Ps. 45:2. Please note that the *sed contra* to the article on mutual indwelling is 1 Jn 4:16, to which Dionysius appears to refer.

⁹⁰ DDN IV, 704b. “The Beautiful is therefore the same as the Good, for everything looks to the Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is nothing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good.” (Colm Luibheid, trans.)

⁹¹ “And so it is that all things must desire, must yearn for, must love, the Beautiful and the Good.” (DDN IV #10, 708a)

one its own natural laws⁹² and moves each one to its own proper movement.⁹³

There can be no doubt that Thomas accepts that this Dionysian vision of love as the force behind all “rest and movement,” all “intercommunion of all things according to the power of each.” Love and metaphysics are intimately connected in St. Thomas. He writes:⁹⁴

And since all things proceed from God inasmuch as he is good, as Augustine says, and also Dionysius, therefore all creatures, according to an impression received from the Creator are, each according to its own mode, inclined by appetite to the good, so that a certain circular pattern is found in all things: for, having gone forth from the good, they tend toward the good.⁹⁵

The context of the passage is the question regarding whether or not all things have an aptitude for beatitude. Thomas, following both Dionysius and Augustine, replies in the affirmative.

⁹² In this ‘grounding of the natural law’ of Dionysius we see a possible source for Thomas’s idea of connaturality.

⁹³ *DDN IV*, (704b, c, #7), trans., C.E. Rolt.

⁹⁴ This insight should be joined with the scriptural insights that “*Deus est Caritas*” and “*Ego Sum Qui Sum*” (Gen 3:14) and their many patristic commentaries.

⁹⁵ *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q1, a3, qc. 1: “Et quia omnia procedunt a Deo in quantum bonus est, ut dicit Augustinus, et Dionysius; ideo omnia creata secundum impressionem a creatore receptam inclinantur in bonum appetendum secundum suum modum; ut sic in rebus quaedam circulatio inveniatur; dum, a bono egredientia, in bonum tendunt.”

Thomas makes mention himself that even some Presocratics perceived that Love is the first principle (of metaphysics) although they “did not formulate this explicitly or clearly.” (See *In. Metaphys.* I, lect. 5, 101) Additionally, there is some evidence of the Angelic Doctor’s acceptance of the Neo-Platonic *exitus* of all things from God and the circular *reditus* of all things back into God. Thus, we see the justification of the statement that the primeval “indwelling,” if we may be so bold, is that of all things in God (See pp. 86-7 for a further discussion of this.)

These definitions of Dionysius lead us directly into one of the key principles of Dionysian thought and St. Thomas's appropriation of it, thus a cornerstone of this dissertation: one of the most obvious influences on the Thomistic philosophy of love is the notion of love as a *unitive force*.⁹⁶ The relevant text is the following: "When we talk of yearning, whether this be in God or an angel, in the mind or in the spirit or in nature, we should think of a *unifying and co-mingling power* which moves the superior to provide for the subordinate, peer to be in communion with peer, and subordinate to return to the superior and the outstanding."⁹⁷ How are we to understand this proposition? We must make a very important observation regarding the translation of "*unitiva et concretiva*." To translate *concretiva* as "binding" is a grave mistake for the reason that it is synonymous term with "uniting" and fails to capture the reason why Dionysius added *concretiva* to the definition over and above the use of *unitiva*. Thomas states this reason very succinctly: "Thus, in addition to 'union' Dionysius adds 'concretion,' in order to

⁹⁶ See SCG I, cap. 91; Thomas mentions himself that even some Presocratics perceived that Love is the first principle (of metaphysics) although they "did not formulate this explicitly or clearly (See *In. Metaphys.* I, lect. 5, 101)." Additionally, there is some evidence of the Angelic Doctor's acceptance of the Neo-Platonic *exitus* of all things from God and the circular *reditus* of all things back into God. Thus, we see the justification of the statement that the primeval "indwelling," if we may be so bold, is that of all things in God. (See *ST* Ia, q37, a1, obj.3; *Ia* *IIae*, q25, a4, c; *Ia* *IIae*, q27, a5, c; *Ia* *IIae*, q29, a3, ad3 for explicit references. Other implicit references include *ST* I, q20, a3, ad3; *Ia*, q36, a4, ad1; *I*, q60, a2, obj. 2. Usually, "*Amor est unitiva virtus*"; sometimes "*amor est vis unitiva et concretiva* (*ST* I, q20, a3, obj. 3).

⁹⁷ *DDN* IV (PG 713a, b). What is more interesting about this text is that Dionysius himself credits the Hymns of Yearning of "the most holy Hierotheus" for this insight. Paul Rorem claims that this figure is "part of the overall fiction" of the work, at least regarding authorship and influence. (See Luibheid, trans. *Divine Names*, 69, n.128; See also B. Brons, "Pronoia und das Verhältnis von Metaphysik un Geschichte bei Dionysius Areopagita," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24 (1977): 165-186.

differentiate it from the first union, since those things are called ‘thoroughly mingled’⁹⁸ which are made to be simply one.”⁹⁹ We see in Dionysius’ definition of love as *unitiva* and *concretiva* a source for Thomas’ theory that the first two effects of love are *unio* and *mutua inhaesio*. If mere *unio* were sufficient, he would not have seen it necessary to add *mutua inhaesio* to the list of effects in *ST I-II*, q28, a2 because *mutua inhaesio*, like a concrete union, “makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.”¹⁰⁰ *In other words, the addition of the Dionysian concretiva is one of Thomas’s primary sources for defining mutua inhaesio as an aspect of love over and above that of union.*¹⁰¹

Dionysius is also integral to Thomas’s understanding of the relationship between love and union. First of all, it should be mentioned that Dionysius is not Thomas’s only source for the connection between love and union. We will see that other thinkers provide different dimensions to the concept of union, adding to it a special richness and

⁹⁸ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1: “Et ideo supra unionem addit concretionem, ad differentiam primae unionis, quia concreta dicuntur quae simpliciter unum sunt effecta.”

In the footnotes to his translation of this text, Kwasniewski adds that *concreta* in this context “has to be taken in its most literal sense: mingled or mixed together, and thus made solid, condensed, coherent.” (Peter Kwasniewski, *On Love and Charity: Readings from the “Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard”* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 2008), 125, n.(g).

⁹⁹ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1 ad5.

¹⁰⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, sed.: “...facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.” We will examine this more closely in Chapter Five.

¹⁰¹ Thomas himself explains what he means by concrete in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. He adds that over and above a mere union by contact, when it comes to the appetite, “there is a joining in the manner of continuity and concretion. For this reason love unites more than pleasure does, since it makes the lover to *be in* in his affection, the very one loved...” (Peter Kwasniewski, *On Love and Charity: Readings from the ‘Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2008), 135.

complexity. In the very short space of *ST Ia IIae*, q26, Thomas quotes a triumvirate of sources regarding union, all maintaining that union is either love itself or, in the very least, that union is the goal of love:

Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says.¹⁰²

Dionysius says that “love is a unitive force.”¹⁰³

The Philosopher says that union is the work of love.¹⁰⁴

These are mentioned in the short space of the first two articles.¹⁰⁵ This seems especially significant considering that union is not explicitly the topic of the discussion, but rather the nature of love itself. Obviously, Thomas sees the concept of union as closely related to the concept of love *per se* or he would not have made the concept so prevalent in q26. In fact, we will see in the following chapter how St. Thomas works out a “threefold relation of love to union” in the key locus of q28, a1 on union. The basic distinction is

¹⁰² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, arg2: “Amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum” (quoted from *De Trin.* VIII, 10); See also *DV III*, q22, arg9.

Though Augustine is cited as a source on the concept of union, It appear that in the Latin West union was not the basic category for describing the immediate experience of God in Thomas’s time. Though the concept of union is pervasive in Plotinus, St. Augustine’s dependence upon Plotinus does not apply to the concept of union. St. Augustine is generally unaware of union as a concept. (See Bernard McGinn, “Love, Knowledge, and Mystical Union in Western Christianity: Twelfth to Sixteenth Centuries,” *Church History* 56:1 (March, 1987): p. 8. Abbot Butler disagrees with this conclusion. See Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism*, 2nd. edition (New York: 1927), p. 62.

¹⁰³ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, ad2: “Dionysius dicit quod amor est virtus unitiva.”

¹⁰⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, ad2: “Et philosophus dicit, unio est opus amoris.”

¹⁰⁵ McEvoy locates Augustine as Thomas’s influence regarding the fact that love unites or seeks to unite those whom it influences. (See McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 29.) Though I agree with this, I think it is only a partial explanation. Dionysius seems a much more pervasive influence on this point than Augustine.

the following: 1) There is a union that is love itself¹⁰⁶, 2) There is a union that causes love¹⁰⁷, 3) There is a union that is the effect of love.¹⁰⁸ Though Thomas mentions both Aristotle and Augustine as sources of his concept of union, it is Dionysius that is most often cited as that idea's progenitor.

Upon closer inspection, Thomas appears to be trying to synthesize all of these sources, affirming that each one is correct according to specific distinctions. Considering the pre-eminence of the authors cited, we can see why Thomas would want to accept the authority of each of them. He is at pains to work out the reason why all of these thinkers are simultaneously correct. Observing the quotations above from q26, we see that the first union (Augustine) asserts that union is *love itself*. The second quotation (Dionysius) implies that union is the *cause of love*. The third quotation (Aristotle) claims that union is the *effect of love*. Could the fact that Thomas works out in q28, a1 this "threefold relationship" between union and love shortly after citing these various opinions on union in q26 be accidental? The precise meaning of these separate unions will be analyzed in Chapter Five. Even though other thinkers, particularly Aristotle and Augustine, are cited regarding the intrinsic relationship between union and love, there can be no doubt that Thomas cites Dionysius far more than any other on the concept of union. In *ST Ia IIae*, q26-28 alone, he mentions Dionysian union explicitly twice. The *sed contra* of q28, a1, which is the archetypal question on union, reads, "On the contrary,

¹⁰⁶ Affective Union.

¹⁰⁷ Substantial Union.

¹⁰⁸ Real Union.

Dionysius says that every love is a unitive love.”¹⁰⁹ It is to Dionysius then, that we should primarily look to understand the concept of union.

It should be no surprise that Dionysius is a major source of Thomas’s view of connaturality, considering that connaturality and union are concepts very closely aligned. The teaching that all things are one in God is very close to the teaching that there is a kind of intuitive or affective union between man and all things.¹¹⁰ The greatest and most pervasive unity is that of God himself. The second would be of all existent things in God—a kind of indwelling that is quite Neo-platonic insofar as every thing is “in” the One. Thomas quotes Dionysius very early on in the *Summa Theologiae* regarding this pervasive cosmic indwelling in the unity of God:

Even as the sun, as Dionysius remarks in Div. Nom. V, while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; ‘a fortiori’ should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, sed.: “Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva.”

¹¹⁰ There is also little doubt that Thomas combines this Dionysian vision with the idea of Aristotelian entelechy and the Roman idea of the *jus naturale*.

Maritain writes, “This notion of knowledge through connaturality is classical in the Thomist school. Thomas Aquinas refers in this connection to the Pseudo-Dionysius (DDN II) and to the *Ethics* 10.5, where Aristotle states that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of human actions. See Jacques Maritain, *On Knowledge Through Connaturality*, *The Review of Metaphysics* 4:4 (June 1951): 473.

¹¹¹ *ST Ia*, q4, a2, ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut sol, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., sensibilibus substantias et qualitates multas et differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso uniformiter praeaccipit; ita multo magis in causa omnium necesse est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem. Et sic, quae sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum, absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.”

Thus we can say that the widest philosophical sense of mutual indwelling is the pre-existence of all things in God, which is the pre-existence of all effects in the one and simple Cause. Indeed, this passion for complete unity is pervasive in Dionysius.

Thomas also cites Dionysius regarding this general unity: "I answer that, nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says (*DDN XIII*)."¹¹² The very fact that anything at all can be connatural with another is because all things pre-exist in the ultimate unity of God, who is simultaneously exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all things.¹¹³ *The ultimate mutual indwelling is that of the pre-existent union of all things in God.* Because of the influence of *DDN IV*, it is no surprise that we see the close connection of the concepts of connaturality, union, mutual indwelling, likeness, the Good, and love in the *Prima Secundae Pars* of St. Thomas.

A corollary of this Dionysian vision of unity-in-the-good and love as "a unitive power" is the principle that each thing tends toward what is *like* it. We must not construe this likeness to mean an image in the sense of an exemplar and its model (even though this sense of likeness is important), but rather a likeness in the sense of what is

¹¹² *ST Ia IIae*, q17, a4, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse secundum quid multa, et secundum quid unum. Quinimmo omnia multa sunt secundum aliquid unum, ut Dionysius dicit, ult. cap. de Div. Nom." It is interesting to note that the context is whether or not the command and the commanded act or one act or distinct. It is characteristic of Thomas to include this rather surprising general principles in what seem to be rather obscure contexts.

¹¹³ Interestingly, in the article mentioned above on the mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son, it is objected that the philosopher gives eight modes for existing "in" something else, but there is no way that orthodoxy could allow the Son existing in the Father as some kind of accident. Thomas replies that "The modes the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle..." This vision appears to be derived directly from Dionysius.

ST Ia, q42, a5, ad1: "Accedit tamen magis ad hoc modus ille, secundum quem aliquid dicitur esse in principio originante."

suitable, what is *connatural to*, what is *made for* a certain thing. To be certain, all things are like God insofar as he is not only their source, but also that all things pre-exist in him. Dionysius writes, “He is the subsistence of absolute similarity, and all the similarity in the world is similar to a trace of the divine similarity so that all creation is thereby made a unity.”¹¹⁴ The entire cosmos and everything in it, on account of indwelling in God, is similar to itself. Thomas takes this Dionysian inspiration and then sets an Aristotelian framework over it. What this means is that insofar as love and likeness are concerned, the relevant likeness is one of form or species. Thus, Dionysius can be seen as a source for Thomas’s understanding of *amor* as a “unitive force” based on the fact that all things pre-exist in God.

THE AUGUSTINIAN INHERITANCE

Along with the *perichoresis*, an equally vital source of *mutua inhaesio* is found in Augustine’s famous “psychological analogy” between the Trinity and the human psyche. The psychological analogy is based, however, on a natural *internal* imprint—a kind of natural indwelling—of the Trinity on the human soul. The psychological trinity of which we are speaking is Augustine’s famous theological development illustrating the Father, Son and Spirit as analogous to *mens*, *notitia* and *amor*, respectively.¹¹⁵ What is the relationship between the psychological analogy of the human *mens* to the Trinity and

¹¹⁴ DDN IX, (916a). Dionysius continues with the traditional teaching on analogy to God that while all things are similar to God, “they are dissimilar to him in that as effects they fall so very far short of their Cause and are infinitely and incomparably subordinate to him.” (Luibheid translation, 118)

¹¹⁵ See Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, 2.

the concept of mutual indwelling?¹¹⁶ If we are concerned in this dissertation about human mutual indwelling, which is intrinsically connected to a discussion of the nature of human interiority, then we must understand the nature of human interiority as Thomas understands it. It is indisputable that Thomas understands human interiority as a Trinitarian Image. The psychological analogy can be briefly described in Thomas's own language: "the likeness of image is found in human nature inasmuch as it is able to receive God, that is, by attaining to Him by its own operation of knowledge and love."¹¹⁷ There are other similar formulations of this principle: "[we are similar to God] by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image...."¹¹⁸ Bernard Lonergan affirms, "...the procedure of the *Summa* reveals very clearly the exact point of application and the measure of significance of the psychological *imago Dei* in Trinitarian thought,"¹¹⁹ and then ties this specifically to St. Augustine. One of the reasons why

¹¹⁶ The teaching on the psychological analogy of Augustine is variegated. See Ann Hunt, "Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology," *Theological Studies* 59 (1988): 197-218; Neil Ormerod, "The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity: At Odds with Modernity," *Pacifica* 14 (October 2001): 281-294. Available on-line at www.pacifica.org.au/volumes/volume14/issue03/the...nalogy-for.../pdf, [accessed December 16, 2009].

¹¹⁷ *ST* III, q4, a1, ad2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris."

¹¹⁸ *DP* III, q9, a9, c.: "Alio modo secundum eandem rationem operationis; et sic representatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere, et haec dicitur similitudo naturalis imaginis."

¹¹⁹ Bernard Lonergan. *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. In *Collected Works of*

Augustine's psychological analogy is so important— equally as important as the application of the *perichoresis* to human psychology — is because *mutua inhaesio* is according to the apprehensive and appetitive powers. In other words, the person himself is an analogue of *mens* (i.e., God the Father) his apprehensive power is analogous to God's *Verbum* (i.e., Jesus Christ), and his appetitive power is analogous to God's *Amor* (i.e., the Holy Spirit).

It is not without support that we discuss the psychological analogy of the person as *imago dei* in tandem with a discussion of the *perichoresis*. J.P. Torrell, has a section entitled 'Image and Indwelling' in his masterful work on the Angelic Doctor, indicating that this Thomistic master treats the two concepts as connected. There cannot be an "Indwelling" without something that indwells. Torrell's point is that *what indwells* is the image of God.¹²⁰ The basic connection is that the whole human person is seen as an

Bernard Lonergan, in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 21 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997): II: 214-15.

¹²⁰ Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), II: 90-94. Torrell mentions that the image of God has "three degrees of conformity to it model." (90) The first is man's natural aptitude to know and love God (which is the psychological image of man's powers to the Trinitarian Persons), the second is that man knows and loves God actually or habitually, though perhaps imperfectly, and the third is that man knows and loves God perfectly. (See *ST Ia*, q93, a4, c)

Note also the following text: "In creatures a likeness to this trinity appears in three ways. First as an effect reflects its cause; and in this way the principle of the whole Godhead, i.e. the Father, is represented by that which holds the first place in the creature, namely by being in itself one subsistent thing. The Word is represented by the form of each creature; because in those things which are done by an intellectual agent the form of the effect derives from the concept of his intelligence. Love is represented in the order of creatures: because from the fact that God loves himself, he directs all things to himself in a certain order. Wherefore this likeness is called a vestigiary likeness in that this bears the trace of the foot as an effect bears a trace of its cause. Secondly, by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image; because in order that

image of the perichoretic Trinity. In effect, the interwoven and commingling powers of the human person is an image of the eternal commingling perichoretic dance of the Trinity. Thus we see that Augustine's teaching about the *Imago Dei* via the psychological analogy is related to Thomas's teaching on *mutua inhaesio*.

The psychological analogy itself is based upon an understanding of the Trinitarian processions. In a very thoughtful analysis, Matthew Levering points out that Thomas's critique of the Christological and Trinitarian errors of Sabellius and Arius have profoundly metaphysical and therefore philosophical implications. Thomas makes it clear that if God the Son claims to have "proceeded" from the Father, we must know what "proceeded" means (particularly considering that they are spiritual beings). What

one thing be the image of another it must present a like species. Thirdly, on account of the unity of object, inasmuch as the rational creature understands and loves God: this is a kind of conformity of union that is found in the saints alone who understand and love the same thing as God understands and loves." (DP, q9, a9, c)

"Cuius quidem ternarii similitudo in creaturis apparet tripliciter: primo quidem sicut effectus repraesentat causam; et hoc modo principium totius divinitatis, scilicet pater, repraesentatur per id quod est primum in creatura, scilicet per hoc quod est in se una subsistens; verbum vero per formam cuiuslibet creaturae: nam in his quae ab intelligente aguntur, forma effectus a conceptione intelligentis derivatur; amor vero in ordine creaturae. Nam ex eo quod Deus amat seipsum, omnia ordine quodam in se convertit; et ideo haec similitudo dicitur vestigii, quod repraesentat pedem sicut effectus causam. Alio modo secundum eandem rationem operationis; et sic repraesentatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere, et haec dicitur similitudo naturalis imaginis; ea enim imaginem aliorum gerunt quae similem speciem praeferunt. Tertio modo per unitatem obiecti, in quantum creatura rationalis intelligit et amat Deum; et haec est quaedam unionis conformitas, quae in solis sanctis invenitur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus."

Torrell sees the relationship between "image" and "indwelling" in Thomas's teaching that though man's created image naturally and dimly images the Trinity, his re-created Image does so much more closely in that it is not only the powers of man that image God, but God's actual person indwells in him. (See Torrell, "Image and Indwelling," II: 90-94.) We might say that a more familiar analogy to this is when a son is very much like his father in temperment, intelligence, and specific talents, but that his father truly *dwells in* the Son when the Son actually pursues the father's similar dreams and goals.

sort of relation exists between the being of Jesus and the being of the Father is a profoundly metaphysical speculation. If the two are distinct, in what way are they distinct? Levering concludes, "Metaphysically, the concept of procession can either be understood in terms of outward, external processions, or in terms of inward, intellectual processions. Since the first way (outward processions) reduces Jesus to a mere creature, the second way is necessary. *This second way is the psychological analogy.*"¹²¹ In other words, it is according to the interiority of human operations of intellect and will that the Trinitarian processions have been understood by the Christian tradition.

Another major element of the Augustinian inheritance is the way in which Thomas drew on Augustine's concept of the entire cosmos as a kind of harmony where each being is connatural to every other being according to hierarchical relationships.¹²² Considering that Thomas defines love strictly as a passion in *ST Ia IIae, q26, a1*, we need to constantly keep in mind this broader, more metaphysical definition of *amor*. Citing Augustine, Thomas maintains that love is a uniting principle that seeks to bond both lover and beloved.¹²³ Thus, *amor* is much more than a passion. As we have already seen, all things are held together by love. As Thomas affirms, "We answer that it is

¹²¹ See Matthew Levering, "Essence, Persons, and the Question of Trinitarian Metaphysics," In *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 153-4. (Emphasis added.)

¹²² SCG II, cap. 21: "Omne agens instrumentale exequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi."

"Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself."

¹²³ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, c.*

necessary to place love in God. For the first movement of the will and of every appetitive power is love."¹²⁴

We see this particularly in Thomas's re-working of Augustine's concept that love is like weight. Referencing St. Augustine, Thomas notes, "In spirits, love is like weight in bodies."¹²⁵ This notion of love as a kind of "weight" is very important to St. Thomas, insofar as one of Thomas's preferred analogies for the nature of the will's movement is to an object that inclines naturally toward the center of gravity because of its weight. This "inclining" is love. The following passage makes essentially the same points, illustrating Thomas's understanding of Augustine's proposition that "love is like the weight of bodies.":

Although several acts are viewed to belong to the will such as to desire, to delight, to hate, and other kinds like this, we nonetheless find that love is the common root and principle of them all. We can accept this from the following points. The will, in truth, as has been said, is itself related to intellectual things just as the natural inclination is related to natural things, which is said to be the natural appetite. However, the natural inclination arises because the natural thing possesses an affinity and correspondence according to form – which we have said to be the principle of the inclination – with that thing to which it is moved, rather like a heavy thing [gravitates towards] a lower place. Whence also every inclination of the will arises from this: that through an intelligible form something is apprehended as suitable or moving/attractive. To be affected/moved, insofar as it is of this kind, is to love that thing. Therefore, every inclination of the will and also of the sensitive appetite has its origin from love.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor." (Translation mine.)

¹²⁵ *DQT*, Vol. 3, q24, a11, arg3: "Amor autem, secundum Augustinum, in spiritibus, est sicut pondus in corporibus."

¹²⁶ *SCG IV*, cap. 19: "Cum autem ad voluntatem plures actus pertinere videantur, ut desiderare, delectari, odire, et huiusmodi, omnium tamen amor et unum principium et communis radix invenitur. Quod ex his accipi potest. Voluntas enim, ut dictum est, sic se habet in rebus intellectualibus sicut naturalis inclinatio in rebus naturalibus, quae et

The above passage contains the following points: 1) Natural inclination toward a specific end is due to an existent possessing certain form (i.e., the principle of entelechy), 2) The will is to the human person what the natural inclination is to the inclined object, 3) It could not tend toward any object without there being an aptitude or connaturality for that object (i.e., the principle of connaturality). In sum, we should notice the similarity between Augustine and Aquinas on the pervasive notion that whether it is natural, sensitive or rational, any inclination whatsoever has the force of *amor*.

ARISTOTELIAN FRIENDSHIP

It goes without saying that one of the single greatest influences on the thought of Thomas Aquinas is Aristotle.¹²⁷ The same applies to Thomas's philosophy of friendship as well, considering that friendship is the paradigm for love in scholastic thought. The reason for this is that even *caritas*, which is the divinely supreme form of self-giving, self-sacrificial love, is a species of friendship. Thomas never wrote his own version of *De Amicitia*. Still, Torrell, quoting Thomas, entitled an entire chapter of his masterpiece,

naturalis appetitus dicitur. Ex hoc autem oritur inclinatio naturalis, quod res naturalis habet affinitatem et convenientiam secundum formam, quam diximus esse inclinationis principium, cum eo ad quod movetur, sicut grave cum loco inferiori. Unde etiam hinc oritur omnis inclinatio voluntatis, quod per formam intelligibilem aliquid apprehenditur ut conveniens vel afficiens. Affici autem ad aliquid, in quantum huiusmodi, est amare ipsum. Omnis igitur inclinatio voluntatis, et etiam appetitus sensibilis, ex amore originem habet." (My translation.)

¹²⁷ Torrell notes that neither Cicero's *De Amicitia* nor Aelred of Riveaux's works on love and friendship are mentioned by the Angelic Doctor. They are perhaps the two most conspicuously absent works, considering the topic at hand. (Torrell, II: 277, n.4.)

“Without Friends, Who Would Want to Live?”¹²⁸ Obviously, the concept plays a pervasive role in the Thomistic philosophy of love. A dissertation on St. Thomas’s theory of love would be remiss without some comments on his primary Aristotelian source in Books VIII and IX of the *Ethics*. We will briefly outline what Aristotle claims in those books, and then comment on some Thomistic transformations of those Aristotelian concepts.

The work of Aristotle is notable insofar as he generally used the word *philia* to embrace nearly all kinds of relationships—whether those of citizens, husband and wife, true friends, etc. It is from Aristotle that Thomas receives the philosophical ammunition to place *caritas* as a species of *amicitia*, which is a relationship based upon mutual similarity. The sense of *philia* and *philein* in Greek is even wider than its vague English translation in the word “friendship.”¹²⁹ Aristotle never really systematically discusses *agape* other than as a kind of “first principle” proposed originally by Parmenides,¹³⁰ but he does discuss *philia*. In a key text in *Ethics* VIII, we see Aristotle himself relate *philia* with *agape* and mutual love:

The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only

¹²⁸ Torrell, II: 276-308. Thomas repeats this adage in *ST* IIa IIae, q74, a2, c. In that context, he quotes, “no man can live without friends” from Aristotle’s *Ethics* VIII, 1, as well as *Ecclus.* 6:15: “Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend” (*amico fideli nulla est comparatio*).

¹²⁹ Wanda Cizewski notes that in the Nichomachean *Ethics* VIII & IX, “Aristotle uses *philia* to refer to ordinary affection within family or kinship groups (1159b-1160a10-30), to an attitude of trust between business partners, members of clubs, associations, or fraternities (1160a19-30), and also to the esteem in which fellow citizens might hold each other or their head of state (1160a1; 1161a10-14).” (See Wanda Cizewski, “Friendship with God? Variations on a Theme in Aristotle, Aquinas, and Macmurray,” *Philosophy and Theology* 6:4 (1992): 371.

¹³⁰ See for example Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 4; III, 4; IV, 5.

the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the pleasant that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is that which seems lovable. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word "friendship"; for it is not mutual love,¹³¹ nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add "when it is recognized"? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.¹³²

Friendship must go beyond goodwill because simply bearing goodwill toward someone does not mean that the feeling is mutual; thus, this goodwill must be "mutually recognized." Aristotle grants that friendship based on pleasure or usefulness merits the name of friendship, but qualifies this by adding "but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake." Thus, at least initially in the discussion of friendship in the *Ethics*, Aristotle lays out that three qualifications must be met in order for a true friendship to exist: 1) *goodwill*, that is 2) *mutually recognized*, and 3) *for the other's sake*.

¹³¹ We note that the word Aristotle uses for "mutual love" is *antiphilēsis*, which may be translated as "love for love," literally "love (or friendly affection instead of/in place of friendly affection). Liddell & Scott, *An Intermediate Greek/English Lexicon*, 7th. Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889). Liddell & Scott notes that both Plato and Xenophon use *antiphilēo* for "returned love."

¹³² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII, 2 (1155b17-1156a5).

Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* provide one of the most comprehensive discussions of friendship in the philosophical tradition. Cizewski summarizes them well:

Aristotle's discussion of *philia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is structured around three sets of relationships and the permutations to be found within them. First, he distinguishes among the degrees of *philia* in relationships based upon mutual appreciation for or exchange of the useful, the pleasant, and the good (1156a6-1156b33). Next, he distinguishes among relationships based on equality and relationships based on varying degrees of inequality (1158b11-1159b24). Finally, he distinguishes among relationships within the family, within the state, and in the society of human persons at large (1159b25-1162a34).¹³³

Additionally, among the more important arguments of Book Eight are various arguments on the status of friendship between equals and un-equals, the fact that love is not merely an emotion but involves a choice, and some interesting points about the status of friendship with one's self.¹³⁴ Guy Mansini notes that at the heart of Book IX are three arguments given for the necessity of friendship: 1) the virtuous man can better observe his friend's actions than his own, and a friend is "another self," (1169b29-1170a4); 2) happiness consists in activity and continuous activity is more easily maintained with friends (1170a4-11) and 3) the happy man needs friends (1170a13-1170b81).¹³⁵

¹³³ Cizewski, 371. Guy Mansini thinks that the most important part of Bk. 9 is the argument that the happy man needs friends, "Aristotle on Needing Friends," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 72:3 (1998): 405. For some other opinions, see Cooper, John M. "Friendship and the Good in Aristotle." *The Philosophical Review* 86:3 (1977): 290-315; and Richard Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 141.

¹³⁴ See Madigan, A. "EN IX 8: Beyond Egoism and Altruism?" *The Modern Schoolman* 62 (1985): 1-20.

¹³⁵ Mansini, "Aristotle on Needing Friends," 405-6.

Daniel Schwartz's conclusion about Aquinas's differences from Aristotle on friendship is that the saint is "more flexible and more able to accommodate disagreement and lack of mutual knowledge than that proposed by Aristotle." This difference is primarily due to *amicitia's* transformation by the Christian self-sacrificing concept of *caritas*.¹³⁶ Indeed, there is likely no single source that is more transformative of Aristotelian *philia* than what John ascribes to Jesus's confession at His Last Supper, "I call you no longer servants, but friends."¹³⁷ We will have the opportunity to comment at further length on the concept of *caritas* shortly.

Torrell maintains that Thomas's *amicitia* contains the nuances of Aristotelian *philia* while being transformed by the Latin tradition (particularly Cicero) and its concomitant re-interpretation by twelfth-century monks such as the notably enigmatic Bernard.¹³⁸ According to McEvoy, Thomas solves the dilemma of love by interposing *philia* between *eros* and *agape*. In other words, love must first be personalized by goodwill; then, raised from the pull of mere desire, it becomes *amor amicitiae*. McEvoy points out that the only two basic words for love in Greek were *eros* and *philia*. One of the major differences between Aristotle's discussion of *philia* and Thomas's discussion of *amicitia* is in the unavoidable problems that result in translation. *Amor* and *amicitia* have a single root in the Latin verb *amare*. McEvoy further indicates that "St. Thomas was obliged by the nature of the Latin language to place the discussion of *amicitia* within

¹³⁶ Daniel Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), viii.

¹³⁷ John 15:15.

¹³⁸ Torrell, II: 277.

the context of *amor*, thus making friendship a form of love.”¹³⁹ McEvoy concludes that “*amicitia* morally defines *amor*, and it is in turn *amicitia* that creates a conceptual passage to charity, the love by which God has first loved us.”¹⁴⁰ It is only at this point where love, seeing in the other “another self,” can be purified by *caritas*.¹⁴¹

Aquinas became acquainted with some of Aristotle’s ideas on friendship through Cicero. As one of the major translators of Aristotelian ideas into Latin, Cicero also had to labor with the differences between Greek and Latin. It is well-known that Cicero had an influence on Augustine’s theory of friendship, but there is no evidence that Cicero had a direct influence on that of Thomas Aquinas.¹⁴² Though Thomas borrowed heavily from Augustine, one thing he did *not* adopt is the notion that *amor*, *dilectio*, *amicitia* and *caritas* are generally synonymous terms.¹⁴³ It is likely that beyond these specifics, the basic influence of Augustine is pervasive insofar as the idea of the classical, elitist ideal of friendship is wedded to the sweeping Christian notion of *caritas* as a love that must be extended toward all men by virtue of their common humanity under God.¹⁴⁴ Thus, another key transformation of Aristotelian *philia* in Thomas is the fact that Thomas does

¹³⁹ Ibid., 27.

¹⁴⁰ McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 37.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴² See T.J. Van Bavel, “The Influence of Cicero’s Ideal of Friendship on Augustine,” in *Augustiniana Traiectina*, ed. J. den Boeft and J. van Ort (*Etudes Augustiniennes*, Paris, 1987, 59-72.) For some classical influences of friendship on Augustine see James McEvoy, “Friendship and Mutual Deception in Book IV of the Confessions of St. Augustine,” in *Eklogai: Studies in Honour of Thomas Finan and Gerard Watson*, ed. K. McGroarty, Maynooth, 2001, 3-19.

¹⁴³ See McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 29.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 29.

not write about man in the individualistic terms that have predominated in the West since the Renaissance and Reformation (nor as the great-souled *spoudaios*¹⁴⁵ of Aristotle), but always in the context of the *ecclesia*, which is the community of saints bound in an over-arching unity in the Trinitarian God.¹⁴⁶ Regarding the major transformation of Aristotelian friendship, Torrell locates it in not only in the Gospel of John but also in the thought of Cicero and the Stoic natural law tradition. Aristotle's *philia*, circumscribed to the *polis* and its noble men, is far too narrow for Thomas. Thomas found in Stoicism's notion of the "citizen of the world" a ready philosophical tool for the universalism of Christianity.¹⁴⁷ Man requires friends for his happiness not only because of natural inclination but also because of his supernatural destiny. Thomas himself writes, "for as all men form one species, each individual man is by nature the friend of all others."¹⁴⁸ This notion, though also distinctly Christian, also contains echoes of the Stoic conception of *philanthropia*¹⁴⁹ in a strange juxtaposition with the Christian *ecclesia*. It is apparent that Thomas Aquinas takes the natural gregariousness of Aristotle to an entirely new level. The friendship of persons is always *present in* a larger political community, which is

¹⁴⁵ According to the glossary that Martin Ostwald provides in his translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *spoudaios* (σπουδαίος) is "literally, 'serious man,' whom Aristotle frequently invokes for purposes similar to those which make modern laws invoke the 'reasonable man.' However, Aristotle's stress is less on the reasonableness of a man under particular circumstances than on a person who has a sense of the importance of living his life well and of fulfilling his function in society in accordance with the highest standards." (See Martin Ostwald, trans., *Nicomachean Ethics*, 314.)

¹⁴⁶ Torrell, II: 277.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 280.

¹⁴⁸ Thomas, *Liber de perfectionione spiritualis vitae*, cap. 14: "...quia enim omnes homines conveniunt in natura speciei, omnis homo est naturaliter omni homini amicus.

¹⁴⁹ James McEvoy, "The Other as Oneself," 18.

itself always present in the community of humanity that together share a likeness insofar as they all participate (and exist within) the same Ultimate Cause. Thus, it could be said that any mutual indwelling between friends comes into being through the pre-existent political and social community as well as the universal community of human persons.

There can be little doubt that Thomas's annexation of Aristotle's teaching that a friend is an *alter ipse* is a cornerstone of *mutua inhaesio*. Thomas received this notion from Aristotle via Robert Grossteste's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁵⁰ After all, if a friend is "another self," then they, in a way, share the same form.¹⁵¹ Thomas often teaches and completely accepts Aristotle's idea that true friends share goods, common goals, wisdom, and even emotions.¹⁵² In conclusion, it should be mentioned that even Aristotle's teaching of the friend as "another self" finds a ready equivalent in Scripture. Sirach writes, "Another is a friend, a boon companion, who will not be with you when sorrow comes. When things go well, he is your other self...."¹⁵³ Thomas himself quotes this passage in his *Commentary on St. John*, Chap. 3, lecture 5. With what has already been stated above concerning Thomas's notion of the *ecclesia* as the indwelling spirit of God in the whole church, Thomas takes Aristotle's notion of the *alter ipse* to a new level. Thus, we see that Thomas (through the Tradition) makes several major transformations of Aristotle's notion of friendship: 1) He made *amicitia* the moral compass for *amor*, 2) He purified *amicitia* with *caritas*, making it possible to be friends with God and one's

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 17.

¹⁵¹ We will examine this idea of the friend as *alter ipse* in detail in Chapter Two.

¹⁵² For Aristotle on friends as *alter ipse*, see *Ethics* 9.4 (1166a31-32); *Rhetoric* 2.4 (1380b35-1381a).

¹⁵³ Sirach 6:10b-11a.

enemies, 3) He spiritually transformed the social relations of the Aristotelian *politeia* into a more spiritual, cosmic *ecclesia* through the indwelling spirit of God and, 4) By the same principle (of the indwelling Spirit), he was able to deepen and enrich the concept of the friend as *alter ipse*. These points will be made more understandable once we briefly review the Johannine transformation of Aristotle's idea of *philia* in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST, *CARITAS*, AND *MUTUA INHAESIO*

Aristotle certainly had the idea that in a certain way, a friend "dwelled within" another insofar as he saw him as an *alter ipse* and shared common pursuits and ideals with him. This is part of the meaning of *amicitia*. But the Christian tradition possesses an entirely transformed idea of the power of love. When the creator of the universe literally *is* love, and exists as a personal force within those He loves and vice versa, we see a radical transformation in the meaning of *amor*. Thomas gathers much inspiration for his construction of the concept of *amor*, and certainly of *mutua inhaesio*, from St. John the Evangelist. It is St. John who is the authority in the *sed contra* of the article on *mutua inhaesio* itself: "On the contrary, it is written (1 Jo 4:16), 'He who remains in charity remains in God and God in him.'"¹⁵⁴ It is St. John who asserts, "*Deus Caritas est.*"¹⁵⁵ Precisely how far this inspiration goes or how it can be separated from the other

¹⁵⁴ "Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo." (Translation mine.)

¹⁵⁵ 1 Jo. 4:8.

traditions is much more difficult to assert.¹⁵⁶

What did it mean for St. Thomas that God *is* love? The first time that Thomas mentions John 1 Jo. 4:16 in the *Summa*, he does so in the context of the *sed contra* just as he does so in the *sed contra* of the article on *mutua inhaesio*. There must be love in God because “the first movement of the will and of absolutely every appetitive power is love.”¹⁵⁷ From this explanation we might be tempted to think that love is something only found *in* God rather than a definition of His very nature. Thomas further explains later in the *Summa* specifically in his explanation of *caritas*, “The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness.”¹⁵⁸ We should keep in mind that Thomas is replying to the objection that since God *is* love (where he again quotes 1 Jo. 4:16) then love cannot be something in the soul because charity is God himself. Thomas replies that simply because God is charity it need not exclude the fact that *caritas* is also something in the human soul.¹⁵⁹ It is Johannine that God is love and that God can mutually exist within Himself and within another person through love. We do not have to take a far step to see the formulation of *mutua inhaesio* as an effect of love. A few comments should be made on how *caritas* exists in the soul as a participation in God’s

¹⁵⁶ Peter Kwasniewski comments that q28 is “profoundly scriptural not only in thematic inspiration, but in argument and purpose as well. All six effects are most strikingly unfolded in the Gospel and Epistles of John. When speaking of love, Dionysius, for all the coloring he adds, is as transparent to his sources as stained glass to sunlight.” (Kwasniewski, 206).

¹⁵⁷ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, c.: “Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor.” Note that Thomas does not use the word *caritas* in this context, but *amor*. We cannot ascribe the nature of God to *caritas* alone. God is the source and principle of all kinds of love.

¹⁵⁸ *ST IIa IIae*, q23, a2, ad1: “Quod ipsa essential divina caritas est, sicut et sapientia est, et sicut bonitas est.”

¹⁵⁹ *ST IIa IIae*, q23, a2, ad1 and ad2.

love, and how what we have already presented on both the psychological analogy and the *perichoresis* helps to fill out this Johannine inspiration.

It is one thing for God to dwell in man (and vice versa) and another for God to dwell in God. It is only the latter that can properly be called the *perichoresis* as we have already seen. We may find a theological basis for *mutua inhaesio* in Thomas's teachings on the mutual indwelling of God in man, which is itself based on the indwelling of God in God. We have already seen in the section on Dionysius that the entire cosmos bears a certain likeness to its Creator, but we know from Genesis 1:26 that there is an even more intimate likeness between God and man. The following passage makes a connection between the operations of the Divine Trinity and the operations of will and intellect in man:

We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding itself, produces its word within itself: this word is the intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea, existing in the soul: and when it loves itself, it reproduces itself in the will as loved. Further than this it does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle, when by love it returns to the very substance whence the procession began in the idea: there is however a procession towards external effects, when through love of self one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in the mind; the mind itself in its natural existence, which is the starting-point of the procession; in the intellect, the conception of the mind; and in the will, the mind loved. Yet these three are not one nature, since the mind's act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not persons, since they are not subsistent: nor is the mind, in its natural existence, a person, for it is not the whole subsistence, but only part of the subsistence, that is to say, of man. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness to the divine Trinity, as regards the processions which multiply the Persons. For we have sufficiently shown that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine procession: God begotten, as the word is conceived in the intellect, and this is the Son; and God proceeding as love, namely, the Holy Ghost. There are no further processions within the divine nature, but only those that terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in that Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost are of one nature, and each of them is a perfect Person, since God's very being is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence the divine likeness is reproduced in man, as the likeness of Hercules is reproduced in stone, in respect of the form represented, but not only by community of nature: wherefore God's image is stated to be in the human mind (Gen. I, 26): "Let us make man to our own image."¹⁶⁰

To comment on this passage in its entirety would be beyond the scope of what we are studying. What is important is that Thomas clearly draws a comparison between the divine likeness as it is in itself (i.e., *perichoresis*) and the processions of love and intellect in the human person: the procession of intellect is likened to the procession of the Son from the Father and the procession of love is likened to the procession of the Holy Spirit from them both. The Holy Spirit exists as the love of the Father and the Son who

¹⁶⁰ SCG IV, cap. 26: "Huius autem divinae Trinitatis similitudinem in mente humana possumus considerare. Ipsa enim mens, ex hoc quod se actu intelligit, verbum suum concipit in seipsa: quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa intentio intelligibilis mentis, quae et mens intellecta dicitur, in mente existens. Quae dum ulterius seipsam amat, seipsam producit in voluntate ut amatum. Ulterius autem non procedit intra se, sed concluditur circulo, dum per amorem redit ad ipsam substantiam a qua processio incoeperat per intentionem intellectam: sed fit processio ad exteriores effectus, dum ex amore sui procedit ad aliquid faciendum. Et sic tria in mente inveniuntur: mens ipsa, quae est processionis principium, in sua natura existens; et mens concepta in intellectu; et mens amata in voluntate. Non tamen haec tria sunt una natura: quia intelligere mentis non est eius esse, nec eius velle est eius esse aut intelligere. Et propter hoc etiam mens intellecta et mens amata non sunt personae: cum non sint subsistentes. Mens etiam ipsa, in sua natura existens, non est persona: cum non sit totum quod subsistit, sed pars subsistentis, scilicet hominis. In mente igitur nostra invenitur similitudo Trinitatis divinae quantum ad processionem, quae multiplicat Trinitatem cum ex dictis manifestum sit esse in divina natura Deum ingenitum, qui est totius divinae processionis principium, scilicet patrem; et Deum genitum per modum verbi in intellectu concepti, scilicet filium; et Deum per modum amoris procedentem, scilicet spiritum sanctum. Ulterius autem intra divinam naturam nulla processio invenitur, sed solum processio in exteriores effectus. In hoc autem deficit a repraesentatione divinae Trinitatis, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unius naturae, et singulis horum est persona perfecta, eo quod intelligere et velle sunt ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum est. Et propter hoc, sic consideratur divina similitudo in homine sicut similitudo Herculis in lapide: quantum ad repraesentationem formae, non quantum ad convenientiam naturae. Unde et in mente hominis dicitur esse imago Dei: secundum illud Gen. 1-26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram."

mutually dwell within the other.¹⁶¹ *Mutua inhaesio*, more than any other effect of love, appears to be some kind of analogy to the Holy Spirit.

It would make sense that if a human being is to dwell in God and vice versa, then it must be according the power and indwelling of the Holy Spirit, who is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. We see that this is precisely the case. *Caritas* is made possible by the presence of the Holy Spirit which exists as a new mode of being within us.¹⁶² Thomas himself asserts that if a human being is to be a friend of God, there must be some kind of communication established between them.¹⁶³ It is the Holy Spirit that is principle of the communication of God's Goodness.¹⁶⁴ It is only after such an indwelling is affected that man may extend this friendship to his fellow man, which the Holy Spirit makes him love for God's sake.¹⁶⁵ According to Torrell, "Though the Philosopher continues to furnish the definitional structure, the elements are radically changed because the good around which the communion between God and man is established, as well as the communion among men, is the divine life communicated by grace."¹⁶⁶ *Therefore, in order for caritas to be possible at all, the indwelling of a Divine Person*

¹⁶¹ *ST Ia*, q42, a5.

¹⁶² *ST Ia*, 8, a3, ad4; q43, a3; q43, a4, ad2; *I Sent.*, d15, q5, a1, q2, ad4. For a much more detailed discussion of the way God exists as *caritas* in the human soul, see Paul J. Wadell, "An Interpretation of Aquinas' Treatise on the Passions, the Virtues, and the Gifts from the Perspective of Charity as Friendship with God," (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1985).

¹⁶³ See *ST IIa IIae*, q23, a1.

¹⁶⁴ *SCG IV*, chap. 26.

¹⁶⁵ Cizewski, "Friendship with God," 376.

¹⁶⁶ Torrell II: 277 (Emphasis added).

is absolutely necessary. Quite simply, mutual indwelling is the sweetest fruit of *caritas*.

Thomas writes:

It is clear that God must love very much those whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the Holy Ghost: for He would not bestow so great a good except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord's Person: I love them that love me (Prov. viii. 17), not as though we had first loved God, but because he hath first loved us (1 Jo. iv. 10). Now everything that is loved is in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Ghost is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. iv. 16): He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him: and again (ibid. 13): In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us; because he hath given us of his Spirit.¹⁶⁷

Commenting on this text, Torrell concludes that it refers to the "affective circumincession" which unites all the church's members. He further states:

The learned term [*circumincession*] with which theology designates the mutual presence of the three Persons in the unutterable unity of the Trinity, may also be used to signify that the ecclesial union realizes at a created level something of the ineffable intra-Trinitarian exchange. In truth, this is the very definition of friendship that Thomas borrows from Aristotle and puts to work in his conception of charity, which allows him to think about this mystery.¹⁶⁸

We could not possibly fare better than having the Holy Spirit dwell within us as the lover dwells in the beloved. Though it is difficult to make precise connections, it is not difficult to see that Thomas possessed a theological framework for *mutua inhaesio* in the general tradition concerning the *perichoresis*, in the Holy Spirit as the mutual love

¹⁶⁷ SCG IV, cap. 21: "Manifestum est quod Deus maxime amat illos quos sui amatores per spiritum sanctum constituit, non enim tantum bonum nisi amando conferret, unde Proverb. 8-17 dicitur ex persona domini: ego diligentes me diligo; non quasi nos prius dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. 4-10. Omne autem amatum in amante est. Necesse est igitur quod per spiritum sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 4-16: qui manet in caritate in Deo manet, et Deus in eo; et iterum: in hoc intelligimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de spiritu suo dedit nobis."

¹⁶⁸ Torrell II: 165.

between the Father and the Son, and in the conception of the mutual indwelling of God and man through the Holy Spirit. If it is true that *the effect* of the Holy Spirit is the mutual indwelling of God and man, is it too far to make the step that by analogy, the proper effect of *amor* is a similar kind of indwelling among persons?

We have already seen that Thomas takes up Augustine's teaching on the psychological analogy to prove essentially two things: 1) that the powers of man's soul are a natural image of God and 2) that God can dwell in man when man stretches forth his powers to God. *But it appears to require an additional step or jump in logic to apply this analogy to a human person dwelling in another human person.* I think that it is the inspiration of St. John that helps Thomas makes this logical step. Thomas gives us a rare hint regarding this additional step in the *sed contra* of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, on mutual indwelling. He writes,

On the contrary, it is written (1 John 4:16): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.¹⁶⁹

It seems that the Augustinian view of the *imago dei* required an additional transformation by an essentially Johannine idea. Though this will be commented on at length in the chapter on *mutua inhaesio*, we posit a brief analysis here in order to justify reviewing Thomas's theological sources in a philosophical dissertation. The analogy is indicated by the phrase, "for the same reason (*eadem ratione*)."¹⁶⁹ What is the logic that Thomas constructs here? What are the premises that are linked by *eadem ratione*?

First of all, we see that charity is the love of God. Insofar as charity *is* the love of

¹⁶⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, sed.: "Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso."

God, charity both *is* God and is *in* God. Therefore, he that dwells *in* charity dwells also *in* God. Thomas then asserts that *for this same reason* we may affirm that there is a mutual indwelling of a *human* lover and beloved. It would be fair to ask what this reason might be. The phrase, “for the same reason” indicates the construction of the analogy between the Divine Persons and the inner powers of the human person. The consequence of the analogy is to equate the very being of the human person with the procession/power of love possessed by a person. The human lover both has this love existing in himself and loves by a procession that is analogous to God’s love. It is *for this same reason* that whomever we love dwells in us, and us in God.

At least on the level of *caritas*, Thomas makes the relationship between God and man primary, which is a relationship Aristotle found impossible.¹⁷⁰ Though he does not truly develop the idea, J.P. Torrell notes that Thomas made a key transformation of Aristotelian *philia* via John 15:15: “I no longer call you servants, but *friends*.”¹⁷¹ That the recorder of these words is known as “The Beloved Disciple” only makes the passage more resonant.¹⁷² We can be friends of God because God mutually indwells in us

¹⁷⁰ See *Nicomachean Ethics* (1159a5).

¹⁷¹ Torrell, II: 277. See also Mary Margaret Pazdan, O.P., “Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Biblical Interpreters: ‘I Call You Friends’ (John 15:15),” *New Blackfriars* 86:1005 (Sep. 2005): 465-477.

¹⁷² There are limits to the theological transformation. L. Gregory Jones concludes, “Friendship is central to both Thomas’s and Aristotle’s accounts of the moral life; but Thomas differs from Aristotle in making friendship with God the primary relation. Moreover, Thomas’s discussion of charity as friendship with God is seemingly dependent on a Christological and sacramental referent which he does not provide in that context, and he does not even discuss the possibility of inner-Trinitarian friendship (God as God’s own best friend).... Thomas ‘baptizes’ Aristotle’s account of friendship” but “Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover’ constrains his account of the moral possibility and

through his love, thus establishing a kind of communication between God and man that was not possible in Aristotelian thought. The inspiration of St. John helped Thomas to connect the Aristotelian idea of *philia* as merely sharing life and ideals in common to actually sharing one's very *person* through the power of love. In short, if God can dwell in man by love, perhaps man can dwell in each other through a similar love.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to provide both a general sketch of Thomas's sources on love as well as speculate about his more specific inspirations for the concept of *mutua inhaesio*. Following Torrell, we agree that Aristotle continues to provide the "definitonal structure" of human friendship, as stated above. *Amor*, however, possesses a wider meaning than human friendship that embraces the notions of a kind of union, connaturality, weight or attraction between like things. This wider meaning of *amor* appears to have both Augustine and Dionysius as primary sources. We will differentiate these kinds of love further when we analyze the very nature of love along with its various appetites in Chapter Three. St. John provides a bridge for a friendship between God and man, and also some key insights into the fruit of this communication which is *mutua inhaesio*. The theological tradition of the *perichoresis* (which itself takes much of its inspiration from St. John) likely gave St. Thomas added inspiration for the concept of *mutua inhaesio*. Another source for *amor* in general (and its application to *mutua inhaesio*) is the psychological analogy of St. Augustine. As we saw, Thomas like

significance of friendship with God." (See L. Gregory Jones, "The Theological Transformation of Aristotelian Friendship in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas," 373.

Augustine, frequently compares to the human actions of loving and willing to the dual processions of the Holy Spirit and the Son from the Father, respectively. God is supremely unified “in Himself, though all the universe is “in Him.” Thomas frequently states that whatever is loved is in the lover and whatever is known is in the knower.¹⁷³ Mere in-being, however, is not *mutua inhaesio*. It is not a far step for Thomas to posit one of the more noble activities of the human being to be mutually unified with another personal being in an analogous way that God mutually inheres in Himself. But at this point, we must speculate as to how far Thomas specifically applied the psychological analogy to *mutua inhaesio*. We introduce it here as a very likely source for Thomas’s fertile thought on *amor* and its relation to *mutua inhaesio*.

¹⁷³ See SCG I, cap. 91; SCG IV, cap. 19; ST Ia, a3, c; ST Ia, q37, a1; ST Ia, q43, a3; CT I, cap. 45; CT I, cap. 46; CT I, cap. 49; CT I, cap. 52.

CHAPTER 2: “DEUS CARITAS EST”: THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF THE *DE AMORE* AND ITS TEXTUAL PARALLELS

While human beings have the power to love, “God is love.”¹⁷⁴ It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a general background to Thomas’s theory of love using his own texts while examining the parallels and preludes to the *De Amore*. The Johannine revelation, “Deus Caritas est,” is vitally important to understanding the background of Thomas’s general theory of love. We have introduced this pervasive idea in the previous chapter, but in the present chapter we will attempt to relate that statement more closely to the *De Amore*’s structure and to its uniqueness among several other Thomistic texts that treat *amor* as a concept. Even though some of these reflections are theological, they are not out of place in a philosophical analysis. In order to place the *De Amore* in a proper context, we will briefly review some of the key places in the Thomistic corpus where he deals with the subject of love.

The most relevant passages that prepare the way in the *Summa* for the *De Amore* can be found in *ST Ia*, q20 on the Love of God, *ST Ia*, q37 on the Holy Spirit as Love, and *Ia*, q42, a5 on the Mutual Indwelling of the Father and the Son. These questions, found in the *Prima Pars*, anticipate the *De Amore* in the *Prima Secundae*. The *De Amore* itself anticipates and lays a philosophical foundation for the *De Caritate* in the *Secunda*

¹⁷⁴ See the *sed contra* *ST Ia*, q20, a1 (1 John 4:16). Thomas specifically states that “Deus Caritas est” (*ST Ia*, q20, a1, *sed*; *Ia* *IIae*, q23, a2, *arg*1). He also states specifically that “Deus dilectio est” (*De Virtutibus*, q2, a1, *ad*5, *ad*7). However, in *ST Ia*, q20 about “whether there is love in God,” the whole discussion is in terms of *amor* in God, where Thomas replies in the absolute affirmative. Thus, there must be *amor* in God. That being said, I have found no place where Thomas specifically writes, “Deus amor est.”

Secundae, qq. 23-46. Before treating the *Summa Theologiae*, however, the text that provides the closest parallel to the *De Amore* can be found in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Book III, d27, q1 on the nature of love.

THE COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES

When reviewing the order of the questions dealt with the *Commentary on the Sentences*, it is important to remember that Thomas is following an order set by Peter Lombard. When we analyze the structure of the *De Amore* shortly, it will be helpful to see how the Angelic Doctor re-orders and changes the discussion of *amor* when he is no longer bound to the order set by the Master of the *Sentences*. The headings of the discussion in the *Commentary* are the following: “1) what love is, 2) that in which it is, 3) how it compares to other affections of the soul, 4) how it compares to things that are in knowledge.”¹⁷⁵ There are several observations that arise when comparing this text to its parallel in the *De Amore*. The first and most obvious difference is that the governing text used in the *Sentences* is not anything written by the Lombard, but by Dionysius. The entire first article is based on whether or not *Dionysius’s* definition for love is fitting. Thomas quotes Dionysius, including some additions in his own words:

“Love is a unitive and concreative power, moving superiors to exercise providence for those having less,” i.e., their inferiors, “further moving coordinated things,” i.e., equals, “to a communicative relationship with each other; and finally, moving subjects,” i.e., inferiors, “to turn themselves toward better things,” i.e., their superiors.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1: “1) quid sit amor, 2) in quo sit, 3) de comparatione ejus ad alias animi affectiones, 4) de comparatione ejus ad ea quae in cognitione sunt.”

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* Thomas noted the same definition back at *In I Sent.*, d10, on the Holy Spirit as love.

Though we see this definition at least in part mentioned in the *De Amore*, it by no means sets the tone for the entire discussion in that text. The first time this definition appears in the *De Amore* is not even in the corpus but rather in an objection; moreover, it appears in the second article of *ST Ia*, q26 rather than the first. The *Commentary* is a far more “metaphysical” definition than we will see presented in the *De Amore* where Thomas focuses on *amor* as a passion rather than a “unitive and concreative power.” Though the Dionysian elements of focusing on union and similitude are present in the *Pars Prima Secundae*, they are much more prevalent in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. The immediately apparent difference between the parallel sections on “Love Itself” in the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Commentary* is the latter’s overwhelming emphasis on the Dionysian principle that “Love is a unitive force.” Unlike the evidence presented in the *Summa*, the very first sentence that Thomas presents on “Love Itself” in the *Commentary* makes us focus on the concept of *union*.

Another major focus that differentiates the two texts is Thomas’s focus on love as a *form* in the *Sentences*, which is an emphasis not as significantly present in the *Pars Prima Secundae*.¹⁷⁷ According to Michael Sherwin:

In his early work, Aquinas employs the language of form to describe the nature of love. Love, he tells us, is a form received into the appetite

“Amor virtus est unitiva, movens superiora ad providentiam minus habentium,” idest inferiorum, “coordinata autem,” idest aequalia, “rurus ad communicativam.” alternam habitudinem,” subjecta, “idest inferiora, “ad meliorum,” idest superiorum, “conversionem.”

¹⁷⁷ Michael Sherwin, “By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Ph.d Diss. (Notre Dame University, 2001), 91. This is noted as well in H.D. Simonin’s classic study, “Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l’amour,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 6 (1931): 181.

analogous to the form received into the intellect in the act of cognition. In his mature work, however, Aquinas reserves the language of form to the intellect and now describes love as a pleasing affective affinity (*complacentia*) or an inclination.¹⁷⁸

At least Thomas's earlier understanding of *mutua inhaesio* is described in terms of love as an alteration of form. As Thomas writes, "For by the fact that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the interior of the beloved and vice versa, so that nothing of the beloved remains not united to the lover, just as a form reaches to innermost recesses of that which it informs and vice versa...."¹⁷⁹ In the *De Amore*, we will see that Thomas attenuates this language. Instead of this complete transformation, we see instead that the appetite of the lover somewhat changes into the beloved through a kind of *complacentia*. We will have more to say about the content of this passage when we analyze *mutua inhaesio* itself. It is enough to know that Thomas has somewhat attenuated the language of the radical transformation of love by the time he wrote the *De Amore* of the *Summa Theologiae*.¹⁸⁰ We will review the Commentary on the Sentences much more in Chapter Five where it will become thematic.

¹⁷⁸ Sherwin, 91.

¹⁷⁹ *In Sent* III, d27, q1, a1, ad4: "Ex hoc enim quod amor transformat amatem in amatum, facit amantem intrare ad interiori amati, et e contra; et nihil amati amanti remaneat non unitum; sicut format pervenit ad intima formati, et e converso; et ideo amans quadammodo penetrat in amatum."

Thomas does not use the explicit term "*mutua inhaesio*" in the *Commentary*, the language used there is conceptually similar considering that the forms of beloved and lover penetrat one another *et e converso*.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Sherwin, "By Knowledge and By Love," 96-1000. Sherwin notes that this early notion of love as the transformation of the lover into the beloved has several weakness. For example, he claims that Thomas's earlier notion confuses the process of intellection with that of affection, making them sound nearly identical. Thomas seems to forget that an agent can impart some lesser form to the subject rather than affect a complete transformation—a fact that he himself notes in *In I Sent.*, q2, a1.

PRELUDES TO THE *DE AMORE* IN THE *SUMMA*

Thomas constantly makes comparisons between human relationships and the relationships of the Three Divine Persons with each other. Liz Carmichael, noting that Thomas at least refers to God as “subsistent friendship” criticizes him as follows:

Like Augustine, he never explored interpersonal friendship within the Trinity. His interest tended primarily, in traditional Western fashion, towards the unity of the divine essence rather than the mysterious dynamic of ecstatic love between the three Persons.¹⁸¹

Though Carmichael is correct to an extent, hers is a typical misunderstanding about the philosophy of St. Thomas. Thomas actually has a great deal to say about the interpersonal relations between the Persons of the Trinity. It is simply often couched in terms of processions, relations and missions, and hidden in passages about the love between friends. For these reasons, we must search some of these more theological texts for their philosophical assumptions.

Isolating the prior assumptions of the *De Amore* is a difficult task. In a way, one must assume knowledge of the entire first part of the *Summa Theologiae*. We must, therefore, isolate only those elements that bear directly on love *per se*, as well as some textual analogies to *mutua inhaesio*. Those specific elements are twofold: 1) *ST I*, q20 on the general identity of God as love because this is the key question in the *Prima Pars* where Thomas identifies God’s identity in relation to love; 2) *ST I*, q37 on the specific person of the Holy Spirit as love because this is the key place in the *Prima Pars* where a

¹⁸¹ Liz Carmichael, *Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love* (New York: T & T. Clark International, 2004), 125.

single person of the Trinity is identified *as* love, providing absolutely vital information for the powers of the human person as analogical to the Trinity.

Thomas quotes 1 John 4:16 in the *sed contra* of the question concerning the love of God. 1 John 4.16b reads, “Deus caritas est et qui manet in caritate in Deo manet et Deus in eo.” Interestingly enough, in this question (q20), Thomas quotes the first part of the scripture verse, “*Deus caritas est.*” In the actual article concerning *mutua inhaesio* in the *Pars Prima Secundae* (Ia IIae, q28, a2), he quotes the *second* half, “qui manet in caritate in Deo manet et Deus in eo.” It is almost as if, through the divided use of the verse 1 John 4.16 as their mutual *sed contra*, *ST Ia IIae, q28, a2* on mutual indwelling as an effect of love is the completion of I, q20, a1, which examines the love of God. This sets up an implicit relationship between the essence of love and the primary effect of love as *mutua inhaesio*. The logic of 1 John 4:16¹⁸² is as follows:

- 1) God is love.
- 2) God’s love is “in” him as the Holy Spirit.¹⁸³
- 3) Therefore those who abide in God’s love abide in the Holy Spirit, which is in God.

The principle of both intra-Trinitarian and human/divine *perichoresis* is contained in very terse form in 1 Jn. 4:16.

If God is love and if Thomas analyzes the nature of “love itself” explicitly in *ST I-II, q26* (and implicitly in both q27 & q28), then similar principles should arise in *ST I, q20*

¹⁸² 1 John 4:16: “...et nos cognovimus et credidimus caritati quam habet Deus in nobis Deus caritas est et qui manet in caritate in Deo manet et Deus in eo.”

¹⁸³ This premiss is more implicit than explicit. Though scripture itself does not identify the Holy Spirit specifically as love, this is Thomas interprets it. God’s love is simultaneously “in” Him (as the Holy Spirit) and *is* Him *per se*.

and the *De Amore*. We find that this is, in fact, the case. Thomas claims that when considering God's love, there are four points of inquiry: 1) Whether love exists in God? 2) Whether He loves all things? 3) Whether he loves one thing more than another? 4) Whether He loves more the better things?¹⁸⁴ There are several points of similarity between I, q20, and the content of the *De Amore*. First of all, goodness as the preeminent cause of love is treated thematically in the first article of *ST I-II*, q27. Secondly, the second two articles of q20 emphasize that there is a definite *ordo amoris* on account of the fact that though God loves all things,¹⁸⁵ he does not love all things equally,¹⁸⁶ but loves better things more on account of the principle of *similitudo*.¹⁸⁷ Thirdly, likeness as a cause of love is treated in both questions. Fourthly, in a1, Thomas brings up a main point that we will find in *ST I-II*, q26, a1 that "love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty."¹⁸⁸ This should remind us of the fact that love is much more than a passion,¹⁸⁹ even though Thomas defines love as a passion strictly speaking. Most importantly, quoting the decisive text from Dionysius for the first time in the *Summa*

¹⁸⁴ *ST Ia*, q20, prol.: "Unde primo considerabimus De Amore Dei; secundo, de iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia. Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora magis amet."

¹⁸⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2.

¹⁸⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3.

¹⁸⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a4. *Similitudo* will play a decisive role in Thomas's theory of love in the *De Amore*.

¹⁸⁸ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, c.: "Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor."

¹⁸⁹ See *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad1 & ad2.

Theologiae, Thomas affirms, “Love is a uniting and binding force.”¹⁹⁰ This principle cannot be underestimated. As we will see in our analysis of *mutua inhaesio*, the entire discussion of “Love itself” in the context of the *Commentary on the Sentences* is governed by Dionysius’ definition of love.¹⁹¹ Thomas quotes this Dionysian principle in the context of answering whether there is love in God. The objection reads, “Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* IV): Love is a uniting and binding force. But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.”¹⁹² Because there are several principles contained in the reply to this objection that are significant to this study, we will quote it in full:

An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to him for whom one wills it: since to love someone is to wish good for him. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as shown above (Q6, AA1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. *Thus, it is said that love is a concretive force since it gathers another to oneself, possessing him as he has his own self.* And so again the divine love is a concretive force – which implies no composition in God – so far as the good wills to others.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, obj. 3: “Amor est vis unitiva et concretiva.”

¹⁹¹ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1.

¹⁹² *ST Ia*, q20, a1, arg3: “Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor est vis unitiva et concretiva. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.”

¹⁹³ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, in quantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens

In this paragraph, we see the harmony of several principles: substantial union,¹⁹⁴ the act of love as it manifests in *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*,¹⁹⁵ affective union,¹⁹⁶ a friend as *alter ipse*, and similitude. These terms are not named explicitly, but it will become obvious in a more detailed study of the *De Amore* that I, q20 is the first place in the *Summa Theologiae* where they all emerge together in a compact form, which will receive a detailed analysis in subsequent chapters.

We must keep in mind the context of the reply to the objection. The objection states that love cannot exist in God because Dionysius makes it manifest that *love is a uniting and binding force*; since God is supremely One and simple,¹⁹⁷ love cannot exist in God because to unite something to him would mar His absolute simplicity. The main

bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum. *Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, in quantum aliis bona vult.*" (Emphasis added.)

¹⁹⁴ *Substantial union* refers to the love with which one loves one's self, and is mentioned as a cause of love in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2. We will have occasion to analyze it in detail in Parts II and III.

¹⁹⁵ Briefly, these two "kinds" of love differentiate the act of love and are present in every act of love. *Amor amicitiae* refers to the love that one has for a person – either one's self or another – and *amor concupiscentiae* refers to the love that one has for the goods that we wish toward that person. This will be fully explained in the commentary on I-II, q26, a4. In the Thomistic theory of love, *amor amicitiae* (the love for a person) must always be present in every act of love.

¹⁹⁶ *Affective union* refers to the joining of wills of the lover and the beloved. It is the *sine qua non* of love, for it is this kind of union that seems to refer to "falling in love," considering that it is this kind of love that attaches the heart of the one to the other (See *ST I-II*, q28, a1). Essentially, the union of affection is when a man loves a beloved and is concerned for her *as though it concerned himself* ("sicut amicus sollicitus est de his quae ad amicum spectant, sicut de suis") (*ST I-II*, q14, a3, ad4). Thus, the concept of *alter ipse* is at least *prima facie* explained.

¹⁹⁷ See *ST Ia*, q11, on the Unity and Simplicity of God.

point of Thomas's reply is that love does exist in God, but without composition. What is at stake is nothing less than the mode of unity that is both the cause and effect of love. Considering that the primary difficulty with understanding *mutua inhaesio* is how lovers can be simultaneously both one and many, Thomas's reply in *ST I*, q20, a1, ad3, is a vital prelude to the solution of that problem.

Thomas begins the reply by differentiating the act of love in the twofold tendency of a well-wishing toward either the specific good that the lover wills, or the specific person to whom one wills it. This is the first indication in the *Summa Theologiae* of the differentiation of the act of love into *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* that we will find explicated in *ST I-II*, q26, a4.¹⁹⁸ In order to answer how there might be love in God, Thomas refers us to the human experience of love. Love for rational creatures is a kind of well-wishing, which we know through experience. Moreover, love is ultimately given only to a person (in its more perfect forms of *amicitia* and *caritas*).¹⁹⁹ At this point, however, we see a number of Thomistic assumptions about love. Love is much more than simply a "well-wishing" toward another. Love "puts the other...in the place of himself,"²⁰⁰ regards the good done to him as done to himself,²⁰¹ "aggregates another to

¹⁹⁸ The first place in the *Summa* that we find the actual terms, *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* is immediately after this article in *ST I*, q20, a2, ad3.

¹⁹⁹ *ST Ia*, q20, a2, ad3: "Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised." ("...amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est.")

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*: "...et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso."

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*: "...referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum."

ourselves,” and “refers his good to our own.”²⁰² This litany of self-referential terminology assumes that *amor amicitiae* necessarily views the beloved as an *alter ipse*. The assumption that is prior to this is that self-love is the absolute foundation of all other human loves, and that the human will has no choice but to love another through the gateway, as it were, of himself.²⁰³ Thomas uses the Dionysian principle of unity to justify even this self-referential love: “As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms ‘uniting’ and ‘binding’ in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.”²⁰⁴ It is significant that the very definition of love as a union prompts Thomas to refer to this litany of self-referential terms. Very early in the *Summa*, we see a relationship between union and the subject.

Because similitude is merely a shadow and type of unity,²⁰⁵ another significant principle for our study is that of similitude as a cause of love. In the *sed contra* of the question concerning whether God loves better things more, he asserts, “Everything loves what is like it.”²⁰⁶ Thus, the Father loves the Son most of all, after that he loves creatures,

²⁰² Ibid.: “...quia alium aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum.”

²⁰³ We should recall the argument between the “physical” and the “Graeco-Thomist” schools of thought mentioned in xxviii-xxxiv of the Introduction.

²⁰⁴ *ST Ia*, q60, a3, ad2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum, quam ad diversa quae ei uniuntur. Sed ideo Dionysius usus fuit nomine unionis et concretionis, ut ostenderet derivationem amoris a se in alia, sicut ab uno derivatur unio.”

²⁰⁵ *ST Ia*, q93, a9, c.

²⁰⁶ *ST Ia*, q20, a4, sc.

and “especially those who are members of his only-begotten Son.”²⁰⁷ The principle of likeness sets up a further relationship between the indwelling and likeness in God:

The Father loves those who are most like him.
The Son, as the Father’s (inner) Word, is most like the Father.
Therefore, the Father loves those who are “in” the Son most of all.

We would do well to remember, therefore, that the essence of love is directly related to indwelling in the mind of St. Thomas, as well as the principle of likeness. What is “in” a thing is also “like” that thing for the same reason that a part resembles its whole, or an effect resembles its cause.

In q20, we see that in God there is love. We see that even in God, there is a difference in what it means to love generally and properly. When defining love in the following chapter, we will see how important it is to note that Thomas often designates that we call a certain thing by a name properly and another thing by the same name generally.²⁰⁸ God wills the good to all things, and this is what it means to love generally. Properly speaking, however, love is the Holy Spirit. *ST Ia*, q20, asks “Is there love in God?” while q37 responds that the love *in* God properly *is* the Holy Spirit. The *sed contra* for q37, a1 reads: “Gregory says: The Holy Spirit Himself is Love.”²⁰⁹ The

²⁰⁷ Augustine, *Tract. In. Joan. CX*, quoted in *ST Ia*, q20, a3, sed.

²⁰⁸ For example, *cupiditas* has a general and proper meaning (*ST IIa IIae*, q155, a2); as is “fate” (*Comp. Theol. I*, cap. 138); as is “expectation” (*Ethic. III*, lect. XIV).

²⁰⁹ St. Gregory the Great, *Hom. 30, in Pentecost*. In an important text that connects several sources for Thomas’s view of *caritas*, Guy Mansini writes, “We know the Holy Spirit as Love not only from Romans 5:5 but also from John, and as St. Augustine shows (See Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV). Again, in 14:13, the disciples are bidden to ask for whatever they desire in the confidence it will be done – as it were, the way friends ask.

following text is Thomas's explanation of the Holy Spirit as Proceeding Love, relating this directly to the psychological analogy of Mind/Word/Love:

For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word "to understand" and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception; namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves - to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten."²¹⁰

*And there is a mutual indwelling of Christ and the disciples, as of friends, in 14:20 (Emphasis added). [Guy Mansini, "Charity and the Form of Friendship," In *Ethics and Theological Discourses: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski*, eds. Guy Mansini and J.G. Hart (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 40-41.]*

²¹⁰ ST Ia, q37, a1, c: "Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante. Sed ex parte intellectus, sunt vocabula adinventata ad significandum respectum intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ut patet in hoc quod dico intelligere, et sunt etiam alia vocabula adinventata ad significandum processum intellectualis conceptionis, scilicet ipsum dicere, et verbum. Unde in divinis intelligere solum essentialiter dicitur, quia non importat habitudinem ad verbum procedens, sed verbum personaliter dicitur, quia significat id quod procedit, ipsum vero dicere dicitur notionaliter, quia importat

While an entire study could easily be written to interpret this statement, what is important is that in a very real way the mutual love of the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. Their love is so real as to be able to generate a divinity equal to themselves. Though not nearly as dramatic or as real, Thomas conceives of the mutual indwelling of lover and beloved as creating a new relationship, which is the ultimate flowering of love. Having introduced some vital preludes to the *De Amore* in the *Prima Pars*, qq20 and 37, we now proceed to some additional comments on Thomas's understanding of *caritas*.

“DE CARITATE,” IIa IIae, QQ23-46

A discussion of Thomas's writings on *amor* would be incomplete without mentioning its expression in the *Secunda Secundae* on *caritas*. Thomas makes a very clear distinction between the two loves: “Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship.”²¹¹ The most basic difference between *caritas* and *amicitia* is that they are both loves that demand benevolence and a mutual sharing of life and goods with another, but *caritas* contains the specific difference that these activities are directed

habitudinem principii verbi ad verbum ipsum. Ex parte autem voluntatis, praeter diligere et amare, quae important habitudinem amantis ad rem amatam, non sunt aliqua vocabula imposita, quae important habitudinem ipsius impressionis vel affectionis rei amatae, quae provenit in amante ex hoc quod amat, ad suum principium, aut e converso. Et ideo, propter vocabulorum inopiam, huiusmodi habitudines significamus vocabulis amoris et dilectionis; sicut si verbum nominaremus intelligentiam conceptam, vel sapientiam genitam.”

See Anthony Keaty, “The Holy Spirit Proceeding as Mutual Love: An Interpretation of Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae*, I.37,” *Angelicum* 77 (2000): 533-557.

²¹¹ *ST* IIa IIae, q25, a2, c: “Sed caritas non est simplex amor, sed habet rationem amicitiae.”

specifically toward God.²¹² The structure of the *De Caritate* is significantly different than that of the *De Amore*. Both “treatises” begin with a discussion of the nature of their respective types of love “in themselves.”

Ia IIae, q26: Amor in Itself

- A1 = Is Love in the Concupiscible Power?
- A2 = Is Love a Passion?
- A3 = Is Love the Same as Dilection?
- A4 = Is Love Properly Divided into *Amor Amicitiae* and *Amor Concupiscentiae*?

IIa IIae, q23: Caritas in Itself

- A1 = Is Charity Friendship?
- A2 = Is Charity Created in the Soul?
- A3 = Is Charity a Virtue?
- A4 = Is Charity a Special Virtue?
- A5 = Is Charity One Virtue?
- A6 = Is Charity the Most Excellent of Virtues?
- A7 = Is Any True Virtue Possible without Charity?
- A8 = Is Charity the Form of the Virtues?

The *per se* consideration of the *De Amore* proceeds from subject to genus to species to act. *Caritas*, however, has some special considerations. Like the *De Amore*, the *De Caritate* deals with the species (a1) and the genus (a3).²¹³ Another significant difference is that *amor* is a primarily a passion and *caritas* is a virtue. Unlike the *De Amore*, however, the *De Caritate* deals with both the subject (*ST* IIa IIae, q24) and the acts (*ST* IIa IIae, qq. 27-33) of *caritas* in entire questions of their own rather than with merely one article apiece within a single question as in the *De Amore*.

Caritas has its own special considerations. First of these is the fact that Thomas has to deal with the controversy concerning whether *caritas* is God Himself or something

²¹² It is, of course, possible to direct *caritas* toward a neighbor or even one’s self. But the ultimate intention for doing this is for God’s sake. If we truly love a person then we will love what belongs to him. All people belong to God. Therefore, if we truly have charity in our hearts, this kind of love enables us to love even our enemies.

²¹³ *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a5 concerning whether *caritas* is one virtue or not refers to its species.

created in the soul. We will refer to this as the “*Caritas Controversy*” and treat it more extensively below. The other special problem that Thomas has to deal with is whether or not *caritas* is the form of the virtues. *Amor*, as the root and foundation of the passions,²¹⁴ is somewhat analogous to this question, although Thomas never refers to the “form of the passions.”²¹⁵ Articles 6-8 in fact all deal with this special issue in one way or another. First we will treat the “*Caritas Controversy*” and then treat of the problem of whether *caritas* is the form of the virtues.

If it is true that “*Deus Caritas est*” then it seems also true that no love can exist that is not *caritas* and not God. In other words, the *theo*-logic of this statement dictates that every act of love is essentially God. This controversy deserves comment because it bears directly on the essence of love as Thomas understands it. In this rare instance, Thomas disagrees with the Master of the *Sentences* regarding the teaching that the Holy Spirit causes the movement of love without any intervening habit.²¹⁶ The broad outline of the controversy²¹⁷ that Thomas inherited from Peter Lombard is as follows:

²¹⁴ See *ST Ia IIae*, q23, a4; q46, a1.

²¹⁵ There exists an analogy between *amor* as the “master passion” found in any passion whatsoever and *caritas* as the “master virtue” found in any act of virtue whatsoever.

²¹⁶ *ST IIa IIae*, q23, a2, c.

²¹⁷ Thomas summarizes the crux of the difficulty as follows in *De Vir.*, q2, c.: “If, therefore, the act of charity in man does not proceed from an interior habit superadded to a natural potency, but proceeds from the movement of the Holy Spirit, then one of these two alternatives follow: either that act of charity is not voluntary, which is impossible because to love something is to will it; or it does not exceed the capability of nature, and this view is heretical.”

“*Si igitur actus caritatis in homine non ex aliquo habitu interiori procedat naturali potentiae superaddito, sed ex motione spiritus sancti, sequetur alterum duorum: vel quod actus caritatis non sit voluntarius; quod est impossibile, quia hoc*

- 1) If charity is something created in the soul directly by God, then it cannot be meritorious.
- 2) In that case, charity could not be meritorious because it reduces man to an agent or instrument.
- 3) Man's acts of love must proceed from some *intrinsic* principle for them to be considered *his* acts.
- 4) Yet charity must still be something created in the soul, because *qua* charity, it exceeds the capacity of human beings.
- 5) It must exceed the capacity of human beings, because *Deus caritas est*, and human beings are certainly not.
- 6) So it seems that it must either be maintained that charity is completely from the Holy Spirit, in which case human freedom is completely compromised, or that human nature is capable *per se* of charity, which is heretical.

Thomas answers this difficulty by claiming (consistently with the Tradition) that charity is indeed something created in the soul.²¹⁸ The solution that Thomas finds is that *caritas* must be both superadded (by God) and voluntary.²¹⁹ This will be discussed in more detail below.

ipsum diligere est quoddam velle; aut quod non excedat facultatem naturae, et hoc est haereticum."

See Philipp W. Rosemann, "*Fraterna dilectio est Deus: Peter Lombard's Thesis on Charity as the Holy Spirit*," in *Amor Amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship: Essays in Medieval Thought in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy*," Edited by Thomas A. F. Kelly and Philipp W. Rosemann, (Peeters), 409-436. Rosemann writes, "The absence of a robust natural law and of natural virtue means that the entire ethics of the *Sentences* hinges upon charity, which, received as gift of and from the Holy Spirit, enables us to emulate the perfect love that Christ showed us through the work of redemption (433). He adds, "Virtue is simply not possible without the Holy Spirit, which is why Lombard did not discuss virtue in the context of his treatise on man, which is where Thomas discusses (434)."

²¹⁸ See A. J. Falanga, *Charity, the Form of the Virtues According to Saint Thomas* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press: 1948), 59-75, for a discussion of the tradition on treating *caritas* as the form of the virtues. Peter Lombard's opinion can be found in Lombard, Peter, *Libri Sententiarum* III, d27, c3: "Eadem sane dilectio, qua diligitur Deus et proximus, quae Spiritus Sanctus est...quia Deus caritas est."

²¹⁹ *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a2, c.

The crux of the matter is that Thomas must prove that the act of charity proceeds from an intrinsic principle rather than an extrinsic principle so that it might still be called the act of a human being. The solution to the “*caritas* controversy” is, in a very real way, solved on the level of *mutua inhaesio*. In other words, in order for charity to be both God and the act of a human will, the act of charity must habitually and simultaneously proceed from both the human being and from the Holy Spirit.²²⁰ The controversy itself involves whether or not the Holy Spirit lives and acts *in* man as charity or not, and if so, in what mode does it act *in* us. This question involves mutual indwelling on a higher level than the merely human, i.e., the indwelling of the divine in the human. Thomas affirms that just as the soul is the life of the body, charity is the life of the soul.²²¹ Thus, Thomas affirms the proportion: *soul: body :: charity : soul*. Moreover, he adds to this that charity is the life of the soul in the manner of a *mover* and not in the manner of a *formal principle*.²²² In cooperation with the will, which is the intrinsic appetitive principle of man, the *extrinsic* person of the Holy Spirit comes into the soul and indwells by a superadded habit that orders it in such a way as to make charitable acts joyful. In this way, Thomas maintains charity as the act of a particular man while affirming that charity itself is still the person of the Holy Spirit.²²³

²²⁰ *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a2, c. Thomas claims that in order to perform an act of charity, a habitual form must be added to our natural power, as we have seen above.

²²¹ *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a2, ad2.

²²² St. Thomas, *De Vir.* q2, a1, ad1.

²²³ Jeane-Pierre Torrell specifically ties the discussion of the effects that charity produces in us with the effects that the Holy Spirit produces in us. In the main text of “Man in the World and Before God,” he concludes that charity “unites the person to the object of his love, the lover to the Beloved, the Lover to the beloved, for it is the nature of love to produce union.” Footnoting this text, he continues: “I ought to introduce here

Additionally, we see that there are at least two general modes of indwelling: 1) that of an intrinsic principle, 2) that of a mover as a superadded habit. *Caritas* itself operates in the manner of a mutual indwelling, and must do so in order to solve the “*caritas* controversy.” It remains to be seen how this compares to the structure of *amor*.

In the *De Caritate* as in the *De Amore*, Thomas appears to consider the subject of both loves as part of both of their respective *per se* considerations. In the *De Amore*, the very first article of Ia IIae, q26 locates the subject of *amor* in the concupiscible power.²²⁴ The consideration of the subject of an act is a foundational one in Thomas’s thought. We see, however, in the *De Caritate* that the consideration of its subject has an entire question dedicated to it rather than merely an article. Basically, the subject of *caritas* is *voluntas* – the higher appetitive faculty.²²⁵ In the prologue of IIa IIae, q23, where Thomas lays out the entire structure of his consideration of *caritas*, he writes that *caritas* in itself must be treated first, then its object, acts, opposite vices, and related precepts. He does not include the subject of *caritas* in this list, apparently considering it as part of the discussion of *caritas per se*. For this reason, we think it is justifiable to claim that Thomas also deals with the subject of *amor* in his discussion of *amor per se*, although he does not explicitly claim that he is discussing the subject of *amor* in *ST Ia IIae, q26, a1*.

the entire question of the effects of love (*ST Ia IIae, q28*); instead, I refer once again to the chapters of *SCG IV 20-22*, which treat so beautifully the friendship with God realized by the Holy Spirit.” (Torrell, *Spiritual Master II*: 340, n.95).

²²⁴ *ST Ia IIae, q26, sed*: “*Amor est in concupiscibili.*”

²²⁵ *ST IIa IIae, q24, a1, sed*. The subject is also God, since *caritas* is caused in us by an infusion (a2). The remainder of the articles deal with the mode and intensity of *caritas* in the subject in one way or another (a3-a10), and whether it can be lost or not (a11-a12).

Because *caritas* is a virtue, there is much more of a question about its proper object (q25) and order (q26). In the subsequent treatment of the effects of *caritas*, the *De Caritate* is significantly different than the *De Amore*. An entirely different list of effects is listed for *caritas*: 1) to love (q27), 2) joy (q28), 3) peace (q29), 4) mercy (q30), 5) beneficence (q31), 6) almsgiving (q32), 7) fraternal correction (q33). Whereas the effects of *amor* fall more in the category of relations and conditions, the effects of *caritas* are classified as operative habits and virtues. This should not be surprising considering the nature of *amor* as a ruling *passion* and *caritas* as a divine virtue. We will have more to say about the comparisons between these effects in our final chapter on *mutua inhaesio*.

THE *DE AMORE* IN ITS STRUCTURAL CONTEXT

M.D. Chenu's theory that St. Thomas follows the generally Neo-Platonic theory of *exitus/reditus* in the *Summa* is well-known. Chenu writes, "...in the *Summa*, emanation and return unfold in two sections closely knit together in the unity of two reverse movements; the Ia Pars and the II Pars are related to one another as are *exitus* and *reditus*."²²⁶ This general structure has been challenged in recent years, most strongly by Rudi Te Velde.²²⁷ Te Velde admits with Chenu that at least "at first sight, the global movement of the three parts of the *Summa* seem to fit wonderfully well into the scheme

²²⁶ M.D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 310. Chenu's *exitus/reditus* paradigm has been challenged in recent years.

²²⁷ Rudi te Velde, *Aquinas on God: The "Divine Science" of the Summa Theologiae*, Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology (London: Ashgate, 2006). See also Brian Johnstone, "The Debate on the Structure of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas from Chenu (1939) to Metz (1998)" ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), pp. 187-200.

which places God at the beginning and end of all things.”²²⁸ There are several problems with the conception of the *Summa* as an *exitus* and *reditus*. First, Thomas himself never uses the language of *exitus/reditus* even though he was familiar with the terms.²²⁹ Second, despite the fact that the first part of the *Summa* should deal with the *exitus* of all things from God, Thomas deals with God insofar as he is the final cause of creatures, which is clearly a subject that should fall under the heading of *reditus*.²³⁰ The *Secunda Pars* is an extended analysis of how the rational creature is a subject of divine government in a special way. Further, the *Secunda Pars* views God as the external principle of human acts through the means of law (*lex*) and grace (*gratis*) as opposed the *Prima Pars* which focuses on God as the internal and natural principle of creation.²³¹ Te Velde concludes, “The *exitus-reditus* scheme is misleading insofar as it is unable to make visible the continuity (divine government), as well as the discontinuity (the new way in which the divine government presents itself in relation to human freedom), between the First and Second Part.”²³² In short, the *reditus* of the Second Part is a special one rather than a general one making a description of the Second Part as merely a *reditus* somewhat misleading. Te Velde continues, “The three parts of the *Summa* do not appear to be organized according to the double movement of *exitus* and *reditus*, but rather according

²²⁸ Te Velde, 12.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

²³² *Ibid.*, 14.

to the three agents: God, Man and Christ, respectively.”²³³ Finally, in the schema suggested by Chenu, Te Velde suggests that one can get the impression that the Third Part seems a kind of “theological appendix” that is “not fully integrated into its movement” since it represents merely a more concrete manifestation of how the creature (and creation) returns to God.²³⁴ Te Velde suggests instead a threefold schema organized by various agents in increasing specificity: 1) God and his creating freedom, 2) man and his created freedom, and 3) Christ in his work of restoring man’s freedom.²³⁵ It should be admitted that Te Velde’s schema does not invalidate Chenu’s outright so much as render the latter’s argument less precise and therefore less helpful. We find that Te Velde’s argument is convincing. Though *amor* is treated in the *De Amore* as a kind of force or passion that is present in absolutely everything, there is little doubt that Thomas focuses on *amor* insofar as it is *in man*.

The general theory of *exitus/reditus* can be helpful to conceptualize Thomas’s overall intention, but it is more important to review what he himself writes in the immediate structural context of *ST Ia IIae*, qq. 26-28. These three questions occur within the broader context of the *Pars Prima Secundae*, the prologue of which states the following:

Since, as Damascene states (*De Fide Orth.* ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image,

²³³ *Ibid.*, 18.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.²³⁶

What is clear is that the subject matter of the *Prima Secundae* is the human person *qua imago Dei*, which Thomas specifies further as “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.” This *reditus* of the human being to God is absolutely dependent upon a certain moral order. Elsewhere, Thomas writes:

Wherever a certain order is requisite to an end, that order must needs lead to that end, and infringement of that order debars from it: since those things that are on account of the end, take their necessity from the end; so that, to wit, they are necessary, if the end has to follow; and, given them, if there be no obstacle, the end will follow. Now, God appointed to man’s actions a certain order in relation to the end of the good, as we have already proved.²³⁷

The *Prima Secundae* is located at that axis in the *Summa* where the self-movement (i.e., the *reditus*) of the human person becomes explicitly thematic. Since Thomas defines love as a movement toward the good, the *De Amore* is a vital element in the structure of the *Prima Secundae*.

The broad divisions of the *Pars Prima Secundae* are clear. The entire discussion is governed by the following: the concept of happiness, those principles of human action that make human action human, and those particular principles that are either conducive or damaging to happiness. Thomas himself writes:

²³⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q1, prol.: “Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.”

²³⁷ *SCG IIIb*, cap. 140: “Ubi cumque est aliquis debitus ordo ad finem, oportet quod ordo ille ad finem ducat, recessus autem ab ordine finem excludat: ea enim quae sunt ex fine, necessitatem sortiuntur ex fine; ut scilicet ea necesse sit esse, si finis debeat sequi; et eis absque impedimento existentibus, finis consequatur. Deus autem imposuit actibus hominum ordinem aliquem in respectu ad finem boni, ut ex praedictis patet.”

Since therefore happiness is to be acquired through certain acts, it is necessary to consider human acts that result from this so that we may know which acts arrive at happiness, and which are impeded from the way of happiness. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly the particulars.²³⁸

It is interesting to note particularly which subjects St. Thomas considers necessary to demonstrate the *imago dei* by which man is capable of “free-will and self-movement.” In other words, the headings of the *Pars Prima Secundae* provide the answer to the question, “What is characteristic of human acts to account for a being who has free will and is capable of self-movement?” Those subjects are the following,²³⁹ and they are the answer to the question, “By what does man return to God?”²⁴⁰

²³⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q6, prol.: “Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via. Sed quia operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur consideratio quia est humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est in universal secundo vero, in particulari.”

In a very convincing article, Antonio Donato deconstructs the typical view that Thomas merely “baptized” or “Christianized” Aristotle’s theory of happiness. It is much more complex than that. There are significant Dionysian elements involved as well. See Antonio Donato, “Aquinas’ Theory of Happiness and its Greek, Byzantine, Latin and Arabic Sources,” in *Al-Masaq: Islam & the Medieval Mediterranean* 18:2 (September 2006): 161-189.

²³⁹ *ST Ia*, q49, prol.: “Post actus et passiones, considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de principiis intrinsicis; secundo, de principiis extrinsicis. Principium autem intrinsicum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt humanorum actuum principia.”

“After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the *ST Ia*, q77, it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.”

- 1) Man's Last End (q1-5): the final cause
- 2) Human Acts (q6-21): the *per se* principles of human action
- 3) Passions (q22-48): mediate principles of human action
- 4) Habits (q49-70): intrinsic principles of human action (along with powers & virtues)
- 5) Vice and Sin (q71-89): intrinsic principles of human action
- 6) Law (q90-108): extrinsic principles of human action
- 7) Grace (q109-114): extrinsic principles of human action

In §1, Thomas analyzes the final cause of man in the concept of happiness and then proceeds in §2 to a detailed examination of the nature of all those acts that either lead man toward or from happiness. Thus §1 and §2 treat of human actions *in genere*. In sections §3-7, he treats of specific intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of those activities, i.e., the causes of human activity itself. Thus, qq. 26-28 on love not only represent a particular dimension of the manner in which creatures may return to God, but they represent the key axis of man's search for the good since *amor* is at the root of passions, habits, law and grace. The basic difference between the treatment of man in the *Prima Pars* and his treatment in the *Prima Secundae* is that in the former, Thomas analyzes what man is *per se* (his essence, powers, and operations) while in the latter he treats of man *in actu*, consisting of the formal, final, efficient and material causes of the specific acts of the human will. To use an image, Thomas constructs an exemplary statue of man in the *Prima Pars*, whereas in the *Prima Secundae* he paints man-in-motion.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Thomas himself does not enumerate these particular sections as they are done so here. They are outlined for the sake of more clearly seeing the structure of the *Prima Secundae*.

²⁴¹ We might say that the formal object of the *Prima Pars* is man insofar as he is a creation of God and for God, while the formal object of the *Pars Prima Secundae* is man insofar as he is capable of moving toward God.

ST Ia IIae, qq. 26-28, are subsumed under the larger section of the *Prima Secundae* that is sometimes called the “Treatise on the Passions.”²⁴² Following another tripartite structure, the sub-headings of this treatise are as follows:

The Passions in General (q22-25)

- Their Subject (q22)
- Their Differences (q23)
- Their Goodness & Evil (q24)
- Their Relations (q25)

The Concupiscible Appetite (q26-39)

- Love (q26-29)²⁴³
- Concupiscence (q30)
- Delight (q31-34)
- Sorrow or Pain (q35-39)

The Irascible Appetite (q40-48)

- Hope and Despair (q40)
- Fear (q41-q44)
- Daring (q45)
- Anger (q46-48)

The number of questions devoted to the concupiscible passions (14) over the irascible passions (9) should be noted because the number reflects the subordination of the irascible to the concupiscible appetites.²⁴⁴ The general structure of the analysis on the passions is typical of Thomas’s method of proceeding from the general to the specific. First he deals with the passions in themselves, and then proceeds to their divisions. The

²⁴² There is, of course, no such “treatise.” Thomas did not mean the *Summa Theologiae* to be any kind of treatise as we might define it. However, it will be called as such for the sake of argument.

²⁴³ I include q29 on hatred here because as love’s opposite, it can only be understood in relation to *amor*.

²⁴⁴ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 114.

passions are a particularly difficult subject because they are “motions” that are situated “between” the spiritual motions of the human being and his bodily motions.²⁴⁵ Miner comments that it is rather striking that Thomas grants eight times the space to the particular passions as he does the general passions, indicating that if we want to understand the passions in general, it is likely not possible to focus merely on that general analysis.²⁴⁶ This would be particularly true of *amor*, the master-passion.

The first topic that Thomas treats in the “Treatise on the Passions” is their subject. In the course of three articles, Thomas determines that there are passions in the soul²⁴⁷; however, those passions are only present accidentally²⁴⁸ and properly speaking only in the sensitive appetite.²⁴⁹ Passions do not exist properly in the apprehensive part, though there is an extended sense of the word *passio* in which even the apprehensive part can be said to be drawn to an agent.²⁵⁰ This will be covered in detail in the following chapter. One point that should be noted is that in the same way that Thomas initially treats of the subject in the Treatise on the Passions, he does the same in the *De Amore* (q26, a1). He then proceeds to discuss their differences in Ia IIae, q23. In the

²⁴⁵ Kevin White, “The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq.22-48),” in *The Ethics of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 103.

²⁴⁶ Miner, 111.

²⁴⁷ *ST* Ia IIae, q22, a1, sed & c.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ad2.

²⁴⁹ *ST* Ia IIae, q22, a3.

²⁵⁰ *ST* Ia IIae, q22, a1, c; a2

context of discussing whether good and evil can be found in the soul, Thomas makes a distinction in the mode of the indwelling of the passions:

I answer that, we may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above. If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.²⁵¹

There are two modes in which the passions can be said to “indwell” in the soul: either in themselves or according to the command of reason. It is only the passions under the command of reason that can truly refer to any kind of human willing, considering that truly human action is voluntary action. In this discussion of passions, we already see that the definition of *amor* as merely a passion will be complicated by how much it is under the control of reason and the higher will.²⁵²

²⁵¹ *ST Ia Iae, q24, a1, c.*: “Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.”

²⁵² We will discuss the differentiations of the appetite more fully in Chapter Three. However, we should note that St. Thomas distinguishes three possible appetites, which are three possible modes of a subject tending toward a good: the natural, the sensitive, and the rational. Thomas outlines the distinctions in *ST Ia Iae, q26, a1*.

The *De Amore* is not the first place where Thomas discusses love as a theme in the “Treatise on the Passions.” In *ST Ia IIae*, q25, a2, he treats of a common topic: whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions. It should be noted that this article is discussed in the context of the question of the ordering of the passions to one another, where Thomas deems it necessary to discuss both the relations of the passions to one another and which ones have preeminence. We see echoes of this in the article concerning whether love is in the concupiscible power (q26, a1), whether any other passion of the soul is the cause of love (q27, a4), and whether love is the cause of all that the lover does (q28, a6). The overwhelming point in all of these articles is that because good and evil are the objects of the concupiscible appetite and because love is the first movement of the appetite *per se*, then love is the “master passion.” The order of the passions is such that the concupiscible passions (and especially love), being directed toward the good, always precede the irascible. For example, a person may only combat

Perhaps the clearest explanation of this is in *SCG II*, cap. 47: “For there is in all things a desire for good, since the good is what all desire, as philosophers teach. This desire, in things devoid of knowledge, is called natural appetite; thus a stone desires to be below. In those which have sensitive knowledge, it is called animal appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible. In those which understand it is called intellectual or rational appetite, which is the will.”

(Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni: cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, ut philosophi tradunt. Huiusmodi autem appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent, dicitur naturalis appetitus: sicut dicitur quod lapis appetit esse deorsum. In his autem quae cognitionem sensitivam habent, dicitur appetitus animalis, qui dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. In his vero quae intelligunt, dicitur appetitus intellectualis seu rationalis, qui est voluntas.)

The basis of this distinction is the various kinds of subjects that tend toward their respective goods in distinctive ways. The natural appetite is controlled by something outside itself, the sensitive has some interior control while voluntas possesses the most interiority insofar as it is free and understands its own operation. According to Thomas, the difficulty with man is that these distinct but not separate appetites were placed in some degree of enmity with one another by original sin (*SCG IV*, cap. 52) although man still “has but one individual substance” (quamvis sit supposito unus — *SCG IV*, cap. 36) despite being the subject of these various appetites.

and/or overcome a temptation to go partying late with friends (irascible appetite) because he is directed in his concupiscible appetite toward the good of studying and doing his job. Thomas then proceeds to outline a “physics of love” primarily in order to refute the objection that desire must precede love.²⁵³ Love as a proportion or aptitude precedes the movement of desire, and thus the objections are false. In the order of execution, the “first act” of love is the proportion itself, the second is the movement toward the desired object, and the final one is pleasure. In the order of intention, however, it is the reverse.²⁵⁴ This discussion is also a prelude to q26, a2 concerning whether love is a passion, in which Thomas also discusses these “three movements” of love. We should note that in defining love, this discussion indicates love as a proportion, a kind of movement and a kind of rest.

Having commented on the section on the passions, we will make a few comments about the structure of the *De Amore* itself. It is noteworthy that regarding the *sed contras* of Ia IIae, q26, three of the four are based on the authority of Aristotle. Only the discussion of whether love is the same as dilection (a3) deviates from using “the Philosopher” in favor of St. Augustine. We will see that this particular article has a theological background, and thus the choice of Augustine as an authority is not surprising. Thus, regarding the “quid sit” of love, we find a discussion that largely follows Aristotle’s notions of the passions as movements of the soul. In *ST Ia IIae*, q27 on the causes of love, however, Thomas cites Augustine as the authority for the first two *sed contras* and scripture as the last (Ecclus. 13:19). It seems that though Aristotle can

²⁵³ *ST Ia IIae*, q25, a2, obj. 1 & 2.

²⁵⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q25, a2, c.

provide a general vocabulary for the discussion, his thought does not contain the conceptual depth that Thomas needs to delve into the root causes of love. More Christian sources are required for such an analysis. Finally, when it comes to love's effects, all the *sed contras* but the one on *mutua inhaesio* (which cites 1 Jo 4:16) have their authority as Book IV of Dionysius's *Divine Names*. It is difficult to know what to make of this progression of the *sed contras* of the *De Amore* from the authority of Aristotle to Augustine to Dionysius. In the least, it indicates that when it comes to a discussion of *amor ipse*, Thomas is not relying on a single source but rather synthesizing several into a new analysis.

In the beginning of the corpus of q26, a1, which begins the *De Amore*, all we know initially is that "love is something pertaining to the appetite,"²⁵⁵ and that the object of both is the *bonum*. Ultimately, the primary purpose of a1 is to establish the proper subject of love. As previously mentioned, the *De Amore* is part of a larger analysis of human passions. The very first article in that section treats of the "Subject of the Soul's Passions," which Thomas locates in the will. In q26, we have an analogous discussion of the proper subject of *amor*, which is the master-passion. The entire focus of the article is on the *appetitive* subject insofar as he is directed toward a connatural good, thus identifying love's subject as the concupiscible power.²⁵⁶ We find ourselves, therefore, in the realm of tendency and choice—broadly, in the realm of the appetite. We read

²⁵⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: "Amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens."

²⁵⁶ The distinction between the concupiscible and irascible appetites is well-known. Thomas himself writes at the conclusion of the corpus in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: "And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty."

"Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est obiectum irascibilis."

further that since love pertains to the appetite, it is true that “love differs according to the difference of appetites.”²⁵⁷

If we take to Velde’s argument that the Second Part of the *Summa* focuses on man as its primary agent, we find that the *De Amore* occurs at a point where Thomas’s analysis develops from a discussion of human acts in general to those principles of human action that are *in man*: passions, habits, vices, sins. Before Thomas moves on to discussing both the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of human action, he first deals with *what it means to be moved at all* in the “Treatise on the Passions.” It seems that he is progressing from the more natural and passive to the more supernatural and active. It is not surprising that he would begin a discussion of more specific principles with what is most pervasive and difficult to define—*amor*. After all, God Himself is love. We will understand more fully why *amor* is so difficult to define in the following chapter. Having reviewed St. Thomas Aquinas’s sources on love, some of his own writings on that subject other than the *De Amore*, and some structural comments on the context of the *De Amore* within the *Summa Theologiae*, we are now in a position to proceed to the commentary.

²⁵⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “Unde secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris.”

CHAPTER 3: “DE IPSO AMORE”

To introduce the commentary, we will provide a working definition of *amor* and then outline some of the difficulties with that working definition. Thomas himself writes, “With regard to the other operations of the soul such as to love, to rejoice, and the like, we must beware of equivocation.”²⁵⁸ While clarifying what it means *to love*, this kind of equivocation is a constant danger. In a way, when we hear the word “love” (in whatever language), we somewhat understand its meaning. Love breaks hearts and heals them; it is the lifeblood of poets and mystics, but perhaps the bane of philosophers for the reason that although we all have some vague idea of what love is, the concept is ambiguous in the extreme. I may “love” my God, my wife, cold beer, my dog, and my country, but it does not require a philosopher to recognize that “love” in each of these instances must mean something different, and yet simultaneously share some similar qualities.

In the previous two chapters we have been circling around the very broad topic of St. Thomas’s sources of the concept of *amor* and some other literary considerations. We are now in the position to become more specific about the key question, “*Quid sit amor?*” The prologue of *ST Ia IIae*, q26 reads simply that “Concerning love, three points must be considered: 1) Love itself; 2) The cause of love; 3) The effects of love.”²⁵⁹ In Thomas’s typical fashion, he progresses in the *De Amore* from the general to the specific.

²⁵⁸ SCG II, cap. 81: “Circa alias vero animae operationes, sicut est amare, gaudere, et alia huiusmodi, est aequivocatio cavenda.”

²⁵⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1: “Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius.”

It is logical that before he treats of the causes and effects of *amor*, he must first deal with *de ipso amore*. Q26 deals specifically with the “*quid sit?*” of *amor* or specifically what makes up “love itself” (*ipse amore*). The points of inquiry in answering the *quid sit* of love are the following:

- 1) Whether Love is in the Concupiscible Power? (a1)
- 2) Whether Love is a Passion? (a2)
- 3) Whether Love is the Same as Dilection? (a3)
- 4) Whether Love is Properly Divided into Love of Friendship and Love of Concupiscence? (a4)

Thomas’s method in q26 begins in a1 with establishing the *subject* of love as properly residing in the concupiscible power.²⁶⁰ A1 specifically asks the question, “*Where is amor properly found?*” He then proceeds in a2 to establish what kind of thing love is. He concludes that *amor* falls within the genus of passion. In a3 Thomas deals with some difficulties regarding the various species of *amor*. Considering that he discussed the proper subject of love in a1, we should not be surprised that these various species of love delineate various *objects* of *amor*. The final article in q26 treats of the twofold act of love, and constitutes a kind of appendix to the first three articles. We will discuss why a4 seems “out of place” shortly. In answering the question, “*Quid sit amor?*”, Thomas’s analysis progresses as follows: subject – genus – species (object) – act. This is a logical method of analysis. Because *amor* is a passion that is a relation (at least broadly speaking), he must first establish what grounds the passion. Proceeding to the parts of a definition, he then clarifies *amor*’s genus and species. Only after these general topics are covered does he deal with a special consideration: the twofold act of love in a rational being. *Prima facie*, the information given to us by the articles of q26 is that love

²⁶⁰ The concupiscible appetite is that part of the sensitive appetite that is directed toward particular goods for particular senses. It is the function of the will (*voluntas*) to be directed toward the good in general. (See *ST Ia*, q82, a5.)

is a passion that exists in the concupiscible appetite which can be further subdivided into *amicitia*, *caritas*, and *dilectio* and expressed in action by a rational being as *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae*.

Before we begin our commentary, it will be helpful both to establish a working definition of love and address some of the limitations of what the Angelic Doctor establishes in q26 under the heading, “*Quid sit amor?*” According to Thomas himself, “Every definition is composed of genus and difference.”²⁶¹ This is the most common definition of definition itself. This kind of definition is perhaps clearest when we consider substances, such as when we say that “man is a rational animal.” *Amor*, however, is not a substance.²⁶² How then may we classify it? At the beginning of our analysis we are beset with the difficulty that there are many ways in which *amor* is used. In every sense in which *amor* is used, the following definition is operative: *amor is that passive principle of movement in either the natural, sensitive and rational appetites that tends towards their respective goods.*

We will see that this definition can work in any case whatsoever where Thomas uses the term *amor*. What should not be forgotten about q26 is that Thomas is dealing with man as both a sensitive and rational being. Outlining the program of the Second Part of the *Summa*, Thomas writes, “First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals,

²⁶¹ SCG I, cap. 25: “Omnis definitio est ex genere et differentiis.”

²⁶² We cannot forget the ultimate theological framework in which this analysis takes place. Ultimately, *amor* is substantial in the fact that God, who is love, is his own operation (See *ST Ia*, q77, a1).

and are called passions.”²⁶³ Thomas does not deviate from this plan in q26. The difficulty with *amor* is that it can be both an act proper to man and common to animals. Despite the fact that *amor* can be found in objects that do not have a concupiscible appetite, Thomas still claims that *amor* is found in the concupiscible appetite²⁶⁴ because that is where it is properly located *in man*. Q26 is not intelligible if we understand him to be defining *amor* only in its most general sense. The fourth article, for example, is unintelligible if we understand that Thomas means each article to define *amor* in creatures (or objects) with a natural appetite alone. This is because he claims that each act of love is twofold: *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. These acts are clearly possible only for a creature with a rational intellect and higher will (*voluntas*). We might say that q26 does a kind of “double duty” insofar as Thomas is defining *amor* in its broadest sense as existing in all things whatsoever (i.e., the natural appetite), and *amor* in its more specific sense insofar as it exists in the sensitive and rational appetites of *man*. Thus, q26 is a microcosm of the *Prima Secunda* itself: both the *De Amore* and the *Prima Secundae* treat of man insofar as he is a sensitive and rational being.

As Thomas himself says, we must be aware of equivocation and not make a mistake at the beginning of the analysis so that it becomes a large one in the end. From the more general to the most specific, *amor* is: 1) a kind of connaturality or relation, 2) a unitive force, 3) a movement, 4) a change or complacency wrought in the appetite, 5) a transformation of the lover into the beloved, 6) the primary root or source of the

²⁶³ *ST Ia IIae*, q6, prol.: “Primo ergo considerandum est de actibus qui sunt proprii hominis; secundo, de actibus qui sunt homini aliisque animalibus communes, qui dicuntur animae passiones. Circa primum duo consideranda occurrunt, primo, de conditione humanorum actuum; secundo, de distinctione eorum.”

²⁶⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1.

emotions, 7) a kind of well-wishing (*benevolentia*) that results in 8) *dilectio*, 9) *amicitia*, and/or 10) *caritas*.²⁶⁵ In the following commentary, these senses of *amor* will be made clearer; but we will make several preliminary comments here. In *amor*'s most general sense, it pertains to one thing's capability of being affected by any other thing whatsoever. The corpus of the final article of the *De Amore* reads as follows: "I answer that, every agent acts for an end, as stated above. Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind."²⁶⁶ He also writes, "To be affected/moved toward another, insofar as it is of this kind, is to love that thing. Therefore, every inclination of the will and also of the sensitive appetite has its origin from love."²⁶⁷ *Amor* is that primary inclination toward the good that makes it possible for one thing to act on another thing. If it is possible for one thing to affect another thing then it is connatural with it.²⁶⁸ We might say that connaturality is the condition for the possibility of *amor*, which is the first movement or inclination that acts in this broad field of connatural

²⁶⁵ This list is provided as a preliminary summary. The proper citations concerning where to find these different senses in St. Thomas's work will be provided in the substantive commentary.

²⁶⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore."

²⁶⁷ *SCG IV*, cap. 19: "Affici autem ad aliquid, in quantum huiusmodi, est amare ipsum. Omnis igitur inclinatio voluntatis, et etiam appetitus sensibilis, ex amore originem habet." (Translation mine.)

²⁶⁸ In *Ethic II*, 5 Thomas writes, "...love implies a certain connaturality of the appetite with the thing loved."

"...amor, qui importat quandam connaturalitatem appetitus ad bonum amatum."

relations. It is about this most general and more metaphysical sense of *amor* that Etienne Gilson writes:

Born of love, the whole universe is penetrated, moved, vivified from within, by love that circulates through it like the life-giving blood through the body.... This new metaphysic of love, wholly based as it is on the metaphysic of being, raises problems equally new touching the nature and even the psychology of human love.²⁶⁹

Amor, in its broadest sense, consists of all of creation being ordered toward itself and to its Creator. *Amor* as a unitive force (#2) adds the relation of actual union to connaturality. *Amor* as connaturality remains in the realm of the potential, while *amor* as a unitive force begins to describe what *amor* truly *does*. The following passage brings both these senses of *amor* together:

Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Wherefore it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way: for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force.²⁷⁰

The reason why the lover is connatural with the beloved is because the beloved is referred to the lover's unity with himself.²⁷¹ Connaturality implies unity.

The senses of *amor* as a movement (#3) and a change or *complacentia* of the appetite (#4) can seem to be mutually exclusive, for *motus* seems an active term while

²⁶⁹ Gilson, *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 276-7.

²⁷⁰ SCG I, cap. 91; *ST* IIa IIae, q25, a4, c; IIa IIae, q29, a3, ad3; *De Vir.* q2, a9, arg7.

²⁷¹ Simply because we use the language of lover and beloved here, it should not be misunderstood that we refer here exclusively to personal love. If a stone has a certain connaturality with the center of the earth, one of them can be referred to as the "lover" and another as "beloved." There is something "in" the stone that "needs" to be attracted to the center of the earth, and thus there is a connaturality or "oneness" between them. This will be clearer when we discuss the appetites in the commentary on *ST* Ia IIae, q26, a1.

complacentia seems passive. Thus, we are rightfully led to ask whether *amor* is an active or passive force. Thomas clearly states that “love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.”²⁷² Writing of the angels, Thomas states: “And first we will treat of the will itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love or dilection.”²⁷³ As stated, this sense of *amor* as *motus* seems to conflict with *amor* as a *complacentia* or change in the appetite. Thomas relates the sense of *amor* as connaturality with *amor* as *complacentia* as follows: “And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good.”²⁷⁴ The tension between *amor* as a movement and *amor* as a more passive change or *complacentia* in the appetite can be resolved by reviewing the following proposition: “Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called ‘love,’ and is nothing else than complacency in that object, and from this complacency results a movement towards that some object, and this movement is ‘desire.’”²⁷⁵ Properly speaking, it seems the passive *complacentia* is the essence of *amor* while the actual movement that results from it is more properly called *desiderium*. Nevertheless, Thomas still calls *amor* a movement. The apparent conflict between these passive and active senses of *amor* can further be resolved by

²⁷² *ST Ia*, q20, a1, c.: “Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor.” (Translation mine.) See also *SCG IV*, cap. 23.

²⁷³ *ST Ia*, q59, prol.: “Et primo considerabimus de ipsa voluntate secundo, de motu eius, qui est amor sive dilectio.”

²⁷⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q25, a2, c.: “Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni.” *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1 & a2 speak of *complacentia* in the same manner.

²⁷⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium.”

remembering that Thomas specifically calls *amor* a movement when treating of the higher will; in other words, insofar as human beings are active images of a God who is supremely active, our love is an active movement.²⁷⁶ Moreover, the apparent conflict is solved by noting that Thomas equates a passive change as a *motus* as well. Both an agent and a patient is said “to move.”²⁷⁷ If love both unites a lover and a beloved and alters the appetite of the lover by a certain complacency, we should not be surprised that Thomas speaks about *amor* as a transformation (#5) of the lover into the beloved.²⁷⁸ Regarding the remainder of the senses of love there are fewer difficulties of equivocation since they deal much more specifically with human emotion and will. We will analyze them specifically in the commentary itself. *Amor* can be both passive and a movement simultaneously, and tends toward a good in the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites.

IA IIAE, Q26, A1: IS LOVE IN THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWER? OR “WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF LOVE?”

Looking at the structure of the topic and the initial objections, it is clear that Thomas seeks to establish the subject of love, or the “where” of this passion or movement in the human person. He actually does something similar at the beginning of the “Treatise on the Passions,” where *ST* I-II, q22 discusses “The Subject of the Passions”

²⁷⁶ In the passage quoted above concerning the angels, Thomas refers to “*amor sive dilectio*.” The love that is an active movement is ascribed more properly to intellectual love.

²⁷⁷ *SCG* II, cap. 57: “Movement is the common act of mover and moved.” (“*Licet motus sit communis actus moventis et moti*.”)

²⁷⁸ *De Malo*, q6, ad13; *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1, ad5.

as “the sensitive appetite.”²⁷⁹ The objections render this fact more apparent in raising the following questions: 1) it is objected whether love can truly be in the sensitive appetite *qua* concupiscible power, 2) it is objected that the exclusivity of love resides merely in the concupiscible power, and 3) the initial claim that perhaps love is only found in the vegetal soul. All of these clearly deal with love *qua* subject. The objections simply attempt to deny the fact that the concupiscible power is the subject of love rather than offer any new candidates for that subject. The first objection counters that if wisdom can be sought and loved (Wisdom 8:2), then the concupiscible appetite cannot be the subject of love on account of the fact that the concupiscible appetite is a part of the sensitive appetite. This sensitive appetite, being bodily, cannot attend to something as spiritual as Wisdom. Thomas simply responds that the love referred to in Wisdom 8:2 is “intellectual or rational love.”²⁸⁰ The second objection cites Augustine²⁸¹ to the effect that *every* passion is a form of love in its own way. Since passions like fear are in the irascible power and not in the concupiscible, the subject of love cannot simply be in the concupiscible power. Thomas responds that the *essence* of love is not fear, joy, sadness, or desire but rather the *cause* of these emotions.²⁸² The third objection, citing Dionysius, asserts that if there is such a thing as “natural love,” which seems only to belong to the

²⁷⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a3: “appetitu sensitivo”

²⁸⁰ “De Amore intellectivo vel rationali.”

²⁸¹ Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* XIV, 7.

²⁸² Thomas affirms that Augustine recognized that all passions have love as their root and principle. If one is afraid of heights (fear as occurring in the irascible appetite), it merely affirms that one *loves* his own life. Thomas must distinguish love as a passion in the concupiscible appetite from love as the principle of passions like fear and sadness, which occur in the irascible appetite.

vegetal soul, then such a love cannot exist in the concupiscible power, which is in the sensory soul as mentioned above. Aquinas simply responds that *amor naturalis* is in all the powers of the soul, making *amor naturalis* almost a synonym with *connaturalitas*.

As stated, all of the objections attempt to deny that the subject of love is in the concupiscible power. Thomas's responses do not entirely satisfy the objections because they do not contain the crux of his argument which is the following: *love pertains to the appetite since the good is the object of both. If its object is the good per se, then the subject of love must be in the concupiscible power, which is the power that tends toward the good per se.*²⁸³ The overwhelming content of the article is to make the term *appetitus* clear, and to delineate its types. At first glance, the content of the first article is to determine the concupiscible appetite as the subject of love while simultaneously affirming that there are other appetites that are also the subject of love. Exactly what is the subject of love?

Thomas will often clarify the meaning of terms by designating a more general and more specific meaning for that particular term.²⁸⁴ In the broader sense, *voluntas* is a synonym for every appetitive faculty and synonymous with *appetitus*.²⁸⁵ In the narrower and proper sense of the term, *voluntas* is that part of the appetitive power which is *not*

²⁸³ Thomas writes in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c. : "I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites."

"Respondeo dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque obiectum sit bonum."

²⁸⁴ The word "marriage," in general Christian parlance denotes a lifelong, unbreakable bond between a man and a woman. "Marriage," however, can refer to many kinds of unions as in the sentence: "Success is the result of a marriage of time and talent."

²⁸⁵ DeFerrari, "Voluntas," 1170.

sensual.²⁸⁶ Thomas confirms the narrow and proper sense of *voluntas* clearly in the

Prima Pars:

Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions – arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. *They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will.* And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.²⁸⁷

Therefore, what is not as clear in q26 regarding the subject of love as the concupiscible power is that *rational* love (i.e., fully human love) – *dilectio, amicitia*, and even *caritas* – does *not* have its subject entirely in that concupiscible power.²⁸⁸ Returning, then, to objection 1, we now understand that Thomas actually grants the objection that the concupiscible power cannot seek wisdom since the concupiscible power is found specifically in the sensual appetite. *Voluntas*, however, can seek wisdom.

With regard to the other operations of the soul, such as to love, to rejoice, and the like, we must beware of equivocation. Because sometimes they are taken for passions of the soul: and thus they are acts of the sensible appetite in respect of the irascible and concupiscible faculties, together

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ *ST Ia*, q82, a5, ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.” (Emphasis added.)

²⁸⁸ If with an act of my will I do something kind to an enemy out of *caritas*, we cannot say that this love is found only in the concupiscible appetite because *caritas* requires an intellectual act of which the concupiscible appetite is not capable. But insofar as my will commands my concupiscible appetite as well, this act of *caritas* includes the concupiscible appetite.

with a certain bodily transmutation. And thus they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle proves in his book *De Anima*. But sometimes they are taken for a simple act of the will, that is without any passion. Wherefore Aristotle says in the seventh book of *Ethics* that God rejoices by one simple operation, and in the tenth book that in the contemplation of wisdom there is wonderful pleasure, and in the eighth book, he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love that is a passion.²⁸⁹

Thomas has already made this point about both the simple and bodily operations of the soul's passions earlier in the *Summa*, so he does not see the need to repeat himself needlessly in the *De Amore*. A major difficulty with *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1 is that Thomas actually grants the objection that *amor*, when considered in all its aspects – natural, sensitive, and rational – does *not* have its subject merely in the concupiscible power. But properly speaking, *amor* as a passion does have its subject in the concupiscible power. If love can be found in the rational powers, then it cannot be found absolutely in the concupiscible power. This is an essential point for understanding the *De Amore* itself, for it highlights the analogous nature of love.

The Meaning of Subject (Subiectum)

If the purpose of a1 is to establish the subject of love, it will be helpful to briefly consider the meaning of "*subiectum*" in the Thomistic corpus. One of the most common words used in conjunction with "subject" in the Thomistic corpus is "in." Accidents or

²⁸⁹ SCG II, cap. 81: "Circa alias vero animae operationes, sicut est amare, gaudere, et alia huiusmodi, est aequivocatio cavenda. Nam quandoque sumuntur ut sunt animae passiones. Et sic sunt actus sensibilis appetitus secundum concupiscibilem vel irascibilem, cum aliqua permutatione corporali. Et sic in anima manere non possunt post mortem: ut Aristoteles probat in libro de anima. Sumuntur autem quandoque pro simplici actu voluntatis, qui est absque passione. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet; et in X, quod in contemplatione sapientiae est delectatio admirabilis; et in VIII, amorem amicitiae ab amatione, quae est passio, distinguit. Cum vero voluntas sit potentia non utens organo, sicut nec intellectus, palam est huiusmodi, secundum quod sunt actus voluntatis, in anima separata remanere."

powers must be *in* a subject. Its most basic ontological meaning is simply “that upon which accidental determinations depend for existence, or that in which forms are received,” and can be a synonym for *hypostasis* and *substantia*.²⁹⁰ To predicate *about* something (including a relation, like *mutua inhaesio*), a subject is required for the predication. The other primary and more nuanced metaphysical meaning of *subiectum* is “the object of an action, a faculty, that concerning which, or about which action takes place, as distinct from the object-motive of an action.”²⁹¹ The *subiectum* answers the question of “where” a particular act or faculty operates, or where an accident is found. It is the latter meaning of *subiectum* as “that concerning which an action takes place” which is more relevant for our purposes.

In Thomistic philosophy, any *res* or *substantia* can be the subject of accidents or powers.²⁹² But the *genera* of subjects about which Thomas is primarily concerned is that of intellectual substances, which are angels and men.²⁹³ But because man is a complex intellectual subject, we find that there are within him many subjects that are, in the latter sense, the “that concerning which” a particular power or action is operating. Consider the following titles of various questions in the *Summa Theologiae*:

²⁹⁰ Deferrari, 1060.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² For example, the intellect can be the subject of the reasoning power, the body can be the subject of emotions, a chair can be the subject of blackness, etc.

²⁹³ And arguably, the reason why Thomas philosophizes so profoundly about angels is not so much to understand angels as to understand men.

- I-II, q22 = “Of the Subject of the Soul’s Passions”²⁹⁴
 - SUBJECT: The will
 - OBJECT: The Good

- I-II, q50 = “Of the Subject of Habits”
 - SUBJECT: A habit is “a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or operation,” and can be found in the body, in the soul, in the will (both rational and irrational parts), and in the intellect itself.²⁹⁵
 - OBJECT: Variable

- I-II, q56 = “Of the Subject of Virtue”
 - SUBJECT: Any power of the soul
 - OBJECT: Variable

- I-II, q74 = “Of the Subject of Sin”
 - SUBJECT: The will primarily insofar as sin is mostly characterized by a voluntary act; all powers and acts that can either be moved or restrained by the will are the subject of sin
 - OBJECT: Variable

- I-II, q83 = “Of the Subject of Original Sin”
 - SUBJECT: More in the soul than in the flesh, and more so in the very essence of the soul than accidentally
 - OBJECT: Variable

- II-II, q18 = “Of the Subject of Hope”
 - SUBJECT: In the will
 - OBJECT: God

- II-II, q24 = “Of the Subject of Charity”
 - SUBJECT: In the will
 - OBJECT: God

²⁹⁴ The subject of the passions is the soul in general, although in three ways; it is properly an appetitive phenomenon rather than an apprehensive one; and passion is not properly in the intellectual appetite although in an extended sense we can say that it is. (See *ST Ia IIae*, q22)

²⁹⁵ Even angels possess habits insofar as they are still related to God insofar as only God is Pure Act while angels must be composed of some potency.

Etienne Gilson writes, "The movement of every power of the soul can indeed be considered from two points of view: that of the subject and that of the object."²⁹⁶ It is the subject in which the power moves.²⁹⁷ The most relevant of these for our purposes are the subjects of both the passions and of *caritas*, the former because the discussion of *mutua inhaesio* is included in the section of the *Summa* on the passions of the soul and the latter because charity is related to love as being one of its species.²⁹⁸

For all of these topics, the secondary or remote subject is the human person himself. The primary and proximate subject is the specific power in which there is an act or movement. We can see that if subject can be taken in all of these various ways, Thomas must not be using it in the sense of a hypostasis. For example, love considered absolutely is a passion that is "in" the soul, and specifically "in" the concupiscible appetite. Passions always occur with a concomitant change in the sensitive appetite, meaning that they are always accompanied by some change in the body. There is, however, a kind of love that moves through the higher appetite (the will) and thus occurs without passion.²⁹⁹ When Thomas identifies in one of the questions of the *Summa* what the subject of something is, he is locating the specific faculty of the human person in which a virtue, vice, habit, passion or other activity resides. All of these *subiecta* indicate where in the *subiectum* (in the first, substantial sense) a particular motion or

²⁹⁶ Gilson, *Philosophy*, 298.

²⁹⁷ See Rossner, "An Inclination to an Intellectually Known Good: the Question of the Existence of Intellectual Love," *Modern Schoolman* 63 (1989): 65.

²⁹⁸ If it were literally and exclusively true that *amor* was a passion, it would follow that *caritas* is also a passion as being a species of *amor*.

²⁹⁹ See *ST Ia IIae*, q22.

activity is taking place.³⁰⁰ It could be said that the human person himself is the ultimate subject of those other things within him that are said to be proximate subjects.³⁰¹

The Corpus

The corpus of a1 has two primary parts. The first part differentiates the basic appetites – natural, sensory and rational – according to the manner in which appetite follows upon an apprehension, while the second explains the nature of love’s

³⁰⁰ Thomas does indeed refer to the human person as a *subiectum*, specifically regarding love – the movement of the Holy Spirit causing charity:

De Vir. q2, a1, ad2: “...it must be said that although it pertains to the effectiveness of a mover that it does not require any disposition in the subject, however, that mover displays its effectiveness if it impresses a strong disposition in that which receives or is moved. For, a great fire causes not only substantial form to appear, but also a strong disposition. That agent which moves to action, and which also impresses a form through that which it moves, is stronger than that mover which so moves to action that it impresses no form. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit is the most powerful mover, He so moves to love that He also causes a habit of charity.”

“...quod licet ad efficaciam moventis pertineat ut dispositionem non praeexigat in subiecto; tamen efficaciam eius demonstrat, si dispositionem fortem imprimat in passo vel moto. Fortis enim ignis non solum formam substantialem, sed et fortem dispositionem inducit. Unde fortius est agens quod sic ad agendum movet, quod etiam formam imprimit per quam agat, quam id movens quod sic movet ad agendum, ut tamen nullam imprimat formam. Unde cum spiritus sanctus sit virtuosissimum movens; sic movet ad diligendum, quod etiam habitum caritatis inducit.”

³⁰¹ Other texts have recognized this differentiation between the two meanings of *subiectum*, although with different terminology. Faraon writes, “According to the axiom, ‘*eius est agere cuius est esse*,’ or the more frequently quoted ‘*actiones sunt suppositorum*,’ all of the activity and every distinct act of man emanates from the person as the ultimate remote ‘*principium quod*.’ (Faraon, “Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love, 12; See Aristotle, *In Meta*, A, 981a, 17) He continues, “By means of five hierarchically arranged genera of potencies, which are really distinguished from one another by their proper objects (*secundum actus et objecta*), man is acted upon and reacts in turn upon the extramental and trans-subjective world of being. These potencies are accidental realities which in some way emanate from the soul and are really distinct though by their nature inseparable from it.” (Faraon, 13) These potencies are the vegetant, the external and sensory potencies, the intellectual cognitive potencies, the sensory and rational appetitive potencies, and the power of local motion. (Faraon, 13).

movement.³⁰² Every form entails an inclination, but it can only incline to what it knows. It can only incline to what has “informed” it. As Gilson writes, “It suffices that the author of nature has provided for this by imparting to each being its requisite inclination.”³⁰³ Thomas writes:

I answer that, it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being – that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.³⁰⁴

A natural object like a stone only has only a natural appetite insofar as it will simply follow the force of gravity according to an apprehension that it does not have within itself. The sensory appetite has some internal apprehension of its inclinations, while the rational being is the most “internalized” regarding both his apprehension and appetite.³⁰⁵ The more complex the creature is, the greater the number of appetites.

³⁰² These distinctions were introduced on p. 90.

³⁰³ Gilson, *Philosophy of St. Thomas*, 287.

³⁰⁴ *ST Ia*, q80, a1, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere quendam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur.”

³⁰⁵ *SCG IV*, cap. 11: “It is evident from what has been already proved that God understands Himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands: because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect: wherefore our intellect in understanding itself, remains within itself, not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension.”

Thomas writes that both sensitive and rational love arise from an apprehension *in the subject* of the appetite.³⁰⁶ The specific difference between these two loves is that sensitive love arises out of necessity whereas rational love arises out of free choice.³⁰⁷ When the eye performs its work of seeing the spectrum of colors, this elicits sensitive love. *Sensitive love* “tends at least to every object which is useful or pleasant to it. As the corresponding sense has for its object some particular sensible, so the sensitive appetite aims at some particular good.”³⁰⁸ When the human will chooses one good among many goods, it is the result of a *rational love* (i.e., *dilection*). Rational love is the only love that can truly be called a human love. Thomas writes that, “...insensible things do so [love God] naturally, brute animals sensitively, rational creatures through the intellectual love which is called *dilectio*.”³⁰⁹ Thus, the most general distinction pertaining to *amor* is that there is a love that does not choose (natural and sensitive loves) and a love that chooses.

“Manifestum est enim ex his quae in primo declarata sunt, quod Deus seipsum intelligit. Omne autem intellectum, in quantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligente: significat enim ipsum intelligere apprehensionem eius quod intelligitur per intellectum; unde etiam intellectus noster, seipsum intelligens, est in seipso, non solum ut idem sibi per essentiam, sed etiam ut a se apprehensum intelligendo.”

³⁰⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ Gilson, *Philosophy of St. Thomas*, 287. Technically, seeing color itself is an operation of the apprehensive power rather than the appetitive, but the “seeing” gives rise to the appetite which results in either aversion or attraction.

³⁰⁹ *Quodlibetal Questions* 1 & 2, trans. and notes, Sandra Edwards (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), n. 38. The footnote provided is also enlightening: “In general St. Thomas distinguishes three types of love. *Amor* is love which pertains to the appetites – natural, sensitive, or intellectual. *Dilectio* adds to the notion of *amor* the notion of a preceding choice so that this type of love cannot be found in the concupiscible appetite but must belong to the will of a rational being. *Caritas* adds to these notions that of a kind of perfection of love, the object of love being esteemed as something of great value.”

First, there is kind of *amor* that originates from completely without (i.e., the natural appetite). Second, there is an *amor* that is determined, existing partially within. Third, there is an *amor* that is the most internalized because it is free. The differentiation of the kinds of appetite (and thus the kinds of love) stands or falls with the kind of subject involved and the mode of knowledge in operation.

As mentioned above, the purpose of q26, a1 is to establish the subject of love. The problem is the clarification of several terms that specifically deal with the appetitive faculty. If love *pertains* to the appetite, is it the *same* as appetite? In what way does it pertain to the appetite, and what is Thomas's primary point by establishing love as something pertaining to the appetite? The connection that Thomas makes between the appetite and love is so close as to appear sometimes synonymous, which can be seen in the following texts:

Now, to be attracted towards a thing, as such, is to love it.³¹⁰

Now, the chief perfection of the affective faculty is love. A sign of which is that every affective movement originates in love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, save on account of a good that he loves; and in like manner no one shuns, or fears, or grieves, or is angry, except on account of something contrary to that which he loves.³¹¹

Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite.³¹²

³¹⁰ SCG IV, cap. 19: "Affici autem ad aliquid, inquantum huiusmodi, est amare ipsum."

³¹¹ SCG IIIb, cap. 151: "Principalis autem perfectio affectus est dilectio. Cuius signum est, quod omnis motus affectus ab amore derivatur: nullus enim desiderat, aut sperat, aut gaudet, nisi propter bonum amatum; similiter autem neque aliquis refugit, aut timet, aut tristatur, aut irascitur, nisi propter id quod contrariatur bono amato."

³¹² ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, ad1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a Dionysio vocatur virtus."

Love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.³¹³

Thomas claims that Dionysius calls love a power only insofar as love is a *principle of movement in the appetite*. Similarly, in the first quotation, *amor* is not called an act *per se*, but rather a *radix* and *principium*. In the first article of the *De Amore* itself, Thomas writes, “Now in each of these appetites, the name ‘love’ is given to the *principle of movement* towards the end loved.”³¹⁴ This is confirmed by the above quotations as well: to love is “to be attracted toward a thing.” Drost raises the key point that *amor* is a movement before it is an inclination.³¹⁵ The distinction between *appetitus* and *amor*, when they are differentiated at all, appears to be on the basis of potency to act, respectively.³¹⁶

What St. Thomas writes about the natural appetite in the context of q26, a1 is extremely significant in relation to its subject, for we see that a natural appetite need not arise from cognition in subject itself: “For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, *but in some other*: and this is called the ‘natural appetite.’” It might seem strange that a subject can have *within* it an

³¹³ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, c.: “Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor.”

³¹⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum.”

³¹⁵ Mark Drost, “Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 31, no.4 (1991): 54.

³¹⁶ Even with this distinction, though, we must be careful. For Thomas clearly claims in the following article that *amor* is a *passio* rather than an act. We will clarify this in the subsequent commentary.

appetite that derives from an apprehension that exists *without* it.³¹⁷ Thomas continues by specifying that “natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an appetite which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature.”³¹⁸ He himself refers us to the *Prima Pars* to further explain what he means. The following two texts are related, and bear directly on this point:

All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above. And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.³¹⁹

The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow.³²⁰

³¹⁷ It is arguable, of course, whether or not this kind of natural love is within the subject. There is a major implication here – directly relevant to our thesis – that a principle as intrinsic to an *ens* as natural love, actually arises from another will outside of it. This points to the primal inter-relatedness of all things, and the ultimate indwelling of all of creation as an effect in the cause which is God.

³¹⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.

³¹⁹ *ST Ia*, q6, a1, ad2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.”

³²⁰ *ST Ia*, q103, a1, ad3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem.”

We see clearly that the psychology of human love (for St. Thomas) cannot be separated from this “natural necessity” that exists even in free beings as “a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end.” It is interesting to note that natural love is described in almost the same way that *complacentia* is described. We see in the above passages that there are various levels of knowledge that correspond to the kinds of appetite. Thus, the following features are observable in the first section of q26, a1:

- 1) First, there is a natural appetite that arises not from a substance’s own cognition but from a cognition existing outside the subject of the appetite, namely God’s cognition. This is the appetite that has no choice about seeking that which is suitable or connatural to it.
- 2) Second, an appetite arises in the cognition of the subject, “but from necessity and not from free will.” This is sensitive love. It is the appetite we share with animals, but it does partake in liberty “insofar as it obeys reason.”
- 3) Third, an appetite arises “following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite.” This is rational love/appetite, which is called *voluntas*.

The first section of the corpus differentiates the various appetites based upon the several inclinations toward the good while the second section regards specifically the *movement* of those inclinations, which consists of *amor*. We will now proceed to discuss the foundation of those movements in natural love.

Natural Love

Not all substances are capable of rational love; similarly, not all are capable of sensitive love. Natural love, the love that pervades all things, is the one form of love that comes closer to what Gilson characterizes above as the “life-giving blood” of the universe. There is no being, no substance, that is not related to another through some

inclination, no matter how faint or simple, of natural love. Other than referring to the Holy Spirit as love itself,³²¹ natural love is likely the most metaphysical and comprehensive “kind” of love in Thomistic thought. I write *kind* in italics for the reason that Thomas claims that, “Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things...”³²² In its widest aspect, love is more of a cosmic force than a “type” or species in Thomistic thought. It is a pre-moral response (*complacentia boni*) in anything that the lover finds suitable to its nature.³²³ It appears that natural love as the principle of all other kinds of love is thus properly speaking not a “kind” of love in itself.³²⁴

Thomas defines and/or refers to natural love in several places. This discussion of natural love provides a good propaedeutic to our discussion of the species of love which will occur shortly. The following are perhaps the most representative texts concerning natural love:

³²¹ See SCG IV, cap. 20: “Now we established in the foregoing chapter that the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself. Hence the Holy Spirit is the cause of the creation: and this is indicated (Ps. 103:30): ‘Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created.’ Also, seeing that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Spirit.”

“Igitur spiritus sanctus est principium creationis rerum. Et hoc significatur in Psalmo: emitte spiritum tuum et creabuntur. Ex hoc etiam quod spiritus sanctus per modum amoris procedit; amor autem vim quandam impulsivam et motivam habet: motus qui est a Deo in rebus, spiritui sancto proprie attribui videtur.”

³²² ST Ia IIae, q26, a1, ad3.

³²³ McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 21. McEvoy mentions that an outstanding summary of this sort of love is given in Helmut Kuhn, *Liebe. Geschichte eines Begriffs*, (Munich, 1975), ch. 9: “Die Theologie der Liebe im 13 Jahrhundert,” 131-46.

³²⁴ If the kinds of love are not only distinguished by appetites but also by their objects, then natural love has no particular object. Any object whatsoever can be described as a natural love for the appetite that tends to it.

A: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature.³²⁵

B: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself.³²⁶

C: Natural love is the root and principle of the love of choice—in other words, of every other kind of intellectual love.³²⁷

D: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), 'Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things'; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it."³²⁸

E: But, just as the appetite or natural love is a certain inclination implanted in natural things to ends which are connatural to them, so the love of charity is a certain inclination infused in rational nature for the purpose of tending toward God.³²⁹

³²⁵ *ST Ia*, q60, a1, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturae indita ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturae."

³²⁶ *ST Ia*, q60, a4, ad3.: "Ad tertium dicendum quod dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tanquam cui aliquis velit bonum; sed tanquam bonum quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens alii, in quantum est unum sibi."

³²⁷ *ST Ia*, q60, a2, c.

³²⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam."

³²⁹ *De Vir.* q2, a9, c.: "Sicut autem appetitus vel amor naturalis est inclinatio quaedam, indita rebus naturalibus ad fines connaturales, ita dilectio caritatis est inclinatio quaedam infusa rationali naturae ad tendendum in Deum."

Thomas argues that natural love cannot be perverse without the Author of Nature Himself being perverse, since it is He who implants natural love in all things (A).³³⁰ Natural love is a principle of all other loves (C), and refers directly to the good to which one wills the self, as united to one's self (B). This last observation is perhaps the most important, considering that it sounds identical to the concept substantial union which we will analyze in detail in Chapter Five. To conclude, natural love is a kind of inclination³³¹ of the lover toward the beloved that is found in all powers of the soul and implanted by the Author of nature which inclines the substance to its own Good, which can be defined as what is connatural and suitable to it. Thus, we must remember this about natural love: that before love becomes desire, it has already been "carried away toward a real object" and exists in a horizon that makes desire possible.³³² In other words, there is a love that exists that is a condition for the possibility of desire, which is itself the ground for the possibility of *mutua inhaesio*.

Connaturality

Continuing the analysis of our primary text, Thomas ties together the nature of love itself intrinsically with the concepts of appetite and *connaturalitas*. He writes:

Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness

³³⁰ This is a perfect text that represents the metaphysics of creation and participation so pervasive in the work of St. Thomas.

³³¹ Natural love is not a habit but an act. (See *DV I*, q8, #10.)

³³² Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 13.

of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called “natural love.”³³³

We have seen that love for Thomas is the principle of movement in all things. All beings have a natural tendency (natural love) existing in a larger field of relations that presuppose other beings which, in turn, cooperate with this natural tendency (connaturality). In the above passage, natural love is considered a synonym for connaturality.

There remains a problem in the passage quoted above. If love is defined in this context as the principle movement toward the end loved, and the principle of this movement is “the appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which it tends,” does that imply that natural love and connaturality are the same thing? Further, we also see that the words *coaptatio* and *complacentia* are used comparatively with *connaturalitas*. What are the similarities and differences in these terms? We see that in the final analysis, though they are quite related, the terms are not precise equivalents. Thomas delineates the concepts as follows: 1) *amor* is the principle movement toward the end loved in each appetite – natural, sensitive, and rational. *Connaturality* (at least as described in 26, a1) specifically refers to the principle of the movement of love in the natural appetite. We may surmise, therefore, that connaturality does *not* (absolutely speaking) refer to the principle of the movement in the sensitive and rational appetites.

³³³ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis.”

The same principle of connaturality being illustrated by weight comes up in the corpus of *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2. We should recall St. Augustine’s teaching regarding “love as weight” discussed in Chapter 1.

Though connaturality is the root of the movement of these appetites, the proper principle of the movement of the sensitive and rational appetites is the object or the beloved. This must be true because Thomas further delineates that, “*In a like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency*³³⁴ in good is called ‘sensitive love,’ or ‘intellectual’ or ‘rational love.’”³³⁵

We should inquire into the comparison (*similiter* = “in a like manner”) to which Thomas refers. Thomas sets up the comparison in the following way:

- 1) *Amor* = the principle of movement (*principium motus tendentis*) towards the end loved in each appetite.
- 2) However: specifically in the *natural* appetite...
 - i. Connaturality = the principle of the movement of love (*principium huiusmodi motus*)
- 3) Therefore, *similiter*.... (in a like manner to the above)
- 4) *Amor sensitivus* and *amor intellectivus* and *amor rationalis* = the principle of movement toward the end loved (in both the sensitive and rational appetites)...
 - i. Complacency = the principle of these movements of love.

Thomas calls both *amor* and connaturality the “principle of movement” of the appetite toward the good to which it tends. Thus, in at least some contexts, the concept of natural love is no different than that of connaturality. He appears to equate the appetite, natural love, and connaturality in the following passage as well: “But, just as the appetite or natural love is a certain inclination implanted in natural things to ends which are connatural to them, so the love of charity is a certain inclination infused in rational

³³⁴ The concept of complacency is vital to an understanding of *mutua inhaesio* in particular, and of *amor* in general. For a more detailed discussion of the concept, see below at pp. 277-281.

³³⁵ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a1, c.*: “*Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis.*” (Emphasis added).

nature for the purpose of tending toward God.”³³⁶ Yet, it still appears that natural love refers to the principle of tendency or seeking in a particular subject, while connaturality is a concept that also includes the relations which that natural love engenders. It is one thing to claim that it is part of the natural love of a man to desire to marry and have children. It is a slightly different thing to claim that he is connatural to this desire. The former has only the man himself as a subject. The latter claims a relation as its subject. Speaking of a connatural love already bespeaks of a union or bond. Natural love is clearly an appetitive term, while connaturality is more of a metaphysical term.³³⁷

In this context, Thomas describes both the sensitive and rational *coaptatio* of a subject in its appetitive good as a *complacentia* (unlike the natural appetite, the principle of motion being called *connaturality*).³³⁸ Considering that *complacentia* plays a major role in the article on *mutua inhaesio*, we would do well to make special note of this fact. The concept of *complacentia* plays a more active role in a2 on love as a passion, where the word is used five times. We will analyze it further in that context. There are some contexts in which the two terms of complacency and connaturality are used synonymously; the former has a more psychological connotation whereas the latter has a more metaphysical one. If this were not so, Thomas could not refer to the fact that the

³³⁶ *De Vir.* q2, a9.

³³⁷ Natural love has its subject specifically in the appetite of an existent thing while connaturality refers to the order and relation of all of creation to itself. For this reason, we refer to natural love as an appetitive term and connaturality as a metaphysical term.

³³⁸ Is there truly a difference between connaturality as the principle of motion of natural love and *complacentia* being the principle of movement of sensitive and rational love? This question must be postponed until a further discussion of *complacentia* in the context of the chapter on *mutua inhaesio*.

complacentia of the beloved in the lover is specifically in the affections of the lover such that the complacency is also “rooted in [the lover’s] heart.”³³⁹ This is *complacentia* in its more psychological meaning. As for the metaphysical meaning, it would be ridiculous to assert that connaturality *itself* is either “in the affections” or that it is “rooted in the heart.” Connaturality refers to the metaphysical possibility of one thing being able to experience or incline toward another, whereas complacency refers to actual change in the appetite wrought by the appetible object, such that the appetite is moved by the complacency in the object.³⁴⁰ We might say that because of the unity of natural love, i.e., the participation of all things in God, substances find themselves co-natured to one another, which in turn is the condition for the possibility of a lover having complacency in a beloved. Much more will be said about complacency in future chapters, but this will suffice to clarify the meaning of connaturality in the present context. Natural love is an inherent inclination to specific goods. It is directional. Connaturality is goodness spilled-out into an infinity of possible inclinations. Considering, however, that *complacentia* and *connaturalitas* both imply that a subject has some kind of *coaptatio* with a *bonum*, we would do well to proceed to a brief examination of the concept of the *bonum* and its use in q26.

The Good

It was just mentioned that love means “to be attracted to” anything at all. The more specific object of the appetite is the good; moreover, it is not possible that the

³³⁹ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: “*amati interius radicatum*”

³⁴⁰ See ST Ia IIae, q26, a1 & a2.

object of appetite be anything other than the good. The good sought by the will is *happiness (beatitudo)*. Thomas quite emphatically claims that just as the intellect adheres to first principles by necessity, so does the will adhere to happiness as the good by necessity:

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the *intellect of necessity inheres in the first principles, the will must of necessity inheres in the last end, which is happiness*: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.³⁴¹

It does not subtract from man's freedom to will happiness necessarily, for there are many means and ends that he can freely choose under the aspect of good which may be objectively evil or at least non-perfective. Much has been written about the nature of happiness as the end and good of human actions, and it is not the purpose of this section to recreate these well-known arguments.³⁴² What should be covered, however, is the manner in which Thomas deals with the necessity of willing happiness or the good in his specific treatment of love. After all, the notion of the necessity of willing the lover's

³⁴¹ *ST Ia*, q82, a1, c.: "Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut *intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo*, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili." (Emphasis added.)

³⁴² See John Cooper, "Friendship and the Good in Aristotle," *The Philosophical Review* 86:3 (Jul 1977): 290-315; David M. Gallagher, "Aquinas on Goodness and Moral Goodness," in *Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy*, ed. David Gallagher, *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 28 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1994); Daniel Westberg, "Good and Evil in Human Acts," In *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 90-103.

own personal good or his own personal happiness can seem repugnant to the lover, considering that true love should be about the beautiful beloved. How necessitated, how free, how “natural” is the choice of his beloved? What natural laws necessitate this *summum bonum* of choices? These questions introduce a dilemma that will surface repeatedly in this analysis: the dilemma of the true meaning of love in relation to the lover’s *own* good versus the good of the beloved.

We might be surprised that *beatitudo* figures hardly at all in qq26-28. As a matter of fact, the term *beatitudo* does not arise a single time in qq26-28. If Thomas went through such trouble in Ia IIae, q1-5, to designate happiness as the end of human activity, why is it not connected more explicitly with that most supreme of motive forces—love itself? Our initial observation is that love is anything but romantic for St. Thomas. The movement of love, though *leading* to happiness if well-ordered, is more about the objective search for perfection than the subjective search for “completion.” The ultimate good and happiness are essentially the same thing, but in the treatment of love, St. Thomas is much more concerned about the objective structure of love and its relation to the objective fulfillment of the human person. In answering whether love actually wounds the lover, Thomas responds, “Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him.”³⁴³ Thomas’s focus regarding love in the *De Amore* regards much more the moral, perfective good than love as something that grants a subjective happiness, although the two ultimately converge in Thomistic thought. We will have

³⁴³ ST Ia IIae, q26, a5, c.: “Amor ergo boni convenientis est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis.”

more of an opportunity to comment on the nature of the *Bonum* in Part Three. As far as the *De Amore* is concerned, the *bonum* is simply the good sought by the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites where the good is defined as that which love seeks.³⁴⁴

IA II AE, Q26, A2: IS LOVE A PASSION?

There is a great dilemma defining *amor* as a passion. In *ST Ia IIae*, q22 where Thomas defines *passio*, he clearly states that passion most properly construed is when the agent is drawn *away* from what is suitable to it;³⁴⁵ moreover, this “drawing away” is mostly according to a bodily transmutation.³⁴⁶ Yet shortly afterwards in the beginning of the *De Amore*, Thomas will not only claim that *amor* is defined as that which seeks the good³⁴⁷ but will also continue to demonstrate that *amor* in its higher forms has little to do with a bodily transmutation. Any definition of *amor* will have to deal with this apparent dilemma. Considering that the *De Amore* is located in the context of a larger discussion on the passions, it will be helpful to discuss the various senses of “*passio*” in the Thomistic corpus. Passions pertain to the appetitive part of the soul, which always consists of *being drawn* by (or to) an appetible object. The widest definition of *passio* is “that by which the patient is drawn to the agent.”³⁴⁸ The proper subject of the passions

³⁴⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1.

³⁴⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a1, c.

³⁴⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a2, c.

³⁴⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1.

³⁴⁸ *ST I, IIae*, q22, c.

is “properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation.”³⁴⁹ We see that in a broad sense, a passion is almost synonymous with potentiality. Thomas writes, “Now passion pertains to defect because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.”³⁵⁰ If it is true that passion pertains to that by which a patient is drawn to an agent, then a passion refers just as much to the intensity of the beloved object as it does anything existing within the lover. In other words, if a man suffers extreme passion over a woman, it is not merely a statement concerning the strength of his passion but also concerning the strength of her capability to draw that passion out of him. In this way, we see why *amor* refers to passion.³⁵¹ It refers to that unitive force that makes it possible for the beloved to form an impression (i.e., a *complacentia*) on the lover.³⁵² We find a marvelous prelude to the idea of substantial unity, and a prelude to q28, a5 concerning whether love wounds the lover in the following statement: “For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something

³⁴⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a3, c: “Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis.”

³⁵⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a2, ad1: “Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent, attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus consistit.

³⁵¹ Thomas claims in *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a3, ad2: “Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient.”

“Magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis.

³⁵² When we enter the discussion of *amor* as a passion, we can see more clearly why Thomas describes *amor* as a *complacentia*.

else.”³⁵³ The more a person remains “within himself,” as it were, the less he is moved by an external object, the less *passion* he *suffers*.

A passion does not have entirely positive connotations in Thomistic philosophy, specifically when we understand Thomas’s definition of *passio* in the strictest sense. Because they are a part of human nature, the passions cannot be intrinsically disordered.³⁵⁴ Thomas notes that the soul can experience passion in three ways: 1) *passio* can refer to mere reception, in the same way as air receives light; in this sense, “nothing is taken away” from the subject experiencing the passion; 2) *passio* in its proper sense can refer to the movement where something is received and something is taken away. Thomas makes a twofold distinction of this second sense. The first distinction is that this kind of *passio* occurs when something unsuitable is taken away while something suitable replaces it, such as health replacing sickness; 3) The second way that this alteration takes place is “passion in its proper sense” where there is a transmutation for the *worse*.³⁵⁵ It might be said that passion “properly construed” causes the self to recede from itself, i.e., the obeying of a siren call that causes him to be less himself. Thomas claims that this third way is how we understand passion in its most proper sense. A thing is *most* a passion when it is *most* drawn from what is suitable to itself. When proceeding with the definition that *amor* is a passion, these three senses of passion

³⁵³ *ST Ia IIae, q22, a1, c.*: “Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad aliud trahi.”

³⁵⁴ The passions cannot be intrinsically disordered according to their original nature. We are not taking into account the Christian teaching of how original sin disorders the passions.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

must be constantly kept in mind. The dilemma that we face is that if *amor* is that power that unites us with the *good*, how can it be defined most properly as a passion in which “a thing recedes from what is suitable to it”?³⁵⁶

Regarding the existing scholarship on love and certainly on the passions, “one is faced with a rather limited selection.”³⁵⁷ Though this is true, there is more scholarship available on the passions themselves than on the general nature of *amor per se*.

Considering its importance to our topic, we should review some of the more important aspects of Thomas’s affective theory, particularly regarding the passions. Judith Barad has a very moderate view of the emotions, identifying the importance of Thomas’s emphasis of the “political rule” that reason has over them.³⁵⁸ This underscores the fact that though the passions play a decisive role in human life, they are not fully in control of it. Our reactions are both psychic and corporeal, and not exclusively either.³⁵⁹

Whereas judgment “looks at things from afar,” the emotions tend toward reality *per se*, and keep us from being too distanced from that realistic immediacy. Properly habituated emotions, she concludes, “can have a moral significance of their own, contributing to the goodness of a moral action and thereby truly enriching our moral

³⁵⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a1, c.: “...recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens.”

³⁵⁷ Stephen Loughlin, “A Response to Five Critiques of Aquinas’s Doctrine of Passion,” (Ph.d Diss, The Catholic University of America, 2001), 1. This dissertation has extensive footnotes for those scholars interested in the theory of emotions.

³⁵⁸ Judith Barad, “Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity,” *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 412-13. See *ST Ia*, q81, a3, ad2. Barad’s article is not in dialogue with other Thomistic views, but with other more general theories of emotion. See Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

³⁵⁹ Barad, “Role of Emotion,” 399.

life.”³⁶⁰ She translates *passio* as “emotion,” accepting Thomas’s double-definition of *passio* as a movement of the will which is “in respect of a bodily transmutation” and also “a movement of the sensitive appetite when we think of good or evil.”³⁶¹ Even the use of the word “emotion,” however, can have philosophical consequences. *Passio/παθος* cannot be rendered precisely as “feeling,” “sentiment,” “affect” or “emotion.”³⁶² Drost adds that, “Emotions are unions with their objects,” whether they are possessed or not.³⁶³ He brings out the point that pleasure is itself an affective union if the object of one’s will is possessed.³⁶⁴ Drost adds to Barad’s psychological account of the emotions a more metaphysical understanding of the relationship between *love as union* with *love as emotion*.

A more lively debate that bears more fully on our subject is the debate between Daniel Westberg and Michael Sarot regarding whether or not emotionality is restricted to corporeal creatures and whether emotion can be ascribed to God. The crux of Westberg’s argument is that Sarot both relies too heavily on the physicalist interpretation of the Latin *passio* as well as associating that word too closely with the word “emotion.”³⁶⁵ Westberg denies, in fact, that even though Thomas mostly meant

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 413.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 398. See *ST Ia IIae*, q22.

³⁶² See Amelie O. Rorty, “Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of *Pathe*,” *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (March 1984): 521-546.

³⁶³ Drost, “Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions,” 53.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 53.

³⁶⁵ Daniel Westberg, “Emotion and God: A Reply to Michael Sarot,” *The Thomist* 60 (1996): 110.

passio as involving a bodily transmutation, he did not define *passio* exclusively this way. In a word, "The essence of emotion has to do with being a moral agent, not with bodily existence."³⁶⁶ Even non-bodily persons are capable of *amor*. Thomas clearly maintains, however, that neither God nor the angels are capable of *passio*, yet "emotions" like love and joy can nonetheless be attributed to them.³⁶⁷ Thomas occasionally uses *affectus* instead of *passio* to describe the movement of the will.³⁶⁸ Westberg's argument is ultimately more convincing than Sarot's, seeing as that Westberg more deeply understands the analogous character of love as both a sensate emotion and something far beyond that. Love is a tendency that exists in God Himself.

As mentioned previously, the purpose of a2 is to establish the genus of love. The framing of the objections makes this rather obvious. Each of the three objections attempt to prove that love is not a passion by bringing up the possibility of love falling into a different genus. Each of the objections fall into a syllogism:

No power is a passion.
But every love is a power.³⁶⁹
Therefore love is not a passion.

Love is a union or bond.
But neither a union nor a bond is a passion.³⁷⁰
Therefore love is not a passion.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.

³⁶⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a3.

³⁶⁸ Westberg, 113.

³⁶⁹ This is established by the authority of Dionysius, *DDN IV*.

³⁷⁰ This is established by St. Augustine, *De Trin.* VIII, 10.

Passions are movements.³⁷¹
But desire is a movement, whereas love is a principle of movement.³⁷²
Therefore love is not a passion.

These objections differ in structure from those of a1 insofar as St. Thomas actually provides other candidates for the genus of love (whereas he did not provide other candidates for the subject of love in a1). Other than a *passio*, Love may be a *virtus* (power), an *unio* (union), *nexus* (a link or bond), *motus* (movement), or a *principium motus* (principle or beginning of movement). The manner in which we speak of *amor* can cause us to place it in various *genera*.³⁷³

The first and third objections are similar in that they both clarify an analogous sense of terms. We will leave the discussion of the second objection to the conclusion of this chapter because it poses some unique problems that cannot be answered in this section. The first objection is answered by establishing that Dionysius defined love as a power in the wider sense of denoting the principle of any movement or action. This is a necessary clarification on account of the fact that no power is also a passion. The third objection is also answered by widening the connotation of a term. Love is a movement, but not in the clearer way that *desiderium* is a movement (i.e., of a lover toward a beloved). Love is a movement insofar as one can call the primal change of the appetite (consisting of *complacentia*) a movement. This is a necessary clarification, because if passion is a movement, whereas *amor* is only a principle of movement (*principium*

³⁷¹ This is established by the authority of John Damascene, *De Fide Orth.*, II, 22.

³⁷² This has already been established by the previous article, *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1.

³⁷³ The different senses depend on whether we are speaking of *amor* in the natural, sensitive or intellectual appetites, and whether we are speaking of *amor* as a cause or as an effect.

Thomas begins with a general principle of physics and then applies this principle analogously to the movement of the appetite. The physical principle that he gives involves the twofold effect of the agent on the patient. This twofold effect is as follows: 1) the agent gives the patient his form, 2) the agent gives the patient the movement that results from the form.³⁷⁶ We know that Thomas is drawing an analogy between physics and appetitive movement because he begins, "In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite...."³⁷⁷ He then goes on to describe the steps of the effect that the agent has on the patient. The basic steps of the movement of love are as follows:

- 1) LOVE = The beloved is introduced into the appetite of the lover, changing, in a way, the form of his appetite. This alteration consists in the *complacency* of the beloved in the appetite of the lover.³⁷⁸
- 2) DESIRE = The movement toward the appetible object (i.e., the seeking of real union with the beloved.) Desire is an effect of complacency.

tantum effata furens antro se immisit aperto;
ille ducem haud timidis uadentem passibus aequat. (Emphasis added.)

³⁷⁶ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, c.*. See also *SCG IIIa, cap. 48*: "Whatever is in motion towards an end, has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein: hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest."

"Omne quod movetur in finem, desiderat naturaliter stabiliri et quiescere in illo: unde a loco quo corpus naturaliter movetur, non recedit nisi per motum violentum, qui contrariatur appetitui. Felicitas autem est ultimus finis, quem homo naturaliter desiderat. Est igitur hominis desiderium naturale ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter immobilem stabilitatem consequatur, nondum est felix, eius desiderio naturali nondum quiescente."

³⁷⁷ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a1, c.*: "Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitive...."

³⁷⁸ The concept of complacency will be further explained in the chapter specifically on *mutua inhaesio*.

- 3) JOY = The resting of the lover in the beloved. The real attainment of the beloved.

What should be remembered most about love is that it is the transformation of the appetite, in either the intentional³⁷⁹ or affective order, *into* the good.³⁸⁰ The first movement is the alteration of the appetite of the patient. It is this movement that is called *love*. Love, in a certain sense, *alters the very affections of the lover into the form of the beloved*.³⁸¹ The common understanding of love is that it consists of the movement of the lover toward the beloved. This, however, is not the case. This “actual motion” just described is equated with desire, not love. Love is even more foundational than desire. As Thomas writes, “the *first change* wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called ‘love,’ and is nothing else than complacency in that object,”³⁸² and it is only consequent upon this initial change that the movement of desire begins.

Thomas, citing Aristotle, describes this movement as *circular*:

³⁷⁹ “...the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention.” The quotation from Rossner given above re-echoes this “intentional existence” of love in the appetite.

³⁸⁰ Kwasniewski, 121. Vella identifies the change in the appetite brought about by the beloved – the “*immutatio appetitus ab appetibili*” – as “the key notion to the question of love.” (Vella, *Love is Acceptance*, 118)

³⁸¹ This is by no means an exaggeration. St. Thomas is actually much more emphatic about the transformation of love on the level of form in the *Commentary on the Sentences*: “Similarly, when the affection or appetite is wholly imbued by the form of a good that is an object for it, it finds the good suitable and adheres to it as though fixed upon it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of affection into the thing loved.” (*In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1.)

³⁸² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “*Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis...*”

For “the appetitive movement is circular,”³⁸³ as stated in *De Anima* 3. 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began.³⁸⁴ Thus, the circularity is that the beloved, in a way, alters the form of the beloved, the lover obtains a certain complacency therein (which is the adaptation of the appetite into the appetible object), and then the lover reaches out in desire to obtain rest in the beloved. Two passions are consequent upon this transformation of *amor* that occurs in the lover: either desire to be united with the beloved if she is absent or pleasure if the beloved is present.³⁸⁵ Desire is almost always found with the idea of motion in Thomistic thought, whereas the real union of the lover with the beloved is usually associated with rest.³⁸⁶ Note, for example, the following passage:

³⁸³ We will concentrate more on this circular movement of love in the chapter on *mutua inhaesio*. (See *Ia IIae*, q34, a5, ad1) In a very interesting passage Thomas unites the concepts of *union* with *circularity* and *perfection*: “...it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the *Physics*, because its terminus is united to its starting-point.” (See *In Metaphys.* 1.1) The context of the passage involves Thomas explaining why all men desire to know.

³⁸⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.

³⁸⁵ Kwasniewski, *ibid.*

³⁸⁶ Note the following beautifully written passage in the context of happiness as man’s last end: “It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire.” (*ST Ia IIae*, q1, a5, c.) “Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur.”

We also find a classic statement involving desire, motion and rest in *SCG IIIa*, cap. 48: “The sensitive appetite is divided into two powers: (1) the concupiscible, which concerns sensible good absolutely (this is pleasurable to sense) and evil contrary to it; (2) the irascible, which concerns good under the aspect of a certain eminence. For example, victory is said to be a kind of good, although it is not accompanied by pleasure of sense. Whatever passions concern good or evil absolutely, therefore, are found in the concupiscible appetite. Certain of these – three in number – regard the good: love (which implies a certain connaturality of the appetite with the good loved), desire (which

Whatever is in motion towards an end, has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein: hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When therefore a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness: hence the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. x.): We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon.³⁸⁷

It should be admitted that Thomas has a difficult balancing act regarding the establishment of love's genus. On the one hand, he wants to be faithful to Aristotle's

implies a movement of the appetite towards the good loved), and delight (which implies a repose of the appetite in the good loved. (*Ethic. II, 5, #293*).

"Appetitus autem sensitivus dividitur in duas vires: scilicet in concupiscibilem, quae respicit absolute bonum sensibile, quod scilicet est delectabile secundum sensum, et malum ei contrarium, et irascibilem, quae respicit bonum sub ratione cuiusdam altitudinis; sicut victoria dicitur esse quoddam bonum, quamvis non sit cum delectatione sensus. Sic igitur quaecumque passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum absolute, sunt in concupiscibili. Quae quidem respectu boni sunt tres, scilicet amor, qui importat quandam connaturalitatem appetitus ad bonum amatum, et desiderium, quod importat motum appetitus in bonum amatum."

See *ST Ia IIae, q23, a4*. Another formulation is the following: "Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us..." (*ST IIa-IIae, q28, a3, c.*)

"Gaudium autem comparatur ad desiderium sicut quies ad motum; ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Est autem quies plena cum nihil restat de motu. Unde tunc est gaudium plenum quando iam nihil desiderandum restat. Quandiu autem in hoc mundo sumus, non quiescit in nobis desiderii motus...."

³⁸⁷ *SCG IIIa, cap. 48*: "Omne quod movetur in finem, desiderat naturaliter stabiliri et quiescere in illo: unde a loco quo corpus naturaliter movetur, non recedit nisi per motum violentum, qui contrariatur appetitui. Felicitas autem est ultimus finis, quem homo naturaliter desiderat. Est igitur hominis desiderium naturale ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter immobilem stabilitatem consequatur, nondum est felix, eius desiderio naturali nondum quiescente. Cum igitur aliquis felicitatem consequitur, pariter stabilitatem et quietem consequetur: unde et omnium haec est de felicitate conceptio, quod de sui ratione stabilitatem requirit; propter quod philosophus dicit, in I Eth., quod *non aestimamus felicem esse chamaleontem quendam.*" (Emphasis added.)

insight that love is a passion, which comes with the negative connotations of being altered—particularly for the worse. On the other hand, he must justify the fact that love is one of the higher activities of which man is capable.

As previously mentioned, the second objection has additional problems that make it more difficult to treat it summarily. Like obj. 1 & 3, it also clarifies love in relation to a genus; in this case, primarily that of *unio*. First of all, Thomas must wrestle with the authority of both Augustine and Dionysius who answer in the affirmative that love is a union. The problem is that union is not a *passion* but rather a *relation*. Thus, unless Thomas rejects these two eminent authorities, he must establish in what sense love is a union. Thomas's explanation is the following: "Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself."³⁸⁸ *Thus, it seems that the explanation of love as a union is made on the basis of a highly subjective principle which is the relation of the lover to the beloved only insofar as the beloved is "himself or part of himself."*³⁸⁹ In this second objection, at least, love does not appear to be a real union with the other at all, but rather some kind of self-relation. In the present article, the only union that Thomas accepts in relation to love is the union that is an effect of love, i.e., that love

³⁸⁸ "Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, in quantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui."

³⁸⁹ This is quite a complex principle that we will treat later in Chapter Five.

causes a union.³⁹⁰ We will make some final comments on the genus of love as a passion in the conclusion to this chapter.

IA IIAE, Q26, A3: IS AMOR THE SAME AS DILECTIO?

Considering what has already been said about the elusive nature of defining love, we may be relieved to see an article on the species of love, considering that such enumerations tend to make a concept much clearer. The most obvious text in which Thomas outlines the different kinds of love is *ST I-II, q26, a3*. The beginning of the corpus reads, “I answer that, we find four words referring in a way to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity, and friendship.”³⁹¹ A problem with this text is that although Thomas mentions four species of love, he passes over them in a rather cursory fashion. His purpose, however, is not to clarify the different species of love according to their various differentiae. The question concerns whether or not *dilectio* is the same as *amor* and, if not, which is superior.

The *sed contra* indicates that there was an issue with the identification of *amor* and *dilectio* in the schools during the time of St. Thomas. Thomas claims in the *sed contra* with Dionysius that “some holy men have held that love [*amor*] means something more godlike than dilection [*dilectio*] does.” The reason why *amor* could be more divine than

³⁹⁰ “Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love.” (*ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, ad2*) “Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem.”

³⁹¹ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a3, c.*: “Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia.”

dilectio is somewhat opaque.³⁹² Considering that *dilectio* is associated specifically with intellectual love, one might expect Thomas to affirm that it is *more* divine than *amor*. But the opposite is true. It is noteworthy that the *sed contra* of the entire article—its point of departure—consists of Aquinas affirming that *amor* is more divine than *dilectio* based upon the authority of Dionysius.³⁹³ Because Thomas uses Dionysius, he inherits some of the conceptual problems in the work of Dionysius regarding the fact that Dionysius makes *eros* more important than *agape*. According to Nygren, “*Agape* is for him simply a substitute for *eros* in Proclus’ sense of the word.” As a matter of fact, not only are the two synonymous, but Nygren claims that *agape* is almost a “nuisance” for Dionysius and is only found in the Dionysian corpus because it is in the New Testament whereas *eros* is not.³⁹⁴ Regarding this distinction, Thomas provides a response to an objection that does not exist in the text, though it appears to be a response to the *sed contra*.³⁹⁵ There is a

³⁹² Kwasniewski completely ignores explaining why Thomas claims this. See Kwasniewski 122-3. Eric D’arcy’s comments on this question are also ultimately unhelpful.

³⁹³ Dionysius, in fact, claims that *eros* is more divine than *agape*. It appears that we have a translation problem here based on the text of Scotus Eriugena.

³⁹⁴ See Nygren, 589-593. See G. Horn, “*Amour et extase d’après Denys l’Aréopagite*,” *Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique* (6 Année, 1925), 278.

³⁹⁵ This is the only place in the *Summa* that I know of where Thomas provides an answer to an objection that does not exist. Dionysius clearly claims that *eros* is more divine than *agape* (See *DDN IV*). Dionysius knows well that *Agape* is used in the New Testament whereas *eros* is not, which is embarrassing for his argument. He explains this by claiming that the New Testament writers did this for pedagogical reasons, considering that divine *eros* can be confused with vulgar *eros*. This does not stop him from claiming that once *eros* is understood, it is the “more divine” word (See Nygren, 591-2). One should also see John M. Rist, “An Note on *Eros* and *Agape* in Pseudo-Dionysius,” *Vigilae Christianae* 20 (1966): 235-243. Rist thinks that Nygren separates *eros* and *agape* too much in the thought of Dionysius. A major part of Rist’s argument is that according to Dionysius, *eros* and *agape* are essentially the same (Rist, 237-8).

translation problem here. According to Dionysius, *eros* is more divine than *agape*, which seems close to blasphemous in the Christian dispensation.

In a surprising turn from the expected, Thomas claims that *amor* is more divine than *dilectio* precisely because we can be drawn by God *without* (or perhaps despite) reason.³⁹⁶ Josef Pieper claims that “because *amor* primarily means being carried away, he says, it is somewhat more divine than *dilectio*, which contains more of an element of rational selectiveness.”³⁹⁷ We should remember that because of the translation that Thomas received from Grosstete, Dionysian *eros* is rendered in Latin as *amor*. The key point is not that *amor* is related to *eros*, as Pieper appears to maintain, but that, in

Rist notes that although Proclean *eros* only has two directions – the higher to the lower and vice versa – Dionysian *eros* also includes love between equals, which more accurately represents the kind of *mutua inhaesio* this dissertation is after. Rist writes, “Why does Dionysius add in the third kind, the love between equals? It is noteworthy that he does not make much use of it, but it is clear that one significant role such a love can play in the Dionysian universe is to represent the love between the persons of the Trinity, the non-descending aspect of God’s love. Another role would be the altruistic love of one’s fellow men” (Rist, 241). *Thus, we have a possible Dionysian source for the idea of perichoresis applied to the kind of friendship-love shared between human equals.*

³⁹⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a3, ad4: “But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above.”

“Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est.”

³⁹⁷ Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love*, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 257. Thomas actually says that the reason why some have claimed that *amor* is more godlike than *dilectio* is because *amor* denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite. Pieper makes a logical jump in calling this (the passion of the sensitive appetite) a “being carried away.” He is assuming Thomas’s knowledge of the Greek *eros*, which may not be a fair assumption. Still, in the main, I think that Pieper has the right idea. *Eros* is present in Thomas Aquinas in the whole notion of the will as a faculty that manifests its activity in an inclination toward an end.

Frederick Crowe notes that *eros* is implicit in the division of the *Summa Theologiae* in the second and third parts according to the “*motus rationalis creaturae in Deum.*” (Crowe, “Complacency and Concern,” 1). (*ST Ia*, q2, prol.)

Thomas's own words, "It is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason."³⁹⁸ We might expect the "intellectualist" in Thomas to maintain that the more active kind of willing in *dilectio* is superior to the more passive willing of *amor*, but this is not the case. Thomas's point is as metaphysical as it is theological because it concerns the transcendental attribute of the good; whether man chooses (*dilectio*) the objective good or not, the objective good still exhibits an ultimate superior power over the human will. An additional reason why *amor* might be more divine than *dilectio* is that *amor*, in fact, virtually contains and implies all the various loves. It is superior in the way that a genus is superior to a species.³⁹⁹

There is not the same kind of logical pattern to the objections of a3 as there is in a1 and a2. Their only similarity is that each of the objections attempts to establish that *amor* and *dilectio* are synonymous, while Thomas will reply with his usual masterful ability to distinguish. We will return shortly to the first objection.⁴⁰⁰ The second objection brings up the point that if movements of the appetite differ according to their objections, then *amor* and *dilectio* must be the same, on account of the fact that their

³⁹⁸ ST Ia IIae, q26, a3, ad4: "Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum ratio propria ducere posit, quod pertinet ad rationem."

³⁹⁹ There have been additional interpretations of why *amor* is more divine than *dilectio*. Miner claims that *amor* is more divine "on account of its greater potency to overcome sloth and propel the creature to the wholehearted love of God." (Miner, 121) Ramirez claims that this is so because since *amor* is a more general term, it is more appropriately used for God. [S.M. Ramirez, *De passionibus animae in I-II Summa Theologiae divi Thomae expositio* (qq. XXII-XLVIII). *Obras completas de Santiago Ramirez*, V (Instituto de Filosofia Luis Vives, Madrid (1973): 97-8.]

⁴⁰⁰ The reply to this objection, however, is very important. We will review this shortly.

objects are the same. The third objection raises a point that according to Augustine, it is not one thing to speak of *amor* and another to speak of *dilectio*, even though some authors have claimed that the former refers to evil things and the latter of good things.⁴⁰¹

The answers to these objections, found in the corpus as well as in their specific replies, make two overwhelming points: 1) that the object of *amor* has a wider designation than that of *dilectio* and 2) that love and dilection are the same insofar as they

⁴⁰¹ Thomas refers to Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* XIV, 7: "I have judged it right to mention this, because some are of opinion that charity or regard (*dilectio*) is one thing, love (*amor*) another. They say that *dilectio* is used of a good affection, *amor* of an evil love. But it is very certain that even secular literature knows no such distinction. However, it is for the philosophers to determine whether and how they differ, though their own writings sufficiently testify that they make great account of love (*amor*) placed on good objects, and even on God Himself. But we wished to show that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority we prefer to all writings whatsoever, make no distinction between *amor*, *dilectio*, and *caritas*; and we have already shown that *amor* is used in a good connection. And if any one fancy that *amor* is no doubt used both of good and bad loves, but that *dilectio* is reserved for the good only, let him remember what the psalm says, He that loves (*diligit*) iniquity hates his own soul; and the words of the Apostle John, If any man love (*diligere*) the world, the love (*dilectio*) of the Father is not in him. (1 John 2:15) Here you have in one passage *dilectio* used both in a good and a bad sense. And if any one demands an instance of *amor* being used in a bad sense (for we have already shown its use in a good sense), let him read the words, 'For men shall be lovers (*amantes*) of their own selves, lovers (*amatores*) of money (2 Tim 3:2).'"

"Hoc propterea commemorandum putavi, quia nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem siue caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. Sic autem nec ipsos auctores saecularium litterarum locutos esse certissimum est. Sed uiderint philosophi utrum uel qua ratione ista discernant; amorem tamen eos in bonis rebus et erga ipsum Deum magni pendere, libri eorum satis loquuntur. Sed scripturas religionis nostrae, quarum auctoritatem ceteris omnibus litteris anteposimus, non aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem uel caritatem, insinuandum fuit. Nam et amorem in bono dici iam ostendimus. Sed ne quis existimet amorem quidem et in malo et in bono, dilectionem autem non nisi in bono esse dicendam, illud attendat quod in psalmo scriptum est: Qui autem diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam, et illud apostoli Iohannis: Si quis dilexerit mundum, non est dilectio Patris in illo. Ecce uno loco dilectio et in bono et in malo. Amorem autem in malo (quia in bono iam ostendimus) ne quisquam flagitet, legat quod scriptum est: Erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, amatores pecuniae."

are in the intellectual appetite.⁴⁰² Thomas states this last point in another way.

Dilection⁴⁰³ also denotes a choice because it “is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature.”⁴⁰⁴ If we inquire into why (#1) is true, the answer is essentially (#2). Thomas explains in the corpus that if dilection also entails a choice, then it must also be true that all dilection is love but not all love is dilection. As we have already seen, there is no choice regarding either sensory or natural love. If we were not convinced by the analogous nature of love in the commentary on the first two articles, Thomas makes several points rather emphatically in the context of a3. For example, he clearly implies that the subject of dilection, as stated above, is not in the concupiscible power on account of the fact that dilection involves the judgment of reason, which goes beyond the scope of the concupiscible power. Moreover, because dilection is found strictly in the rational appetite, it cannot possibly be a passion strictly speaking.

We will now proceed to discuss these points and their relationship to the kinds of love that Thomas has already mentioned in a1 as well as the additional kinds that he mentions in the present article. The Angelic Doctor designates three separate appetites in a1 and adds that there is a kind of love associated with each.⁴⁰⁵ It appears that there is no difference whatsoever in the meaning of *dilectio* and the rational or intellectual

⁴⁰² *ST Ia IIae, q26, a3, ad1.*

⁴⁰³ Thomas claims that a root for *dilectio* is the word *electionem*, meaning a choice (*ST Ia IIae, q26, a3, c.*)

⁴⁰⁴ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a3, c.* Thomas repeats the same point in *ad3* as well.

⁴⁰⁵ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a1:* “Wherefore love differs according to the difference in appetites.”

“Unde secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris.”

appetite. If every dilection denotes a choice, then every dilection must be rational by definition. Sensory love and natural love take place without dilection, but could be said to be principles of dilection insofar as both are factors in the determination of what is connatural to the lover that he might choose his proper good.

It is also the case that while every act of *caritas* is a kind of *amor*, not every act of *amor* has its root in *caritas*. Then Thomas goes on to provide specific differences for each kind of love. Those specific differences are as follows:

- 1) *Amor* virtually includes *dilectio*, *caritas*, and *amicitia*
- 2) *Dilectio* adds to *amor* a choice of the will.
- 3) *Caritas* adds to *amor* a kind of perfection, and can be an act, habit, or passion.
- 4) *Amicitia* is “like a habit.”⁴⁰⁶

One of the problems of the present article is that we have read nothing about either *amicitia*,⁴⁰⁷ *dilectio*,⁴⁰⁸ or *caritas* until this point. Thomas assumes a great deal, probably because he is going to analyze *caritas* thoroughly in the *Secunda Secundae*. We can,

⁴⁰⁶ Thomas does not actually provide a specific difference for *amicitia* in this context other than that it is “like a habit.” We will have much more to say about *amicitia* in the context of the *via redamationis*.

⁴⁰⁷ Earlier in the *Summa*, Thomas has clarified the meaning of *amicitia* – tellingly, in the article concerning “The Love of God.” He writes in *ST Ia*, q20, a2, ad3: “Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are *capable of returning love*, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised.”

“*Amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad racionales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est.*” (Emphasis added.)

The concept that figures more often than *amicitia* in the *Summa* is not *amicitia*, but *amor amicitia*. We will see this in the following chapter.

⁴⁰⁸ *ST Ia*, q60, a1, on “The Love or Dilection of the Angels,” Thomas states that his authority for differentiating these two loves is Dionysius, *DDN IV*, and posits basically that the former is natural while the latter is intellectual.

however, make some inferences. Since he mentions that the specific difference of charity (from *amor*) denotes something “of great price,” we can conclude that *caritas*, like *dilectio*, has its subject in the higher will.⁴⁰⁹ After all, if *caritas* designates a love that is “of great price,” it seems to necessitate a previous sober evaluation concerning what that price may be, and whether or not one is willing to pay it.⁴¹⁰ But further, we know that *caritas* is a kind of *amicitia* insofar as it is a friendship with God, although there is nothing in the *De Amore* that makes this clear.⁴¹¹

When we reach a3, we see in the various *differentia* of *amor* that it is not found in the concupisibile power alone nor is it only a passion. There is a strict sense in which we understand *amor* as existing as a passion in the concupisibile power, and a wider sense in which an act of *amor* can express itself as *amicitia*, *caritas*, or *dilectio*. Every act of these three is *amor*, but not vice versa. Moreover, we cannot be fully satisfied with defining love as a passion because Thomas clearly states that “love and dilection are expressed by way of act or passion.”⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁹ “Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.” (*ST* IIa IIae, q24, a1, c.)

“Nam obiectum appetitus sensitivi est bonum per sensum apprehensum, obiectum vero appetitus intellectivi, vel voluntatis, est bonum sub communi ratione boni, prout est apprehensibile ab intellectu. Caritatis autem obiectum non est aliquod bonum sensibile, sed bonum divinum, quod solo intellectu cognoscitur.”

⁴¹⁰ Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love*, 154.

⁴¹¹ See *ST* Ia IIae, q65, a5, c.; *ST* IIa IIae, q25, a4, c.

⁴¹² *ST* Ia IIae, q26, a3, c.: “...amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis.”

IA IIAE, Q26, A4: AMOR AMICITIAE AND AMOR CONCUPISCENTIAE

We have just seen in the previous article that Thomas comments on the various species of *amor*. The present article focuses on precisely how those species are expressed, particularly insofar as *amor* is *dilectio*. We should not be surprised that Thomas is narrowing his focus in the final article of q26 to acts of *dilectio*. The whole of the *Prima Secundae* deals with man insofar as he is both a sensitive and rational being, and thus q26 is a microcosm of the treatment of *amor* as both sensitive and rational. Having established the subject and genus of love in a1 and a2, the species of love in a3, Thomas makes a distinction regarding the *act of love* in a4 that treats of love not as it exists primarily in the sensitive appetite, but rather as it does in the rational appetite. In the corpus of a4, Thomas goes on to prove that because the definition of love is “to wish good to someone,” love has a “twofold tendency”: 1) toward someone to whom we wish good and, 2) toward any other good that we wish for the sake of the person to whom we wish good.⁴¹³ This twofold tendency of love is so closely associated with a metaphysics of good insofar as both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* specifically deal with the kind of good loved. Thomas makes it clear that the good specifies the type of love in question. He writes, “Now the proper object of love is the Good...so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love.”⁴¹⁴ A4 deals with the special aspect of the good that it is a *person* who is loving.⁴¹⁵ In the

⁴¹³ *ST Ia Ilae, q26, a4, c.*

⁴¹⁴ *ST Ila Ilae, q23, 4c.* “Proprium autem obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra habitum est.”

⁴¹⁵ Thomas also implies in *Ia Ilae, q26, a4*, that it is almost as important that it is a person who is being loved, though this is not implied in every case where Thomas talks about loving in a4.

philosophical realism of St. Thomas, the two broadest possible aspects of the good are either substantial goods or accidental goods because everything that exists (other than God) exists either *per se* or *per accidens*. The following two passages are representative of Thomas's link between the kind of love in question and the kind of good in question:

I answer that, as stated above, the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing.⁴¹⁶

The aforementioned passage specifically speaks of the twofold aspect of the end which essentially divides it into an end sought *per se* and various ways we might use or attain that end. The following passage adds the aspect that this twofold end implies also a twofold way of loving:

I answer that, since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from *Ethic.* II, 6 a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."⁴¹⁷

This division is extremely significant in a Thomistic philosophy of love because it

⁴¹⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q2, a7, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei."

⁴¹⁷ *ST Ia*, q60, a3, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente, ut patet I *Ethic.*, dupliciter aliquid amatur, uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquis velit bonum. Ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhaerens amatur id quod desideratur alteri, sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sed ut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt concupiscentiam, primum vero amicitiam."

is perhaps one of the most explicit instances of the personalism of St. Thomas.⁴¹⁸

Thomas himself says that friendship extends to a *person*.⁴¹⁹ This is also implied in the *sed contra* of q26, a4, where Thomas comments that it is ridiculous to say that we have friendship for something like wine.⁴²⁰ We must observe that according to St. Thomas, the definition of true love is that “it is required that we will *someone’s* good as his good.”⁴²¹ Thomas continues:

For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another’s good, is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking.⁴²²

⁴¹⁸ There are several sources that outline in more detail the difference between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. See particularly Guy Mansini, “*Duplex Amor* and the Structure of Love in Aquinas,” in *Thomistica*, edited by E. Manning (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 1-26; Wohlman, “*Amour du bien propre*,” 211-215; Kwasniewski, Ph.d Dissertation, 70-75; 134-97; R. Mary Hayden, “The Paradox of Aquinas’s Altruism: From Self-Love to Love of Others,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 63 (1989): 72-83.

⁴¹⁹ *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a1, ad2. Faraon writes that Thomas distinguishes four kinds of *amor amicitiae* in *In Comm. De Divinis Nominibus* c4, lectio 9 & 10: “that of the lover for himself, that of the lover for those who are more or less perfectly like him, that of the lover for those parts which belong to him, and that of the lover for the whole of which he is a part.” (See Faraon, 66)

⁴²⁰ Thomas does not call this “true love” explicitly, but it is everywhere implied. The higher forms of love—*caritas* and *amicitia*—are both identical insofar as they must consist ultimately of the love of one person for another person. He reiterates this clearly in *ST* IIa IIae, q23, a1, c. “For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.”

⁴²¹ *SCG* I, cap. 91; See also *ST* I, q60, a3, c.

⁴²² *SCG* I, cap. 91: “*Cuius enim bonum aliquis vult solum prout in alterius bonum cedit, per accidens amatur; sicut qui vult vinum conservari ut illud bibat, aut hominem ut sibi sit utilis aut delectabilis, per accidens amat vinum aut hominem, per se autem seipsum.*”

True love concerns persons and persons alone. Mary Hayden Lemmons aptly notes that “love of concupiscence is love of a benefit, and the love of friendship is the love of the beneficiary to whom a benefit is willed.”⁴²³ Kwasniewski glosses the two tendencies as “the sort of love one has towards a friend” and “the sort of love one has towards an instrument of a friend’s good.”⁴²⁴ *Amor amicitiae* is always person-centered and has everything to do with the person to whom the intention of an act of *amor* is directed. *Amor concupiscentiae* is the willing of one good for the sake of another good; therefore it need not be person-centered. *Amor amicitiae* always has positive connotations in Thomistic philosophy while *amor concupiscentiae* sometimes does. If I love my friend as I love myself and will the good for him directly, this is *amor amicitiae*. *Amor concupiscentiae* can, however, lapse into selfishness. If I buy him a bike because he cannot afford it and I want him to have it because I consider him an *alter ipse*, this is *amor concupiscentiae* considered positively. I am willing another accidental good *for his sake*.⁴²⁵ If the reason why I want him to have the bike is only because I want a partner to ride with, I am loving both the bike and my friend with *amor concupiscentiae*. In this case, I am using both the bike and my friend for my use and pleasure, and the only person I am loving with *amor amicitiae* is myself.

A4 does, in a way, continue the work of a3 insofar as it focuses on how to divide love into its separate species, whereas the objections of a3 focus on how *amor* and *dilectio* differ – essentially how love in general differs from rational love. We see some of the

⁴²³ Mary Hayden, 277.

⁴²⁴ Kwasniewski, 74.

⁴²⁵ We must be careful here. The love that I direct toward my friend in this cause is *amor amicitiae* whereas the love that I direct toward the bike is *amor concupiscentiae*.

same kinds of objections in a4 as we do in a2 regarding placing love in its proper genus or species. A summary of the objections are the following:

Love is a passion.
Friendship is a habit.
Habit cannot be part of a subdivision of passions.
Thus, love is not properly divided into *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*.⁴²⁶

“Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division.”⁴²⁷

But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love.
Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.⁴²⁸

Friendship is threefold (usefulness, pleasure and goodness)⁴²⁹

⁴²⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, arg1: “It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For ‘love is a passion, while friendship is a habit,’ according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.”

“Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia vero est habitus, ut dicit philosophus, in VIII *Ethic.* Sed habitus non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.”

⁴²⁷ D’arcy renders this, “A species cannot be subdivided in terms of a fellow species (*Praeterea, nihil dividitur per id quod ei connemeratur*).” He notes that it literally reads, “Nothing is divided by means of a thing which is numbered along with it.” (See D’arcy, 71) In other words, *amor* cannot be divided by concupiscence, which is itself passional form of love.

⁴²⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, arg2. “Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as “animal.” But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.”

“*Praeterea, nihil dividitur per id quod ei connumeratur, non enim homo connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori, sicut alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per concupiscentiam.*”

⁴²⁹ See *Ethics* VIII, 3. Thomas clearly accepts the threefold distinction (See I-II, q26, a4, ad3) but denies that friendship based on usefulness or pleasure is actually true friendship, based on the fact that both of these are connected with the *amor concupiscentiae*.

Useful and pleasant friendships involve concupiscence.
Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.⁴³⁰

It will be noted that all of these objections can be answered by specifying that the terms *amicitia* and *concupiscentia* are not equivalent to *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*.

It is not the objections that are particularly noteworthy in a4, but the *sed contra*, which is the longest of its kind in the *De Amore*.⁴³¹ The full text reads:

On the contrary, we are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus a man is said to love wine on account of its sweetness which he desires; as stated in *Topic*. 2.3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in *Ethic*. 8.2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.⁴³²

The *sed contra* brings out the fundamentally personal character of the most important kind of love in Thomistic thought – *amicitia*.⁴³³ There can be friendship for none but persons, but there is also little doubt that we love many things other than persons.⁴³⁴

⁴³⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, arg3. “Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic*. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on ‘usefulness,’ that which is founded on ‘pleasure,’ and that which is founded on ‘goodness.’ But useful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.

“Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VIII *Ethic*., triplex est amicitia, utilis, delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra amicitiam.”

⁴³¹ It is 46 Latin words. The second longest *sed contra* is that of q28, a2 on *mutua inhaesio* itself.

⁴³² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, sed.: “Sed contra, quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut dicitur aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit, ut dicitur in II *Topic*. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII *Ethic*. Ergo alius est amor *concupiscentiae*, et alius est amor *amicitiae*.”

⁴³³ *Caritas*, it will be remembered, is a species of *amicitia*.

⁴³⁴ Though there is no mention of “persona” in the *sed contra* quoted above, there is no doubt that Thomas means that we can only have friendship with other persons. In *Ethic*. VIII, 3, Thomas specifically mentions that the very definition of friendship hinges upon the return of love by *someone*: “In singulis enim horum salvatur ratio amicitiae

There is still a very general character to a3 insofar as Thomas makes it clear that *amor* is simply more general than *dilectio*.⁴³⁵ In the present article, however, Thomas makes the specification of the act of love much more particular. We will clarify this further in the following sections.

The difference between these two loves is not determined by whether or not the tendency of love is toward either a substance or an accident, but whether or not the lover tends toward something *as* a substance or an accident.⁴³⁶ We see in this more of a reference to perception than actual existence. This fact nuances Thomas's theory of love tremendously. One may love another because he wishes some good to her *per se* (i.e., *amor amicitiae*) or he may love her because the one he loves is primarily himself, and only loves her insofar as she is an accidental or relative good for him (i.e., *amor concupiscentiae*). Even though she is a personal substance, he does not love her *as* a personal substance. But we know, of course, that objects can be loved more than persons, persons can (tragically) be loved *as* objects, and objects can be loved for the sake of persons.

supraposita, quia secundum unumquodque horum trium potest esse redamatio non latens." ("In each of these [the three kinds of friendship] however, the reason is fulfilled because according to each one of these three a return of love is not hidden.") The definition of love, insofar as it is friendship, is predicated on a return of love that is not concealed. This is only possible for another person.

⁴³⁵ It is true that Thomas writes in a3 that "Moreover, these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others... (Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria, Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor)." Does this mean that a3 is primarily about the act of love, similarly to a4? There is no doubt the Thomas refers to it. One cannot delineate the species of an activity of love without making at least an implied reference to the acts of those species.

⁴³⁶ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 69.

One of the most important things to note about this twofold division of the act of love is that they are not, properly speaking, “kinds” of love any more than the head and tail of a coin are “kinds” of a coin. *Amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* both exist in every act of rational love. It is for this reason that I think we are justified in designating q26, a4 generally as determining the nature of the single *act* of love. Thomas makes this more explicit in the following passage: “An act of love always tends towards two things: to the good that one wills, and to him for whom one wills it.”⁴³⁷ It might be objected that a person can love an object *per se*, or philosophy *per se*, in which case it is false that one dimension of that act of love tends towards a person. This is incorrect. If we love philosophy *per se*, for example, the truth is that we love philosophy for ourselves. We wish to possess it. Teresa DeFerrari states well that, “[the fact that] neither of these types of good can be loved separately is shown through analogy with being as accidental and substantial, whereby the good willed to someone else is said to be reduced as an accident to the substantial love for the person himself, and substantial love for a person is expressed through the ‘accidental’ instrumentality of love for things. All love, therefore, consists fundamentally in love of persons.”⁴³⁸ Just as Thomas does, Johann views human love as a synthesis of both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* (except Johann will call them “direct love” and “desire,” respectively). According to

⁴³⁷ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad3. “Actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum.”

It should be noted that “persona” does not occur in this sentence in the original Latin. Still, the *alicui* has the connotation of “to whom” one wishes good.

⁴³⁸ Teresa Mary DeFerrari, *The Problem of Charity for Self: A Study of Thomistic and Modern Theological Discussion* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 124-5.

Johann, the synthesis of these two loves produces a dynamism in man that has two dimensions:

One of them looks to the outside. It is a dimension of exteriority, a teleology situated on the plane of the relative and based on the passive synthesis of act with potency. It consists in the quest of the potential for what it lacks, of nature for its completion. In virtue of this drive, man looks out upon the world that surrounds him and seeks to appropriate what he needs – first of all, what he needs for survival, but also, and hardly with less urgency, whatever may contribute to his natural perfection. He desires, therefore, not merely food and clothing and shelter, but, over and above these, all the fruits of civilized life – cultivation of mind, refinement of tastes, his basic share in the common patrimony of society, and, indeed, of the whole human achievement of reason and virtue. There is, nevertheless, another dimension, more profound. It is the dimension of interiority. Based on man's participation in the eternal presence of Being to Itself, and achieved through the inwardness of consciousness, it looks to the progressive fathoming by the infinite self of the Unique Value, the Unique Self in whom he actually participates. It is a structure of finality situated on the plane of the absolute – a drive, not to possession or the appropriation of impersonal goods, but to communion, the communion of act with Act, of a person with the Source of all personality, of being with Itself.⁴³⁹

Every act of rational love should be seen as dividing into *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*, and only then into their separate "kinds" of love.

The love of concupiscence involves perhaps the clearest example of the natural love of self.⁴⁴⁰ We naturally love *goods* that are connatural to us (*amor concupiscentiae*); but these natural goods are willed as benefiting one's self (*amor amicitiae*).⁴⁴¹ It should be added that the primary principle of natural love *qua* persons is that *amor amicitiae* for the

⁴³⁹ Johann, *The Meaning of Love*, 69-70.

⁴⁴⁰ McEvoy makes the excellent point that depending on the context, *amor concupiscentiae* can be translated as perspectival, accidental, incomplete, functional or ambiguous love. (McEvoy, "The Other as Oneself," 25).

⁴⁴¹ Mary Hayden, "Love and the First Principles of St. Thomas's Natural Law," 277.

self cannot be avoided, just as willing the good cannot be avoided. The partial and inferior nature of *amor concupiscentiae* only comes into full focus when we contrast it to *amor amicitiae*. After all, all of our loves cannot be *per se*, and this is not necessarily bad or evil. When people get together to make music, for example, it is often the *music* that is important, and this is most certainly accidental to persons themselves. And there is no fault in this.⁴⁴²

As mentioned, *amor amicitiae* is not *amicitia* and *amor concupiscentiae* is not *concupiscentia*. Thomas recognizes this in the first objection to I-II, q26, a4. *Amicitia* refers both to a habit and to a virtue. Thus, it is objected that because the genus of love is passion and *amicitia* is habit, one of love's divisions cannot be the love of friendship—i.e., they fall in different genera. Thomas clarifies that he is not referring to friendship but to *love of friendship*. Considered absolutely, friendship can only refer to a relationship with another person while concupiscence (considered absolutely) refers to the desire of the sensitive appetite, “a craving for what is pleasant” in the lower appetite, which is always self-centered.⁴⁴³ Both friendship and concupiscence, then, are directed toward specific objects: the object of friendship is another person as *alter ipse*,⁴⁴⁴ and the object of concupiscence is “something delightful to the senses.”⁴⁴⁵ *Amor amicitiae* can

⁴⁴² McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 25.

⁴⁴³ See *ST Ia IIae*, q30, specifically a1. Idea gleaned from Kwasniewski, 73-4. We write “selfish” in the sense of “for the self,” and not necessarily the more unpleasant connotations of being “self-centeredly selfish.”

⁴⁴⁴ More specifically, it is another person in whom the good resides in some restricted way (See *ST IIa IIae*, q26, a3, ad1).

⁴⁴⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q30, a2, arg1: “delectabile secundum sensum”

refer to the self, while *amicitia* cannot technically refer to the self.⁴⁴⁶ Moreover, the object of *amor concupiscentiae* is much wider than that of mere concupiscence, involving any good that is desired accidentally for the sake of the self or for the sake of another. Thus, *amor concupiscentiae* does not possess some of the negative connotations that *concupiscentia* does.⁴⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

It should be obvious that defining *amor* strictly as a passion is not Thomas's sole focus in q26, or it would be impossible to delineate *amor* as *dilectio*, *amicitia* and *caritas* in a3, nor would it be possible to divide *amor* into *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* in a4. Thomas's aim in q26 is twofold: 1) his specific aim is to define *amor* insofar as it exists in the sensitive appetite of man 2) his general aim is to define *amor* insofar as it exists in all appetites while laying the groundwork for how *amor* exists particularly in the rational appetite. According to the schema set out by Te Velde for the structure of the *Summa*, we cannot forget that the primary actor in the *Prima Secundae* is man, and man is, in a way, all things. Man is the only creature under heaven possessing all appetites within himself. Some of the apparent contradictions in Thomas's definition of *amor* can be understood and solved when we remember that Thomas is attempting to do justice to how such a pervasive force as *amor* can exist within a creature with such manifold drives and intentions. As we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas introduces

⁴⁴⁶ ST IIa IIae, q25, a4: "...we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself." "Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum...."

⁴⁴⁷ And for this reason, *amor concupiscentiae* is perhaps not aptly named.

the *Prima Secundae* by informing us that he will deal with those various topics that treat of man insofar as he is a creature endowed with “free will and self-movement.”⁴⁴⁸ The fact that man is free implies that he can be a principle of his actions. But man is not merely an intellectual creature. He is not the only principle of his movement as a rational being, but he is also a “moved mover” insofar as he is a natural and sensitive being. *Amor* is the hinge upon which man’s actions turn as a creature that is both *mover* and *moved*.

In a1, Thomas establishes that the subject of love is the concupiscible appetite. Because the concupiscible appetite is the appetite that tends toward the good (in the sensitive appetite), and *amor* pertains to the tendency to the good, then the concupiscible appetite must be the subject of *amor* in the sensitive appetite. But man does not have a sensitive appetite alone. He has a higher will (*voluntas*), and can therefore possess affections (like the angels) that can exist *without passion*.⁴⁴⁹ So is *amor* a passion or is it not? Thomas solves the problem for us:

Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions – arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q1, prol.: “arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum”

⁴⁴⁹ Miner confirms that Thomas is only dealing with *amor* insofar as it exists in the sensitive appetite in a1. Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 116.

⁴⁵⁰ *ST Ia*, q82, a5, ad1: “Amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo.”

If this is the case, then we must ask the question that if *amor* is not strictly a passion, then what is *amor* when it is not a passion and how can that definition be so broad as to still include the definition of *amor* as a passion? *Amor* is always an affection in the sense of a movement of the appetite and is sometimes a passion in the sense of a concomitant movement of the body.

We will now summarize our findings concerning the question, “*quid sit amor?*” Thomas himself gives us the more general definition of *amor* at the beginning of q26, a1 as “something pertaining to the appetite since good is the object of both.”⁴⁵¹ He then continues to explain that *amor* is differentiated according to the various appetites. Thus we know so far that the good is *amor*’s final cause⁴⁵² and the appetite, broadly speaking, is *amor*’s material cause. What we do not know yet is *amor*’s formal cause—i.e., what it is—nor its efficient cause. We know that *amor* “pertains” to the appetite, but we do not know precisely how. These appetites are not merely sensitive (the fact that he primarily establishes in a1) but also natural and rational. These appetites are differentiated in a1 according to the level of apprehension, for appetition follows upon apprehension. Thus, we can state that the efficient cause for *amor* is a certain kind of apprehension.⁴⁵³ It is in

⁴⁵¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “...aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque obiectum sit bonum.”

⁴⁵² The final cause answers the question of what is extrinsic to the thing which provides its end or purpose.

⁴⁵³ The principle of sufficient reason states that every being must have the explanation for its existence in itself or in another. If its existence is based in itself, then there would be no more need to explain it. If it does not, then we must search in the order of being for something outside itself to explain how it came into existence. The efficient cause answers the question, “what extrinsic explanation accounts for something’s existence?” [(Norris Clarke, *The One and the Many: A Contemporary*

a2 where Thomas gives us a more clear understanding of what *amor* might be (i.e., the formal cause) other than merely a passion existing in the concupiscible appetite. In every inclination, whether natural, sensitive, or rational, there must be a lover and a beloved. When asking specifically *what* love is, Thomas mostly speaks in terms of a kind of *connaturalitas* in the natural appetite, a kind of *complacentia* in the sensitive appetite, and a simple, free act of the will in the rational appetite. The problem is attempting to find into what genus all these can fall. Thomas solves this problem in the objections to q26, a2. *Amor* is the “principle of movement” (*principium motus*) in the appetite.⁴⁵⁴ However, the problem with defining *amor* as a *principium motus* is that a both a passion and an act of the will are movements rather than principles of movements. In truth, Thomas seems to solve the entire problem on the level of *complacentia*. If Thomas designates *complacentia* as “the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object,” then he can simultaneously affirm that *amor* is both a *principium motus* insofar as *amor* is both the “first” (principle) contact of lover with beloved as well as a *motus* insofar as *amor* is the primal change in the appetite leading to all other acts of love. For this reason Thomas can claim that *amor* is “nothing else than complacency in that object.”⁴⁵⁵ And this is not true only of the sensitive appetite, but “in a wider and extended sense according as it is in the will.”⁴⁵⁶ Defining *amor* as an *inclination toward a motion* maintains

Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 179.] *Amor* is not a real being, but a kind of relation or inclination, but it is grounded in a real being with one of the three appetites just enumerated.

⁴⁵⁴ *ST Ia Iae*, q26, a2, ad1.

⁴⁵⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis”

⁴⁵⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “...communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.”

both the sense of *amor* as both a *motus* and a *principium motus*. Thus we can repeat with confidence that *amor* is that passive principle of movement in the natural, sensitive and rational appetites that tends towards their respective goods.⁴⁵⁷ In its broadest sense, Thomas does not substantially depart from Dionysius's definition of *amor* set out in the *Commentary on the Sentences*.

This definition is expanded and clarified in q26. But we must remember that q26 is not merely a definition. It is an analysis and a demonstration that extends to other properties of *amor*. None of the senses of *amor* listed above contradict or invalidate each other, but they can change when we consider the following: 1) Who or what is "loving" (i.e., the lover), 2) who or what is being loved (i.e., the beloved) and the mode of the love itself. As Thomas himself writes, "three things are required for love: the lover, the thing being loved and love itself."⁴⁵⁸ Having introduced a discussion of the relationship between the definition of *amor* and its causes, we can proceed to a more detailed discussion of the causes of *amor* in q27.

⁴⁵⁷ We should not forget the definition that Thomas took from Dionysius that *amor* is "a unitive and concrete power" which "moves" all things into order with other things. The general influence of this wider, more metaphysical understanding of *amor* is certainly present in the *De Amore*, though more implicitly than explicitly.

⁴⁵⁸ *DP III*, q9, a9, c.: "...ad amorem tria requiruntur, scilicet amans, id quod amatur, et ipse amor." (Translation mine.)

CHAPTER 4: THE CAUSES OF LOVE

In setting out the causes of love, we should present some initial difficulties with our subject. As we claimed in the last chapter, Thomas's primary purpose in the *De Amore* is to define *amor* itself as well as its causes and effects insofar as it is a passion in the sensitive appetite. This is clear from what he says at the beginning of the *Prima Secundae* as well as the analysis in the beginning of q26 that *amor* exists in the concupiscible appetite as a passion. But the Angelic Doctor does not keep his definition circumscribed to *amor* insofar as it exists in the sensitive appetite alone. He adds significant comments in his main arguments as well as in the replies to the objections that expand the treatment of *amor* to include the rational appetite as well, where love is a simple movement of the will that is *without* passion and therefore does *not* exist only in the concupiscible appetite.⁴⁵⁹ As we have stated before, the *De Amore* attempts to define love as a passion while simultaneously defining it in an extended and analogous sense. Thomas states himself, "its [an appetite's] very complacency in good is called sensitive love, or intellectual or rational love."⁴⁶⁰ In this sentence, Thomas draws a clear analogy between the complacency of a good in both the sensitive and rational appetites. Moreover, Thomas adds in the following question, "...it is evident that love is a passion properly so called according as it is in the concupiscible faculty *and in a wider and*

⁴⁵⁹ We have already brought up the point that *ST Ia Iae*, q26, a4 on *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* would be unintelligible if *amor* were simply a passion in the concupiscible appetite. Also, Thomas also speaks of the forms of rational love in that same question, a3.

⁴⁶⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: "...idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis."

extended sense, according as it is in the will."⁴⁶¹ In every case of *amor* whatsoever, it is a passion⁴⁶² existing in an appetite that is a response to a good. But since properly speaking *amor* is a passion in the sensitive appetite, he establishes this as a kind of "control" case in the *De Amore*, deviating from it when necessary to speak analogously of natural love and rational love. *Amor* is always a relation because it depends in every case on a lover, a beloved, and the love itself. But Thomas claims that all relations are based on either quantity, action, or passion.⁴⁶³

We may affirm that *amor* is generally the activity of a passive power, but even this affirmation has difficulties. The problem with *amor* is that depending on which appetite is operative, it is either completely moved by another (natural appetite), as when the body responds to gravity or pressure, or moved partially from within by necessity by a particular object (sensitive appetite), as when we desire a certain kind of food, or moved freely from within by a particular object (rational appetite), as when we choose to whom or what to devote our time and attention. These various forms of *amor* are not entirely passive in the human person. Thomas affirms that the appetitive power in the human person is "passive in a way," but also "a principle of human actions"⁴⁶⁴; moreover, he makes it clear that the appetite is not entirely passive: "the apprehended

⁴⁶¹ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, c.*: "...manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, *et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.*" (Emphasis added).

⁴⁶² Whether *amor* is a mere reception where the recipient is unchanged, a reception of something that betters the recipient or the reception of something that worsens the recipient, *amor* is always a passion (See *ST Ia IIae, q22, a1*).

⁴⁶³ *ST Ia, q28, a4, c.*

⁴⁶⁴ *ST Ia IIae, q18, a2, ad3*: "quodammodo passive" and "principium humanorum actuum."

appetible object is a mover not moved, but the appetite is a moved mover.”⁴⁶⁵ *Amor* becomes a more active principle particularly in the rational appetite, making it much harder to define *amor* too simplistically as a passion. Thus, when delving into the causes of love, we should maintain that Thomas continues to treat primarily of the causes of *amor* insofar as they exist in the sensitive appetite and in an extended sense as they exist in the rational appetite. We are attempting to find the causes of a kind of motion — i.e., the passive motion in which the lover is being moved by an object that is considered under the aspect of a good.

Thomas’s method in q27 focuses primarily on how goodness is the primary cause of *amor*, but in various modes. In q27, Thomas progresses from treating goodness as a cause of love (a1), then knowledge (a2), and then likeness (a3). He ends by re-affirming *amor* as the principle passion (a4). In a1, Thomas reaffirms that the object is, properly speaking, the cause of love.⁴⁶⁶ In this article, he also reaffirms the fact that this object *must* be a good because it is the very nature of the appetite to tend towards its good. What makes the object a good for the subject is twofold: the fact that it is cognized (q27, a2) and the fact that there is some kind of similitude between the lover and the object loved (q27, a3). Therefore, knowledge and likeness are also causes of love. Accordingly, because love is synonymous with the first inclination toward the good, there can be no passion prior to love in the causal order (q27, a4).⁴⁶⁷ The good is only the object of the

⁴⁶⁵ *ST* Ia, q80, a2, c.: “...appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum.”

⁴⁶⁶ He has stated this in several ways, particular in *ST* Ia IIae, q26, a1, c concerning the fact that love is the “principle movement toward the end loved.”

⁴⁶⁷ See Miner, 126.

appetite as apprehended. Moreover, this good is apprehended as a *mode of likeness to the self*. The reason why Thomas proceeds from goodness to knowledge to similarity is because *amor* is passive, meaning that it must be caused by its object. Therefore, the good is the cause of love properly speaking. But as Thomas proves in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, the good toward which a lover tends is based upon a preceding cognition, whether it is natural (and therefore divine), sensitive or rational. Thus, knowledge is treated second. The answer to the question, "What is known?" is the beloved's *aptitudo*, *similitudo* or *connaturalitas* with the lover. Thus, likeness is treated in a3. We might say that the good is the proper object of *amor*, but it is only a good because I know the object as a good and because the lover perceives it as "fitting" or "like" him. The final article on whether any other passion causes love is a special consideration in which Thomas establishes *amor* as primary cause of every appetite. Thus, by way of introduction, we will outline the causes as follows:⁴⁶⁸ 1) As the source of the relation, the "material" cause of *amor* is the appetite of the lover himself; 2) because love is for the sake of the beloved, the beloved (i.e., "the good") is the final cause; 3) because the lover only formally loves what connatural to him and therefore like him, likeness (*similitudo*) is the formal cause of *amor* and 4) because the appetite is moved by knowledge of a good, knowledge (*cognitio*) is the efficient cause of *amor*. We will have more to say about this in the commentary itself.

The problem is that there is no place in q27 where Thomas explicitly writes, "x is the final cause of love," "y is the efficient cause of love," etc. This does not invalidate the attempt to analyze q27 according to this schema, but it should give us pause for thought.

⁴⁶⁸ Our purpose is not to explain them here, but merely to introduce them so that the reader has an idea where the analysis is proceeding.

Depending upon the kind of appetite, the lover, his intention, and the beloved object, it is possible that the causes may change aspects thus making it overly simplistic, for example, to claim that knowledge is the efficient cause of love in *every* case of *amor*. According to Miner, a2 and a4 do not precisely multiply the causes of love, but rather “illuminate the various modes by which good exerts causality. There is a sense in which goodness is the *only* cause of love. After all, it is true “in a sense” that *amor* is only a passion.

Although St. Thomas does not explicitly refer to the four causes in the *De Amore*, he *does* explicitly speak of the causes of love in other contexts. Before proceeding, we will provide some of these texts as a prelude to understanding what is meant by saying that *amor* has a final, efficient, formal, and material cause. Thomas refers specifically to the relation of three of the causes to whether or not a rational creature can be loved out of charity.⁴⁶⁹ In a reply to an objection, Thomas writes:

To the seventeenth, it must be said that when one is said to love his neighbor out of charity, this preposition “out of” can designate a relation of final, efficient and formal causes; the final cause inasmuch as the love of neighbor is ordered to the love of God as to an end, whence it is written (1 Tim. i. 5), “The end of the commandment is charity,” because the love of God is the goal in observing the precepts. In the relationship of efficient cause, however, inasmuch as charity is a habit tending toward loving, being related to the act of loving as heat is to heating. In the relationship of formal cause, however, inasmuch as the act receives its species from the habit, as heating does from heat.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁹ We realize that Thomas is not precisely responding to the question of what causes *amor*. But he is relating the causes to a species of love, which can give us a clearer idea of what Thomas means by referring to the causes of love.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, ad17: “Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquis diligere proximum ex caritate, haec praepositio ex potest designare habitudinem causae finalis, efficientis et formalis. Finalis quidem, in quantum dilectio proximi ordinatur ad dilectionem Dei sicut ad finem; unde dicitur I ad Timoth. I, 5: *finis praecepti est caritas*, quia scilicet dilectio Dei est finis observationis praeceptorum. In habitudine autem causae efficientis, in quantum caritas est habitus inclinans ad diligendum, sic se habens

Regarding the final cause, Thomas claims that *caritas* is directed toward God as its end. God is the specific “good” of *caritas*, so the claim that the good in general is the object of *amor* is consistent with this. We know that the efficient cause in every case has some kind of motive power. The efficient cause is an “agent,” and “that which by its activity or its exercise of power produces existence or change in another.”⁴⁷¹ In the abovementioned case, Thomas designates the efficient cause of *caritas* as a habit. We should not forget that Thomas has established in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a3 that *amor* and *dilectio* are expressed by either act or passion, *amicitia* is like a habit, and *caritas* can be understood either way. What Thomas is designating as the efficient cause of *caritas* is the answer to the question, “What is moving the will to act specifically with *caritas*?” Our claim is that just as the habit moves the will to act efficiently with *caritas*, knowledge moves the appetite to act with either natural, sensitive, or rational *amor*. We cannot claim that a habit moves *amor* because *amor* is properly a passion and not a habit. Thus, our question is, “What moves a passion?” Thomas specifically claims that the appetites are differentiated by the mode of apprehension in the subject—the appetite “follows” (*consequens*) the apprehension.⁴⁷² At this point we should stop and recall that Thomas has already introduced the causes of love somewhat in the preceding question. He could not possibly avoid doing so, considering that the subject of q26 is “*Quid sit amor?*”

ad actum dilectionis, sicut calor ad calefactionem. In habitudine autem causae formalis, in quantum actus recipit speciem ab habitu, sicut et calefactio a calore.” (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁷¹ Wuellner, *Scholastic Dictionary*, 39.

⁴⁷² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.

Thomas writes: “I answer that, passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondarily it gives it the movement consequent upon the form; thus, the generator gives the body weight and the movement consequent upon that weight.”⁴⁷³ Thomas is doing nothing less than indicating the efficient and formal causes of the passion of *amor*. We might be tempted to claim that the object is both the efficient and formal cause of love. But we just mentioned above that knowledge and likeness do not precisely multiply the causes of love, but rather distinguish different ways in which the good is the cause of love. We have already commented on this passage; but for our present purposes, we should recognize that Thomas claims that by reason of connaturality, the beloved becomes impressed upon the will of the lover (i.e., *complacentia*), thus altering the form of his appetite. Complacency is “a certain adaptation to itself [of the beloved to the lover]”⁴⁷⁴ that “introduces itself into its intention.”⁴⁷⁵ It is for this reason we can claim that likeness is the formal cause of love. The object could not “move toward the realization of its appetible object”⁴⁷⁶ unless it was first cognized, and thus knowledge is the efficient cause of love.

⁴⁷³ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c. (My translation): “Respondeo dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patientem, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam.

⁴⁷⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “...quandam coaptationem ad ipsum.”

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*: “faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione.”

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: “...tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum.”

IA IIAE, Q27, A1: THE GOOD AS CAUSE OF LOVE

As we mentioned above, the *sed contra* to a1 states confidently, “Surely, it is not loved unless it is good.”⁴⁷⁷ The most obvious and important objection to the argument that some men love what is evil is Thomas’s axiom that, “evil is never loved except under the aspect of good.”⁴⁷⁸ Thomas is not naïve, however. He nuances this axiom with the further insight that love is sometimes called evil when an accidental good is loved above “simply a true good (*simpliciter verum bonum*).”⁴⁷⁹ Though he does not mention what this *simpliciter verum bonum* is, he does imply two different things that it is *not*: 1) If what Thomas wrote in q26, a4 is accurate, we can surmise that he is referring to the ordering of *amor concupiscentiae* to *amor amicitiae*. This twofold act of love can be disordered insofar as one treats another person only for the sake of his own private use or pleasure, thus treating the other’s *per se* goodness as secondary. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the only *simpliciter verum bonum* can be another person. 2) Thomas mentions that man can, in a certain sense, “love iniquity” insofar as he uses an immoral *means* to obtain a legitimate good. It should be noted that this objection can only apply to *dilectio* and thus only to a human person. The second objection merely notes that if it is true that we love those who acknowledge our iniquities,⁴⁸⁰ then it seems that we love iniquity as well. This is a minor objection that Thomas easily dismisses on account of the fact that what

⁴⁷⁷ ST Ia IIAe, q27, a1, sed.: “Non amatur certe nisi bonum.” (My translation)

⁴⁷⁸ ST Ia IIAe, q27, a1, ad1: “Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni.”

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ From Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II, 4.

we love is the virtue of honesty, not any kind of evil. The second objection is similar to the first in that it refers to *dilectio* rather than to *amor* as a passion. It is also similar to the first insofar as they both claim that evil can be loved along with goodness.

As for the third objection, Thomas, quoting Dionysius, notes that since beauty can be loved, it is not true that goodness is the only cause of love.⁴⁸¹ Thomas adds that “it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty so that good means that which simply pleases the appetite, while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend.”⁴⁸² Thomas is making the point that goodness is not truly different than beauty. The beautiful simply adds the notion of “something pleasant to apprehend.”⁴⁸³ The third objection only makes logical sense if we accept that the Good alone is the cause of love. The first two objections do not present a truly different candidate from goodness because they both posit the good’s opposite (i.e., evil) as a cause of love. In the idea of beauty, however, the third objection presents a truly different candidate for a cause of love. Thus, similarly to the first two objections, it becomes all the more clear that we have transcended the notion of *amor* as a passion and have passed over into the various forms of *dilectio*. It is also clear that strictly speaking,

⁴⁸¹ Miner writes, “The objector offers Aquinas the opportunity to restate the teaching of the Ia pars on the relation between beauty and goodness: ‘that which pleases the appetite is simply called *bonum*; whereas that of which the very apprehension is pleasing, is called *pulchrum*.’ (27.1 ad 3m) The view fits ordinary experience. We call any meal that satisfies our appetite ‘good’ (at least in some respect). But we never speak of a meal as ‘beautiful’ unless it is presented in such a way that its very apprehension is pleasing.” (See Miner, 127)

⁴⁸² *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1, ad3: “Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.”

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

goodness alone is the cause of love. The only proper answer to the question, “*What is the object of amor?*” is *goodness*.

The corpus begins, “Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.”⁴⁸⁴ Here, Thomas indicates merely that *amor* belongs to the appetite which is a *vis passiva*, not specifically a *passio*. This places it in the first category of the threefold senses of passion that Thomas outlines in *ST Ia IIae*, q22, a1, thereby divesting *amor* of some of the negative connotations of being a passion in the strict sense. What he does *not* repeat in the present context of q27, a1, on the *bonum* is any mention of the kinds of appetites. It would seem, therefore, that rather than focusing on the relation of the good to the *subject* (wherein dwell the appetites), this article is specifically focused on the relation of the good to the *object*.

From reiterating love as something that properly pertains to passive appetite, he continues: “Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act.”⁴⁸⁵ In comparison with the information given in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1 & a2, where the Master of Aquino outlines the complex circular movement of love, the relationship between the subject and the object of love in *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1 is more simplified. Thomas emphatically lists the object (i.e., the beloved) as the cause of the movement of the appetitive power. The question is *how* is the good the cause of love’s movement? The good causes love’s movement as its *end*. Thomas reaffirms this in another place in the *Summa*: “But goodness, since it has the aspect of the desirable, implies the idea of a

⁴⁸⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva.”

⁴⁸⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1, c.: “Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius.”

final cause, the causality of which is the first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to form. Hence the end is called the 'cause of causes.'"⁴⁸⁶ We should not be surprised that Thomas writes about goodness as the cause of amor first, since it is the "*causa causarum*."⁴⁸⁷ But there is a final point that should be made about the final cause. The great Thomist Cardinal Mercier writes, "The final cause exercises an attraction upon the active powers of beings and determines these powers or forces so attracted to will or to tend towards the good offered to them. From this it is clear that the causality of the final cause consists in an attraction which it exercises upon the will and a consequent tendency in the same power or faculty towards the good offered."⁴⁸⁸ Not only does it seem proper to say that goodness is the final cause of *amor*, but that the final cause ultimately *is amor*, for what else does Thomas claim exercises such a universal attraction on all beings but *amor*? Thus, we can say with confidence that the *bonum* is the final cause of *amor*.

Cardinal Mercier adds that we must not be careful to confuse the final and efficient cause on account of the fact that the attraction that the final cause exercises on a being is not the same as the physical effect of an efficient cause. The final cause, considered as an end, does not exist in nature. It is interesting to note that the example the Cardinal presents when comparing final cause to efficient cause is that of

⁴⁸⁶ *ST Ia*, q5, a2, ad1: "Bonum autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam, unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum."

⁴⁸⁷ Thomas affirms *amor* as the final cause in *Ethic. I,2*.

⁴⁸⁸ Cardinal Mercier, *A Manual of Scholastic Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1919), 543.

knowledge: "...knowledge of the good to be obtained is the *condition* without which the attraction of the object would not influence the conscious subject."⁴⁸⁹ It is for this reason that we will introduce knowledge as the efficient cause of love in a2.

IA IIAE, Q27, A2: KNOWLEDGE AS A CAUSE OF LOVE

The relationship between love and knowledge is absolutely essential in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. In *ST Ia IIAe q27, a2*, Thomas clearly claims that knowledge causes love rather than vice versa. Michael Sherwin concludes at the end of his chapter on knowledge and love in Aquinas, "Knowledge has priority in showing and attaining the beloved, while love has priority in moving toward the beloved."⁴⁹⁰ The *sed contra* cites St. Augustine rather emphatically: "No one can love what he does not know."⁴⁹¹ Thomas repeats in the corpus that the good is the cause of love, but that the good is not the object of the appetite unless it is first an *apprehended* good. This proposition supports the primacy of the Good as the preeminent cause of love. There are many passages in which Thomas essentially claims the same thing:⁴⁹²

It must be said that although what is known is loved, it does not follow that what is more known is also more loved. For, a thing is not loved because it is known, but because it is good; thus that which is better is more lovable, even though it is not better known. For example, a man

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 543.

⁴⁹⁰ Sherwin, "By Knowledge and By Love." 169.

⁴⁹¹ *ST Ia IIAe, q27, a2, sed.*: "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."

⁴⁹² See *DT*, vol. 1, q8, a11, sed.

loves his servant or even his horse which he has had in constant use less than he loves some good man whom he knows only by reputation.⁴⁹³

It is clear from this statement that it is still the Good that is the preeminent cause of love, i.e., “a thing is not loved because it is known, but because it is good.” The scholar James McEvoy notes that the good is the only cause of love because it is the good that has value to the lover. In order, however, for something to have value, one must make a value *judgment*. McEvoy mentions that knowledge is merely a necessary condition for love to awaken rather than properly a cause of love, being that Thomas certainly teaches that nothing is in the will that is not first in the intellect.⁴⁹⁴

In a very interesting passage relating love’s causality to knowledge, Thomas writes the following:

To the first it must therefore be said that there are two ways that something is the cause of dilection. In one way, as being the reason for loving [with dilection]. In this way the good is the cause of dilection, because each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. In another way [something is a cause of dilection] because it is a way to acquire dilection. In this way that vision is a cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it; but it does not follow that that which is more visible is the more lovable, but that this is the first that is

⁴⁹³ *De Vir.*, q2, a4, ad4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet cognitum diligatur, tamen non sequitur quod magis cognitum magis diligatur. Non enim ea ratione aliquid diligitur quia cognoscitur, sed quia est bonum; unde quod est magis bonum, magis est diligibile, licet non sit magis cognitum; sicut homo minus diligit aliquem servum, vel etiam equum, quem in continuo usu habet, quam aliquem bonum hominem quem tantum fama cognoscit.”

⁴⁹⁴ McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 22. McEvoy rather blithely mentions *similitudo* as a cause of love without really analyzing it. This is ironic considering the title of the article. He provides some very lucid reflections about the theory of love; but by the conclusion, one is left wondering what *similitudo* has to do with the causes of love, and what Thomas actually meant by loving “the other as oneself.” This merely underscores the difficulty of explaining the material in question.

McEvoy is not alone in his contention that knowledge is not properly a cause of love. See William Rossner, “An Inclination to an Intellectually Known Good,” 75-78.

presented to us to love [with dilection]. This is, in a way, what is argued by the the Apostle. A neighbor, because he is more visible to us, is presented to us as the first lovable thing “from these things the soul knows it discerns to love what it does not know,” as Gregory says in a certain homily.⁴⁹⁵

The above text is quite important because it indicates the two ways that a thing might be the cause of love. Knowledge is not the “reason for loving” (*ratio diligendi*). We know many things, and dislike quite a few of them. We love something because it is good. But the object must be presented to us as good, and this is the function of the intellect. It is in this way that we can claim that knowledge efficiently causes love.

Thomas himself writes, “Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another.... In respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father.”⁴⁹⁶ It is the *knowledge* that a certain man is the son of “such and such a father” that Thomas claims is the efficient cause of love. This is clear from the comparison that Thomas makes in the very

⁴⁹⁵ *ST* IIa IIae, q26, a2, ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid causa dilectionis. Uno modo, sicut id quod est ratio diligendi. Et hoc modo bonum est causa diligendi, quia unumquodque diligitur in quantum habet rationem boni. Alio modo, quia est via quaedam ad acquirendum dilectionem. Et hoc modo visio est causa dilectionis, non quidem ita quod ea ratione sit aliquid diligibile quia est visibile; sed quia per visionem perducimur ad dilectionem non ergo oportet quod illud quod est magis visibile sit magis diligibile, sed quod prius occurrat nobis ad diligendum. Et hoc modo argumentatur apostolus. Proximus enim, quia est nobis magis visibilis, primo occurrit nobis diligendus, ex his enim quae novit animus discit incognita amare, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia.” (Translation mine.)

⁴⁹⁶ *ST* IIa IIae, q27, a3, c.: “Est autem quadruplex genus causae, scilicet finalis, formalis, efficiens et materialis, ad quam reducitur etiam materialis dispositio, quae non est causa simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et secundum haec quatuor genera causarum dicitur aliquid propter alterum diligendum... Secundum autem causam efficientem, sicut diligimus aliquos in quantum sunt filii talis patris.”

short corpus *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2: “For this reason the Philosopher (*Ethic.* IX: 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love.”⁴⁹⁷ Knowledge is a beginning of love; it is a means in the same way that contemplation (knowledge) is the beginning of a truly spiritual love (which is a good—a final cause) and therefore knowledge is an efficient cause. If we are not convinced of this, Thomas himself specifically states that an object causes a passion thusly: “and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing.”⁴⁹⁸

Before moving on to the objections, we should make some observations about the complexity of the efficient cause. Wuellner lists eleven separate groups of efficient causes for a total of no less than 25 various specific efficient causes.⁴⁹⁹ In finding the proper efficient cause of *amor*, we must avoid both complicating and simplifying the matter. Thus, the most important efficient causes are the following:⁵⁰⁰

- 1) *Transitive and immanent Efficient Causes*: a *transitive* efficient cause results when a change produced by an agent is received in another subject, such as fire changing wood into ash, while an

⁴⁹⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2, c.: “Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX *Ethic.*, quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium amoris spiritualis.”

⁴⁹⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q43, a1, c.: “cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni.”

The specific context is how *delectatio* is caused efficiently, but it occurs in a broader discussion about how any passion is caused efficiently.

⁴⁹⁹ Wuellner, *Scholastic Dictionary*, 20.

⁵⁰⁰ The primary information for the outline of efficient causes is from Cardinal Mercier, *A Manual of Scholastic Philosophy*, Vol. I, 535-6.

- immanent cause is when a change is immanent to the subject, as in an act of volition.
- 2) *Principal Cause and Instrumental Efficient Causes*: "When two causes conjoin to produce an effect, that is the principal one which makes use of the power of the inferior and directs its exercise; and that one which helps in the production of the *instrumental one*."⁵⁰¹
 - 3) *Dispositive and Perfective Efficient Causes*: A dispositive efficient cause produces in a subject an ultimate disposition that introduces into it some definite form but does not produce that form. A perfective efficient cause is that which actually produces the form. A father is the *dispositive cause* of his son because he does dispose matter in such a way that God can inform it into a rational soul. God himself is the *perfective efficient cause*.
 - 4) *Proximate and Remote Efficient Causes*: If a cause is proximate, then there are essentially no other agents interposed between itself and its effects, and a cause is remote when there are other such interposing agents.
 - 5) *Physical and Moral efficient Causes*: "A *physical cause* produces its effects by means of its own power, which it exercises immediately or by means of an instrument. A *moral cause* is one which acts upon the will of another by the presentation of something good or evil to it."

With these causes in mind, what can we say about knowledge as an efficient cause of *amor*? Properly speaking, "transitive action perfects a patient and immanent perfects the agent." Because *amor* is a passion, we must maintain that knowledge is primarily a transitive efficient cause as opposed to an immanent one. For the reasons that we cannot love what we do not know and the three appetites are based on three modes of knowledge, we can affirm that knowledge is the principal efficient cause of love rather than merely an instrumental one. We can affirm that knowledge is a proximate efficient cause for the same reasons. Knowledge is a dispositive efficient cause of love rather than an perfective one insofar as it certainly introduces a form into the appetite that

⁵⁰¹ A surgeon is the principal efficient cause of an operation while a scalpel is an instrumental efficient cause.

contributes to love's creation, but it is the object in the appetite itself that is the perfective efficient cause. As for the distinction between physical and moral efficient causes, we can affirm that in man, knowledge is primarily a moral efficient cause because it is the condition through which he makes a moral judgment. Thus, knowledge is primarily a transitive, principal, proximate, dispositive, and moral efficient cause for *amor*.

The first objection raises the point that since some things are sought without being known such as the sciences, then knowledge cannot be the cause of love. Thomas counters by qualifying certain levels of knowledge and the ways to acquire it. In other words, he explains that in seeking science, for example, we have a certain level of knowledge about it in generalized propositions,⁵⁰² according to one of its effects, or by the recommendation of another.⁵⁰³ We will treat the second objection last, considering that it is the longest and most important for reasons that will be mentioned shortly. The third objection mentions that if it were true that knowledge caused love then there would be no love where there is no knowledge. Citing Dionysius,⁵⁰⁴ Thomas hearkens back to the point he made in q26, a1 concerning the fact that there is love in all things (i.e., natural love) but the same is not true for knowledge. He is able to dismiss the objection quickly by repeating the fact that knowledge is in all things, which includes those things that are so simple that they possess only a natural appetite. In this case,

⁵⁰² Thomas calls this level of knowledge a "certain outline of knowledge," (aliquam summariam cognitionem.)

⁵⁰³ Augustine, *De Trin.* I, 2.

⁵⁰⁴ *DDN* IV.

however, knowledge is “in Him Who created their nature”⁵⁰⁵ rather than in the things themselves.

Both the first and third objections raise interesting points about the kind of in-being that can be present in persons and things. Upon closer observation, the first and second objections can refer only to persons, while the third focuses specifically on impersonal substances. The first objection argues that in order for something to be loved, it need not be known perfectly, but can be sought according to the somewhat oblique levels mentioned above. The third objection that there can be “no love where there is no knowledge” raises a point that we have mentioned in the commentary of q26, a1; namely, that regarding the tendency of natural love, the apprehensive indwelling of the beloved in the lover is not what is important, but rather the indwelling of the lover in God that causes the knowledge that is requisite for natural love. For example, it is clear that Thomas defines the force of gravity as a kind of love, although if a rock plummets to the earth, it is also clear that the rock does not “know” the earth. The knowledge that is operative here is not in the rock, but rather in the God whose knowledge is responsible for the tendency of the rock.

The second objection is more important. This is supported by the fact that it is twice as long as the other two objections combined. The objection argues that we love some things much more than they are known, such as God. As Miner has astutely pointed out, “negative theology” suggests that if full knowledge of a thing is not required in order to know it, then it seems that knowledge is not a cause of love.⁵⁰⁶ The

⁵⁰⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2, ad3: “in eo qui naturam instituit.”

⁵⁰⁶ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 128.

solution brings out a very important point concerning the relationship of knowledge to love which is the fact that “something is required for the perfection of knowledge that is not requisite for the perfection of love.”⁵⁰⁷ What is this “something”? The solution can be found in the fact that love and knowledge belong to different orders and operate according to different functions. The function of knowledge is to *mentally* distinguish things that are *actually* united and, conversely, to logically unite things that are actually distinct through the process of comparing or synthesizing ideas with one another. Thus, perfect knowledge requires that one know all that is in a thing – parts, powers, and properties. But since love is of a different order insofar as it tends toward a thing *per se* rather than *attends* to its parts and properties, a thing can be loved more than it is known.⁵⁰⁸ Quoting the reply to this second objection, Hittinger comments that, “The appetitive power would be frustrated if it could not reach the ‘other’ in its very externality” and “because the movement of the *affectus* terminates at things as they are in themselves, it can engage in community with things beyond the range of ‘likeness’

⁵⁰⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2, ad2: “Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris.”

⁵⁰⁸ See also *DV*, Vol. 2, q10, a9, ad7: “Movement or activity of the cognitive part realizes its perfection within the mind itself, and, therefore, for a thing to be known, there must be some likeness in the mind. This is especially true if, as an object of knowledge, it is not joined to the mind through its essence. But movement or activity of the affective part begins from the soul and terminates at things. Therefore, a likeness of the thing by which it is informed is not required in the affection as it is in the understanding.”

“Ad septimum dicendum, quod motus vel operatio cognitivae partis, perficitur in ipsa mente: et ideo oportet ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur, esse aliquam similitudinem eius in mente; maxime si per essentiam suam non coniungatur menti ut cognitionis obiectum. Sed motus vel operatio affectivae partis incipit ab anima, et terminatur ad res; et ideo non requiritur in affectu aliqua similitudo rei qua informetur, sicut in intellectu.”

that is required by knowledge.”⁵⁰⁹ Thomas has referred to the different function and ordering of knowledge and love earlier in the *Summa Theologiae*. The most representative statement is the following:

For as we have said above,⁵¹⁰ the action of the intellect consists in this – *that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this – that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself.* And therefore the Philosopher says in *Metaph. vi* that “good and evil,” which are objects of the will, “are in things,” but “truth and error,” which are objects of the intellect, “are in the mind.”⁵¹¹

This raises the question concerning the order of knowledge as related to love.

It is not necessary to have a detailed discussion of the relationship between the apprehensive and appetitive powers.⁵¹² What is perhaps most important is to identify what Thomas himself mentions about knowledge when he specifically relates it to love. The problem with working this out in the present context is that the relationship of knowledge and love becomes particularly prevalent only later in q28, a1-a3. In each of those articles, Thomas claims that the respective effect of love for the primary effects of union, mutual indwelling, and ecstasy is according to *both* the apprehensive and

⁵⁰⁹ Russell Hittinger, “When It Is More Excellent to Love than to Know: the Other Side of Thomistic Realism,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 57 (1983): 175.

⁵¹⁰ See *ST Ia*, q16, a1; *Ia*, q27, a4.

⁵¹¹ *ST Ia*, q82, a3, c.: “*Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est.* Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI *Metaphys.*, quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente.” (Emphasis added.)

⁵¹² Michael Sherwin has a detailed discussion of the relationship specifically of *caritas* to knowledge in his dissertation, “By Knowledge and By Love: Charity’s Relationship to Knowledge in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas and Its Implications for Charity’s Status as a Virtue.”

appetitive powers. Therefore, some important aspects concerning the relationship between the apprehensive and the appetitive power will be postponed until our analysis of love's effects.

We have already covered how the three appetites arise from three different kinds of cognitions. Even the more specific types of love (*amicitia* and *caritas*) are differentiated in some way by a kind of knowledge. Additionally, "dilection presupposes the judgment of reason" whereas *amor* can be merely passive, ostensibly presupposing no such judgment.⁵¹³ The division of *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae* is not only based on the object (i.e., a good for someone versus the good of someone), but is also based on an intention. The discussion of q26, a4 hinges on the kind of good that we wish for someone, which is certainly preceded by an *intentio*. Knowledge is a kind of efficient cause, but not merely an instrumental one in the way that a hammer is the instrumental cause of piercing a board with a nail. Knowledge pervades the act and passion of love giving love its specific mode. To offer a comparison, the sun is an efficient cause of light, but it is so constantly and completely in a manner much more radical than mere instrumentality.

IA II AE, Q27, A3: SIMILITUDE AS A CAUSE OF LOVE

The fact that Thomas proceeds from knowledge as a cause of love to likeness should not surprise us, considering that human knowledge is made possible by intentional likenesses. According to Thomas, "the act of the intellect consists in this — that the likeness of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of

⁵¹³ See *ST Ia IIae* q26, a3, ad4.

the will consists in this – that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself.”⁵¹⁴

The discussion of *similitudo* in the present context does not, however, involve the intentional likenesses of real objects in the mind.⁵¹⁵ The likeness to which he refers is the generally well-known understanding of the term as *having a similar quality*. We still discuss this issue of love and similarity in everyday language. The expression that “opposites attract” is indicative of this. We are positing that love occurs on the basis of a likeness of quality. The Angelic Doctor, however, disagrees with the old adage that “opposites attract,” at least according to our shallow understanding. In order to truly understand what he means, we must analyze in detail what he means by *likeness*. Thomas is quite convinced that similars attract rather than opposites. Even colloquial language contains this wisdom in certain expressions. When a man declares, “I like her,” he is admitting in a way that he *is like* her.⁵¹⁶ This likeness between the lover and the beloved is a *formal cause*. Kwasniewski writes:

If we inquire how the lover and beloved are compared to each other, we find that they stand in a relation of likeness: they are, actually or potentially, *like* each other. When the two are really alike, as if sharing one form (*quasi habentes unam formam*), they are, in a sense, one in that form, and thus the lover’s affection tends to the other as though the other were one with him, and wishes good to him as to himself.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹⁴ *ST I*, q82, a3, c.: “Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est.” (See also q16, a1; q27, a4.)

⁵¹⁵ Thomas sets up this epistemology quite well particularly in I, q84-86, which is one of the masterpieces of epistemology in the Western philosophical tradition.

⁵¹⁶ Recall that for any attraction to exist between one thing and another it must be based upon a fundamental likeness which is a kind of connaturality.

⁵¹⁷ Kwasniewski, 126-7.

Thus, there is a vital link between likeness as a cause of love and union. Before moving on to a discussion of the primary text, we will make some comments about Thomas's theory of likeness as outlined earlier in the *Summa*.

Likeness is perhaps the most elusive cause of love because it is a difficult and general relation to define.⁵¹⁸ Likeness, in its widest aspect, is simply the opposite of *differentia*.⁵¹⁹ Though this is a negative definition, it may be more accurate than "a similarity of any kind of quality or species."⁵²⁰ The first thematic treatment of the concept of *similitudo* in the *Summa* is in the context of discussing the Perfection of God.⁵²¹ First, Thomas deals with the question of whether or not God is perfect in the sense of being pre-eminent, best, and principle of all things. Next he treats whether or not the perfections of all things are *in* God, and third he analyzes in that context whether any creature can be *like* God. Thomas briefly gives us the foundation of *similitudo*: "Likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form"⁵²² and thus likeness "varies according to the many modes of communication in form."⁵²³ The likeness itself is based

⁵¹⁸ See particularly Guy Mansini, O.S.B., "Similitudo, communicatio, and the Friendship of Charity in Aquinas," In *Thomistica*, ed. E. Manning, 1-26. *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale*, vol. 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995).

⁵¹⁹ Deferrari mentions no less than 35 kinds of *unio similitudinis* (See pp. 1027-8).

⁵²⁰ The negative definition may actually be more accurate than the positive one for the reason that Thomas claims that there can even exist a similitudo between an act and something with a potency toward that act—an instance that fails to meet the criterion of "possessing the same quality." (See *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3, c.)

⁵²¹ *ST Ia*, q4.

⁵²² *ST Ia*, q4, a3, c.: "Similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma."

⁵²³ "Multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos modos communicandi in forma."

on the unity of a single form, varying though these may be. Thus we see the early connection between *unitas/unio* and *similitudo*. In the *Prima Pars*, we see that all things pre-exist in God in a kind of natural union which appears to be the original cause for the very possibility of *similitudo*. In that article, Thomas says quite emphatically that God “contains within Himself the whole perfection of being.”⁵²⁴ Ultimately (or metaphysically), likeness is based on the fact that everything in the universe is similar because everything exists *in* God. The *sed contra* of a2 on the question of whether or not the perfections of all things are in God reads, “Dionysius says that God in His one existence pre-possesses all things.”⁵²⁵ Thomas justifies this proposition using the well-known axiom that “it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause.”⁵²⁶ God, as both *ipsum esse subsistens* and the cause of existence, “must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being.”⁵²⁷ Even regarding *natural* unity, all things pre-exist in the cause of all things.⁵²⁸ This is a natural, philosophical axiom for Thomas rather than a theological one. If all beings pre-exist in God, this unity necessarily implies likeness.

Thomas outlines three kinds of likeness in *ST I-II*, q27, a3. The first and most perfect kind of likeness is when two things share both the same formality and the same

⁵²⁴ *ST Ia*, q4, a2, c.: “...totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat.”

⁵²⁵ The Latin is even more explicit than this English translation: within God’s unity he “pre-has” everything: “Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno existentia omnia praehabet.”

⁵²⁶ *ST Ia*, q4, a1, c.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*: “Quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat.”

⁵²⁸ *ST Ia*, q4, a2, ad1.

mode. The example given is when two things are not only white (same formality), but equally white. This Thomas calls “the most perfect likeness.”⁵²⁹ It will be expedient to call this a *likeness of equality*. The second kind of likeness is, understandably, when two things share the same formality but differ in mode, measure or degree. This is *imperfect likeness*. Thus, two things may be more or less white. The third kind of likeness is that “which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality as we see in non-univocal agents.”⁵³⁰ Basically, Thomas reiterates the principle that an effect must bear a resemblance to its cause, but the various effects of the same cause might actually fall into separate genera and species. We might call this an *analogous likeness*. The health of a human is an analogous likeness to the health of a plant, and thus there is an analogous likeness between human health and plant health. The creature’s likeness to God can only be analogous to God and therefore imperfect, insofar as God transcends every kind of species, genus, or any quality whatsoever. Let us use these kinds of likeness and apply them to the popular saying that “opposites attract.” A man may be attracted to a woman because she is an equally talented musician as he is, which would be a *perfect likeness*. He may be attracted to her because she is almost as talented or superior a musician as he is, which would be an *imperfect likeness*. He may be attracted to her because she is a good mechanic, which is an ability in which he is completely lacking. We would call these two “opposites,” but Thomas would not. According to

⁵²⁹ We should note that he does not call it a perfect likeness. One thing is never perfectly like another in the metaphysics of creation.

⁵³⁰ *ST Ia*, q4, a3, c.: “...communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos modos communicandi in forma.”

Thomas, his appreciation of excellence in his own field is analogous to his appreciation of excellence in hers, making them *analogously similar* rather than opposite.⁵³¹

As mentioned above, Thomas himself seems to claim in some places that it is likeness that is the pre-eminent cause of love. How can both the *bonum* and *similitudo* be pre-eminent causes of love? Thomas writes:

The form by virtue of which a thing is directed to its end, likens that thing somewhat to that end: thus a body by virtue of the form of gravity assumes a certain likeness to and conformity with the place to which its movement tends naturally. Now, we have already shown that sanctifying grace is a form residing in man, and directing him to his last end, which is God. Therefore grace makes man like to God. *But likeness is the cause of love, because like loves like.* Therefore grace makes man a lover of God.⁵³²

In the above passage, Thomas argues that because grace is the “assistance of God” (*auxilium Dei*)⁵³³ and grace is a form that resides in man, this likeness makes man a lover

⁵³¹ We realize that this situation is an oversimplification. There are many reasons why human beings are attracted to each other. These few are used for the sake of illustration and argument.

⁵³² SCG IIIb, cap. 151: “Forma per quam res ordinatur in aliquem finem, assimilatur quodammodo rem illam fini: sicut corpus per formam gravitatis acquirit similitudinem et conformitatem ad locum ad quem naturaliter movetur. Ostensum est autem quod gratia gratum faciens est forma quaedam in homine per quam ordinatur ad ultimum finem, qui Deus est. Per gratiam ergo homo Dei similitudinem consequitur. Similitudo autem est dilectionis causa: omne enim simile diligit sibi simile. Per gratiam ergo homo efficitur Dei dilector.”

⁵³³ See SCG IIIb, cap. 150. Thomas writes, “There is also another reason for which the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of grace. For one man is said to be pleasing (*gratus*) to another, because he is beloved by him, wherefore he who is beloved of another, is said to be in his grace. Now it is essential to love that the lover be a well-wisher and a well-doer to the one whom he loves. And indeed the good of every creature is the object of God's will and operation: since the creature's very being and its every perfection come from God willing and operating, as we have proved above: wherefore it is said (Wisdom xi. 25): Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. But a special kind of divine love offers itself to our consideration; it is that which is bestowed on those whom he assists to obtain a good

of God. Indeed, in the mind of Thomas Aquinas, *to be good* is almost synonymous with *to be like* God.⁵³⁴ In other words, Thomas can claim simultaneously that both the *bonum* and *similitudo* are the preeminent causes of love for the reason that the *bonum* is the answer to the question, “What causes love *per se*?” and *similitudo* is the answer to the question, “What formally makes an object a *bonum* for the subject?”

The *sed contra* of this article (q27, a3) reads, “On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 13.19): Every beast loveth its like.”⁵³⁵ Thomas mentions this same passage no less than fifteen times in his corpus, indicating that both the passage and its principle are fairly entrenched in his philosophy.⁵³⁶ As a matter of fact, Thomas uses the very same passage as a *sed contra* in at least two other places.⁵³⁷ The second of those passages, concerning

which surpasses the order of their nature, namely the perfect enjoyment, not of any created good, but of his very self.”

“Est autem et alia ratio propter quam praedictum Dei auxilium gratiae nomen accepit. Dicitur enim aliquis alicui esse gratus, quia est ei dilectus: unde et qui ab aliquo diligitur, dicitur gratiam eius habere. Est autem de ratione dilectionis ut diligens bonum velit ei quem diligit, et operetur. Et quidem Deus bona vult et operatur circa omnem creaturam: ipsum enim esse creaturae, et omnis eius perfectio, est a Deo volente et operante, ut supra ostensum est; unde dicitur Sap. 11-25: *diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti*. Sed specialis ratio divinae dilectionis ad illos consideratur quibus auxilium praebet ad hoc quod consequantur bonum quod ordinem naturae eorum excedit, scilicet perfectam fruitionem non alicuius boni creati, sed sui ipsius.”

⁵³⁴ It might be a question worth pursuing whether or not *similitudo* can claim some place among the other transcendentals.

⁵³⁵ The Vulgate reads, “omne animal diligit simile sibi.” It is interesting to note that although Thomas never uses the verb, *diligere*, to refer to animal love, the Vulgate does not support him on this point.

⁵³⁶ See, for example, *ST Ia*, q96, a3, arg2; *Ia IIae*, q99, a2, c.; *Ia IIae*, q105, a3, arg4; *Ia IIae*, q183, a2, arg3; *De Caritate*, a9, arg5; *De Regno I*, chap. 9, #72; *Comm. Eph*, chap. 1, lect 2.

⁵³⁷ See *ST Ia*, q20, a4, sed; *Ia*, q60, a4, sed. This principle is not unique to Thomas. It can also be found, for example, in Bonaventure’s *Commentary on the Sentences II*, dist. 3,

whether an angel loves another angel with natural love as much as he loves himself, will bear comment shortly. It is strange that Thomas does not include the remainder of the verse, considering its relevance to the topic. In his *Commentary on Ephesians*, for example, he does not fail to mention the whole verse from *Ecclesiasticus* in direct connection with the principle of similitude: “For love is based on similarity: ‘every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest himself’ (*Ecclus.* 13:19).”⁵³⁸ It should not be forgotten that this article follows directly after the one where Thomas affirms that knowledge is also a cause of love. Kwasniewski puts it well: “What is it about the other person, what do we apprehend in him, that can give rise to *complacentia* or *coaptatio*?”⁵³⁹ If the lover had nothing in common with the beloved, it would be impossible for them to even *experience* one another, much less be united in the same love.⁵⁴⁰ Thomas certainly extends this vision to the love between human beings, considering that they are themselves microcosms of this universe. Thomas writes, again citing *Ecclesiasticus* 13.19, “Further, ‘Every beast loveth its like’, wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore he is called ‘a little world.’”⁵⁴¹ Moreover, in the article which asks whether God should be loved out of

Part. I, a2, q1. Similarly to Thomas in I, q60, a4, Bonaventure claims that even angels enjoy their own company quite naturally.

⁵³⁸ *Comm. Eph.*, Chap. I, lect. 2.

⁵³⁹ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 126.

⁵⁴⁰ W. Norris Clarke makes this point well. See “Action as the Self-Revelation of Being: A Central Theme in the Thought of St. Thomas,” *Explorations in Metaphysics*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 45-64.

⁵⁴¹ Thomas, *Supp*, III, q91, a1, sed. Note that Thomas quotes the same scripture passage in the *sed contra* of our primary text on similitude.

charity more than one's neighbor, Thomas replies: "The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor."⁵⁴² It is evident, therefore, that the likeness that consists in the pre-existent unity of all things in God is prior and causes the likeness that is the cause of love between lover and beloved.

There are two basic sections to the corpus. The first explains the twofold distinction in kinds of similitude and their relation to *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*, and the second explains the objection that likeness seems to cause hatred as well. Thomas introduces the corpus by indicating a distinction that will govern the article as a whole: the fact that *likeness between things is twofold*.⁵⁴³ The principle of likeness between these things is based on their having either *actually* or *potentially* the same quality. The former likeness causes *amor amicitiae* while the latter likeness causes *amor concupiscentiae*. Recall that *amor amicitiae* is the kind of love that one directs to another person *per se*, whereas *amor concupiscentiae* is toward the good that one wishes for that person (whether for one's self or for another). It is not immediately apparent

⁵⁴² *ST* IIa IIae, q26, a2, ad2. The objection reads: "Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: 'Every beast loveth its like.' Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God."

"Similitudo est causa dilectionis, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile sibi. Sed maior est similitudo hominis ad proximum suum quam ad Deum. Ergo homo ex caritate magis diligit proximum quam Deum."

⁵⁴³ *ST* Ia IIae, q26, a3, c: "similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter."

why the difference between these loves is based on actual versus potential qualities.

Regarding actual likeness as the cause of *amor amicitiae*, Thomas writes:

Therefore, the first mode of likeness causes love of friendship or else, benevolence. From the very fact that these two are similar, possessing one form, they are one in that form; thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men in whiteness.⁵⁴⁴

The above passage recalls two of the similitudes mentioned in I, q4, a2 of perfect and imperfect likeness. Thomas does not mean that two have *amor amicitiae* for one another simply because they share a species because there are just as many persons whom we may *dislike* because they are part of our species. The similarities about which Thomas speaks are those of common pursuit, common habit and common virtue.⁵⁴⁵ In the same vein, C.S. Lewis indicates the simple but profound insight that friendship must be *about* something – some subject, some activity, some common goal that comprises basic similarity between the two.⁵⁴⁶ What is more difficult to understand is why it is only a potential likeness that causes *amor concupiscentiae*.

⁵⁴⁴ *ST Ia IIae, q27, a3, c.* (My translation): “Primus ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine.”

⁵⁴⁵ *De Regno I, chap. 11:* “Now all friendship is concluded upon the basis of something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests.”

“Omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione firmatur. Eos enim qui conveniunt, vel per naturae originem, vel per morum similitudinem, vel per cuiuscumque societatis communionem, videmus amicitia coniungi.”

⁵⁴⁶ If the friendship becomes about the other *person* rather than about a *common pursuit*, it transforms into *eros* and ceases to be simply friendship. See C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves*, 66-7.

Thomas continues that actual likeness causes “the affections of one [to] tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself.”⁵⁴⁷ We see that actual likeness causes *amor amicitiae* for the simple fact that it is only such an actual likeness by which another might be *another one like me* – in other words, an *alter ipse*. Potential likeness causes *amor concupiscentiae*⁵⁴⁸ because “whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act.”⁵⁴⁹ This might be most simply explained by the experience that friendship often arises between persons when one of them has (or is) something that the other *wants*. If it is desired then it is not possessed, which means that it potentially exists, and has a “desire for its act.” If my friend is already so similar to me that I neither need nor want anything from him (but his friendship *per se*), we can see how Thomas concludes that it is only actual likeness that causes *amor amicitiae*.

Kwasniewski explains it in this way:

Insofar as two persons are really different, they are not yet formally one, and so each cannot consider and love the other as though he were himself; the one in potency stands to *gain* something as long as he is in potency. Insofar as they grow nearer in actual likeness, the mutual strangeness or resistant otherness disappears, and love, which is a unitive

⁵⁴⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3, c.: “Et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et sibi.”

⁵⁴⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, ad3: “When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.”

“Ad tertium dicendum quod in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, in quantum trahitur ad amorem *concupiscentiae*, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.”

⁵⁴⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, 27, a3, c.: “Quia unicuique existenti in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur.”

and concrete force, leads the lover to seek the beloved's good as though it were his own.⁵⁵⁰

If someone *has* what I *want*, this is a potential likeness; thus, I want them *for me*. If someone *is* like I *am*, it is much easier for me to want her for herself. If I am a virtuous man, then I want to be friends with another who is formally like me. Thomas makes it clear, therefore, in the following passage that likeness is the formal cause of love: "...in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable."⁵⁵¹ If I want someone *for me* (i.e., for my use or pleasure) then this is indeed *amor concupiscentiae*. What makes this clearer is that *amor concupiscentiae* always has an accidental good as its object. *Amor amicitiae* is the willing of a good to someone, whether to the self or to another, for his or her own sake, without considering mediate goods.

The second section of the corpus is significant. At first glance, the reader can be fooled into thinking that Thomas has covered the essence of his argument in the first part regarding the twofold distinction in similitudes. The second part apparently covers how likeness can also be the occasion for hatred; but it conceals several absolutely central principles for his philosophy of love. Thomas writes:

... in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to

⁵⁵⁰ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 127.

⁵⁵¹ *ST IIa IIae*, q27, a3, c.: "Secundum quidem genus causae finalis, sicut diligimus medicinam propter sanitatem. Secundum autem genus causae formalis, sicut diligimus hominem propter virtutem, quia scilicet virtute formaliter est bonus, et per consequens diligibilis."

him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why “potters quarrel among themselves,” because they hinder one another’s gain: and why “there are contentions among the proud,” because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.⁵⁵²

Thomas must answer the charge that likeness can also obviously cause hatred. Thomas must answer why love and hatred seem to have a root cause in similitude. Human beings have had the experience of jealousy, not on the basis of *failing* share a talent, but rather on the basis of *having* to share it with someone else (thus, a likeness). This kind of jealousy and hatred is, in fact, the most common and the most volatile. For example, I may be a good speaker but dislike my brother because he is also a good speaker, and I perceive that this likeness to him somehow subtracts from *my* notoriety, opportunities for monetary gain, romantic interests, or other such things. The traditional example that Thomas offers regarding the fact that “potters quarrel among themselves” is also understandable. It is their obvious likeness to one another also causes tensions unbecoming of love.⁵⁵³

In order to solve the paradox that similitude is both the cause of love and hatred, Thomas posits an absolutely key principle, which is *the principle of substantial union*. The

⁵⁵² ST Ia IIae, q27, a3, c.: “Dictum est autem supra quod in amore *concupiscentiae* amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.”

⁵⁵³ Objection 3 raises the argument that we love what we need, but if we need something, we are unlike it. Thomas’s argument concerning potential likeness as a caused of love answers this objection. Objection 1 raises the argument that the same thing (i.e., likeness) cannot cause contraries (i.e., love and hatred). His answer is apparent from what has been said.

corollary of self-love is based upon this principle. This principle is found in the following highly significant sentence: "But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form."⁵⁵⁴ We will have ample opportunity to explain the principle of substantial union and self-love, as they will often resurface in the subsequent analysis. We will first mention the connection of these two principles with Thomas's more obvious point that the similarity between two persons can be perceived as either helping or hindering his own good. If the situation is the former, then likeness causes hatred; if the latter, then it causes love. But this does not yet fully explain the matter. What constitutes my perception that this likeness that I share with another is either a help or a hindrance?⁵⁵⁵

We find the answer to this question precisely in the concept of substantial unity. Thomas explains that there is no way that a man can be more unified with another than he is with himself. The simplest definition for substantial unity is self-identity or self-unity. If it is true that love is a union and it is also true that a man cannot be more unified with another than he is with himself, it follows that his self-love will be greater than his love for any other. The love for the beloved is directly proportional to the

⁵⁵⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3, c.: "Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae."

⁵⁵⁵ Kwasniewski explains the matter simply by stating that likeness can be the cause of hatred when the lover loves the coveted object or quality more than the likeness in form. Though he sees the importance of Thomas's teaching on the beloved as *alter ipse*, he does not see the full import in the concept of substantial union and its relation to self-love. (Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 128)

proximity of the beloved from the lover's image of himself.⁵⁵⁶ Thus, it seems that there are, in fact, two kinds of actual likeness that are implied in this article rather than merely one. First, there is the likeness in some form or quality, which can cause either love or hatred. Second, and more importantly, there is the likeness of substantial union, which can cause only love. Let us put it this way: if two men share the form of being a good speaker, they certainly share the first likeness (either perfectly or imperfectly). But there is something additional that must occur for me to see his good as my good. Otherwise, it is false that actual likeness causes *amor amicitiae* alone, and the first part of the corpus is invalidated. But it is true that actual likeness causes *amor amicitiae*. Thus, at least two

⁵⁵⁶ There are other texts that clarify the connection between the concepts of unity and similitude in *amor*. Thomas writes in *ST Ia IIae*, q32, a3, c: "I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge - i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality - i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension."

"Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur. Est autem aliquid praesens nobis dupliciter, uno modo, secundum cognitionem, prout scilicet cognitum est in cognoscente secundum suam similitudinem; alio modo, secundum rem, prout scilicet unum alteri realiter coniungitur, vel actu vel potentia, secundum quemcumque coniunctionis modum. Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam secundum similitudinem, quae est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod delectat. Tertium autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis."

likenesses must be present for this to happen: 1) we must share some common pursuit, and 2) I must see him as an *alter ipse*. The following logic is inescapable: in order for me to see another as an *alter ipse*, there must also be some concept by which I see myself as a *seipsum*. This concept is *substantial unity*. The following passage can be read with greater clarity:

Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Wherefore it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way: for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force.⁵⁵⁷

The passage directly connects the idea of substantial unity⁵⁵⁸ with the friends as an *alter ipse*,⁵⁵⁹ and with the definition of love as a unitive force. Thus, we see that because likeness flows from the unity that the lover has both with himself and with another, that likeness is the formal cause of love.

⁵⁵⁷ SCG I, cap. 91: "Amplius. Cum unumquodque naturaliter velit aut appetat suo modo proprium bonum, si hoc habet amoris ratio quod amans velit aut appetat bonum amati, consequens est quod amans ad amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod est cum eo aliquo modo unum. Ex quo videtur propria ratio amoris consistere in hoc quod affectus unius tendat in alterum sicut in unum cum ipso aliquo modo: propter quod dicitur a Dionysio quod amor est unitiva virtus."

⁵⁵⁸ SCG I, cap. 91: "The lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him."

"Est quod amans ad amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod est cum eo aliquo modo unum."

⁵⁵⁹ The friend is one with the lover "in a way." There is not an absolute identity, but a union by which the friend is not a *seipsum* but an *alter ipse*.

IA IIAE, Q27, A4: LOVE AS THE PREEMINENT PASSION

We are now in a position to briefly treat the final article of q27 concerning whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love. In the first place, Thomas himself is terse in his reply. In the second place, because the article's brevity is mostly due to the fact that it is a repetition of previous points. Citing a text from Augustine, the *sed contra* of q27, a4 repeats a point raised in q26, a1, arg2, that all the emotions of the soul are caused by love.⁵⁶⁰ Indeed, the text of q27, a4 reads as if it were merely an extension of q26, a1. The full text may easily be cited:

I answer that, there is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁶⁰ See *De. Civ. Dei* 14, 7, 9.

⁵⁶¹ *ST Ia IIAe, q27, a4, c.*: "Respondeo dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius."

Thomas makes a similar point earlier in the *Summa*. As mentioned, the corpus of q27, a4, is essentially a repetition: "Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love." (*ST I, q20, a1, c.*)

"Amor autem respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae."

If every passion implies movement and rest in something and it is precisely the power of love that provides the impetus for all such natural movement, then it is clear that *amor* is the cause of all the other passions. Considering that a4 somewhat concludes the discussion of what love is—formally, efficiently, and finally—it is not surprising that Thomas is in a position to state the meaning of *amor* with such clarity. The essence of love is tied to the principle of the movement that is caused by *connaturalitate vel coaptatione*.⁵⁶² It is for this reason that the notion of love is so intimately tied with that of the Good. *To be connatural to something* is equivalent to *being a thing's good*, and to have an aptitude for something is to be *like* it. As Thomas has both implied and stated in many diverse ways, *amor* is something much wider than a passion. It is quite literally the motive force of the universe, and the force with which God moves all things.⁵⁶³

However, we must assume that q27, a4 does not simply comprise a useless appendix in the center of the *De Amore*. We must look more closely for the content that is essentially different than what has gone before it. The objections offer three other possible candidates for possible causes of love: pleasure (obj. 1), desire (obj. 2), and hope (obj. 3). The first two responses answer two equally obvious objections: first, it seems that we love things on account of the *pleasure* that they give us; second, it seems equally

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ SCG IV, cap. 20: "God's government of the world is understood to be a kind of movement, forasmuch as God directs and moves all things to their respective ends. Accordingly if impulse and movement belong to the Holy Ghost as love, it is fitting that government and increase be ascribed to the Holy Ghost."

"Rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quandam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia dirigit et movet in proprios fines. Si igitur impulsus et motio ad spiritum sanctum ratione amoris pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatio et propagatio spiritui sancto attribuitur."

obvious that we love friends because we *desire* their usefulness to us. Therefore, in the order of execution, it is apparent that both pleasure and desire can, in some cases, precede *amor*, thereby being its cause. Both of these objections are answered in the same way because both pleasure and desire are based upon some deeper, primeval love: "...but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love."⁵⁶⁴ Say, for example, I do not love a friend *per se* but primarily because he is wealthy. It could be argued that my friend's usefulness or even my passion for money is the principal cause of love. Although Thomas does not reject the truth of these possible scenarios, he rejects the logic that any passion like desire, usefulness or pleasure truly precedes *amor* understood in its most basic sense on account of the fact that desire, usefulness, or pleasure are themselves based on a more fundamental love. McGinnis writes tersely:

Worked out in detail the reduction of all the emotions to love follows this line of reasoning. Desire is the love for a good that is not yet possessed and joy is the love consequent upon possession. Aversion and sadness are love shrinking from and deploring the evil. Courage is the love attempting the seeming impossible in order to prevent the loss of the beloved object. Fear is love despairing of that which is lost; and anger is love desirous of avenging a wrong that has been perpetrated. Hate is love of the good which is opposed to evil.⁵⁶⁵

The key of this entire article is the statement that "it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another."⁵⁶⁶ With this sentence, Thomas affirms both the truth and falsity of the above example. It is

⁵⁶⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a4, ad1: "...sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente."

⁵⁶⁵ McGinnis, *The Wisdom of Love*, 40. (See *ST Ia IIae*, q29, a1, c.)

⁵⁶⁶ *ST Ia IIae* q27, a4, c.: "Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius."

true that a particular pleasure or passion could be the cause of a particular love. It is false, however, that these passions merely arise *ex nihilo* without presupposing some more fundamental love. Thomas writes, “God’s love is the cause of goodness in things and is not called forth by any pre-existing goodness, as our love is.”⁵⁶⁷ *Amor* is ultimately the passive response to the good because it must be “called forth.”

CONCLUSION: THE “MISSING” MATERIAL CAUSE?

St. Thomas does not explicitly cover the material cause of *amor* in q26, leaving the topic open for speculation. Because the passion of love falls into the broader genus of relation, its material cause should be made clear. Relations only have being insofar as they exist as a kind of order between real substances. In the case of love, the most appropriate candidate for the material cause of *amor* is the lover himself. There are only three causes explicitly listed in *ST Ia IIae*, q27, and we claim that the material cause is not one of them. The lover is the most appropriate material cause because goodness as the cause of love is the good *for the lover* (*ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1), knowledge is a cause of love because it refers to the *lover’s* knowledge of the beloved (*ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2), and likeness is a cause of love because it is the likeness of the beloved *to the lover* (*ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3).

⁵⁶⁷ *CT I*, cap. 143: “Dilectio Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus non a praeexistente bonitate provocata, sicut est dilectio nostra.”

It is quite true that an object specifies its act.⁵⁶⁸ But this does not mean that an act is *solely* determined by its object. If it is true that an act is specified by its object, it is equally true that everything received is received in the mode of the receiver. If this is true of any power, then it should be particularly true of love, the very essence of which is a kind of connaturality. The good alone is the cause of love, but it is the good of the subject-in-object and vice versa. For Thomas affirms that love “implies a certain connaturality of the appetite with the good loved.”⁵⁶⁹ From what Thomas has already written about love as the subject’s adaptation to the object which forms a complacency to that object within the subject, it is more accurate to claim that the material cause of love is a subject-impressed-by-an-object. If one can imagine a mold for a clay figure, the material cause for the formed clay figure is not only the clay figure (which would be analogous to the lover), but also the mold (which would be analogous to the beloved). The good that causes love, therefore, is not merely the subject, but also the object.⁵⁷⁰ It is

⁵⁶⁸ See *ST Ia*, q14, a5, ad3. It is interesting to note in this context that the intellectual act is not specified by the object itself, but by the intelligible form which makes the intellect to be in act.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ethic.* II, 5: “Amor, qui importat quandam connaturalitatem appetitus ad bonum amatum.”

⁵⁷⁰ The complexity of precisely what is the material cause of love is well indicated in Thomas’s reply to the objection that love cannot be a proper name for the Holy Spirit because love cannot be a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved (*ST Ia*, q37, a1, arg2). Thomas replies by emphasizing that love is actually a complex system of relations, but that both the intellectual word and the word of the heart are still actions that subsist and abide in the lover himself, making it still legitimate to claim that the lover is the locus (i.e., “material cause” of love) but that it is much more complicated than that. Thomas writes: “Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as stated above, yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing

overly simplistic to claim that the lover is the sole material cause of amor. The more accurate claim is that the material cause of *amor* considered most generally is the beloved-impressed-on-the-lover.

We have seen that *amor* is not only a passion, but the master passion. In order to conclude our discussion about the causes of *amor*, we will bring up a specific example of a context where Thomas speaks about the causes of a passion. Thomas has the following to say about the causes of the passions in the context of clarifying whether or not love is the cause of fear, particularly regarding efficient and material causes:

The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause in any way of the object is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object either by way of efficient cause or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined; and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitability, or goodness, or apprehension of the good thing, while its cause by way of a material disposition is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or apprehended as such.

accidental, there is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Spirit is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word (*ST Ia, q37, a1, ad2*)."

"Ad secundum dicendum quod intelligere et velle et amare, licet significantur per modum actionum transeuntium in obiecta, sunt tamen actiones manentes in agentibus, ut supra dictum est; ita tamen quod in ipso agente important habitudinem quandam ad obiectum. Unde amor, etiam in nobis, est aliquid manens in amante, et verbum cordis manens in dicente; tamen cum habitudine ad rem verbo expressam, vel amatam. Sed in Deo, in quo nullum est accidens, plus habet, quia tam verbum quam amor est subsistens. Cum ergo dicitur quod spiritus sanctus est amor patris in filium, vel in quidquam aliud, non significatur aliquid transiens in alium; sed solum habitudo amoris ad rem amatam; sicut et in verbo importatur habitudo verbi ad rem verbo expressam."

The implications this insight has for the Holy Spirit as a subsistent relation that is love, though fascinating, are beyond the scope of this inquiry.

Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear since it is through his loving a certain good that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fear evil.⁵⁷¹

The first thing that we should notice is that Thomas draws a direct analogy between the forms of both natural and artificial things and the objects of the passions. In the same way that a thing takes its species from its form, a passion takes its species from its object. The formal cause of the master passion, *amor*, is the impression or the likeness itself of the beloved on the lover. Thomas focuses on the importance of the beloved object so much because *amor* is a passion and therefore a response to an object. Thus, he also claims that whatever is the cause of the object is also a cause of the passion itself, primarily efficiently and materially. Giving the example of the object of pleasure, Thomas continues that the efficient cause of pleasure is “a good apprehended as suitable.” Thus, we maintained that knowledge was the efficient cause of *amor*. The

⁵⁷¹ *ST Ia IIae, q43, a1, c.*: “Obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis. Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.”

slightly more complex case is the material cause. Thomas claims that the material cause is basically whatever causes the material disposition of the lover to be affected by that passion. In the case of fear, he mentions that the material cause of fear is whatever disposed the lover to be affected by that fearful object in the first place. If we were to compare this with *amor*, we could maintain that whatsoever within the lover, whether habit, disposition, or virtue, disposes him to receive the complacency of the beloved is the material cause of *amor*. Thus, the material cause of *amor* is highly circumstantial. This is likely why Thomas did not write a separate article on a clear candidate for the material cause of *amor*. But we can, at least, say that it is something within the lover that disposes him to be affected by that object.

We will sum up what we have learned from the previous two chapters: Most broadly speaking, *amor* is that passive principle of movement in the natural, sensitive and rational appetites that tends towards their respective goods. Because *amor* is the inclination to the good, goodness is its final cause. In a very real way, goodness is the sole cause of love. But because something must move the lover to see the object as beloved, knowledge is the principal efficient cause of *amor*. Likeness is the formal cause of *amor* because love is, formally considered, a suitability or communication between a lover and an object. The lover himself is the material cause of love, as well as anything that disposes him to love the beloved.⁵⁷² This *amor*, this master passion, expresses itself

⁵⁷² *ST IIa IIae*, q27, a3, c.: Thomas speaks elsewhere of the material cause of love: "...in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it."

"Secundum autem dispositionem, quae reducitur ad genus causae materialis, dicimur aliquid diligere propter id quod nos disposuit ad eius dilectionem."

in a number of effects. It is our claim that the effect which most declares love *as* love is *mutua inhaesio*. It is to those effects that we now proceed.

CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECTS OF LOVE I

We will introduce this analysis by making some structural and contextual observations about q28 as a whole. The ten effects of love, listed in the order of their appearance in q28, are the following:

- 1) A1 – Union (*Unio*)
- 2) A2 – Mutual Indwelling (*Mutua inhaesio*)
- 3) A3 – Ecstasy (*Extasis*)
- 4) A4 – Zeal (*Zelus*)
- 5) A5 – Wounding vs. Conserving & Perfecting (*Laesiva vs. Conservativa & Perfectiva*)⁵⁷³
 - a. Melting (*Liquefactio*)
 - b. Enjoyment (*Fruitio*)
 - c. Languor (*Languor*)
 - d. Fervor (*Fervor*)
- 6) A6 – Everything that the lover does (*Amans agat omnia ex amore*)⁵⁷⁴

If we count the comparative effects of #5 as two separate ones, we have eleven effects of love. The first five are considered formal and remote while 5a-5d are considered formal and proximate. The final effect of love is “everything that the lover does.” This realization makes it clear that we have completely burst the boundaries of love as a passion and entered a discussion of love as a pervasive metaphysical force; moreover, a particularly personal force. This is further proven by the fact that the first four articles

⁵⁷³ These terms are from *the sed contra* of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, and refer to whether love wounds or perfects the lover as an effect.

⁵⁷⁴ This phrase is taken from *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a6, arg1. We should recall that Thomas does not draw these effects out of thin air. As already mentioned, he draws union as an effect of love from Aristotle, Augustine, and Dionysius. Mutual Indwelling he draws from Dionysius and the general Christian inheritance on the *perichoresis*. Ecstasy as well as the rest of the effects are largely drawn from Dionysius, *DDN IV* (although he also mentions Augustine *QQ 83*, q35 as a source for zeal and Cicero, *De Tuscul. Quaest.* III.11, as a source for languor.) The influence of Christian scriptures is also pervasive.

make distinctions based on both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*, which require not only *amor* in the natural appetite and sensitive appetites but also the rational appetites. In q28, *amor* is not merely a natural force (q26, a1) or a passion (q26, a2), but love as a human *dilectio* (q26, a3) that can be differentiated by *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* (q26, a4), caused simultaneously by the *bonum*, *cognitio*, and *similitudo* (q27, a1-a3), thereby being the cause of all other passions (q27, a4) and indeed *amans agat omnia ex amore* (q28, a6).

Why does Thomas order the articles in this way? There are several reasons. A6 is an addendum to the question declaring that *all that the lover does* is actually an effect of love. A5 deals primarily with the proximate effects of love, and it is Thomas's usual procedure to deal with the remote prior to the proximate. Thomas almost always treats of what is first *per se* before what is first for us. This is why he usually treats causes before effects, particularly in the *Prima Secundae*. The proximate is more immediately known than the remote, but the remote is closer to the form of the cause. Thus, the more remote effects of union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, zeal and wounding are discussed prior to the others. Most commentators have recognized that the effects that truly illustrate the nature of love itself can be found primarily in the initial triptych mentioned in q28 which covers union, mutual indwelling, and ecstasy.⁵⁷⁵ Kwasniewski explains the ordering in this manner:

Because love is formally and really unitive, originating as *complacentia* and culminating in communion (28.1), it follows that a lover dwells in, or adheres to, the beloved: *mutua inhaesio* (28.2). If this mutual indwelling is mutual, each one is made to stand outside himself in the other, for the soul's powers and the acts to which they give rise are, in the context of friendship, oriented towards the other and have their term in him: *extasis* (28.3). There is accordingly an exchange of goods and evils, the one being

⁵⁷⁵ See for example Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 135; Miner, 132.

drawn to the other, *positio extra seipsum*, while taking the other into himself, *alter ipse*. The lover wills and works for the beloved's good and strives to repel evil from him. When this outgoing providence reaches high intensity it is called *zelus* (28.4), whereby the lover is likened still more to the model lover Christ. By doing all these things it is clear that virtuous friends are at the service of one another's *integritas*; their goal is to lead one another to perfection in the love of God and the knowledge of His truth, by which man is most of all preserved and bettered: *amor non laesivus sed perfectivus est* (28.5). The lovers singly and together cleave to the good they love most, ordering everything else to this good by the power of love (28.6).⁵⁷⁶

I would add the following to Kwasniewski's insight. Whereas the first three effects cover what love formally *is*: it is a coming-together (union), a going-in (mutual indwelling), and a going-out (ecstasy).⁵⁷⁷ A4 covers the *mode* of intensity in which the first three effects occur. The final effects cover essentially what love *does* – it can perfect (or seem to wound) the lover as well as cause the remaining proximate effects of melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor.

All effects are contained within their causes and mirror them in some way.

Thomas writes, "For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent."⁵⁷⁸ The final three effects approach a nearer likeness to their cause

⁵⁷⁶ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 206-7.

⁵⁷⁷ It could be objected that an effect cannot be an explanation of what a thing *is*. Though we have not fully covered this topic, this is explained by the fact that there is a union that causes love (substantial union), a union that is an effect of love (real union), and a union that is love (union of likeness). Though Thomas formally claims that this is only true of union, we could also claim by extension, since *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis* follow from union, that there is also a way in which both *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis* are not merely effects of love but are love itself.

⁵⁷⁸ SCG I, cap. 8: "Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit."

than the others, and mutual indwelling most of all. It would be overly simplistic to ascribe certain effects to certain causes. We cannot claim, for example, that goodness can be matched with union while knowledge can be matched with mutual indwelling, etc. One of the primary reasons why we cannot do this is because the first three articles on *amor*'s effects affirm that each respective effect occurs both appetitively and apprehensively, and the first four make a distinction between the effect occurring according to either *amor amicitiae* or *amor concupiscentiae*. Therefore, each effect resembles all of the causes — goodness, knowledge, and likeness — but each in its own way. There is no doubt that these effects declare their causes. But the sequential order of the effects need not be related to the sequential order of causes. They are, however, *logically* related. We will continue to explain that logic below.

The order of the treatment of the effects of love presents a problem for the following reason: if we are claiming that mutual indwelling is the proper effect of love, is it not possible that its logical position between union and ecstasy weakens that thesis? The strongest argument against our thesis is simply that union is the most proper effect of love and therefore was placed in the first position in the treatment of love's effects. First, as has been stated already, there is an integral relationship between union and similitude considering that the latter is a species of the former.⁵⁷⁹ After all, Thomas calls the similitude that is the essence of affective union the union of likeness,⁵⁸⁰ which is the

⁵⁷⁹ Rousselot considers unity more important to the philosophy of love than similitude (See Rousselot, *The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution*, 11.) Simonin, however, proves that similitude quite naturally passes into the concept of unity (See Simonin, "Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l'amour," 257-59). See also Johann, *Meaning of love*, 84, n11.

⁵⁸⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2.

kind of union that he is referring to in *ST I-II*, q27, a3. Therefore it is quite logical that Thomas would begin q28 with the concept of union, considering that he has already dealt with a kind of union (i.e., likeness) in the previous article. The second reason that he would deal with union before *mutua inhaesio* is on the basis of authority. Thomas must deal with the concept of love as *unio* on the basis of Dionysius, Aristotle, and Augustine, who all claim in one way or another that love is intimately related to union.⁵⁸¹ Thirdly, there is an added metaphysical complexity to union that is not found in mutual indwelling insofar as there is a union that is the cause of love, the effect of love, and love itself. We see this particularly in q28, a1, ad2. It is logical that Thomas would first deal with an effect of love that is also a cause before dealing with the remainder of the effects that are *merely* effects. Fourthly, there appears to be a basic mirroring of the structure of the *Summa* as a whole in the treatment of *unio – mutua inhaesio – exstasis*. In the *Summa* as a whole, Thomas deals with God's *unity* before his Tri-unity. Then, he treats of the co-inherence of the Divine Persons, and then proceeds to the ecstatic Providence of God in the Government of the world. Kwasniewski posits an observation about the structure of q28 as a whole that we think is accurate. He views it as an architectonic, mature recapitulation of Dionysius's doctrine of love. The evidence for this is twofold. First, looking at the first objection in the conclusion of q28 concerning whether or not the love is the cause of everything that the lover does, Thomas writes, "But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that

⁵⁸¹ Augustine, *De Trin.* VIII, 10; Aristotle, *Pol II*, 1; Dionysius, *DDN IV*.

Dionysius speaks of love in chapter 4 of *De Divinis Nominibus*.⁵⁸² Thomas makes it clear that the entire discussion of *De Amore* has taken Dionysius as the primary authority.

Second, every *sed contra* but the second one on *mutua inhaesio* is taken from Dionysius:

1. Love is a unitive force.⁵⁸³
2. He that abides in charity abides in God, and God in Him.⁵⁸⁴
3. Divine love causes extasis; God Himself suffers extasis on account of love.⁵⁸⁵
4. God is said to be a zealot, on account of His great love for all things.⁵⁸⁶
5. Everything loves itself with a love that holds it together.⁵⁸⁷
6. It is for love of the good that all things do whatsoever they do.⁵⁸⁸

The only authority greater than Dionysius is the Beloved Disciple, who is the authority for the *sed contra* on mutual indwelling. Perhaps it is significant that the article on the preeminent effect of love (q28, a2) is the only article that claims the preeminent text of

⁵⁸² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, ad1.

⁵⁸³ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, sed.: "Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva."

⁵⁸⁴ *ST Ia Iae*, q28, a2, sed. (From 1 Jn. 4:16): "Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo."

⁵⁸⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, sed.: "Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., Divinus amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus."

⁵⁸⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a4, sed.: "Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad existentia."

⁵⁸⁷ *ST Ia II ae*, q28, a5, sed.: "Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., Quod singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative."

⁵⁸⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, sed.: "Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt."

Holy Scripture as its authority.⁵⁸⁹ We will quote again Dionysius's definition of *amor* as

Thomas commented on it in the *Commentary on the Sentences*:

'Love is a unitive and concreative power, moving superiors to exercise providence for those having less,' i.e., their inferiors, 'further moving coordinated things,' i.e., equals, 'to a communicative relationship with each other; and finally, moving subjects,' i.e., inferiors, 'to turn themselves toward better things,' i.e., their superiors.⁵⁹⁰

If we look at the definition closely, we see that particularly the first three effects of *amor* as discussed in q28 mirror this definition. In the abovementioned definition, we see first that love is unitive. This matches with a1 on union. Second, we see that love is concreative (meaning "thoroughly mixed"), which is an idea closely related to the fact that lover and beloved mutually indwell. This correlates to a2 on mutual indwelling in the *Summa*. Third, Dionysius describes their movement, i.e., the way that "inferiors" and "superiors" suffer ecstasy in order to "unite" and "mix together." This correlates to a3 on ecstasy. Thus, we maintain that the order of the first three effects still follows a Dionysian inspiration.

⁵⁸⁹ As a matter of fact, Holy Scripture is not quoted at all in the article on union or ecstasy, whereas it is cited three times in the article on mutual indwelling (1 Jo 4.16; Phil 1.7; 1 Cor 2.10).

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid. Thomas noted the same definition back at *In I Sent.*, d10, on the Holy Spirit as love.

"Amor virtus est unitiva, movens superiora ad providentiam minus habentium," idest inferiorum, "coordinata autem," idest aequalia, "rurus ad communicativam." alternam habitudinem," subjecta, "idest inferiora, "ad meliorum," idest superiorum, "conversionem."

IA IIAE, Q28, A1: UNION AS AN EFFECT OF LOVE

The primary difficulty of a1 is that Thomas must explain how union is not merely an effect of love, but is also both a cause of love and the nature of love itself. Union is the condition for the possibility of love more so than the other effects. Moreover, it is the broadest genus mentioned by Thomas to designate the nature of love's effects. Thus, it is no surprise that the Angelic Doctor attempts to clarify the relation of *amor* and *unio* immediately in *ST Ia IIAe, q28, a1*. The relationship between union and *mutua inhaesio* is an intimate one. We see that Thomas's metaphysical vision of the pre-existent unity of all things in God (or the mutual indwelling of causes and effects) naturally flows into his vision of love as a union or a "unitive force." Ultimately, in God all things are connatured to each other; but this attraction exists in a kind of magnetized hierarchy and love is the "weight" of that magnetic force. The following text is one of the most important texts regarding how we differentiate one love from another (and therefore one *mutua inhaesio* from another):

Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁹¹ *ST Ia IIAe, q26, a8, c.*: "Intensio autem dilectionis est ex coniunctione dilecti ad diligentem. Et ideo diversorum dilectio est mensuranda secundum diversam rationem coniunctionis, ut scilicet unusquisque diligatur magis in eo quod pertinet ad illam coniunctionem secundum quam diligitur. Et ulterius comparanda est dilectio dilectioni secundum *comparationem coniunctionis ad coniunctionem.*"

It should be noted that unlike many of the other texts we will use in an analysis of union, this passage uses the term *coniunctio*, *-onis*, which Deferrari defines as, "a union, relation, connection by relationship, affinity, friendship, intimacy" or "a carnal union, a conjugal connection, wedlock" (Deferrari, 208). *Unio* simply refers to the relation of unity or oneness as a much broader philosophical or theological term. *Coniunctio*, as one can see, involves more specific connotations of rational intimacy and connection.

This text is the most emphatic statement in the Thomistic corpus regarding the importance of basing a study of love on the comparison of *unions*. He begins by stating that we measure only the intensity of love by measuring unions, but ends by stating that *dilectio* itself should be measured on the basis of unions. Thus, we see in this passage that basing a philosophy of love upon the concept of union is not inconceivable. The concept of union is pervasive when it comes to a Thomistic philosophy of love. One could say that without understanding the concept of union, one also does not understand the meaning of Thomistic love. Union, therefore, is the condition for the possibility of *mutua inhaesio*. One cannot be “in” another without first becoming *one* with her in some way. But this is not to say that union is somehow superior to *mutua inhaesio* in delineating proper effects. We might say that union relates to mutual indwelling like the marriage rite relates to shared life and consummation. The former is absolutely necessary to experience the latter. Just as the marriage rite itself is noble and necessary but is not its own goal, so union is noble and necessary but not its own goal. The goal or proper effect is *mutua inhaesio*.

Thomas clearly designates the kinds of union specifically in the context of answering whether or not union is a cause of love. The second objection reads: “Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident.”⁵⁹² Thus, union is according to:

⁵⁹² *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, arg2: “Praeterea, omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae (1a), et accidens subiecto (1b), et pars toti vel alteri parti ad*

- 1) *Essence*
 - a. As form to matter
 - b. As accident to subject
 - c. As part to whole
 - d. Or part to part *in* the whole
- 2) *Likeness*
 - a. In genus
 - b. In species
 - c. In accident

An example of the union of essence according to form and matter would be that of soul to body, and an example of the union of essence according to part to whole would be that of the hand to the body. It is clear, therefore, that the union between a lover and a beloved could not be according to essence. Thomas does not recognize the relationship between human beings as merely a relationship between “parts” or as a part to a whole, or as form to matter, although we might refer analogously to the fact that the union between two persons might resemble one of these. Regarding a union of essence, only God has the noble distinction of being several persons united according to essence. The union that refers to love, therefore, must be a union according to likeness. Thomas specifically calls the union of love one of *likeness*.⁵⁹³ We can see why this would be the case, considering that the bond between lover and beloved makes little sense as that between form and matter or part to whole. And yet the union of love transcends mere similitude. This is even truer for *mutua inhaesio*. Thomas’s commentary on union in the *Pars Prima Secundae*, q28, a1, represents one of the principal struggles to clarify this dilemma.

constitutionem totius (1c), aut est per similitudinem vel generis (2a), vel speciei (2b), vel accidentis (2c).” (Numbers added for clarity.)

⁵⁹³ *ST Ia IIae*, a1, q28, ad2.

Thomas also differentiates three other kinds of union in the reply to the second objection. Because an understanding of these unions clarifies the entire question, we will treat it first. *ST I-II, q28, a1, ad2* is truly a stroke of genius on the part of Thomas. In a way, it is a microcosm of his entire theory of love. It is objected that every union is either according to essence or likeness.⁵⁹⁴ The union of love is apparently one of likeness. It could not possibly be according to essence or two persons would not truly be substantially distinct. Thomas must answer a fairly thorny objection regarding the relationship of love and union. Love does not cause the union of likeness but *is caused by it*; after all, Thomas has just gone through pains to explain this in the previous article on similitude. Thus, the obvious objection is that union cannot possibly be an effect of love if the union of likeness causes love. Likeness is ontologically prior to any kind of union of affection (for being precedes action), and so the objection seems rather damning and inescapable: the union of likeness causes love and is not its effect. Thomas answers this objection by positing the “threefold relation of union to love.”⁵⁹⁵ He reiterates the two kinds of union – real and affective – that play a central role in the corpus. Thus,

⁵⁹⁴ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, arg2.*

⁵⁹⁵ The threefold union of love is implicitly present in *ST I-II, q25, a2, ad2*. Thomas writes: “The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.”

“Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum desiderii.”

when Thomas places union in the category of effects of love, the only union that is the effect of love strictly speaking is real union. The master-stroke of genius is his introduction of *substantial union*: “There is a union which causes love: and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself.”⁵⁹⁶ We have already mentioned this concept, but are now in a position to analyze it in its proper context.

Regarding the differences between the corpus and ad2, we must keep several things in mind. First, Thomas has just proven in the previous article that similitude is a cause of love, and similitude is a kind of union; therefore it seems obvious that union is a cause of love rather than its effect. Second, Thomas must differentiate those kinds of unions that are causes and those that are effects. Third, there is a further distinction in that there is a kind of union that is neither a cause nor an effect of love, but rather love itself. Fourth, we must be sensitive to the solution that Thomas offers, which is essentially a complex interplay between substantial union, affective union, and the union of likeness. It is this interplay that is equally complex, interesting, and highly relevant to the effect of *mutua inhaesio*.

We will begin by presenting exactly what Thomas says about the relationship between these concepts as well as their relation to other key related concepts. We will outline the logic of the relevant sentences step by step on account of their relational complexity:

- 1) Substantial union causes love.
- 2) Substantial union is described by Thomas as referring to “the love with which one loves oneself” (*ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum*).
- 3) He then writes a parallel statement to #2 as the following: “...while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of

⁵⁹⁶ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, ad2*: “Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum.”

likeness, as stated above." (...*quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.*)

- 4) Because grammatically speaking, this is a parallel statement, and also because he has already presented similitude as a cause of love, we understand that *unio similitudinis* is a cause of love *similarly* to the way that *unio substantialis* is a cause of love.
- 5) It is the way substantial union and the union of likeness are similar that must be understood.
- 6) The grammar of the Latin sets up a proportion between the union of likeness and the substantial union: As substantial union causes self-love, so is the union of likeness the cause of other things.
- 7) There is also a union which is essentially love itself, which is "according to a bond of affection" (*unio secundum coaptionem affectus*).
- 8) Affective union is then likened to substantial union.
- 9) Thus, at this point we have a double comparison involving substantial union:
 - i. Substantial union is seen as *proportional* to the union of likeness.
 - ii. Substantial union is seen as likened to affective union.
- 10) Whatever the precise meaning of these statements are (which we shall review shortly) it is apparent that the concept of substantial union is the hermeneutical key for the reason that no other union is used as a point of comparison more often than substantial union is.
- 11) The union of affection is likened to substantial union because of the perceived oneness of the lover to the object of his affection.
- 12) If the beloved is perceived as an *alter ipse*, then the affective union is one of *amor amicitiae*.
- 13) If the beloved is perceived as somehow belonging to the lover (i.e., in some way related to the lover's use or pleasure), then the affective union is one of *amor concupiscentiae*.

It seems apparent that substantial union is the centerpiece of this argument. What, then, is at issue is precisely the proportion between substantial union and the union of likeness and precisely the likeness (*assimilatur unioni substantiali*) between substantial union and affective union? In order to differentiate these, we must attempt to locate as precisely as possible the definition and meaning of substantial union.

Substantial union is *likened* to affective union. Understanding the nature of this likeness will help us to understand the meaning of substantial union. Affective union (*coaptionem affectus*) is clearly what we might imagine it to be: our desire to be joined

with or to possess something that we consider good or suitable for us.⁵⁹⁷ Thomas perhaps more clearly states the definition of affective union elsewhere: “There is also an affective union consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.”⁵⁹⁸ Regarding causality, Thomas claims that this *affective union is love*. Love is the formal cause of affective union. If we are attempting to find a metaphysics for love, this point is absolutely vital. According to McGinnis, affective union is the *sine qua non* of love.⁵⁹⁹ Existentially, we can differentiate it from real union by the fact that love forms a close bond between people, even if they are separated by long distances;⁶⁰⁰ in fact, even if they are separated by death itself. When we “fall in love,” even in the sense of merely becoming attached to a friend, *what* we “fall into” is affective union.⁶⁰¹ What we seek after we “fall into” love is real union. What made us fall in love in the first place is the union of likeness, which is based upon the lover’s understanding of himself, which is substantial union. This is sufficient to understand substantial union and its relation to

⁵⁹⁷ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, c.*: “For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.”

“Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.”

⁵⁹⁸ *ST Ia IIae, q25, a2, ad2*: “Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum desiderii.”

⁵⁹⁹ McGinnis, *The Wisdom of Love*, 108.

⁶⁰⁰ McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself,” 23.

⁶⁰¹ Good accounts of the relationship between affective and real union can be found in Faraon, *Principles of Love*, 70-83; Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 22-23.

the other unions in the present context. Love essentially is a union of the lover and the beloved to which he is connatured. In at least three places, Thomas refers to love as “the union of love”⁶⁰² identifying love formally as a union. After understanding this “threefold union,” we should see that there are some instances in which Thomas refers to *unione amoris* where the union *is* the love and others where the union *results from* the love.

The *sed contra*, which deals with the denial that union is an effect of love, reads, “On the contrary, Dionysius says in the *Divine Names*, chap. IV that every love is a unitive power.”⁶⁰³ Consistent with what has already been stated concerning the

⁶⁰² “*Unione amoris.*” See *ST Ia IIae*, q87, a7, c; *IIa IIae*, q17, a3 c; *IIa IIae*, q19, a2, ad3.

See also *ST IIa IIae*, q17, a3, c.: “Yet if we presuppose the *union of love* with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.”

“*Sed praesupposita unione amoris ad alterum, iam aliquis potest desiderare et sperare aliquid alteri sicut sibi. Et secundum hoc aliquis potest sperare alteri vitam aeternam, inquantum est ei unitus per amorem. Et sicut est eadem virtus caritatis qua quis diligit Deum, seipsum et proximum, ita etiam est eadem virtus spei qua quis sperat sibi ipsi et alii.*”

ST IIa IIae, q19, a2, ad3: “The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the *union of love.*” (Emphasis added.)

“*Ad tertium dicendum quod habitudo servi ad dominum est per potestatem domini servum sibi subiicientis, sed habitudo filii ad patrem, vel uxoris ad virum, est e converso per affectum filii se subdentis patri vel uxoris se coniungentis viro unione amoris.*”

⁶⁰³ *ST Ia IIae*, a1, q28, sc.: “*Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva.*”

As mentioned in the chapter on sources, this principle is pervasive in the Thomistic corpus.

relationship between the article on similitude and that on union, the *sed contra* of q28, a1, can be read in tandem with the *sed contra* of the previous article regarding the fact that “Every beast loveth its like.”⁶⁰⁴ Formally speaking, everything loves what is like it because everything is ordained by God to either perfect another or be perfected by another, and in order for this relationship to exist at all there must be a similarity between lover and beloved. According to Norris Clarke, “whenever two entities, no matter how diverse, can come together into an active encounter of any kind, or can even be positively related to each other in any way, there must be some underlying bond of unity between them.”⁶⁰⁵ Similitude is itself a kind of union. Thomas writes:

It belongs to love to seek union as Dionysius says. For, on account of likeness or aptitude between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is united in a way to the beloved, the appetite tending to the perfection of the union so that the union originating in the affections is completed in actions. Thus it is proper for friends to be mutually present, socially interactive and to rejoice together.⁶⁰⁶

We see in this passage that because of the likeness there is a union of affections. The likeness itself, in this case, is a connatural union. There is then another kind of union that results from this principle one that sounds a great deal more like *mutua inhaesio*. We will work out these kinds of unions in the commentary below.

The first part of the corpus explains the “twofold union of lover and beloved” (*duplex est unio amantis ad amantum*). The first union is *real union*, which is characterized

⁶⁰⁴ ST IIa IIae, q26, a2, arg2: “omne animal diligit simile sibi (Ecclus. 13:19).”

⁶⁰⁵ W. Norris Clarke, “The Self as Source of Meaning in Metaphysics,” 604.

⁶⁰⁶ SCG I, cap. 81: “Amoris est ad unionem movere, ut Dionysius dicit. Cum enim, propter similitudinem vel convenientiam amantis et amati, affectus amantis sit quodammodo unitus amato, tendit appetitus in perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet unio quae iam inchoata est in affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et amicorum proprium est mutua praesentia et convictu et collocutionibus gaudere.” (Translation mine.)

by being with, living with, and speaking to the beloved. The second union is *affective union* or union of affections. Though he does not write this in the present context, affective union occurs when the beloved has become the object of the lover's complacency. Recall what was said in *ST I-II, q26, a2*: "...the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object."⁶⁰⁷ The lover's will has conformed itself, in a way, into the beloved. Affective union is a result of this conformation with the beloved; indeed, it might be more accurate to claim that the affective union does not *result* from this conformation of lover and beloved, but rather that the affective union *is itself* this conformation. Miner notes that these two unions are unions "according to the thing" (*secundum res*) or "according to affection" (*secundum affectus*). It is the former that is the efficient cause of the latter.⁶⁰⁸ This is an observation that justifies what has already been said about connaturality and likeness. One kind of union is the basis and cause for yet another kind. Thomas himself writes, "likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness as is written in Book V of the *Metaphysics*."⁶⁰⁹

The second part of the corpus, which is directly related to the first, further explains the union of affection according to the "twofold direction of love" (*duplex amor*) as *amor amicitiae* or *amor concupiscentiae*. The union of affection, Thomas tells us, always follows upon a preceding apprehension. This apprehension is based upon the *oneness of*

⁶⁰⁷ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, c.*: "ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile."

⁶⁰⁸ Miner, 132-3.

⁶⁰⁹ *ST Ia, q23, a9*: "Similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V *Metaphys*." (Translation mine.)

the thing loved with the lover. There are basically two kinds of perceived unions possible when the lover looks upon the beloved. First, if the lover's apprehension views the beloved as "his other self" or "half of his soul," then the affective union is according to *amor amicitiae*. Second, the lover's apprehension views the beloved as merely desiring it as part of his well being, then the affective union is according to *amor concupiscentiae*. Thus, the first part of the corpus explains the twofold union of persons while the second part explains the twofold union of their affections, which are fundamentally ordered toward either *amor amicitiae* or *amor concupiscentiae*.

The third part of the corpus explains these two unions in relation to causation, which is interesting for the reason that in the actual previous question on love's causes (q27), Thomas does not refer explicitly to the traditional four causes. Thomas mentions that love is the efficient cause of real union while being the formal cause of affective union. The reason why love is the efficient cause of union is that love is the motive cause for the lover to seek the actual presence of the beloved, along with all the activities that properly belong to love. Love is the formal cause of affective union because "love itself is this union or bond."⁶¹⁰ What affective union (love itself) seeks is to actually be united to the beloved, i.e., to rest in her. It should be mentioned that both real union and affective union are effects of love, explaining why Thomas does not mention them in the previous question where Thomas is seeking what causes love. There is one exception to this schema. The only union said to be a cause of love is *substantial union*. We will proceed to comment directly on ad2 where it becomes thematic.

The first objection seeks to deny that union is an effect of love on the basis that

⁶¹⁰ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, c.:* "quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus"

“absence is incompatible with union.”⁶¹¹ Basically, Thomas is answering the objection that absence and togetherness (i.e., union) are opposites, but it is obvious to human experience that love exists even when a beloved is absent, so it cannot be possible that union is an effect of love. The argument is rather easily dismissed on the basis that this objection is true only of real union. Desire (*desiderium*) can be present when the beloved is absent while *amor* remains despite presence or absence. Considering what has been said above, the union of likeness that causes affective union is indifferent to the presence or absence of the beloved. It is a matter of differentiating what mode of union is under scrutiny.

The third objection raises some very important issues. It is objected that “Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.”⁶¹² Thomas raises the principle that it is knowledge that causes a union rather than love. There is, of course, an entire epistemology in operation here that is beyond the scope of the present argument.⁶¹³ The following passage is representative of the Thomistic view of union and knowledge: “Assimilation is required for knowledge for this reason only, that the knower be in some way united to what is known. However, when the thing itself is united through its own essence to the intellect,

⁶¹¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, arg1: “Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam”

⁶¹² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, arg3: “Praeterea, sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.”

⁶¹³ See, for example, Wilhelmson, *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1965), 79-81.

the union is more perfect than if it had taken place through a likeness.⁶¹⁴ What is at issue is the status of union in relation to both knowledge and love. Thomas's full reply is the following: "Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge."⁶¹⁵ This statement is vital for the metaphysics of love. Thomas is claiming nothing less than the superiority of love in relation to the real object. The intellect must operate through the union of intentional likenesses whereas the union of love is with the object itself. There is one less medium required for the perfection of love than of knowledge. If there is one less medium "between" the lover and the beloved, Thomas can claim with confidence that the union of love is closer than that of knowledge. What is interesting about this objection is that the Angelic Doctor does not reject the relation of union to knowledge. He is simply setting up the superiority of love in relation to knowledge. Love and its effects are eminently real. There is nothing more real than the human person. Thus, Thomas has set the stage for describing that deeper and more superior union that is the effect of love — *mutua inhaesio*.

⁶¹⁴ *DVI*, q8, a1, ad7: "Ad septimum dicendum, quod ad cognitionem non requiritur assimilatio nisi propter hoc ut cognoscens aliquo modo cognito uniatur. Perfectior autem est unio qua unitur ipsa res per essentiam suam intellectui, quam si uniretur per similitudinem suam."

⁶¹⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio."

IA IIAE, Q28, A2: MUTUAL INDWELLING AS AN EFFECT OF LOVE⁶¹⁶

We have now reached the goal of this entire analysis, which is a commentary on *mutua inhaesio* as the proper effect of love. *ST Ia IIAe, q26, a1* particularly emphasized the nature of love as existing *in* a particular kind of appetite, whether natural, sensitive or rational, providing an admirable preamble for love's preeminent effect as a "being-in." We realize, however, that a being-in is not necessarily a mutual being-in. In all seven of the articles preceding q28, *amor* there is set up as a kind of metaphysical relation between the lover and the beloved according to the perception/union of the lover to the beloved. Q27 on the causes of love also prepares us for seeing mutual indwelling as an effect of love, because the final cause of love is the beloved herself (a1), but only according to the efficient cause of the lover's knowledge of her (a2) and likeness to her (a3). Thus, we may conclude that the material cause of love is a beloved-in-the-lover and vice versa. Moreover, if the very nature of love must be according to this union, then the most perfect effect of love would be the most perfect mirror-image or intensification of this union. As we saw in the first two chapters, the concept of the *perichoresis* provides such a model and *mutua inhaesio* is the closest icon of the *perichoresis*.

ST Ia IIAe, q26, first covers the subject of love in the concupiscible appetite (26, a1), then proceeds to discuss love's genus in the passions (q26, a2), then to some comments about the species of love in *ST Ia IIAe, q26, a3*, to the twofold act of love itself

⁶¹⁶ Considering that the dissertation has *mutua inhaesio* as a primary subject, I have included more sub-headings in this section so that the reader may better follow the logic of the argument.

in *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* (q26, a4). The entirety of q26, a1 deals with *amor* insofar as it is in the concupiscible appetite, examining whether it is natural, sensory or intellectual. “Love is something pertaining to the appetite,”⁶¹⁷ and Thomas differentiates between appetites arising in the apprehension of the subject and those that arise within the author of their nature.⁶¹⁸ Love consists of a certain *complacentia*, *conveniens*, or *connaturalitas* between a subject and an object that cannot arise unless it first arises within a subject that seeks to penetrate *within* an object.⁶¹⁹ In q26, a2, we see that love is “nothing else than complacency” of the object within the subject. Even the way the process begins is an indwelling insofar as Thomas describes it as the object “introducing itself, as it were, into its [the subject’s] intention.”⁶²⁰ Both a1 and a2 have in common the difficulty of locating the power of love *in* something, and Thomas is at pains to circumscribe love as a concupiscible passion while simultaneously admitting that the process is both “circular”⁶²¹ and found “universally in all things”⁶²² as well as being a principle of the movement of the appetite.⁶²³ Though not immediately apparent, Thomas introduces the complexity of *amor* immediately in the first two articles of the *De Amore*. We think that the constant language of relation, circularity, and in-being found

⁶¹⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “Amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens.”

⁶¹⁸ We should recall that the natural appetite begins in a apprehension that does not arise in the subject of that appetite (See *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.)

⁶¹⁹ See *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1.

⁶²⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “Faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione.”

⁶²¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.

⁶²² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, ad3.

⁶²³ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, ad1.

in these first two articles sets up well the thesis that *mutua inhaesio* is the preeminent effect of love. What other effect better illustrates such circularity, reciprocity or in-being? In *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a3, the Angelic Doctor seeks to prove that love is not the same as dilection, but that love is in fact superior. He makes the point that *amor* expresses act in different ways. Even these ways are expressed in terms of in-being, for sometimes the act of love arises in the sensitive appetite (*amor*), sometimes in the higher will (*amicitia* and *dilectio*) and sometimes even in God Himself (*caritas*). The different kinds of love are according to the way that one thing is *in* another.

As for the relation of *mutua inhaesio* to q27, we see the persistent concept of in-being as well. The preeminent cause of love appears to be the good. Though the good is the final cause of love, and the final cause is extrinsic to the creature, we would do well to recall that Thomas claims regarding creatures that “whatever we may take that is within the creature, has being from another.”⁶²⁴ Interestingly, the good that is extrinsic to the creature is the cause of all that is within the creature, and this is particularly true of love. It is *mutua inhaesio* that appears to illustrate this more than any other effect of love. Regarding knowledge as a cause of love, Thomas writes, “As the object known is in the knower, to the extent that it is known, so the beloved must be in the lover, as loved. The lover is, in some way, moved by the beloved with a certain interior impulse. Thomas actually claims that the perfection of knowledge requires that man knows distinctly “all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties.”⁶²⁵ In a section

⁶²⁴ *SCG II*, cap. 31: “Quia quicquid accipiatur intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse ab alio.”

⁶²⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2, ad2: “Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates.”

entitled, "Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge," Frederick Wilhelmsen makes the point that knowledge is a kind of non-physical union. If I eat something, the form of what I have eaten becomes one with me but is itself destroyed, assimilated, and deformed. Knowledge is not like this. The knowledge of particulars does not imply their destruction. Thus, knowledge is explained by a union with the *copy* or *similitude* of the thing. This *act of intentional existing* is an act whereby there is no new being created, but a kind of "creation" takes place insofar as it makes a thing known for the sake of the knower.⁶²⁶ Wilhelmsen concludes the section thusly: "Thoroughly relational in character, opposed to simply being in itself, it is an act whereby a knower is the other as other."⁶²⁷ Throughout his epistemology, Thomas speaks of something as being *in* the intellect, and of the intellect penetrating into the depths of a thing.⁶²⁸ Thomas writes:

The name intellect arises from the intellect's ability to know the most profound elements of a thing; for to understand (*intelligere*) means to read what is inside a thing (*intus legere*). Sense and imagination know only external accidents, but the intellect alone penetrates to the interior and to the essence of a thing.⁶²⁹

The connection between intimacy, indwelling and knowledge is thus made more apparent. As stated above, similitude is a species of union. It should be admitted that

⁶²⁶ Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality*, 80.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, 79-81.

⁶²⁸ For example, *SCG IV*, cap. 19: "Consequently that which is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in his will." Also, *ST Ia*, q27, a3, ad3: "For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect."

⁶²⁹ *DV*, q1, a12, c.: "Dicendum, quod nomen intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi intus legere: sensus enim et imaginatio sola accidentia exteriora cognoscunt; solus autem intellectus ad interiora et essentiam rei pertingit."

ST Ia IIae, q27, a3, is written more in terms of union than mutual indwelling, for one of the primary principles of similitude is the following: “But a man loves himself more than another; because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form.”⁶³⁰ But this union only sets up the condition for the possibility of love. It is only when the union becomes concrete or thoroughly mixed, as Thomas comments in the *Sentences*, that the full definition of love is satisfied, for love is defined as not only *unitive* but *concretive*. The true definition—the form, as it were, of love—takes it far beyond a mere union. Again, *mutua inhaesio* illustrates this reality better than any other effect of love.

Mutua Inhaesio Itself

Though the phrase *mutua inhaesio* is quite rare, we agree with Kwasniewski that its concept is “ubiquitous.”⁶³¹ We have attempted in the course of this commentary to bring out this ubiquity. It has been rendered in different ways by different authors and translators. Corvez has translated it as “*l’existence mutuelle en autrui*.” We have discovered at least four German renderings of mutual indwelling as “die Ineinanderheftung,” “das wechselseitige Ineinander,” “die Anhänglichkeit, ein Ineinanderverhaftestein,” and “ein gegenseitiges Anhängen.”⁶³² All of these terms have

⁶³⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3, c.: “Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae.”

⁶³¹ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 135.

⁶³² Joseph Bernhart, *Summe der Theologie*, vol. 2: Die sittliche Weltordnung [translation of and commentary on I-II] (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1935), 193; Bernard Ziermann, *Die menschlichen Leidenschaften* [translation of and commentary on I-II, qq. 22-48] (Graz-Wien-Köln: Verlag Styria, 1955), 90; Raymund Erni, *Die theologische Summe des Thomas von Aquin in ihrem Grundbau*, II.1 [commentary on I-II] (Luzern: Verlag Räber &

in common the notion of something *intimate* – the mysterious existence of the other in the interior depths of my being.⁶³³

There are numerous other places that translators render as “indwelling” what is not, in fact, *inhaesio-onem*. The *Prima Pars* I, q43, a4, obj. 2 refers to how the Divine Person is sent according to the indwelling (*inhabitationem*) of grace. Again, in I, q63, a9, ad3, Thomas notes that the orders of the angels are derived from “the ardor of love and from God’s indwelling” (*ab ardore caritatis et ab inhabitatione Dei*). In fact, the word *inhabitatio-onis* is translated as “indwelling” many times. Deferrari notes that it is the word *inhabitatio* that Thomas usually uses to refer to spiritual indwelling⁶³⁴ whereas *inhaesio* is used “especially of the inhabitation of a soul by God because of union with God through sanctifying grace.”⁶³⁵ One wonders whether or not there is truly a difference between these two terms. In any case, we can see that the translators have seen enough equivalence between *inhaesio* and *inhabitatio* to consider them equivalent terms.

Thomas was certainly quite familiar with the verb *inhaerere*. Every day at Mass he was required to bow his head before the Eucharist and recite the following words: “*Fac me tuis semper inhaerere mandatis et a te nunquam separari*

Cie., 1949), 58; Dander, “Grundsätzliches Auffassung der Freundschaft,” 142. I am indebted to Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 136, n. 48 for this information.

⁶³³ Indeed, given the progression (or regression) of language today, I would argue that intimacy is perhaps the best translation for mutual indwelling.

⁶³⁴ Deferrari, “Inhabitatio,” 557.

⁶³⁵ Deferrari, “Inhaesio,” 558.

permittas."⁶³⁶ Where etymological issues begin to relate to philosophical issues is in the apparent ease with which *inhaerere* and *adhaerere* are interchanged.

Deferrari defines both *adhaerere* and *inhaerere* as almost precise synonyms, defining the former as "to cling to" or "to adhere to"⁶³⁷ and the latter as "to cling to, cleave to, or adhere to."⁶³⁸ Note the following passage:

A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it *adheres*. Now one may *adhere* to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.⁶³⁹

The noun form of *inhaerere*, *inhaesio*, however, only occurs two other times in the *Summa Theologiae*.⁶⁴⁰ Interestingly, both uses are actually connected to the virtue of *faith* rather than love. Thomas writes:

On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to

⁶³⁶ "Make me always adhere to Thy commandments, and let me never be separated from Thee." These insights are from Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 138, n. 59.)

⁶³⁷ Deferrari, 22.

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, 558.

⁶³⁹ *ST IIa IIae*, q17, a6, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod virtus aliqua dicitur theologica ex hoc quod habet Deum pro obiecto cui inhaeret. Potest autem aliquis alicui rei inhaerere dupliciter, uno modo, propter seipsum; alio modo, in quantum ex eo ad aliud devenitur. Caritas igitur facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris."

Despite the interesting fact that adherence/inherence of the human person in God directly relates to the twofold distinction of love in *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*, we see that the translator renders the Latin *inhaerere* as "to adhere."

⁶⁴⁰ I am indebted mostly to Kwasniewski for this insight. Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 136, n.45. The verb form of *inhaesio*, *inhaerere*, is found in numerous places in the *Summa*. Kwasniewski notes *ST Ia IIae*, q15, a1 and *Ia IIae*, q33, a1, ad3, *Ia IIae* as well as *Ia IIae*, q33, a3 are the most interesting.

opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our *adhesion* is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm *adhesion* with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its *adhesion* is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.⁶⁴¹

The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain *adhesion*: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses.⁶⁴²

Upon closer inspection of these uses of *inhaesio*, they do not refer as much to faith as they do to the possession of a certain kind of *habitus*.⁶⁴³ There is an explicit comparison in both passages between the mode of the “indwellings” that result from faith and those from scientific demonstration. In the first quotation, the *inhaesio* to/of an opinion is due to the habit of intellectual vision while the indwelling/*inhaesio* of faith is firm, but lacking in vision. In the second quotation, Thomas makes a similar comparison between the indwellings of knowledge and faith. The indwellings of understanding and knowledge, which are gifts of the Holy Spirit, are firm, but not as firm as the kind of

⁶⁴¹ ST Ia IIae, q63, a7, c.: “Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi, unde non habet firmam *inhaesionem*. De ratione vero scientiae est quod habeat firmam *inhaesionem* cum visione intellectiva, habet enim certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet firmam *inhaesionem*; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet visionem.” (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁴² ST IIa IIae, q4, a8, ad3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio intellectus et scientiae excedit cognitionem fidei quantum ad maiorem manifestationem, non tamen quantum ad certiores *inhaesionem*. Quia tota certitudo intellectus vel scientiae secundum quod sunt dona, procedit a certitudine fidei, sicut certitudo cognitionis conclusionum procedit ex certitudine principiorum.” (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁴³ Kwasniewski refers to these passages and explains the use of *inhaesio* as “a clinging of the mind to an infallible truth.” (Kwasniewski, 136, n.45.)

knowledge that arises from scientific demonstration. What these comparisons have to do with the *mutua inhaesio* of love in the *Pars Prima Secundae* q28, a2 is that they all seek to describe the depth, intensity or strength that a particular passion, virtue, or mode of knowledge enjoys in the soul. In each instance of the use of *inhaesio* above, we are dealing with an effect—either the effect that the knowledge of faith has on the soul or the effect of scientific knowledge. It is significant that Thomas uses the same language for the indwelling of another *person* to the indwelling of two modes of *knowledge*. What the above passages⁶⁴⁴ indicate to us is that *inhaesio* need not refer exclusively to an effect of love. The word indicates the relative strength of presence of a particular virtue, habit, passion, or so forth.

Objection 1: The Idea of Mutual Containment⁶⁴⁵

The objections do not deal specifically with either the appetitive or intellective power. Rather, each objection deals with *mutua inhaesio* in a more general fashion. The first objection treats of the mode of mutual indwelling, the second objection treats of the powers appropriate to cause mutual indwelling, and the third objection deals with a minor argument. We will deal with each objection in turn. The first objection is perhaps the most important considering that it deals with another concept directly connected

⁶⁴⁴ Meaning *ST Ia IIae*, q63, a7c and *ST IIa IIae*, q4, a8, ad3.

⁶⁴⁵ Not much is made of the idea of mutual containment in Thomas Aquinas. Diana Fritz Cates says of it, “The image of a container is an intriguing one. I have in mind not a closed container, but a generous, open bowl. I imagine a brass prayer bowl that vibrates and intones when struck. In containing or holding the other, the self receives an impression of the other (within the appetitive dimension of the self) and resonates with it.” (Diana Fritz Cates, “Thomas Aquinas on Intimacy and Emotional Integrity,” *Studies in Spirituality* 6 (2006): 121.

with *mutua inhaesio* – that of *mutual containment*. Because mutual containment is such an important concept, we will deal with it at length. It is initially objected that “the same [lover and beloved] cannot be container and contents.”⁶⁴⁶ Thomas responds to the objection:

The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, arg1: “Sed non potest idem esse continens et continentum.”

⁶⁴⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, in quantum est impressum in affectu eius per quamdam complacentiam. E converso vero amans continetur in amato, in quantum amans sequitur aliquo modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in specie et e converso.”

Think, for example, of the genus and species of man as a “rational animal.” Animal contains rationality insofar as rationality is a specific mode of being an animal, thus the genus contains the species. Rationality contains animal insofar as man is an intellectual creature with an animals body, thus the species contains the genus.

There is a very interesting text of Aristotle’s that could shed some light on the idea of mutual containment which could be pursued in another study. In the context of analyzing the various notions of disposition, affection, and “to have” Aristotle writes [*Aristotle, Metaphysics V.20 (1022b4-15)*]: “To have (to possess or to hold) has many meanings. In one sense it means to treat something according to one’s own nature or to one’s own impulse; and for this reason a fever is said to possess a man, and tyrants are said to possess cities, and people who are clothed are said to possess clothing. And in another sense a thing is said to have something when this is present in the subject which receives it; thus bronze has the form of a statue, and a body, disease. And whatever contains something else is said to have or to hold it; for that which is contained is said to be held by the container; for example, we say that a bottle holds a liquid and a city men and a ship sailors. It is in this way too that a whole has parts. Again, whatever prevents a thing from moving or from acting according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars hold the weight imposed on them. It is in this sense that the poets make Atlas hold the heavens, as if otherwise it would fall on the earth, as certain of the physicists also say. And it is in this sense that that which holds something together is said to hold what it holds together, because otherwise it would be separated, each according to its own impulse. And to be in something is expressed in a similar way and corresponds to the meanings of to have.”

Thomas comments on the third way of “having” as follows: “To have is used in a third way (to hold) when a container is said to have or to hold the thing contained, and

With this objection, Thomas must answer or at least indicate how two substances can dwell in the same place at the same time; but perhaps not in the same manner. Thomas makes a subtle distinction regarding the mode in which each indwells in the other. First, he states that the beloved is in the lover “by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his *complacentia*.”⁶⁴⁸ Second, concerning the lover’s *inhaesio* in the beloved, it exists “inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved.”⁶⁴⁹ Regarding the former, we discover a more rigorous concept in *complacentia*. As for the latter, Thomas is satisfied with more vagueness and metaphor. Both of these modal statements are clarified further in the corpus of the article.

More directly answering the objection regarding the kind of mode by which two persons can mutually indwell, he gives an example: “For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its

the thing contained is said to be held by the container. For example, we say that a bottle has or ‘holds a liquid,’ i.e., some fluid, such as water or wine; and a city, men; and a ship, sailors. It is in this sense too that a whole is said to have parts; for a whole contains a part just as a place contains the thing in place. But a place differs from a whole in this respect that a place may be separated from the thing which occupies it, whereas a whole may not be separated from its parts. Hence, anything that occupies a place is like a separate part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics.” (Lesson 20, #1082)

“Tertius modus est, secundum quod continens dicitur habere contentum, et contentum haberi a continente; sicut dicimus quod lagena *habet humidum*, idest humorem aliquem, ut aquam vel vinum; et quod civitas habet homines, et navis nautas. Et secundum hunc modum etiam dicitur quod totum habet partes. Totum enim continet partem, sicut et locus locatum. In hoc enim differt locus a toto, quia locus est divisus a locato, non autem totum a partibus. Unde locatum est sicut pars divisa, ut habetur in quarto physicorum.”

⁶⁴⁸ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, ad1: “inquantum est impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam”

⁶⁴⁹ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: “inquantum amans sequitur aliquo modo illud quod est intimum amati.”

species, and vice versa.”⁶⁵⁰ Here we discover the concept of *mutual containment*. We can take the human person as an example. Thomas teaches that a definition must contain a genus and the difference, which points to a species of that genus.⁶⁵¹ Man is said to be in the genus of rational beings, and specifically as a rational animal. For the two ideas to converge, they must mutually contain one another. In a sense, we could say that “animal” is pregnant with “rationality”, while “rationality” is pregnant with “animality.”⁶⁵² For example, *caritas* is, in a sense, every virtue, and a human being is, in a sense, his intellect. They are both formal causes insofar as they *virtually contain*⁶⁵³ one

⁶⁵⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad1: “Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in specie et e converso.”

⁶⁵¹ See *Exp. Lib. Post. Anal. I*, lect. 42, 27.

⁶⁵² At least this is true specifically in man.

⁶⁵³ The idea of virtual containment is not foreign to the *Summa*. Thomas writes: “Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.” (See *ST I*, q76, a4, c.)

“Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.”

Perhaps even more illustrative is Thomas’ argument that the soul is in each part of the body. The soul is in each of the parts insofar as the human person can only be divided virtually, or according to potency. (See *ST I*, q76, a8, c) In the *sed contra* of this article, Thomas argues, quoting Augustine, *De Trin.* 6.6, “On the contrary, Augustine says, that ‘in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.’” This is essentially St. Augustine’s argument how God can be simultaneously one and several. (See Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a*, 75-89, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 94). Not everyone accepted this view, namely John Buridan (1295-1358). See Zupko, Jack. “How

another and are related to all the other aspects of what they define. Mutual containment is closely connected to the idea of virtual containment in Thomistic thought. Thus, by virtual containment, we mean a kind of contact whereby one thing is potentially included in another while not being included by it. *Caritas* virtually contains all virtues.⁶⁵⁴ It annexes the other virtues while retaining its own particular meaning. Likewise, the soul annexes the body while retaining its own particular "individuality."

Another excellent example of this is Thomas's teaching about the virtual containment of an effect within a cause. Thomas writes:

Are Souls Related to Bodies? A Study of John Buridan," *Review of Metaphysics* 46 (575-601).

Thomas also argues that an angel is wholly in a place, i.e., "contains" a place in a virtual way, simply by applying any of its angelic powers to that place. Thomas writes: "I answer that, it is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it." (*ST I*, q52, a1, c)

"Respondeo dicendum quod Angelo convenit esse in loco, aequivoce tamen dicitur Angelus esse in loco, et corpus. Corpus enim est in loco per hoc, quod applicatur loco secundum contactum dimensivae quantitatis. Quae quidem in Angelis non est; sed est in eis quantitas virtualis. Per applicationem igitur virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque, dicitur Angelus esse in loco corporeo. Et secundum hoc patet quod non oportet dicere quod Angelus commensuretur loco; vel quod habeat situm in continuo. Haec enim conveniunt corpori locato, prout est quantum quantitate dimensiva. Similiter etiam non oportet propter hoc, quod contineatur a loco. Nam substantia incorporea sua virtute contingens rem corpoream, continet ipsam, et non continetur ab ea, anima enim est in corpore ut continens, et non ut contenta. Et similiter Angelus dicitur esse in loco corporeo, non ut contentum, sed ut continens aliquo modo."

⁶⁵⁴ See *De Vir.*, q2, a7, c.

An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends.⁶⁵⁵

Arguing the point that the New Law is contained in the Old, Thomas asserts the following: "I answer that, one thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree, virtually."⁶⁵⁶ In this example, we see precisely the

⁶⁵⁵ *ST Ia*, q105, a1, ad1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualementiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis."

See also *DP I*, q3, a15: "Since every agent in some way produces its like, the effect must in some way pre-exist in its cause. Now whatsoever is contained in another is therein according to the mode of the container: wherefore as God himself is intelligence it follows that creatures pre-exist in him intelligibly, in which sense it is written (Jo. i, 3): That which was made was life in him. But that which is in an intelligence does not proceed therefrom except by means of the will: for the will is the executor of the intellect, and the intelligible moves the will. Consequently creatures must have proceeded from God by his will."

"Tertia ratio est, quia cum omne agens agat sibi simile aliquo modo, oportet quod effectus in sua causa aliquo modo praeexistat. Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est; unde cum ipse Deus sit intellectus, creaturae in ipso intelligibiliter praeexistunt propter quod dicitur Ioan. I, 3: quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Quod autem est in intellectu, non producit nisi mediante voluntate: voluntas enim est executrix intellectus et intelligibile voluntatem movet; et ita oportet quod res creatae a Deo processerint per voluntatem."

⁶⁵⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q107, a3, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid continetur in alio dupliciter. Uno modo, in actu, sicut locatum in loco. Alio modo, virtute, sicut effectus in causa, vel complementum in incompleto, sicut genus continet species potestate, et sicut tota arbor continetur in semine."

difference that is being raised in the objection of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad1 – that of space or contact versus power.

It will be helpful to compare the idea of mutual containment found in the article on *mutua inhaesio* with another dilemma in which Thomas makes use of this same idea. We find him mentioning mutual containment in the context of dealing with the dilemma of the body/soul composite. Thomas has a very interesting teaching regarding the manner in which a substance can be united to a body. Though the article on *mutua inhaesio* does not deal with the union/in-being of body and soul, there are certainly some similarities between the body/soul union and the *mutua inhaesio* of lover and beloved. In our search to understand precisely what mutual indwelling is, we will briefly review what Thomas says about the modes of union between body and soul. Thomas discusses three modes: 1) mixture, 2) contact, and 3) power. We will proceed to summarize SCG II, Chapter LVI on the mode of contact between an intellectual substance and a body.

First of all, the mode of union between body and intellectual substance cannot be according to a mixture for two primary reasons: 1) since they are not mixable because they do not have the same matter and 2) since in a mixture, each element remains itself only virtually rather than actually and that otherwise it would merely be a collection or a heap; thus, the union of soul and body is not a mixture because they each remain themselves actually.⁶⁵⁷ Second of all, the mode of union between body and intellectual substance cannot be by contact properly so-called because contact can only be between bodies. Contact is between the extremities of a bodily substance, and a soul cannot be said to have any such extremities. Thirdly, there is a way in which the soul, of course, can be united with a body. Thomas explains that even regarding contact between two

⁶⁵⁷ SCG II, cap. 56.

bodies, they retain a likeness for one another on the basis that they are in mutual contact, and that one alters the other by virtue of that contact. When this contact is between bodies, it is necessarily mutual – the one must touch the other. But, Thomas continues, even in natural bodies there is a mode by which this contact is not mutual; in other words, the contact is not between body and body but between *power* and body. Celestial bodies, for example, have a certain kind of contact upon the earth by virtue of their power. Thomas even gives an example that is still understandable in modern parlance insofar as we still say that when we encounter a sad person, it “touches” us. Though there is no physical contact, there *is* a relationship of action and passion between the two. Thus, this contact is according to *power*.

Thomas then explains that the contact of quantity is different than the contact of power in three ways. First, according to the contact of power, the indivisible can touch the divisible whereas in the contact of quantity the divisible must touch the divisible.⁶⁵⁸ Secondly, the contact of quantity is only according to a point or an extremity whereas the contact of power concerns “the whole thing touched.” This is because when a power touches a thing, it touches it according to its potentiality, and potentiality refers to the entire thing. If we use the same example that Thomas uses above, we can see that the sun’s power touches the whole of the earth, not merely a part of it. The third difference is perhaps the most important, and flows logically from the second. The Angelic Doctor further explains that quantitative contact only takes place according to points or extremities. He writes, “Because in quantitative contact which takes place in regard to

⁶⁵⁸ We will see that in arg2 Thomas deals with the question of mutual indwelling and divisibility, although it is the divisibility of reason rather than that according to quantity so the term appears to be used analogously.

the extremes, that which touches must be outside that which is touched and cannot pierce it since it is hindered by it. *Whereas virtual contact, which applies to intellectual substances, since it reaches inwards, makes the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance.*"⁶⁵⁹

The similarity between the language used in this context and between our text on *mutua inhaesio* is notable. Thomas says regarding apprehensive indwelling that the lover seeks to penetrate the beloved in such a way that he is "added to his interior"⁶⁶⁰ and that the love in question is "*intimus*" and "penetrating into his innermost self."⁶⁶¹ We see the same concern between this kind of contact (the contact of power) and the radically interior kind of contact of mutual indwelling that specifically deals with the apprehensive and appetitive powers. Compare this with the fact that Thomas' explanation of virtual contact "extends to the innermost things," making "the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance."⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁹ SCG II, cap. 56: "Quia in tactu quantitatis, qui fit secundum extrema, oportet esse tangens extrinsecum ei quod tangitur; et non potest incedere per ipsum, sed impeditur ab eo. *Tactus autem virtutis, qui competit substantiis intellectualibus, cum sit ad intima, facit substantiam tangentem esse intra id quod tangitur, et incedentem per ipsum absque impedimento.*" (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁶⁰ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: "ad interior eius igreditor"

⁶⁶¹ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: "ad intima illius perveniens." Cajetan writes, "Love, in its manner of being through knowledge, adds a delaying or lingering on the part of the lover, and a thorough searching-out of the beloved; hence not just any sort of knowledge is an effect of love, but a knowledge as it were unbroken, searching."

"Amor in modo essendi per apprehensionem addit moram in amante, et perscrutationem amati: ita quod non quaecumque apprehensio est effectus amoris, sed apprehensio quasi continua et perscrutans." (Cajetan, *Commentaria* in Ia IIae, q28, a2, quoted in Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 151.)

⁶⁶² SCG II, cap. 56: "Tactus autem virtutis, qui competit substantiis intellectualibus, cum sit ad intima, facit substantiam tangentem esse intra id quod tangitur, et incedentem per ipsum absque impedimento."

Indeed, we could almost be reading an extended commentary on the explanation of the non-superficial contact of lover and beloved if we were not aware that Thomas is writing on the union of body and soul. At least preliminarily, we can posit that the mode of indwelling between lover and beloved is *virtual* or *according to power*.

But the reason is still somehow not entirely satisfied with this explanation. Claiming that the contact between body and soul is merely virtual still leaves us wondering how singular they are; in other words, how they comprise *a single man*. Explaining the virtual contact between body and soul, Thomas writes, "Things united by contact of this kind are not one simply. For they are one in action and passion, which is not to be one simply. For one is predicated in the same way as being. But to be an agent does not signify being simply. Consequently neither is to be one in action to be one simply."⁶⁶³ In other words, they act upon each other and possess enough singularity to be called "one thing," although the body/soul union is not one simply. Analogously, we could extend this image of the body/soul union as a thing that is "one-but-not-one" to the true intimacy or oneness of the lover and the beloved. Thomas intuitively understands this dissatisfaction. In his characteristic way, he distinguishes the fact that oneness refers to essentially three things: 1) to the indivisible,⁶⁶⁴ 2) to the continuous,⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶³ Ibid.: Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiando: quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nec esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter."

⁶⁶⁴ Something that is indivisibly one would be a substance. A coffee cup is indivisibly one.

⁶⁶⁵ Something that is continuously one is something that is joined together but still capable of separation. Interlocking puzzle pieces are continuously one.

and 3) to that which is one according to reason.⁶⁶⁶ The soul and body are not indivisibly one, considering that the soul has an operation that is independent of the body. The two are not continuous, because they are not both comprised of quantities, and only quantities can be continuous with one another. The only thing remaining is the fact that body and soul are logically unified.⁶⁶⁷ Again, this does not seem very satisfactory; but the comparison may help us to understand the nature of *mutua inhaesio*. If we continue to inquire precisely how much the body and soul are one, we may also understand how much the lover and beloved are one. How unified can two separate substances truly be?

Thomas writes:

For from two actually existing substances there cannot be made something one: because the act of a thing is that whereby it is distinguished from another. Now an intellectual substance is an actually existing substance, as is clear from what has been said: and so likewise is a body. Therefore, seemingly, something one cannot be made from an intellectual substance and a body.⁶⁶⁸

What might this have to do with the mode of mutual indwelling between lover and beloved? Regarding the quotation directly above, let us focus on the proposition that the act of a thing is that whereby it is distinguished from another. Regarding the human soul and body, the soul is the act of the body. The body would not exist without the soul to vivify it; yet they are logically distinct, because the soul can exist without the

⁶⁶⁶ If I think of all the houses in a neighborhood as “one neighborhood,” the houses are not indivisibly one nor are they continuous, but they could be considered “one neighborhood” logically or reasonably.

⁶⁶⁷ or “sicut quod est ratione unum”

⁶⁶⁸ SCG II, cap. 56: “Ex duabus enim substantiis actu existentibus non potest fieri aliquid unum: actus enim cuiuslibet est id quo ab altero distinguitur. Substantia autem intellectualis est substantia actu existens, ut ex praemissis apparet. Similiter autem et corpus. Non igitur potest aliquid unum fieri, ut videtur, ex substantia intellectuali et corpore.”

body, but not vice versa. If it is true that the act of a thing is that whereby it is distinguished from another, is it not also true that the unity and mutual indwelling of a lover and beloved can be explained, at least logically, by the fact that they are united in the same act that is love? Love does not exist without a lover and a beloved (as a material cause) and they are united in the single form of their love.⁶⁶⁹ Moreover, because their union is according to power, they are more than united; their love for one another “extends to the innermost things, [making] the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance.”⁶⁷⁰ This should suffice to explain *mutua inhaesio* according to the analogy of the union of body and soul.

Objection 2: The Comparative Functions of Intellect and Apprehension

The second objection has to do with the comparative functions of the intellectual and appetitive powers. It is argued that “nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole.”⁶⁷¹ It is further argued that since it is the function of reason to do this rather than appetite, mutual indwelling cannot be an effect of love. Essentially, the objection denies the possibility of an appetitive indwelling whereas it affirms the possibility of an intellectual one. For the reason that the article is on the

⁶⁶⁹ For this reason, it is difficult to say with clarity whether the beloved is the material cause of love or whether it is the lover. Properly speaking, we can conclude particularly from *ST I-II, q27, a1* that strictly speaking it is the beloved. But since love is a relation, is it not even more proper to say that the material cause is the “beloved-in-the-lover”?

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷¹ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, arg2*: “nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per aliquam divisionem.”

effects of love (which belongs to the appetite), then mutual indwelling certainly should not number among its effects if mutual indwelling could only be a result of reason.

The last sentence of the reply to the objection refers us to the corpus for an answer, so we need not delve into it too deeply here. However, Thomas does say, "The apprehension of reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved..."⁶⁷² First of all, we might ask what is meant by "division." The answer is not difficult to find. First of all, the Thomistic teaching that the intellect proceeds by composition and division is well-known.⁶⁷³ Secondly, Thomas compares this divisive function several times with the uniting function of love:

Affection tends toward things themselves, but intellect not only tends toward things but also divides them up into many concepts. Consequently, these concepts are understood but not loved. They can, however, be the principle of love or the reason for it. But, properly speaking, what is loved is the thing itself.⁶⁷⁴

We have previously seen a prelude to the divisive function of the intellect versus the uniting function of the appetite in the *De Amore*:

Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers,

⁶⁷² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad2: "...rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et ideo, sicut ratio disquirat, ita affectus amoris subintrat in amatum..."

⁶⁷³ See *SCG II*, cap. 73; *ST Ia*, q85, a8.

⁶⁷⁴ *DV I*, q8, a4, ad5: "Ad quintum dicendum, quod affectus terminatur ad res ipsas; sed intellectus non solum sistit in rebus, sed res in multas intentiones dividit; unde illae intentiones sunt intellectae, non autem sunt dilectae; sed possunt esse dilectionis principium, sive ratio; dilectum autem proprie est res ipsa."

and properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself.⁶⁷⁵

It seems that while it is the function of the intellect to distinguish, it is the function of love, quite literally, to “keep things real” or to keep them “whole.” While the intellect can become lost in theory as it delves into the hidden truths of its object, love demands not only that this sojourn in the depths be directed toward a real object, but that its intention be kept pure. It is as if the appetitive power is attached to the intellectual power and rides along with it as it penetrates into the being of another.

This view that the two powers ‘travel along together’ is actually supported by the parallel to the *De Amore* found in the *Sentences*. According to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, one comparison between the appetitive and intellective powers is according to capacity. He writes, “...in this way they are equal, because just as the knowing power has some relation to all things, so too has the appetitive. *For this reason they mutually include each other*: intellect knows the will, and the will has appetite for or loves what pertains to intellect.”⁶⁷⁶ Had he said this statement more clearly in the reply to the second objection, we can more readily understand why appetite, in a certain sense, “follows” the intellect as it pierces within its object. Specifically referring to the

⁶⁷⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a2, ad2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitionis enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur.”

⁶⁷⁶ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a4, c. (Emphasis added.)

powers of appetite and apprehension, Thomas mentions that each can be contained in the other:

The “good” and the “true” which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above; for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.⁶⁷⁷

Etienne Gilson testifies to the fact that the intellect and the will are “reciprocally ordered powers” that “mutually set one another in motion.”⁶⁷⁸ Considering that all of the three initial effects of love are according to both the appetitive and apprehensive powers and Thomas emphasizes so much the mutuality of these powers, there is no effect of love that provides a better icon of this than *mutua inhaesio*.

There almost seems to be “more” of an indwelling regarding intellect than the will on account of the fact that the active intellect makes an object to be in act for itself by transforming it into an inner word within itself.⁶⁷⁹ The very meaning of understanding is, in a sense, to transform *things*, along with their properties and relations, into *mind*. Thus, it appears that objects are more intrinsic to the apprehensive power than they are

⁶⁷⁷ ST I, q87, a4, ad2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum continetur sub alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate.”

⁶⁷⁸ Gilson, *Christian Philosophy*, 295-6.

⁶⁷⁹ ST Ia, q82, a3, c.: “For, as we have said above, the action of the intellect consists in this — that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this — that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself.”

“Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est.”

to the appetitive. But it appears precisely the opposite regarding which power is more intrinsic to the object itself. Thomas writes:

...it should be said that love enters more into a thing than knowledge, since knowledge is of the known insofar as it is received in the knower's capacity, whereas love is of the loved in a different way, the lover himself being transformed into the very thing loved, as was said before. Thus, it was stated that will exceeds knowledge as regards the way in which the soul is perfected in its order to other things, to which way it pertains to be more or less intimate with a thing.⁶⁸⁰

One can hardly mistake the meaning of "love enters more into a thing than knowledge."

Thomas relates *becoming intimate with a thing* specifically with the appetitive power, which is that power that is perfected according to its order to things.

In another place, Thomas affirms that the term of the appetite is in the appetible object whereas the term of the intellect is within the intellect itself.⁶⁸¹ The way that Thomas puts this is in terms of indwelling: "Now there is a difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as

⁶⁸⁰ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a4, ad10: "...quod amor magis intrat ad quam cognitio: quia cognitio est de re secundum id quod recipitur in cognoscente: amor autem de re, in quantum ipse amans in rem ipsam transformatur, ut dictum est prius. In hac autem via, qua perficitur anima in ordine ad res alias, dictum est, quod voluntas cognitionem excedit, ad quam viam pertinet esse magis vel minus intimum rei." (Emphasis added.)

Compare with *SCG IV*, cap. 11: "By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible species is known as the inner word, that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it reflects on its action: for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas. Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act."

⁶⁸¹ *ST Ia*, q16, a1, c.: "...est in ipso intellectu"

the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired.”⁶⁸² What we should note is that Thomas’s language regarding apprehension seems to focus more on the interior than the appetitive.⁶⁸³ Again, it appears that the object must necessarily be in the intellect more intimately than in the appetite. But this is not necessarily the case. Note the following text:

Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite – and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.⁶⁸⁴

Thomas continues to explain the relationship of the appetite and the intellect in comparative terms. Thomas draws an analogy between the conformity of the intellect with the object and the conformity of the appetite with the desired object. An appetite is called “good” if its object is good. Regarding the intellect, we see that the relation is according to the opposite direction. A thing is called “truth” if the intellect that

⁶⁸² *ST Ia*, q16, a1, c.: “Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.”

⁶⁸³ Broadly speaking, the apprehensive power is that power which draws the world into us, and the appetitive power is how we penetrate into the world. This generalization can certainly be taken too far, but it has some merit. The object of the appetitive power is the “things themselves” (*ST Ia IIae*, q22, a2, c.) whereas the object of the apprehensive power is more universal (*SCG I*, cap. 90). The object of the appetitive power is what a thing is, not precisely the thing itself (*SCG I*, cap. 58).

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.* “Sicut autem bonum est in re, in quantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum.”

conforms to it is true. It would be ridiculous to ask if a real thing is *true*; insofar as it exists, it is true. But it is not ridiculous at all to ask if a real thing is *good*.⁶⁸⁵

Objection 3: Introducing the Via Redamationis

For the reason that the third objection deals directly with the *via redamationis*, we will introduce the concept here and deal with it more fully below. It will be sufficient to indicate its general structure here. It is argued that *mutua inhaesio* cannot possibly be the effect of love on account of the fact that if this were so, then it would also be true that the union between lover and beloved would also be the same. In other words, if the indwelling is *truly mutual and reciprocal*, then it follows that “the beloved is united to the lover in the same way the lover is united to to the lover.”⁶⁸⁶ But it does not follow that what is contained dwells in the container in the same mode as vice versa. Thomas is referring not only to the obvious argument that love is often unrequited, but also that the mutual indwelling that is the effect of love is not truly reciprocal. A man may love a woman with the love of *amor concupiscentiae* desiring from her only physical and emotional satisfaction, while the same woman may love this man dearly with the love of *amor amicitiae*. There is an *inhaesio* for both of them that is mutual, but it need not be precisely *reciprocal*. Thus, Thomas partially grants the objection.⁶⁸⁷ The objection is a

⁶⁸⁵ All real beings are good in Thomistic philosophy. What is meant is that it is not a moot question to ask if a real being is good *for* a lover.

⁶⁸⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, arg3: “Praeterea, si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato.”

⁶⁸⁷ We are reminded of *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, arg1 & ad1, where it is argued that love cannot possibly be the concupiscible power because love seeks wisdom, and wisdom is part of the intellective appetite rather than the sensitive appetite, to which the

fallacious insofar as it seeks to refute something on the basis of a particular type or example. This argument is similar to one such as the following:

Human persons are fully rational.
Mentally handicapped are not fully rational.
Therefore, mentally handicapped persons are not human persons.

The objector tries to deny *mutua inhaesio* to love in a similar way that the above analogy tries to deny full personhood from the mentally handicapped. It is true that the full act of love requires a *mutua inhaesio* that is also *via redamationis* just as the full flowering of humanity requires full rationality, partially granting the truth of the objection; but *mutua inhaesio* cannot be denied to love any more than humanity can be denied to a mentally handicapped person. The objection is clearly false. Considering that Thomas himself mentions the *via redamationis* at the end of the corpus, we will postpone its discussion until we have analyzed some of the conceptual details of *mutua inhaesio*.

Sed Contra

As we have noted earlier in the dissertation, Thomas directly quotes three scripture passages in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2: 1 Jo 4:16, Phil 1:7, and 1 Cor 2:10. The single most important scriptural text for Thomas's analysis of mutual indwelling is 1 Jn. 4:16 which is found in the *sed contra*. It is extremely significant that Thomas's point of departure in the *sed contra* of the article on mutual indwelling says the following: "On the contrary, it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): 'He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.' Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, *for the same reason*, every love

concupiscible belongs. Thomas partially grants the objection, saying that only the intellectual appetite truly seeks wisdom, but it seems also obvious that the concupiscible appetite must often cooperate in this search. The objection is partially false and partially true.

makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.”⁶⁸⁸ It would seem that Thomas is referring to the fact that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son, and so to abide in the Holy Spirit is to abide in God.⁶⁸⁹ This is significant because we are purportedly given the reason why mutual indwelling is an effect of human love by the *sed contra*’s indication of “for the same reason.” Why is this his immediate refutation that *mutua inhaesio* is not an effect of love? The logic of the passage asserts that the ‘mutual indweller’ who abides in charity simultaneously abides in God because charity is the love of God. In other words, *abiding in God’s charity is synonymous with abiding in God’s very person*. We know that in Thomas’s Trinitarian theology, the procession of God’s love truly is the person of the Holy Spirit, and that each Trinitarian Person equally indwells/abides in the other according to the principle of the divine *perichoresis*, although by distinguishing relations. We might be surprised to find that Thomas goes so far as to make this Trinitarian principle analogous to human love as well. Christian believers can understand that there is a valid *theological* reason why abiding in God’s love is equivalent to abiding in God, but Thomas appears to make quite a leap when he claims that “for the same reason,” abiding in human love is equivalent to a human lover and beloved abiding within one another. In God, there is no difference between abiding in his “power” (i.e., his love) and his “person.” Thomas writes:

Therefore, since God loves Himself, it follows that God is in His own will as the object loved is in the lover. Now the beloved object is in the lover, in as much as it is loved, and love is an act of the will: and the act of

⁶⁸⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, sed.: “Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.”

⁶⁸⁹ Thomas has already discussed the Holy Spirit as the love of God in *ST Ia*, q36, a1, and so does not feel the need to re-establish his argument here.

God's will is His being. Therefore God's being by way of love in His will is not accidental being, as in us, but essential being. Consequently God considered as existing in His will is truly and substantially God.⁶⁹⁰

We noted this point in our analysis of the "gap" between the human person's being and his perception. Regarding the experience of human *mutua inhaesio*, however, Thomas appears to conflate power and person, thereby claiming that regarding *mutua inhaesio*, the *Imago Dei* must be taken extremely seriously. Thus, the usage of 1 Jo. 4:16, in the present context implies that the human person's ability to mutually indwell with another human person is a truly divine likeness or analogy. *To dwell in the lover's love is, for the same reason as 1 Jo 4:16, to dwell in the lover himself.* Though based on a theological point, it is the *psychology* of this mutual indwelling on the human level that we seek to make clearer.

Arguing that man adheres most closely to God through the power of his love, Thomas writes,

It is evident that man adheres to God principally by love. In man there are two things whereby he can adhere to God, his intellect and his will: for by the inferior faculties of his soul he cannot adhere to God, but to lower beings. But the adhesion of the intellect is completed by the adhesion of the will, because by his will man, as it were, rests in that which the intellect apprehends. Now, the will adheres to a thing either by love or by fear, but not in the same way. For when it adheres to a thing through fear, it adheres on account of something else, namely in order to avoid an evil that threatens unless it adhere to that thing. But when it adheres to a thing through love, it adheres for its own sake. Now, that which is for its own sake is superior to that which is for another's

⁶⁹⁰ SCG IV, cap. 19: "Ipse autem Deus seipsum amat: necesse est quod ipse Deus sit in sua voluntate ut amatum in amante. Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velle est; velle autem Dei est eius esse, sicut et voluntas eius est eius esse; esse igitur Dei in voluntate sua per modum amoris, non est esse accidentale, sicut in nobis, sed essenziale. Unde oportet quod Deus, secundum quod consideratur ut in sua voluntate existens, sit vere et substantialiter Deus."

sake. Therefore to adhere to God by love is to adhere to Him in the closest way possible.⁶⁹¹

We should note that it is through love that we can “adhere to Him [God] in the closest way possible.” This does not refer to a union, but something even closer still. On the theological level, there is simply nothing else that makes man and God to indwell but love. Often using 1 Jo 4:16 as a text, Thomas firmly maintains that love causes indwelling, implying that this kind of relation is the closest possible:

Again. It is clear that God must love very much those whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the Holy Spirit: for He would not bestow so great a good except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord’s Person: I love them that love me (Prov. 8:17), not as though we had first loved God, but because he hath first loved us (1 Jo. 4:10). Now everything that is loved is in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Spirit is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. 4:16):⁶⁹² He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him: and again (1 Jo. 4:13): In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us; because he hath given us of his Spirit.⁶⁹³

⁶⁹¹ SCG IIIb, cap. 116: “Quod autem per amorem homo maxime Deo adhaereat, manifestum est. Duo enim sunt in homine quibus Deo potest adhaerere, intellectus scilicet et voluntas: nam secundum inferiores animae partes Deo adhaerere non potest, sed inferioribus rebus. Adhaesio autem quae est per intellectum, completionem recipit per eam quae est voluntatis: quia per voluntatem homo quodammodo quiescit in eo quod intellectus apprehendit. Voluntas autem adhaeret alicui rei vel propter amorem, vel propter timorem: sed differenter. Nam ei quidem cui inhaeret propter timorem, inhaeret propter aliud: ut scilicet evitet malum quod, si non adhaereat ei, imminet. Ei vero cui adhaeret propter amorem, adhaeret propter seipsum. Quod autem est propter se, principalius est eo quod est propter aliud. Adhaesio igitur amoris ad Deum est potissimus modus ei adhaerendi.” (Translation modified.)

⁶⁹² Note the use of 1 Jn. 4:16.

⁶⁹³ SCG IV, cap. 21: “Manifestum est quod Deus maxime amat illos quos sui amatores per spiritum sanctum constituit, non enim tantum bonum nisi amando conferret, unde Proverb. 8-17 dicitur ex persona domini: ego diligentes me diligo; non quasi nos prius dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. 4-10. Omne autem amatum in amante est. Necesse est igitur quod per spiritum sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 4-16: qui manet in caritate in Deo manet, et Deus in eo; et iterum: in hoc intelligimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de spiritu suo dedit nobis.”

The text quoted immediately above is from Thomas's chapter in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* concerning the effects of the Holy Spirit on the rational creature. The primary effect is the mutual indwelling itself. The secondary effect is that all that belongs to the Holy Spirit (as a lover) is given to the person in whom he dwells. In this, we see a parallel for our thesis that the primary effect of love is the indwelling itself, and every other effect follows it.⁶⁹⁴ When we consider the *sed contra* in relation to the larger context of the *De Amore*, we cannot forget the following:

- 1) To adhere to anything according to the power of love is to adhere to it in the closest way possible, where a mere *adhesio* becomes an *inhaesio*.
- 2) Substantial union causes love. This concept mixes the notion of love and individuality to such an extent that anything that the person loves is considered as some kind of extension of the lover himself, according to either *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*.
- 3) "...the action of the intellect consists in this – that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this – that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself."⁶⁹⁵

If it is true that substantial union causes love (which is the union with the self), that uniting to another in love is to unite "in the closest way possible," and that to cling to something with the power of love is to cling to something in the most real way possible, then Thomas can conclude that it is one and the same thing to dwell within the lover's love and to dwell within the lover himself.

⁶⁹⁴ The exception to this statement is the effect of union, which is highly problematic for the reasons that union is not merely an effect of love, but is also love itself and love's cause. Union can be thought of as more of the condition for the possibility of love's effects rather than an effect of love properly speaking. The only kind of union that is truly an effect of union is real union.

⁶⁹⁵ *ST Ia*, q82, a3, c.: "...actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est." This principle is repeated in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad3; *DV* q8, a4, ad5.

Substantial Union: The Subject of Mutua Inhaesio

For our present purposes, it is legitimate to inquire whether *mutua inhaesio* has a proper subject. There is no question solely dedicated in the works of Thomas Aquinas that designates the subject of love. The only instance where Thomas uses the term, *subiectum amoris*, is in the context of analyzing whether or not the intellect can be the subject of virtue. There, we read the following objection:

It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says that all virtue is love.⁶⁹⁶ But the *subject of love* is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.⁶⁹⁷

Thomas then answers:

The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love.⁶⁹⁸

We have here an apparently clear answer on the *subiectum amoris*; it is the “appetitive power alone.” The objection tries to neatly place things in logical boxes. The following syllogism is set up by the objector:

Augustine claims that all virtue is love.

⁶⁹⁶ Augustine, *De Moribus Eccl.* XV, quoted in *ST Ia IIae*, q56, a3.

⁶⁹⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q56, a3, arg1: “Idetur quod intellectus non sit subiectum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod omnis virtus est amor. *Subiectum autem amoris* non est intellectus, sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.” (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁹⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q56, a3, ad1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor; sed quia dependet aliquo modo ab amore, in quantum dependet a voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.” (See also *ST I-II*, q25, a1,2,3; q27, a4; I, q20, a1)

The subject of love is in the appetitive power and not in the intellect.
Therefore there can be no virtue in the intellect.⁶⁹⁹

As he does many times, the Angelic Doctor makes a distinction in order to escape the dilemma. The proper subject of love is indeed the appetitive power. He also affirms the authority of St. Augustine who is correct in his assertion that all virtue depends on love insofar as virtue depends upon the will. The intellect cannot properly be called the subject of love because the intellect is moved by intentional likenesses rather than by the thing itself, which is the term of love. However, since the term of love must be a *known* term, even love is dependent somewhat on the intellect. The complicated relationship between the will and intellect will be taken up elsewhere. What is important in the present context is to examine Thomas's use of the subject insofar as it relates to a metaphysics of love, and more particularly, that of *mutua inhaesio*.

Though the appetitive power is the subject of *love*, it does not seem a satisfactory answer to locate the subject of *mutua inhaesio* there alone. We could leave the question of the subject of *mutua inhaesio* aside if we could simply affirm that it is the will, but this is not the case. In the beginning of the article in which Thomas deals with *mutua inhaesio*, he clearly states, "This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring *both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power.*"⁷⁰⁰ As a matter of fact, the primary effects of love—union, mutual indwelling, and ecstasy—all refer to both the appetitive and apprehensive power. How are we to make sense of the fact that Thomas attributes the

⁶⁹⁹ The unwritten premiss is "because virtue is love and love is in the appetitive power alone."

⁷⁰⁰ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.*: "Respondeo dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum *ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam.*" (Emphasis added.)

subject of love to the appetitive power alone, yet the major effects of love clearly delineate both the appetitive and apprehensive powers as “subjects”?⁷⁰¹

The relevant of text for our purposes is where Thomas takes up questions regarding both the subject of passion and the subject of charity – the former because the discussion of *mutua inhaesio* is included in the section of the *Summa* on the passions of the soul, and the latter because charity is related to love as being one of its species, and may give us some further hints regarding a subject of *mutua inhaesio*. For example, love considered absolutely is a passion that is “in” the soul, specifically in the appetitive part, and more specifically in the concupiscible appetite.⁷⁰² Passions always occur with a concomitant change in the sensitive appetite, meaning that they are always accompanied by some change in the body. As we have seen, however, there is a kind of love that moves through the higher appetite (the will) which occurs *without passion*.⁷⁰³ In almost every case where Thomas philosophizes about the true love of friends in this section of the *Summa Theologiae* and elsewhere, he is considering the kind of love that is without passion. This seems to throw some doubt on the premise that the concupiscible power is the only subject of love. If knowledge is a cause of love, how does this relate to the fact that the intellect is not love’s subject? Love consists in the “very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to the good.”⁷⁰⁴ Love can be said to be the form of all virtue; indeed, of

⁷⁰¹ The Latin text of *ST Ia IIae*, q28 does not refer to the language of the *subiectum* of these effects.

⁷⁰² *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1.

⁷⁰³ See *ST Ia IIae*, q22.

⁷⁰⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q25, a2, c.: “Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor.”

any movement of the soul whatsoever. Rather shockingly, the final article enumerating the effects of love claims with Dionysius that “all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good.”⁷⁰⁵ The subject of love is the human person himself in all his totality. The subject of love is his very substance, and the concept that best indicates the fullness of love toward the self is *unio substantialis*.⁷⁰⁶ McGinnis writes:

The person of man is...the remote *principium quod* of all his actions, and, therefore, of the activity of love. The principles of all the actions of which man is capable are also the principles of love. In ultimate analysis it is always the person who loves. It is the ego, the I, as a rational hypostasis who loves in and through and as a person. However, the person never acts immediately but always by means of a certain media.⁷⁰⁷

Strictly speaking, the subject of love is the concupiscible appetite. General speaking, the source of love is man himself.⁷⁰⁸

As mentioned above, in the context of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, the only explicit indication for the meaning of *unio substantialis* is *ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum*, or “according to the love with which one’s loves the self.” This concept appears based quite directly upon Aristotle’s notion that “friendly relations with others is derived from friendship with one’s self.”⁷⁰⁹ The primary problem with the term *unio substantialis* is

⁷⁰⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, sc. From *DDN IV*. “Propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt.”

⁷⁰⁶ McGinnis, *The Wisdom of Love*, 14.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁸ We might differentiate between the “subject” and “source” of love. I am indebted to Fr. James Lehrberger, O.Cist., for this insight.

⁷⁰⁹ Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* IX, 4 (1166a1-2). In the Latin version, “amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum” is found in, In *ST Ia IIae*, q28, 1, 6c; *Ia IIae*, q25, a4,c; *Ia IIae*, q44, a7, arg2; *SCG 3*, cap. 153; *QQ 5*, 6c; *De Vir.*, q2, a7, ad11.

that it is rarely found in the Thomistic corpus. It is not the case, however, that the *idea* of self-love is rare in the Thomistic corpus. But is *unio substantialis* simply identical with self-love? One of the key principles to remember here is that *union is not the same thing as unity*. As Thomas writes, “Union implies the unity of two.”⁷¹⁰ Union is derived from unity, as there can be no “one-ness” without a pre-existent “one.”⁷¹¹

In the text of the corpus, there is no explicit reference to substantial union or to the fact that this union causes love. However, Thomas *does* claim that “this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension.”⁷¹² The “preceding apprehension” refers to nothing other than the following:⁷¹³

- 1) “the oneness of the thing loved with the lover”⁷¹⁴ which is...
- 2) apprehended as “belonging to our well-being”⁷¹⁵ when, in the love of friendship, this apprehension is...

For a good discussion of the principle of self-love in Aristotle, See Julia Annas, “Self-love in Aristotle,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (Spring 1989, Supp.): 1-18; also Richard Kraut, “Comments on Julia Annas’s ‘Self-love in Aristotle,’” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (Spring 1989, Supp.): 19-23.

⁷¹⁰ *ST Ia*, q39, a8, c.: “Connexio autem importat unitatem aliquorum duorum.”

⁷¹¹ According to Deferrari, both *unitas* and *unio* have precisely the same definition: oneness, unity or union (Deferrari, 1123-1126). But Thomas seems to use them with slightly different connotations. Compare the following sentences: 1) “A thing is sometimes said to be one thing because of the subject’s substantial unity (*unitatem substantialem*), although there are many qualities in it, as there are color and taste in an apple (*Quodl. I*, q2, a1, ad2).” 2) “There is a union which causes love, and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one love’s oneself (*ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2).” Though *unitas* and *unio* can be used interchangeably, *unitas* has the connotation of referring to the logical oneness of a thing in itself whereas *unio* possesses the connotation of the relation of two or more things that have *become* one.

⁷¹² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, c.: “Quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente.”

⁷¹³ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, c.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*: “unitatis amati ad amantem”

- 3) "as his other self,"⁷¹⁶ and...
- 4) "half of my soul."⁷¹⁷

The multiplicity of self-referential statements can hardly refer to anything but substantial union. This is the basis and cause of love. Thomistic love is a kind of doubling: the beloved's mirroring of the lover according to some perception of goodness and similarity. As Miner sates, "The ontological priority of substantial union to the union of likeness cannot be easily evaded or overcome."⁷¹⁸ Moreover, Faraon writes:

It is only in the proportion that the loving subject is one with itself, that it is what it is, that it can be like something else; just as it is only in the proportion that it is like something else that it can be joined to it. The accent of love, from the point of view of its purpose, is on union—real union achieved between loved and beloved. By the same token, but from the point of view of its cause, the accent of love is on unity; for union is specified by unity. *Consequently, the first thing to be considered prior to the union of similitude, which is the principle of the love of others, is the union of the subject with itself, which is the principle of its natural love of self.*⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.: "pertinens ad suum bene esse"

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.: "ut alterum se"

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.: "dimidium animae suae"

⁷¹⁸ Miner, 133.

⁷¹⁹ Faraon, "The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love," 56. It is for this reason (that the "the first thing to be considered prior to the union of similitude...is the union of the subject with itself) that it is somewhat odd that Thomas treats the union of similitude (I-II, q27, a3) prior to substantial union. One might have wished that Thomas had written an entire article on "Substantial Union as a Cause of Love." Essentially, I believe that this is precisely what Thomas does in the context of I, q60 on the Love of the Angels. See especially I, q60, a3, c: "Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself."

In an analogous way that person is and must be both body and soul, so substantial union is and must be both *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae*.

The Corpus

Thomas begins the corpus by explaining that *mutua inhaesio* refers to both the appetitive and intellectual powers. Precisely how this is the case will become clearer as we analyze the text. There are many places where he speaks about the cooperative powers of the intellect and will in terms of indwelling. Note the following text:

As the object known is in the knower, to the extent that it is known, so the beloved must be in the lover, as loved. The lover is, in some way, moved by the beloved with a certain interior motion. Therefore, since a mover is

“Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus, unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi bonum; sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et Angelus et homo naturaliter appetunt suum bonum et suam perfectionem. Et hoc est amare seipsum. Unde naturaliter tam Angelus quam homo diligit seipsum, in quantum aliquod bonum naturali appetitu sibi desiderat. In quantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, in quantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva.”

See also *ST Ia*, q60, a5, c: “I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.”

“Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod Angelus naturali dilectione diligit Deum plus quam se, amore *concupiscentiae*, quia scilicet plus appetit sibi bonum divinum quam bonum suum. Et quodammodo amore amicitiae, in quantum scilicet Deo vult naturaliter Angelus maius bonum quam sibi, vult enim naturaliter Deum esse Deum, se autem vult habere naturam propriam. Sed simpliciter loquendo, naturali dilectione plus diligit se quam Deum, quia intensius et principalius naturaliter diligit se quam Deum.”

in contact with the object moved, the beloved must be intrinsic to the lover.⁷²⁰

Though *mutua inhaesio* is not mentioned, we see very similar appetitive language inasmuch as Thomas explains that the lover is moved by an “*intrinseca motione*.” This passage indicates that when speaking about love between persons, we move beyond mere contact and union into a kind of intermingling or indwelling. Basically, there are two intellectual indwellings and two appetitive indwellings, resulting in the following schema:

- 1) The lover is in the beloved intellectually
- 2) The beloved is in the lover intellectually
- 3) The lover is in the beloved appetitively
- 4) The beloved is in the lover appetitively
- 5) Reciprocal mutual indwelling, both appetitively and intellectually

Reciprocal mutual indwelling (*via redamationis*) somewhat changes the number of *inhaesiones* that are possible, but we will deal with this in the following chapter. The basic five are enumerated above, with the exception that in the appetitive indwelling of the beloved in the lover, there are two separate *inhaesiones* according to whether the beloved is absent or present.

The Intellectual Inhaesio of the Beloved in the Lover

The intellection of the beloved includes both the lover’s indwelling in the beloved and the lover’s indwelling in the lover because of the fact that Thomas focuses both acts on the lover. Thomas’s analysis of the intellection of the beloved is very terse. Thomas merely writes, “Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be

⁷²⁰ *CT*, cap. 45: “Sicut autem intellectum est in intelligente in quantum intelligitur, ita et amatum esse debet in amante in quantum amatur. Movetur enim quodammodo amans ab amato quadam intrinseca motione. Unde cum movens contingat id quod movetur, necesse est amatum intrinsecum esse amanti.” (Translation modified.)

in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil. 1:7, 'For that I have you in my heart.'"⁷²¹ That is all that Thomas says about the matter. Unlike other scriptural passages that he uses in the *De Amore*, there is no other citation of Phil 1:7 where Thomas might attach some other exegesis that further explains his thoughts concerning what it means to be "in the heart." We can relate this particular effect to the efficient cause of love as knowledge insofar as any passion must first proceed from a cognition or a kind of "word of the heart." There is some evidence that Thomas is referring in this text to what the tradition indeed calls, "the word of the heart (*verbum cordis*)."⁷²² Thomas writes,

For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word and it is called the *word of the heart* signified by the word of the voice.⁷²²

Thomas explains that the intellect is a power that reaches out from within us toward the object understood and a conception issues forth from both our intellect and the object understood. This conception is called the *verbum cordis*, and it is this understanding that

⁷²¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: "Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, in quantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Philipp. I, eo quod habeam vos in corde."

There is at least a little irony here. Thomas quotes a passage from Scripture that appears clearly appetitive (i.e., mentioning the "heart") as a proof-text for the existence of an apprehensive *mutua inhaesio*. The point is consistent with what Thomas writes in *ST Ia IIae*, q27 on the causes of love. The end is that one loves. The means or efficient cause of that love is apprehensive. Thus, the ultimate end of thinking is loving.

⁷²² *ST Ia*, q27, a1, c.: "Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur *verbum cordis*, significatum verbo vocis." (Emphasis added.)

is signified by our vocal words.⁷²³ We cannot be certain that it is precisely this conception to which Thomas refers when he writes of the intellective *inhaesio* of the beloved in the lover, but the concept of the *verbum cordis* makes a great deal of sense in the context of *ST* I-II, q28, a2. In short, he takes it for granted that the reader knows what it means for the beloved to have an intellective *inhaesio* within the lover. We should not be surprised at this. In the First Part of the *Summa*, Thomas has gone through great pains to establish how the intellective process works.⁷²⁴

The Intellective Inhaesio of the Lover in the Beloved

Thomas has slightly more to say about the *inhaesio* of the lover in the beloved.

Thomas writes:

The lover is said to be in the beloved according to apprehension inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Spirit, who is God's Love, that He "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God."⁷²⁵

⁷²³ Another reference to the *verbum cordis* is found in *ST* Ia, q37, a1, ad2: "Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker, yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved.

"Unde amor, etiam in nobis, est aliquid manens in amante, et verbum cordis manens in dicente; tamen cum habitudine ad rem verbo expressam, vel amatam."

⁷²⁴ Particularly *ST* Ia, q79, 84-88.

⁷²⁵ *ST* Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: "Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem in quantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod scrutatur etiam profunda Dei."

Again, like the intellective *inhaesio* of the beloved in the lover, Thomas does not give us so much of an explanation of how this happens as to indicate a certain disposition of the lover regarding the beloved. His disposition is that he is simply not content with superficialities.

A text that is very similar to this one concerns whether or not understanding is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Thomas writes:

I answer that, understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for "*intelligere*" [to understand] is the same as "*intus legere*" [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas *intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing*, because the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in *De Anima* iii, 6. Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things. Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it *penetrate into the heart of things*.⁷²⁶

The following is a similar text:

⁷²⁶ *ST* IIa IIae, q8, a1, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam intimam cognitionem importat, *dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere*. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus, nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio *autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei*, obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sunt autem multa genera eorum quae interius latent, ad quae oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsecus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rerum substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata: res etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilibus quae exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus. Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto *potest magis ad intima penetrare*. (Emphasis added.)

If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is."⁷²⁷

The gift whereby man is able to "penetrate into the heart of things" is the *understanding*.

The similar language to q28, a2 is clear. It is the intellect, by the gift of understanding, which is able to penetrate into a thing, going from the outside to the inside, uncovering what is hidden within.

What is perhaps even more interesting than this is the connection between understanding, this penetration into an object, and the Holy Spirit. Thomas uses the authority of 1 Cor 2:10 to prove that the Holy Spirit searches the very depths of God.

The syllogism set up is the following:

The Holy Spirit is the love of God.
The Holy Spirit searches the depths of God.
The Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son.
Therefore, mutual love searches the depths of the beloved.

⁷²⁷ ST Ia IIae, q31, a5, c.: "Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est."

The comparison with a human lover and beloved is clear. A mutual affective union has already been set up between the lover and the beloved. The lover's love, like the Holy Spirit, is also able to search the depths of whatever has caused that love. We should also note that the gift of understanding, i.e. this special gift of "penetration" into an object, refers in a way to both the intellective and appetitive powers. In the same article regarding the gift of the understanding it is objected, "Further, in the powers of the soul *the understanding is condivided with the will* (*De Anima* iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Spirit is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Spirit should receive the name of understanding."⁷²⁸ Thomas replies, "'Will' denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas 'understanding' denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that *penetrates into the heart of things*. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after the will."⁷²⁹ We should take note

⁷²⁸ *ST* IIa IIae, q8, a1, arg3: "Praeterea, in potentiis animae *intellectus contra voluntatem dividitur*, ut patet in III de anima. Sed nullum donum spiritus sancti dicitur voluntas. Ergo etiam nullum donum spiritus sancti debet dici intellectus." (Emphasis added.)

Later in the same question, Thomas repeats, "...understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart." (*ST* II-II, q8, a6, c.)

"Intellectum vero capacitas intellectus eorum quae proponuntur, sive penetratio ad intima eorum."

⁷²⁹ *ST* IIa IIae, q8, a1, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas nominat simpliciter appetitivum motum, absque determinatione alicuius excellentiae. Sed intellectus nominat quandam excellentiam cognitionis *penetrandi ad intima*. Et ideo supernaturale donum magis nominatur nomine intellectus quam nomine voluntatis." (Emphasis added.)

Even in the SCG, the gift of understanding is associated with 1 Cor 2:10 regarding the fact that God perfectly understands himself. "Again. All the perfections of things are found eminently in God. Now among other perfections found in created things is that of understanding God: since the intellectual nature whose perfection it is to understand stands above others: and God is the most excellent intelligible. Therefore God, most of all, understands Himself. This is confirmed by divine authority. For the

that the power of the understanding, in Thomas's mind, is "condivided with the will." In other words, the understanding that is caused by love denotes a certain "excellence" that shares its operation with the will. There is little doubt that the excellence of the understanding is closely related to the fact that lover is not satisfied with superficialities,⁷³⁰ but desires an "intimate knowledge."⁷³¹ This is a perfect analogy with the effect of *mutua inhaesio*, seeing as that both intellective and apprehensive powers are conjoined intimately in order for this effect to be present at all. There should be little doubt that what Thomas means by the intellective *mutua inhaesio* of the lover in the beloved is analogous to the penetration of Holy Spirit's gift of understanding into whatever it searches.

If the understanding is not content with superficialities, then it seems that the opposite of the *superficial* is the *interior*. Commenting on Aristotle's more cursory notion of the soul in the *De Anima*, Thomas writes, "Finally, recapitulating, he [Aristotle] says that the foregoing is an 'outline' description of the soul, meaning that it is extrinsic, as it were, and superficial and incomplete. It will be completed when he comes to define the

Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10) that the Spirit of God searcheth . . . the deep things of God." (SCG I, cap. 47)

"Adhuc. Rerum omnium perfectiones in Deo maxime inveniuntur. Inter alias autem perfectiones in rebus creatis inventas maxima est intelligere Deum: cum natura intellectualis aliis praemineat, cuius perfectio est intelligere; nobilissimum autem intelligibile Deus est. Deus igitur maxime seipsum intelligit."

⁷³⁰ Literally, the lover is "non contentus superficiali apprehensione amati."

⁷³¹ "Ad interiora eius ingreditur." It is extremely interesting to note that the literally translation for this phrase is closer to this: "To penetrate/take up ownership of his inner depths." The verb, *ingredior* has the connotation of actually entering a place in order to take up ownership or even to enter a monastery with the intention of becoming a monk there (See DeFerrari, p. 557). The applications to the lover considering the beloved a kind of precious possession – even a holy cloister – are significant.

innermost nature of the soul and the nature of each of its parts.”⁷³² We should take note that the opposite of the superficial for Thomas is the intrinsic and what is a thing’s “innermost nature.” With the intellectual *inhaesio* of the lover in the beloved, Thomas builds a bridge between the function of the intellect and the function of the appetite. After all, it is cognition that causes *amor*. Thus, it provides a perfect segue to his analysis of the two appetitive indwellings. As Thomas Kelly writes:

I appreciate my friend as the unique individual she is and am made more myself, a better myself, than I would have been without her. Again we return to this overworked word: love is a way of knowing, perhaps better, *the* way of knowing, for among other things it is receptivity to the love-ly [sic] as such. Again, this is an insight which, despite two millenia of Christianity and an even longer period before that of Judaism, has yet to be truly encountered by most philosophers.⁷³³

It is just such an encounter that we seek to analyze now.

The Appetitive Inhaesio of the Beloved in the Lover

Thomas spends more than three times the words explaining appetitive mutual indwelling than he does the intellective.⁷³⁴ Considering that we are dealing with the effects of love belonging to the appetitive power, this is logically consistent with his topic. The primary difference between the appetitive power and the intellective power

⁷³² *De Anima* II, 2, #244: “Deinde epilogando colligit quae dicta sunt; et dicit quod secundum praedicta determinatum est de anima, et posita est animae descriptio *figuraliter* quasi extrinsece et superficialiter et incomplete. Complebitur enim determinatio de anima quando pertinet usque ad intima ut determinetur natura uniuscuiusque partis ipsius animae.”

⁷³³ Thomas A. Kelly, “Towards an Ontology of Love,” in *Amor Amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship*, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 224.

⁷³⁴ The count is 91 Latin words as opposed to 248 in the corpus of *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, which is significantly more than twice as much words spent on appetitive *mutua inhaesio* as apprehensive.

is that the former tends to things as they exist in themselves, whereas the latter tends to things according to their intentional likenesses. This fact has been indicated many times in our analysis. Thomas's comments on appetitive indwelling have two parts, broadly speaking. First, he treats of the appetitive indwelling of the beloved in the lover and second he treats of the indwelling of the lover in the beloved. Thomas then goes on to explain how this indwelling differs according to both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. As for the appetitive indwelling of the lover in the beloved, he also differentiates these according to both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. He finally makes some exceptions for an appetitive indwelling called the *via redamationis*, which is not only mutual but reciprocal. We will discuss this further at the end of the chapter.

In the first sentence of the second part of the corpus we read about a very important technical concept concerning *mutua inhaesio*. We will treat the first part of the sentence before moving on to the second. "As the appetitive power, the object of love is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency...."⁷³⁵ As the beloved is in the apprehension of the lover intellectually, so is the beloved in the affections of the lover appetitively. The subject of the appetitive indwelling is *in affectu*. The mode of the indwelling is according to *complacentia*. How might we understand the subject and mode of this indwelling?

We cannot forget what has been said about affective union. As Thomas has asserted, it is affective union that is, in essence, love itself. Regarding affective union, Thomas quotes St. Augustine: "...love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two

⁷³⁵ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.

together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved.”⁷³⁶ In the differentiation between affective union and real union, Thomas adds that Augustine’s reference to “uniting” refers to the affective union while “seeking to unite two together” refers to real union.⁷³⁷ Apparently, for Thomas, to unite “in the affections” is to unite the persons themselves. We have already noted that to dwell in the *affections* has more to do with the higher will than merely the *passions*.

We have already noted in our commentary of *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1 and a2, where *complacentia* occurs a total of six times that some contexts use it synonymously with *connaturalitas*, and in other contexts it has a more psychological meaning that might have the word “*impressio*” as a synonym. Q26, a1 has this to say about *complacentia*: the “manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called ‘sensitive love,’ or ‘intellectual’ or ‘rational love.’”⁷³⁸ Here, it seems that *complacentia* can refer to both the sensitive passions and the higher will that operates without passion. In q26, a2 where Thomas uses *complacentia* five times, it is described as that process by which the appetible object gives the appetite a “certain adaptation to itself,” which appears to be a change on the level of the appetite’s form that results directly from the principle of natural love.⁷³⁹ Surprisingly,

⁷³⁶ Augustine, *De Trin VIII:10*, quoted in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, c.: “Amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur.”

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1, c.: “Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.”

⁷³⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “quandam coaptationem ad ipsum.”

however, Thomas continues to claim that love is nothing else than complacency in that object, which consists of “the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.”⁷⁴⁰ He then clarifies in the reply to the second objection: “Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love.”⁷⁴¹ In these questions, at least, the meaning of *amor* and *complacentia* are highly related. *Amor* is almost identified with *complacentia*, which is the primal change in the appetite of the lover who recognizes in some way that the beloved is either an alter ipse or simply a part or extension of himself.⁷⁴² We should not be surprised that sometimes *amor* could

⁷⁴⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.: “Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor”

⁷⁴¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, ad2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, in quantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem.”

⁷⁴² We should recognize that the identification of the beloved as an alter ipse or as part of one’s self is directly related to the concepts of *amor amicitiae* or *amor concupiscentiae*, which Thomas makes much more clear in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1.

One thing that should be noted is that in Thomas’s early work, he describes love on the level of a change of form of the lover in the beloved. In his later work, this more metaphysical language of form has been exchanged for a slightly more psychological language of love as *complacentia*. See Sherwin, *Dissertation*, 91, 109. “In his early work, Aquinas employs the language of form to describe the nature of love. Love, he tells us, is a form received into the appetite analogous to the form received into the intellect in the act of cognition. In his mature work, however, Aquinas reserves the language of form to the intellect and now describes love as a pleasing affective affinity (*complacentia*) or an inclination.” (Sherwin, 109). This is noted as well in H.D. Simonin’s classic study, “Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l’amour,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 6 (1931): 181.

Deferrari defines *complacentia* as “Satisfaction, delight, the fact or state of being pleased with oneself or others, the manifestation of tranquil pleasure.” (See Deferrari, p. 185) Deferrari could actually not be more wrong. The completion of the process of

be used interchangeably with words like *connaturalitas*, *unio*, *complacentia*, *amor naturalis*, or *consonantia*. As Kwasniewski well notes, "So primitive a datum [as love] is hard to define; certainly no one term by itself could do justice to its nature and functions."⁷⁴³

Vella has a very good understanding of the relationship between *amor* and *complacentia*: "Complacency is not simply an act of love, as when one makes a gesture of love towards another; complacency fundamentally is being accepting being."⁷⁴⁴

It is not as if the concept of *complacentia* is completely different than the impression or likeness that occurs in the intellect. According to Fr. Sikora:

But in intellectual activity, the intentional form, itself unknown, which determines the intellect to insight, tends to fructify into a further intellectual form, itself known as such, at least in its representational function if not in its entity. This is the concept (pertaining as a representation to the domain of logical objectivity). Something analogous occurs in the will after an initial affective complacency.⁷⁴⁵

What we should observe from Sikora is that *complacentia* is analogous to the process by which the intellect is made active by an intentional likeness. We should also note that this *complacentia* is analogous, not to the development of the concept itself, but of the impression of the species that takes place before the concept is developed. The very first use of *complacentia*

complacentia is a kind of pleasure, but identifying *complacentia* solely with pleasure is like identifying *amor* with pleasure. Thomas uses *complacentia* in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a1 & q27, a2 as more of a generally descriptive psychological phenomenon: it is a kind of "impression" or "rest" of the beloved in the lover which *results* in a kind of pleasure, but is not necessarily synonymous with that pleasure.

⁷⁴³ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 121.

⁷⁴⁴ Vella, *Love is Acceptance*, 120. See also Crowe, "Complacency and Concern," 207-210.

⁷⁴⁵ Sikora, *Inquiry Into Being* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 136. In *ST Ia IIae*, q15, a1, Thomas explicitly identifies *complacentia* as analogous to the similitude that occurs in the intellect.

in the *Summa Theologiae* supports this analogous view. Arguing that enjoyment is the work of both the appetitive and the intellectual powers, Thomas writes, "In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed."⁷⁴⁶ Despite the fact that enjoyment is the subject of this sentence, the meaning is that just as perception is the beginning of the possibility of enjoying what one perceives, analogously speaking, *complacentia* is the beginning of the possibility of the appetitive power being *completed* in delight (and not the same thing as delight).

Reapplying this analysis explicitly to what Thomas writes about *complacentia* in q28, a2, he associates it with pleasure in the beloved's presence⁷⁴⁷ or longing in the beloved's absence. Thus, one might say that the beloved is present in the affections of the lover according to three modes of *complacentia*: 1) According to the kind of perception that the lover has of the beloved, whether she is an *alter ipse* or a part of the lover; 2) according to whether the beloved is actually present, by a kind of delight, and

⁷⁴⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q11, a1, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod in delectatione duo sunt, scilicet perceptio convenientis, quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam; et complacentia eius quod offertur ut conveniens. Et hoc pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur."

⁷⁴⁷ It will be enlightening to examine the effects of the pleasure caused by the appetitive presence of the beloved. In *ST Ia IIae*, q32, a33 Thomas enumerates the effects of pleasure as follows: 1) expansion (*dilatatio*), 2) self-perpetuating, 3) hindering of reason, 4) perfective of operation. As usual, there are numerous distinctions made. We should be particularly concerned with the third and the fourth effect, which appear somewhat contradictory. Does pleasure both hinder the use of reason *and* perfect operation? We need only recall what we said regarding q28, a5 regarding whether or not love perfects or wounds the lover. The answer is that the object may do both, depending upon both the objective good of the loved object for the lover and the lover's subjective stance toward that object.

3) according to the absence of the beloved, by a kind of longing (or even sadness). The first mode of *complacentia* is not dependent upon the vicissitudes of absence or presence and is closer to the basic definition of love, whereas the second is dependent upon actual absence or presence.⁷⁴⁸ The fact that Thomas adds that the *complacentia* is “not indeed from any extrinsic cause...but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart”⁷⁴⁹ points to the first mode of *complacentia*. Moreover, we see an explicit connection between this kind of *complacentia* and Thomas’s definition of intimacy. He writes, “For this reason [i.e., because the complacency is rooted in the lover’s heart] we speak of love as being ‘intimate’ and ‘of the bowels of charity.’”⁷⁵⁰ These more “emotional” effects are not surprising if the appetitive beloved-in-lover indwelling has experienced a basic change in his will which is a kind of impression made in his heart of the beloved herself. In the lover’s desire and longing for the beloved, we can see the proximate effects of love mentioned in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, apply directly to appetitive mutual indwelling. For our purposes, the difference between *amor* and *complacentia* is that *amor* remains a kind of tendency of lover toward beloved whereas *complacentia* denotes a kind of appetitive change in the lover’s heart dependent upon his relation to himself (substantial union).

⁷⁴⁸ Thomas does not claim this explicitly as much as we may infer it from the text. Whether I love my friend or lover is not dependent in the slightest upon her absence or presence. She “holds a place in my heart” that is essentially the same no matter where she is.

⁷⁴⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: “Complacentiam amati interius radicatum” – more literally, “complacency rooted in the lover’s interior.”

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*: “Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis.”

Thomas does not actually describe the appetitive *inhaesio* of beloved-in-lover. As a matter of fact, he does not really describe the affective union that occurs according to *amor concupiscentiae* in the previous article, either. Thomas does not believe *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae* to be equal. This should underscore the fact that Thomas is focusing on a kind of ideal form of love in *ST I-II, q28, a2*.

The Appetitive Inhaesio of the Lover in the Beloved

Like many of the other effects of love, and like the beloved-in-lover *inhaesio*, this indwelling is also according to *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. The lover is in the beloved appetitively according to *amor amicitiae* insofar as the lover “is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were.”⁷⁵¹ We have seen very similar language concerning the intellective lover-in-beloved *inhaesio* where the lover “strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.” Just as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial *apprehension* of the beloved, he is similarly not satisfied with a superficial “possession or enjoyment” (*adeptione vel fruitione*) of the beloved.⁷⁵² We should make note that just as the apprehension seeks to “penetrate into his very soul (*ad interioria eius ingreditur*)” the

⁷⁵¹ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.*: “Non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima perveniens.”

⁷⁵² Deferrari renders *adeptio, -onis*, as “an obtaining, attainment.” The word “possession” might be a bit strong, considering that “possession” has the connotations of “attaining and keeping.” But since this attainment is contrary to what is superficial, we can surmise that possession is probably not too strong a term.

appetitive power also seeks to “penetrate into his heart (*ad intima illius perveniens*).” When we first read this, we might be surprised that such intimate language is reserved for *amor concupiscentiae* rather than *amor amicitiae*. It is here that we must remind ourselves that the Angelic Doctor maintains that even angels possess *amor concupiscentiae*.⁷⁵³ It simply has the connotation here of a good desired for the self alone. This is not a bad thing. If we did not seek good things for ourselves, then the nature ordained by God would itself be disordered. *Amor concupiscentiae* is nearly a synonym of self-love.⁷⁵⁴ There is, in fact, no radical problem whatsoever with loving another human being with the love of *amor concupiscentiae*. As a matter of fact, loving a person for the sake of the self is the basis upon which *amor amicitiae* is possible. It is when the lover is trapped within the bounds of *amor concupiscentiae* without capability of breaking this prison that a healthy self-love can become self-ish. But we cannot truly dwell in another person without first going out of ourselves in ecstasy. It is in the analysis of *extasis* that we see a deeper dimension of *mutua inhaesio*. We will see this in the next section on ecstasy.

The Via Redamationis

As we saw in Chapter Two, Thomas, building on Aristotle, affirms that a key aspect of true friendship is a kind of mutuality – an *antiphilēsis*, in Greek terminology. Thomas understands that for *amicitia*, this kind of mutuality is necessary because

⁷⁵³ See *ST Ia*, q60, a3, c.

⁷⁵⁴ See *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a3, c.

“friends return love for love, and both desire to do good things for one another.”⁷⁵⁵ A perfect example would be the case of a lover’s unrequited love for a beloved who wants to “just be friends.” In such a case, the beloved has a certain amount of respect and admiration for the lover, but the love of the lover far surpasses that of the beloved.⁷⁵⁶ The mutuality of their affection is unequal. One might say that their love is mutual in the sense that they both had a relationship with the other (and thus *amor* causes *mutua inhaesio*) but it is not *reciprocal* in the sense that, as stated above, they “return love for love” and “do good things for one another.”⁷⁵⁷ *Mutuality* does not equal *reciprocity*.

In many ways and forms, we have been analyzing the *via redamationis* all along. It is absolutely essential that we concentrate on the concept of substantial union in order to understand the concept of the *via redamationis*. And so we will end where we began by claiming that *mutua inhaesio*, particularly in its form as *via redamationis*, is the full flowering (*fruitio*) or most proper effect of *amor* as St. Thomas Aquinas discusses it in the “*De Amore*” of the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q26-28. After her entire analysis of friendship, Diana Cates comments, “...friendship is a relationship of benevolence, beneficence, and affection, where each of these is mutual and mutually known.”⁷⁵⁸ Friendship can only be truly intimate when it is truly mutual, and this is illustrated only by the concept of the *via redamationis*, for Thomas makes it clear that not every *mutua inhaesio* is equal.

⁷⁵⁵ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: “In quantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.”

⁷⁵⁶ For the sake of argument, we are setting aside for the moment the fact that the love of the lover may be completely idealistic or even harmful and irrational.

⁷⁵⁷ ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.: “...vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.”

⁷⁵⁸ Cates, “Intimacy and Emotional Integrity,” 116.

One may love another more than the other, and one may love with *amor amicitiae* while another loves with the love of *amor concupiscentiae*.⁷⁵⁹

It is about the *via redamationis* that St. Augustine praised one of his relationships: “No restraint was imposed by the exchange of mind with mind, which marks the brightly lit pathway of friendship.”⁷⁶⁰ Within the context of q28, a2, the following is what the Angelic Doctor writes of this form of *mutua inhaesio*:

In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.⁷⁶¹

We also see from the third objection that it is characteristic of the *via redamationis* for the “beloved [to be] united to the lover in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved.”⁷⁶² This is true of the *via redamationis*, but it is expressly not true of every kind of love.⁷⁶³ Thus, we become immediately aware that a love that is truly mutual is characteristic only of this fairly rare and oddly named effect of love – the *via redamationis*, or “the way of love returned for love.” This is Thomas’s reply to the

⁷⁵⁹ See *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad3. It is interesting to note that the objection is in terms of *unio* rather than *mutua inhaesio*. Thomas objects that if the union itself is love, then “it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false.” What this means is that Thomas clearly recognizes affective union as a precondition to *mutua inhaesio*, making *mutua inhaesio* the greater flowering or result of that union. It is possible that the union that true lovers seek, which is real union, is in some ways equivalent to the *redamationis* form of *mutua inhaesio*.

⁷⁶⁰ Augustine, *Confessions* II, 2, 2, 24.

⁷⁶¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: “Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, in quantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.”

⁷⁶² *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, arg.3: “Quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato.”

⁷⁶³ See *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, ad3.

obvious fact that love may be unrequited: "This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love."⁷⁶⁴

From what is said explicitly about the *via redamationis*, we can gather that it is characterized by the following:

- 1) AMOR AMICITIAE: the *via redamationis* is only present when *amor concupiscentiae* is superceded by *amor amicitiae*.⁷⁶⁵
- 2) IDENTICAL AFFECTIVE UNIONS: the affective union of the beloved is the same as the affective union of the lover
- 3) IDENTICAL REAL UNION SOUGHT: the real union that they share with one another is such that it is actively reciprocated
- 4) RECIPROCITY OF GOODNESS: this results in another desire to do good things for one another.⁷⁶⁶

McEvoy enumerates the aspects of friendship as the following:

- 1) GOOD WILL, meaning that *amor amicitiae* is essentially synonomous with *amor benevolentiae* and requires willing the good to the other in a disinterested way.
- 2) RECIPROCITY which is *mutua amatio*.
- 3) EQUALITY, which though Thomas recognized, said little about it; not surprisingly, considering that the form of friendship was a relationship between a Creator and his Creatures.⁷⁶⁷
- 4) INTIMACY, which McEvoy links explicitly to *mutua inhaesio*, was Thomas's rendering of the Aristotelian *συνηθεία*. He refers us specifically to the *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII, 7 (1158a15).
- 5) SIMILARITY, which McEvoy again refers explicitly to *mutua inhaesio*.
- 6) SHARED EXPERIENCE, which Thomas associates with *communicatio*.

⁷⁶⁴ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, ad3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore."

⁷⁶⁵ Their desire is for the other per se, not per accidens. Though a friendship based on utility or pleasure may be virtually involved here, it is not the basis of the relationship.

⁷⁶⁶ It is important to differentiate these last two, for it could mean the difference between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. They could desire each other without necessarily desire to "do good things" for each other.

⁷⁶⁷ I would add, however, that if grace truly makes God indwell in us, there is an equality in us insofar as God loves himself in us.

This is not all, however. When Thomas speaks about *amor amicitiae* in the context of analyzing appetitive *mutua inhaesio*, he is also describing the characteristics of the *redamtionis*. What Thomas says concerning appetitive *mutua inhaesio* according to *amor amicitiae* must, however, be logically distinguished from the *via redamtionis* because it is certainly possible for a lover, for example, to love a beloved with *amor amicitiae* (thus being indicative of some characteristics of the *redamtionis*) while the lover does not return his love with *amor amicitiae*. The characteristic of appetitive *amor amicitiae* (within the context of q28, a2) that we have not yet commented on is the following:

Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends 'to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same,' as the Philosopher says (Ethics 9.3; Rhetoric 2.4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.⁷⁶⁸

The paragraph quoted immediately above is particularly important because it explains appetitive indwelling according specifically to *amor amicitiae*.⁷⁶⁹ Strictly speaking, the above concerns merely the appetitive indwelling of lover and beloved rather than the *via*

⁷⁶⁸ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.*: "In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, in quantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, in quantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. In quantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante."

⁷⁶⁹ We are more particularly concerned with the appetitive power, seeing as that the appetitive power is the province of love, and also with *amor amicitiae*, which is the basis for the *via redamtionis*.

redamationis. The brevity of Thomas's remarks can be explained by the likelihood that Thomas assumes that the reader will go back and simply view what Thomas has said about mutual indwelling as completely mutual and directed by *amor amicitiae*.⁷⁷⁰

One can read this paragraph several times without truly seeing the difference between the appetitive indwellings according to *amor amicitiae*. The lover is in the beloved according to a complete identification, which is a kind of empathy or sympathy that goes beyond mere "fellow-feeling." The lover is in the beloved according to an identification of wills and extreme empathy to the point where it seems as if the lover "felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend."⁷⁷¹ Thomas then concludes that because of this it is proper for friends to have similar desires. This makes sense, for if the lover feels the same things that the beloved feels, then it is logical that the lover would want her to do the things that he does and feel the things that he feels, insofar as those things are good and pleasureable. Thus, the lover is in the beloved insofar as what affects the beloved seems to affect the lover as well. Thomas explains the *inhaesio* of lover in beloved according to the mode of *unity*, "as though he were become the same as him (*quasi idem factus amato*)."⁷⁷² An important difference between the *inhaesio* of lover in beloved and that of beloved in lover is that Thomas describes the former in passive terms and the latter in active terms. With the *inhaesio* of lover in beloved, the lover suffers what the beloved suffers as if the beloved were an *alter ipse*. With the *inhaesio* of

⁷⁷⁰ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 161.

⁷⁷¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: "ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici."

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*

beloved in lover, he “wills and acts for his friend’s sake”⁷⁷³ as if he were an *alter ipse*.⁷⁷⁴ This dynamic between passive and active makes sense from what we have already reviewed. The lover’s powers are not identified with the beloved’s. Thus, the lover is in the beloved insofar as his powers must suffer what occurs in the powers of his beloved. Conversely, as for the beloved in the lover, he is quite literally “within the lover’s power.” The beloved is in the lover both appetitively and apprehensively, and so the lover *must go out of himself and act* on behalf of the beloved. In both *inhaesiones*, the mode of indwelling seems to be according to an *alter ipse*. With *amor amicitiae*, the beloved has become an *alter ipse* such that though the beloved is another self, the lover still recognizes the beloved as truly other than himself.⁷⁷⁵

It could be argued that simply because love is reciprocal, it does not follow that the *via redamtionis* is the most perfect form of love. After all, could not bad people love one another with a reciprocal kind of love? Upon closer observation of the texts, this argument is specious for several reasons. First, Thomas argues in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3 that with *amor concupiscentiae*, there is no real *extasis*.⁷⁷⁶ Thomas says of the *extasis* of *amor concupiscentiae*, “Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic

⁷⁷³ Ibid.: “vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum.”

⁷⁷⁴ For the meaning of the “conformity of wills,” see Daniel Schwartz Porzecanski, “Should We Will What God Wills?: Friendship With God and Conformity of Wills According to Aquinas,” *Philosophy & Theology* 15:2: 403-418.

⁷⁷⁵ With *amor concupiscentiae*, this “otherness” may or may not disappear. It depends upon whether or not the *amor concupiscentiae* is selfish or not.

⁷⁷⁶ We see that we are already moving into a discussion of *extasis*, which only underscores the interconnectedness of *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis*.

good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him.” The whole dynamic of what is intrinsic or extrinsic to the lover is fascinating and deserves closer appraisal.

The argument is difficult to follow, but vital to an understanding of the *redemptionis*. With *amor concupiscentiae*, the lover does not love an object *per se* but only accidentally to himself. Thus, a certain kind of ecstasy exists by which a lover seeks to have an object for himself. The reason that he is “carried out of himself” is because he is not satisfied with the good that he has. This should remind us of what was said about *amor amicitiae* in the article on *mutua inhaesio*, that the beloved is not in the lover according to an extrinsic cause, referring specifically to the fact that *amor concupiscentiae* desires something that is extrinsic to the beloved herself, i.e., the love is not for *who she is as a person* but for *what she can do or provide for the selfish lover*. Nevertheless, *amor concupiscentiae* still “is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were.”⁷⁷⁷ This seems to contradict what Thomas says in the following article that with *amor concupiscentiae*, “the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. Since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him.”⁷⁷⁸ On the one hand, in the article on *mutua inhaesio*, Thomas claims

⁷⁷⁷ ST Ia IIae, q28, a2, c.: “Amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur.”

⁷⁷⁸ ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.: “Quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, in quantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia

that the lover seeks to penetrate into everything that the beloved is; on the other hand, in the article on *extasis*, Thomas claims that the lover ultimately remains within himself. If love is not according to *amor amicitiae*, the lover can only desire to go out of himself. Thomas merely states that with *amor concupiscentiae*, the lover is not satisfied with a superficial possession of the beloved. This dissatisfaction does not imply that *amor concupiscentiae* actually provides the lover the *power* to truly experience *extasis* so that *mutua inhaesio* might be possible. For the person who is not “satisfied with enjoying the good that he has”⁷⁷⁹ cannot recognize another person as satisfactory on account of the fact that a friend is an *alter ipse*. *Amor concupiscentiae* can never be mutual because with this kind of love, no “others” truly *exist* as persons but the selfish lover. One cannot leave himself (*extasis*) if there are no other selves but the tyrant ego, and one can never dwell within a person (*mutua inhaesio*) if that same ego recognizes no one but the same tyrant. In an article concerning whether compulsion nullifies the sacrament of marriage, Thomas replies: “Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. 8.2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.”⁷⁸⁰ It appears, therefore, that true mutuality can only occur according to *amor amicitiae*.⁷⁸¹ The wicked cannot love mutually because there does not *simply speaking*

illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur.”

⁷⁷⁹ We feel that we can add “...or if he is not satisfied with who he is...”

⁷⁸⁰ III. *Supp.*, q47, a4, ad1.

⁷⁸¹ *Amor amicitiae* is for the sake of the beloved and for no other reason. Thomas clearly states, “Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake: because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and ever to be

exist any other persons to mutually love. Thus, the *via redamationis* only applies to true friendship. Its mutuality cannot possibly refer to the friendship that arises from either utility or pleasure.

Thomas points to the existence of the *via redamationis* before the article on *mutua inhaesio* itself. This is perhaps most apparent in *ST*, q28, a1, ad2 where he quotes Aristotle's citation of Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*: "Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (*Polit.* ii, 1), 'Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one,' but since 'this would result in either one or both being destroyed,' they seek a suitable and becoming union – to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things."⁷⁸² There is a mutuality implied in this form of real union that does not seem to apply to a lover who is only inspired by *amor concupiscentiae*. Indeed, the entire discussion of love as a passion that exists in the concupiscible appetite (q26, a1-a2) is superseded by the *via redamationis*, which is clearly a kind of love that is "nearer to the angels" and thus *without passion*. Thomas writes, "When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion."⁷⁸³ The whole distinction between *amor*

bettered and multiplied as much as possible." Thus, the perfection of love can only be according to a kind of *amor amicitiae*.

⁷⁸² *ST* Ia IIae, q28, a1, ad2: "Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II *Politic.*, Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur."

⁷⁸³ *ST* Ia IIae, q22, a3, ad3: "Quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum,

and *dilectio* indicated in *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a3, points to a “right will” (*recta voluntas*) that is a “well-directed love” (*bonus amor*). Again, there is no doubt that there are *mutua inhaesiones* that exist between friends who are unequal, and who love each other according to varying shades of both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* motivated by usefulness, pleasure, or goodness. But the whole point is this: if likeness is a primary cause of friendship and *amor amicitiae* involves truly being able to recognize another person as an *alter ipse*, then the most perfect kind of friendship (indeed, the only “true friendship”) can be only according to the *via redamationis*, where both love each other with an equal *amor amicitiae*.

Finally, we should mention that there is a structural reason for the mention of the *via redamationis* in the article. We should not forget the context of q28 as falling in the *Prima secundae*, which begins on beatitude in God as man’s end and is concluded with a section on grace. As Kwasniewski writes, “For Thomas to have taken the measure of love’s effects from a mediocre lover would be as incongruous as his having placed happiness in pleasure, or merit in natural effects.”⁷⁸⁴ Thus, Thomas prepares the way for us to re-evaluate love in terms of *caritas* in the *Secunda Secundae* by mentioning the *via redamationis*. In the *via redamationis* of q28, a2, Thomas lays some of the groundwork for what he says in the following articles, particularly a3 on ecstasy and a4 on zeal.

significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione.”
(See also See *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad1.)

⁷⁸⁴ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 165.

IA IIAE, Q28, A3: ECSTASY AS AN EFFECT OF LOVE

Peter Kwasniewski is the expert on *extasis* in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In the conclusion of his dissertation, he summarizes what the Angelic Doctor says about *extasis* in the *Prima Secundae*:

The treatment of *extasis* in the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae* plays a vital role in the three-question sequence on love.⁷⁸⁵ The article on *extasis* (I-II.28.3) serves both to sharpen our perception of love's effects individually and taken all together, and to ensure a nuanced reading of what love essentially is (I-II.26) as well as what initiates and sustains it (I-II.27). Here, too, we spoke of a "phenomenological" analysis, for the texts of I-II.28 do not skate along a surface of abstract ideas but penetrate deeply into the dense, obscure experiential domain of love, drawing upon the language and feelings of friends. In particular, we attended to the philosophical richness of the concept of *mutua inhaesio*, and the interplay which ensues between 28.2 on *mutua inhaesio* and 28.3 on *extasis*, articles related so intimately that they beg comparison to the strands of a double-helix. What emerges is a picture of the dialectical or circulatory structure of love, its invincible power to dominate multiplicity and shatter solitude, while amplifying spiritual singularity in the gift of self. *Extasis* presupposes and thrives upon a plurality which has entered into communion around the good and has thereby been led, in the order of affection, to oneness or simplicity. This sequence of questions, and the brief article on ecstasy, contain far more than meets the eye. As with so many other questions and articles in the *Summa*, one cannot help marveling at the interior riches, the inexhaustible implications, of discussions that seem at first glance so modest.⁷⁸⁶

If anything, this brings out the close interplay between *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis*. It is our contention that the article on *extasis* is almost a kind of extension to the corpus of *mutua inhaesio* in the dialectical and circulatory nature of love, as Kwasniewski has stated it so well.

The *sed contra* of Ia Iiae, q28, a3 reads: "On the contrary, Dionysius says that 'the Divine love produces ecstasy,' and that 'God Himself suffered ecstasy through love.'"

⁷⁸⁵ The *De Amore*, as we have called it.

⁷⁸⁶ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 220-221

Since therefore according to the same author, every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love causes ecstasy.⁷⁸⁷ Considering that Thomas has well-established that God is sufficient in himself and impassable, it is a self-evident proposition that if the Supreme Being suffered ecstasy through love, then every other participated creature must also suffer ecstasy through love. Like in many other articles, Thomas sets up a simple syllogism:

God suffered ecstasy through love.
Every creature is a participated likeness of Divine Love.
Therefore, every creature also suffers ecstasy.⁷⁸⁸

The problem is precisely what Thomas means by *extasis*. In the commentary on Dionysius, he uses phrases other than the ones he uses in the context of q28, a3. Ecstasy is not only an *exiens quodammodo extra seipsum* and an *exit extra se* which denote simply a “going out from one’s self” but also *a se alienatum*. Kwasniewski notes that the language of *alienatio* adds to *extasis* a certain negative notion of losing one’s mind, which is an aspect not absent in q28, a3. But it does not seem likely that the ecstasy referred to in the *sed contra* refers to anything negative, considering that Thomas ties it directly to the activity of God. Because ecstasy is so intimately related to indwelling, we would do well to introduce the negative and positive connotations of ecstasy in the present context of understanding the *sed contra*.

One of the most helpful discussions of ecstasy is found in *ST* II-II, q175, a1 and a2 where Thomas addresses various aspects of *raptus* and *extasis*. For the sake of clarity,

⁷⁸⁷ *ST* Ia IIae, q28, a3, sed.: “Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod divinus amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet amor causet extasim.”

⁷⁸⁸ A missing axiom is that every effect is like its cause.

we will summarize the key points of those two articles as a propaedeutic to understanding q28, a3. *Raptus* denotes a certain kind of violence in addition to a “being carried away.” When a man is carried away, it implies that he is being carried away by something to which he is not connatured. If he is drawn to something to which he is connatured, he can be said to remain within himself.⁷⁸⁹ Therefore, the one carried away in such a manner must be carried away by an external agent “different from that to which his inclination tends.”⁷⁹⁰ It appears that a person can be carried away in two ways that are different from his own inclination: either from the end of the inclination or from the manner of tending. An example of suffering an ecstasy in the mode of the “end of the inclination” is when a stone, which is naturally inclined downward, is thrown upward by something outside itself. An example of suffering ecstasy from “the manner of tending” is when the same stone is thrown down “with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.” Comparing this example of a stone to a person, Thomas comments that a man can suffer ecstasy according to the “end of the inclination” when he is transported to something that does not benefit his nature (such as something base) or by “the manner of tending” when he is transported beyond the power of his senses to contemplate divine things.⁷⁹¹ Essentially, we might call these

⁷⁸⁹ *ST IIa IIae*, q175, a1, c. This definition supports the fact that when a man simply loves a thing that is good for him, Thomas would not call this an ecstasy or a rapture. In other words, if I see a beautiful tree and my “heart goes out to it,” this is not an ecstasy.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.* “*Diversum ab eo in quod eius inclinatio tendit.*”

⁷⁹¹ Though it is natural for man to contemplate divine things, it is not natural for him to do so completely without the aid of his senses. Thomas notes that it is not contrary to nature that he is drawn to divine things, but “above the faculty of nature.” (*ST IIa IIae*, q175, a2, ad2).

ecstasies the “ecstasy of the ends” and the “ecstasy of the means.” Regarding the “ecstasy of the means,” Thomas continues by differentiating that there are three possible causes for the manner of any such “withdrawal”: a bodily cause,⁷⁹² the power of demons, and the power of God. There is a further meaning of ecstasy that simply means that one is drawn away from his senses or drawn from the normal object of his thought in a more mundane and analogous manner than the ones enumerated above. The overwhelming problem, which is directly related to *mutua inhaesio*, is that Thomas sometimes defines ecstasy as denoting something violent, meaning, “...that which has its principle without and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all.”⁷⁹³ We may discern three qualities of ecstasy from this article: it is something passive, external, and beyond the natural powers of man.

ST II-II, q175, a2, adds some additional points that we will find helpful in understanding ecstasy.⁷⁹⁴ The first point is that ecstasy refers to both the appetitive and intellectual powers, which is a point that he repeats in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3. However, he makes a distinction between precisely how the appetitive and intellectual powers can be rapt. Regarding “ecstasy of ends,” it only pertains to the intellectual powers rather than the appetitive powers. What Thomas appears to mean is that since the end of the appetitive power almost always tends to some external good (and therefore “outside” himself), it is not really proper to speak of an appetitive “ecstasy of ends.” We should be

⁷⁹² A man is, for example, taken away from his proper senses by some sickness or bodily weakness.

⁷⁹³ *ST IIa IIae*, q175, a1, c.: “...cuius principium est extra, nil conferente eo qui vim patitur.”

⁷⁹⁴ Like the previous article, Thomas appears to use *raptus* and *extasis* synonymously.

reminded that it is not really possible in Thomistic ethics to tend toward anything but the good. A man cannot truly choose a teleological end contrary to what is proper to him, and therefore there can be no violence that might draw him away from it, thereby producing an ecstasy. Thus, Thomas concludes that when a man desires a particular end, it cannot properly be said that suffers an “ecstasy of the ends,” but is rather “moved by himself.”⁷⁹⁵ The only way we may speak of an appetitive ecstasy is simply when man is strongly affected toward something “owing to the violence of his affection.” The corpus of *ST II-II*, q175, a2 makes us wonder whether man can properly suffer an appetitive ecstasy at all.

We can find some much-needed clarifications in the objections. He clarifies that *raptus* does add a certain notion of violence to *extasis*. More importantly, he defines appetitive ecstasy as “simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one’s proper order, while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition.”⁷⁹⁶ We still, however, need clarification regarding how one can transcend his proper order without doing so violently. *It is in this context that Thomas repeats basically the same point that he does in the sed contra of I-II, q28, a3, that even God suffers ecstasy through love simply by tending to something outside him.*⁷⁹⁷

⁷⁹⁵ *ST IIa IIae*, q175, a2, c.: “sed per se movetur”

⁷⁹⁶ *ST IIa IIae*, q175, a2, ad2.: “contingere quod ex violentia affectus”

⁷⁹⁷ It can certainly be argued that there is nothing “outside” God. But Thomas certainly affirms that in a universe of persons, there are things “other” than God and therefore “outside” him in a certain sense. Thomas is no pantheist.

Peter Kwasniewski notes that it is in *ST II-II*, q175, a2, ad2, that we find the most helpful definition of ecstasy.⁷⁹⁸ In that response, Thomas clarifies that because man has a twofold appetite in the intellective and the sensitive, he can “become outside himself” in a twofold manner. A man can wholly ignore his sensitive appetite and attend to divine things, and be not so much “beside himself” as “above himself,”⁷⁹⁹; he can tend wholly to his lower appetite while escaping the intellective. It is this latter kind of ecstasy that is closer to the meaning of rapture, because a man is drawn more violently from what is natural to him by focusing on his lower appetite to the detriment of the higher. Yet Thomas claims that even when this happens, it cannot be called *violent* on account of the fact that the intellective appetite can control the *raptus* of its own waywardly sensitive appetite. We cannot help but to conclude that ecstasy is not entirely a good thing, and it still remains to be seen how rapture which is violent truly differs from being “placed outside one’s proper order.”

The replies to the three objections of q28, a3, are the shortest of the six articles that comprise a28. The first objection deals with the definition of ecstasy as a loss of reason. It is argued that if ecstasy results in a loss of reason, and is also true that sometimes lovers do not suffer a loss of reason when they fall in love, then it cannot be necessarily true that love always causes ecstasy. Thomas simply counters by affirming that there is a kind of ecstasy that need not result in a loss of reason. The second objection assumes that union completely explains the phenomenon of love. In other words, if it is true that the lover “draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes

⁷⁹⁸ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love”, p166, n140.

⁷⁹⁹ *ST IIa IIae*, q175, a2, arg2. From Gregory the Great, *Dial.* 2.3.

himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself,"⁸⁰⁰ then there is no need for ecstasy at all. Indeed, it seems that the two are mutually exclusive. Again, Thomas responds that the corpus indicates that there is a kind of ecstasy that affirms the objection and another that denies it.⁸⁰¹ The third objection also brings out an aspect of union. It is argued that if the lover truly goes out of himself, then it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself, which is apparently false. The missing part of the logic is something that we have seen earlier in the dissertation – the fact that “unity surpasses union.” Thomas affirms the first part of this proposition while denying its concluding logic. It is true that there is a kind of ecstasy in which the lover goes out of himself, but it does not follow that he loves another more than himself. It seems apparent, therefore, that the corpus makes clear certain kinds of ecstasies in which a lover can lose his reason and another in which the lover remains more or less within the self without loss of reason.

The corpus has two primary parts. The first part describes both the appetitive and apprehensive ecstasies that are possible for the lover. The second part explains how direct or indirect these ecstasies are within their respective powers, and how *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* modify them. Thomas opens the article by offering a definition of ecstasy: “To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself.”⁸⁰² It is noteworthy that Thomas does not provide definitions for either union or mutual

⁸⁰⁰ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, ad2*: “Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, quam etiam pergit in amatum, extra se exiens.”

⁸⁰¹ With *amor concupiscentiae* the lover draws the beloved to himself. It is only with *amor amicitiae* that the love goes out of himself “simply.”

⁸⁰² *ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.*: “Extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur.”

indwelling in their respective contexts. He seems to take it for granted that union simply means to be “joined” to something, while mutual indwelling means to be “in” something.

First of all, one may suffer ecstasy in his apprehension. This simply means for the lover to be “placed outside the knowledge proper to him.”⁸⁰³ But this “being placed outside what is proper to him” can refer to the double-movement of either being lifted up to a higher knowledge⁸⁰⁴ that is beyond the “connatural apprehension of his sense and reason,”⁸⁰⁵ or cast down into a state of debasement⁸⁰⁶ when he is “overcome by violent passion or madness.”⁸⁰⁷ This seems to place us in the odd position that a man is not capable of intellectual ecstasy unless he is either lifted up beyond his *natural* powers or cast down through some disfigurement of his natural powers. Simply put, man does not appear to be able to undergo any kind of beneficial or positive intellectual ecstasy by his own natural powers.⁸⁰⁸ According to Kwasniewski, Thomas wishes “to explain how

⁸⁰³ Ibid., “Quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam.”

⁸⁰⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, c.: “ad superiorem sublimatur”

⁸⁰⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, c.: “Extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus.”

⁸⁰⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, c.: “ad inferiora deprimitur”

⁸⁰⁷ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, c.: “furiam vel amentiam cadit.”

⁸⁰⁸ Kwasniewski mentions that “It is not entirely clear from the context whether we are to understand that knowledge *praeter ordinem naturae* is only to be attained through divinely-inspired *raptus*, as parallel passages in the commentary on 2 Corinthians and the *De veritate* seem to suggest, or whether we may see all other-directed love – charity for God and neighbor, or human friendship at its peak – as having the effect of bearing the mind and senses beyond the lot that would be theirs in a state of solitude, as, for instance, Adam’s condition prior to the creation of Eve.” (Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 168)

it is that love can bring about an *extasis* in the cognitive domain, so as to bear off the subject to a perception of things beyond sense or reason.”⁸⁰⁹ The text seems to bear out this explanation, considering that Thomas himself explains his meaning by writing, “The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above,⁸¹⁰ and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things.”⁸¹¹ In the second part of the corpus, Thomas explains that intellectual ecstasy is caused “dispositively” (*dispositiva*), meaning that this kind of ecstasy causes a change in the disposition of the lover to dwell on the beloved. There seems to be no reason why, however, the lover’s contemplation of the beloved would necessarily take him beyond what is connatural to his powers.⁸¹² The only way that Thomas further differentiates appetitive ecstasy from intellectual is by clarifying that in an appetitive ecstasy, “that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth

⁸⁰⁹ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 169.

⁸¹⁰ Thomas refers directly to the article on *mutua inhaesio*; presumably, the passage stating, “the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.”

“Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem in quantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur.”

It should be noted that mutual indwelling includes this kind of ecstasy, which is part of the thesis that we are arguing— namely, that *mutua inhaesio* includes all the other effects of love and is thus its most perfect effect.

⁸¹¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, c.: “Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositiva, in quantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis.”

⁸¹² We are left wondering if it is possible for a lover to “go out of himself” into a mutual indwelling without an ecstasy. In other words, is an intellectual ecstasy only a “special case” of a union that is particularly intense, or must every mutual indwelling be preceded by a ecstasy?

out from itself, as it were.”⁸¹³ This “clarification” somewhat begs the question of what *extasis* actually is. It remains to be seen what it means to truly be *extra seipsum*. What, after all, does it mean to suffer an ecstasy both “dispositively” and “*extra seipsum*”?

Not surprisingly, Thomas has more to clarify regarding the precise meaning of an appetitive ecstasy. We see that while intellectual ecstasy is caused by love dispositively (*dispositively*), appetitive ecstasy is caused directly (*directe*). This is merely an extension of Thomas’ general teaching on the immediacy of the apprehensive power versus the mediated capability of the intellectual. But there are two ways in which an appetitive ecstasy can be caused directly: by the love of friendship simply (*simpliciter*) and by the love of concupiscence “not simply, but according to something.”⁸¹⁴ Again, we see the Angelic Doctor’s personalism shining forth through the veil of these various distinctions. For to “be carried out of himself” *simpliciter* means for Thomas that the lover’s affections tends toward the good of his friend for his friend’s sake, by “caring and providing for him.”⁸¹⁵ It is not possible to understanding the meaning of this *extasis simpliciter* without contrasting it to the one that is *non simpliciter* and caused by *amor concupiscentiae*. In explaining the ecstasy that is *non simpliciter*, Thomas writes a very brief masterpiece that explains the very heart of what it means to be selfish (in the negative sense):

⁸¹³ ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.: “Exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.” Deferrari notes that “St. Thomas does not apply the word ecstasy on the affective plane, as he did with knowledge, to mean the surpassing of a natural faculty.” (Deferrari, *The Problem of Charity for Self*, 152, n.45.)

⁸¹⁴ ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.: “non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. (Translation mine.)

⁸¹⁵ ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.: “gerens curam et providentiam ipsius.”

Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him.⁸¹⁶

Thomas's knowledge of psychology is superb. It is implied that the man who is not satisfied with himself will range far and wide to find those goods, experiences and friendships that will sate him. As the Proverb states, "A man of understanding sets his face toward wisdom, but the eyes of a fool are on the ends of the earth."⁸¹⁷ Everyone, however, must search outside himself for what he does not have, for no human person is complete in himself.⁸¹⁸ But the crux of the matter is that because he seeks this good selfishly and not for the sake of the other, he cannot be said to be carried out of himself *simpliciter*. He suffers an ecstasy only "in a sense." We should be reminded of what was said in Chapter Three about "The Physics of Love." The appetitive movement is circular. It begins with the first movement of love, which is the change in the appetite of the lover by the beloved, then proceeds to the movement of desire towards the beloved, then terminates back where it began – in the joyful heart of the lover who rests in the beloved.⁸¹⁹ If we add the new knowledge on ecstasy to this earlier knowledge about the

⁸¹⁶ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a3, c.*: "Nam in amore *concupiscentiae*, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, in quantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur."

⁸¹⁷ *Proverbs 17:24*. "In facie prudentis lucet sapientia oculi stultorum in finibus terrae."

⁸¹⁸ It is implied, however, that the more one is dissatisfied with himself – i.e., substantial union – the more he will search outside himself for what will "complete" him.

⁸¹⁹ *ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, c.*

movement of the passions, we see that the man caught in *amor concupiscentiae* can never truly experience the beloved *as* the beloved, because he seeks her for completely selfish ends. He is like Narcissus who can see a reflection that although exists *outside* himself, is only *of* himself. This selfish desire can be likened to the consumption of food. Once we eat a meal, the food disappears and is dissolved within us. The food ceases to be itself and is absorbed into the consumer. It is perfectly acceptable to love food with *amor concupiscentiae*, but a great tragedy of human love when we love other *persons* with *amor concupiscentiae*. Desiring them for our use and/or pleasure, we dissolve them into an abyss of need. In the ecstasy that is *non simpliciter*, the beloved disappears. There is only the titan ego, never really capable of leaving itself, but drawing all things to itself that they might be devoured.

Ecstasy cannot be most proper effect of love for several reasons. First, because ecstasy is often said by Thomas to be beyond the power of the human being, ecstasy is not preeminently human. Second, ecstasy often has negative connotations in Thomistic thought (particularly in terms of the violence of rapture). Nothing negative or “wounding” in Thomas’s terminology can be the most proper effect of love. In q28, a3, we see that intellectual ecstasy either surpasses the powers of the human being or debases them. Man can either be lifted up by something divine or corrupted by “violent passion or madness (*furiam vel amentiam*).” This is not so for the apprehensive power. Thomas does not refer to the appetitive power in terms of being borne away to something that does not belong to it by its very nature, i.e. the power to *go forth from*

itself.⁸²⁰ Fourth, what is truly superior must have its action come from within, and ecstasy implies action without.⁸²¹

Kwasniewski summarizes this attitude, and provides an excellent insight into the relation between ecstasy and *mutua inhaesio*:

Amicus est alter ipse: this is as far from simple otherness, as close to simple unity, as two individual substances of rational nature, two created supposita, can be. Absolute unity is neither possible nor desirable. What is certainly possible and most desirable is a communion of minds and hearts rooted in truly common goods that are, for that very reason, the greatest and most perfective goods each person can have in himself. In contrast to *mutua inhaesio* which emphasizes the overcoming of ontological separateness in the inward communion of affection that spills over outwardly into a sharing of life, conversation, feelings, and works, *extasis* seems to emphasize the *otherness* of the other in the affective sphere....⁸²²

There is a subtext in q28, a3 regarding the meaning of a simple ecstasy. Thomas often attributes simplicity to God. To be simple means *to be one*. But paradoxically, to be one does not mean that there can be no motion *in* and *out* or *back* and *forth*.⁸²³ God himself

⁸²⁰ "exiens quodammodo extra seipsum."

⁸²¹ SCG IIIb, cap. 88: "Moreover. As stated in 3 *Ethic.* i., a violent action is one in which the principle is external, and the one who suffers violence contributes nothing. Consequently if the will be moved by an external principle, its movement will be violent; and I speak of being moved by an external principle that moves as an agent, and not as an end. Now the violent is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore it is impossible that the will be moved by an external principle as an agent, and every movement of the will must come from within."

"Amplius. Violentum, ut dicitur in III *Ethic.*, est cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo. Si igitur voluntas moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio, erit violentus motus: dico autem moveri a principio extrinseco quod moveat per modum agentis, et non per modum finis. Violentum autem voluntario repugnat. Impossibile est ergo quod voluntas moveatur a principio extrinseco quasi ab agente, sed oportet quod omnis motus voluntatis ab interiori procedat."

⁸²² Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 208.

⁸²³ See SCG IV, cap. 26.

experiences ecstasy while being simple. We are now in a position to understand more fully a point made in *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad3 in the discussion of whether or not there is love in God. It is objected that since love is a union or bond and God is simple, then there cannot be love in God. God can suffer no bond “outside” himself because of his absolute simplicity. Thomas’s reply bears directly on our argument:

An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown. And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.⁸²⁴

It is extremely important to note that in the above text, Thomas argues that love as a union is not opposed to simple motion on the basis of the distinction between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. He does the same thing in the *De Amore*, q28, a3. The way that he escapes the horns of this dilemma of reconciling God’s simplicity with his union with multiplicity with the key phrase, “Thus he puts the other, as it were, in place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself.”⁸²⁵ We might summarize by stating that in the ecstasy of love, there is an *ipse* and an *alter ipse* rather than two separate persons; and rather than two separate goods, there is the single good of both. As Thomas has stated earlier in the *De Amore*, the appetitive movement is

⁸²⁴ *ST Ia*, q20, a1.

⁸²⁵ *ST Ia*, q20, a1, ad3: “Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum.”

circular.⁸²⁶ With *amor concupiscentiae*, that movement ultimately remains within the self, is static, and thus non-ecstatic. The circle of love revolves around the lover himself, and he dwells in it like a prison. With *amor amicitiae*, however, the circle of love is dynamic and revolves around not merely the beloved,⁸²⁷ but the beloved as *alter ipse*.

⁸²⁶ ST Ia IIae, q26, a2, c.: "Actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, inquantum aliis bona vult."

⁸²⁷ This is the ultimate solution to the dilemma posed between the ecstatic notion of love and the physical notion of love. Saying that the circle of love revolves only around the beloved is a romantic notion of love, based in an ultimately groundless assumption that we can completely break the bonds of the self to love the other even to the hatred of the self.

CHAPTER 6: THE EFFECTS OF LOVE II

In the following chapter we will analyze zeal (*zelus*) as an effect of love, wounding versus perfecting and conserving (*laesiva versus conservativa* and *perfectiva*), and the remaining proximate effects that Thomas enumerates in the context analyzing the latter in *ST I-II*, q28, a5): melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and *fervor* (fervor). Thomas does not explicitly account for the ordering of these effects, although he offers some hints within the text. As mentioned in the introduction to the previous chapter, Thomas is generally dealing with the effects of *amor* from its more proximate to its more remote effects. This is a general pattern that he often follows in the *Summa*. At the end of a5, however, he provides a kind of pre-conclusion to the whole question. He writes, "And these are the effects of love considered formally according to the relation of the appetite to its object. But in the passion of love other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ."⁸²⁸ Previously in the same article, Thomas refers to the effects of love considered formally as opposed to materially. These formal effects are the first six effects of *amor*: *unio, mutua inhaesio, extasis, zelus*, and *laesiva versus perfectiva/conservativa*.⁸²⁹ As mentioned

⁸²⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, c.: "Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi."

⁸²⁹ It is arguable whether or not wounding versus conserving and perfecting are more than a single effect. A5 is an exception to the other articles in that it is the only one where Thomas essentially replies in the negative concerning the particular effect; in other words, he argues that wounding is *not* formally an effect of love. It may seem that wounding is an effect of love on account of the emotional pain that it can cause, or on account of the fact that the object that we love harms us in some way. The *sed contra* makes it clear that considered absolutely, love conserves and perfects. In the corpus,

previously, the first three effects are the closest to the form of *amor*, being a description of what it actually is. Proceeding to the final two remote effects of love of zeal and wounding, Thomas analyzes essentially *in what mode amor* exists; namely, its intensity on the part of the lover over the beloved (a4) and the good or evil effect that the beloved has on the lover (a5).

IA IIAE, Q28, A4: ZEAL AS AN EFFECT OF LOVE

It is interesting to note that Thomas bases the *sed contra*s of a2, a3, and a4 on how love exists in God. Mutual indwelling is an effect of love because those who abide in charity abide in God, and vice versa; therefore, mutual indwelling is an effect of love.⁸³⁰ God himself experiences ecstasy because of love, so ecstasy is an effect of love.⁸³¹ Regarding zeal, Thomas echoes Dionysius and declares that God himself is said to be a zealot on account of love, therefore zeal is an effect of love.⁸³² Thomas clearly gives the reason for this in the context of the *sed contra* of a3, which is that “every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love.”⁸³³

however, Thomas elaborates that it is possible to love something that is not entirely suitable for the lover, and thus he can be wounded and worsened thereby.

⁸³⁰ ST Ia Ilae, q28, a2, sed.

⁸³¹ ST Ia Ilae, q28, a3, sed.

⁸³² ST Ia Ilae, q28, a4, sed.

⁸³³ ST Ia Ilae, q28, a3, sed.: “quaedam similitudo participata divini amoris.”

We might add that union is an effect of love because God is one, although the *sed contra* of q28, a1 does not indicate this.

It is not only the lover or the beloved that determines love's order, but also the intensity, for there is no doubt that love admits of a "more" or "less." It is about this intensity that Thomas enumerates *zelus* as an effect of love. As the beginning of the corpus indicates, zeal refers to "the intensity of love (*intensione amoris*)" in any circumstance in which that word is used. Harkening back to the *Prima Pars*, q20, Thomas admits that even God's love may vary in degree in relation to the object, even though according to God's essence he constantly wills superlatively. In answer to the objection that God's essence admits of no degree, Thomas replies, "This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures is not the divine essence. Therefore, there is no reason why it may not vary in degree."⁸³⁴

The *sed contra* reads, "On the contrary, Dionysius says (*DDN IV*): 'God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things.'⁸³⁵ Because being a zealot (*zelotes*) is attributed to God, there is no doubt that *zelus* bears positive connotations. But this is not always the case with the word *zelus*, because it is mixed with both the positive and the negative in the text of q28, a4. We should recognize immediately, however, that *zelus* bears a translation problem which also indicates a conceptual problem. D'Arcy chooses to translate *zelus* as "jealousy" whereas the Dominican Fathers translate *zelus* simply as "zeal." We are immediately aware that jealousy has a negative connotation

⁸³⁴ *ST Ia*, q20, a3, ad2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud intendi vel remitti."

⁸³⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a4, sed.: "Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De Div. Nom., quod Deus appellatur Zelotes propter multam amorem quem habet ad existentia."

whereas zeal generally has a positive one, though we are also aware that one can be jealous for the Lord and can also be zealous for some horribly radical cause. D'arcy writes his opinion about this matter in a footnote:

The word *zelus* is hardly known in classical Latin, but one sometimes finds *zeloyphia*, a transliteration of the Greek Ζηλοτυπια, = jealousy, rivalry, envy. The Greek word Ζηλος means "eager rivalry" or "jealousy" in a good sense: the opposite of ψθονος, envy. For this reason, and even more for the various usages in the present article, "jealousy" is probably better than "zeal" or "emulation" as the translation of *zelus*.⁸³⁶

I am not sure whether D'arcy's conclusion is the best one, considering the changes of language over time. It is still quite acceptable in common usage to treat *zeal* in a positive sense, but being jealous for something good in the sense of "God being jealous for his people" has grown more archaic in common usage. Moreover, Thomas himself designates a specific zeal of envy (*zelus invidiae*) that certainly bears negative moral connotations,⁸³⁷ as well as a zeal for justice (*zelus iustitiae*)⁸³⁸ and a zeal for revenge (*zelus vindicta*).⁸³⁹ Similar to the word "ecstasy" (particularly as *raptus*), the term *zelus* is somewhat morally neutral, and depends upon its object. Thomas writes:

Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. II, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. 14:1: "Be zealous

⁸³⁶ D'arcy, *The Emotions*, p. 98-9, note (a). For a further discussion of zeal, emulation and envy, see Corvez, *Les passions de l'âme*, n. 86, 230-32; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life*, trans. M. Timothea Doyle (Rockford, Ill: Tan, 1989), 213-21.

⁸³⁷ See *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a4, c.

⁸³⁸ See *ST IIa IIae*, q34, a4, c.

⁸³⁹ *De Vir.* q2, a8, ad14.

for spiritual gifts”: while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless.⁸⁴⁰

The first objection, on the authority of 1 Cor 3:3, claims that since zeal is the source of contention, it could not possibly be compatible with love. Thomas admits that this is true, but that the zeal that the objection refers to is the “zeal of envy (*zelo invidiae*),” and not properly the zeal of love.⁸⁴¹ The second objection makes an essential point about the nature of the good. The good “communicates itself to other.” The good is that which, in its radiance, demands that the intellect and will assent to it. But it seems that zeal is opposed to communication, for the point is raised that if persons are jealous (*zelare*) of what they love, they will not communicate (i.e. share it) with others. In the reply to the objection, Thomas raises a point which is subtly subjective: “Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover.”⁸⁴² It is implied that there are factors that can hinder the objective communication of the good to the subject. In some cases, zeal may arise when the communication of this objective good is hindered, and this kind of zeal is consistent with love because it seeks to overcome this barrier. We might think of the zeal with which freedom-fighters attempt to liberate their imprisoned comrades. Because there is an enemy that hinders the good of freedom and community, they act with zeal to neutralize that enemy. The zeal of envy, mentioned in the previous

⁸⁴⁰ *ST* IIa IIae, q36, a2, c.: “Alio modo potest aliquis tristari de bono alterius, non ex eo quod ipse habet bonum, sed ex eo quod nobis deest bonum illud quod ipse habet. Et hoc proprie est zelus; ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhet. Et si iste zelus sit circa bona honesta, laudabilis est, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, aemulamini spiritualia. Si autem sit de bonis temporalibus, potest esse cum peccato, et sine peccato.”

⁸⁴¹ *ST* Ia IIae, q28, a4, ad1.

⁸⁴² *ST* Ia IIae, q28, a4, ad2. “Bonum amatur in quantum est communicabile amanti.”

objection, is obviously inconsistent with love. But this zeal does not (or should not) arise when its object can be possessed by the many. The third objection claims that zeal can accompany hatred just as readily as it can accompany love, and thus zeal should not properly be called an effect of love. Thomas's reply to this objection underscores the primacy of love and the reality of the good, and the concomitant *unreality* of evil. Even a wicked man is zealous when he is hindered from what he loves.⁸⁴³

Again, it appears that zeal, on account of the fact that Thomas emphasizes its tendency to "remove everything that opposes it," is more related to the irascible appetite than the concupiscible. The corpus, like the three previous articles, makes the important distinction between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. In other words, just as this twofold act of love alters the mode of union, mutual indwelling and ecstasy, it also alters the nature of *zelus*. As we might expect, the basic differentiation is that *amor concupiscentiae* causes the zeal of envy while *amor amicitiae* "causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good."⁸⁴⁴ The selfish man, viewing his love through the lens of *amor concupiscentiae*, is zealous when he is hindered from the love that is pleasureable or useful to him. He is zealous *on his own behalf*, while the man who

⁸⁴³ Thomas is well aware that there is a "zeal of bitterness" as well as a "zeal of love." (ST II-II, q187, a1. c.) The *Rule of St. Benedict*, with which Thomas was familiar, states toward its conclusion: "Just as there is an evil zeal of bitterness which separates from God and leads to hell, so there is a good zeal which separates from vices and leads to God and to life everlasting." Benedict of Nursia, "Regula" in *RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict in Latin and English with Notes*, ed. Timothy Fry et al. (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1981), chap. 72: 1-2.

"Sicut est zelus amaritudinis malus qui separat a Deo et ducit ad infernum, ita est zelus bonus qui separat a vitia et ducit ad Deum." (*Regula Monachorum, Text Ilati segons el manuscrit de Sankt-Gall.*)

⁸⁴⁴ ST Ia IIae, q28, a4, c: "Facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici."

views his love through the lens of *amor amicitiae* is zealous *on behalf of another*. The former kind of zeal is *zelus invidiae*, which is always morally bad. It should be said, however, that even the zeal caused by *amor concupiscentiae* is not always necessarily bad. A husband is *zelus* over his exclusive sexual and emotional rights concerning his wife, and it is proper for him to have this zeal when her association with others hinders this right.

Thomas refers to the “intensity of love” in contexts other than *ST I-II, q28, a4*. In the *Secunda Secundae* in the context of answering whether we should love one neighbor more than another with *caritas*, he makes two points relevant to our discussion of zeal. First, the fact that “love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.”⁸⁴⁵ Second, the fact that the intensity of love is measured specifically according to the closeness of the union.⁸⁴⁶ For example, Thomas speaks of charity as a kind of form,

⁸⁴⁵ *ST IIa IIae, q26, a7, c*. Also, “I answer that, every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover.”

“Respondeo dicendum quod omnis actus oportet quod proportionetur et obiecto et agenti, sed ex obiecto habet speciem, ex virtute autem agentis habet modum suae intensiois; sicut motus habet speciem ex termino ad quem est, sed intensioem velocitatis habet ex dispositione mobilis et virtute moventis.”

⁸⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, “...the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them.”

“Sed intensio dilectionis est attendenda per comparationem ad ipsum hominem qui diligit. Et secundum hoc illos qui sunt sibi propinquiores intensiori affectu diligit homo ad illud bonum ad quod eos diligit, quam meliores ad maius bonum.”

Though this has already been cited, it deserves to be quoted again – *ST IIa IIae, q26, a8, c*: “I answer that, As stated above (A7), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different

and argues that this form can admit of a “more” or “less” depending upon its adherence to a subject: “Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject.”⁸⁴⁷ We see that Thomas connects the intensity of love (i.e., its zeal) with the idea of the intimacy of its inherence. We must recall that the *ordo amoris*, which we meditated on in our introduction, certainly has to do with “more” and “less.” The order of intensity (zeal) deals directly with the intimacy of union, and what union is more intimate than the union that is also *mutua inhaesio*?

IA IIAE, Q28, A5: THE WOUNDING OF THE LOVER AND THE PROXIMATE EFFECTS OF LOVE

Does love wound the lover? Many poets seem to think so. The experience of heartbreak would seem to attest in the affirmative as well. We see in St. Thomas Aquinas that it has occupied the philosophers as well. Plato, through the interlocutor of Socrates, has often associated love with a kind of madness that destroys the lover.⁸⁴⁸ Thomas was certainly aware that our passions have the power to overwhelm our reason

persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved.”

⁸⁴⁷ *ST* IIa IIAe, q24, a5, c.: “Sic ergo caritas augetur solum per hoc quod subiectum magis ac magis participat caritatem, idest secundum quod magis reducitur in actum illius et magis subditur illi. Hic enim est modus augmenti proprius cuiuslibet formae quae intenditur, eo quod esse huiusmodi formae totaliter consistit in eo quod inhaeret susceptibili. Et ideo, cum magnitudo rei consequitur esse ipsius, formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili, non autem aliam formam advenire.”

⁸⁴⁸ See Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244a-257b.

and cause us harm. On the overwhelming authority of Dionysius, Thomas replies, “everything loves itself with a love that holds it together (*quod singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservitive*)” or, in other words, that “preserves and perfects (*conservativa et perfectiva*)” it.⁸⁴⁹ It is no surprise that Thomas deals with the question of “love’s wounds” in the present article immediately after dealing with another effect with a bad reputation in relation to love (i.e., *zelus*). But if it is true that zeal deals directly with the subjective intensity of the lover’s love for the object of his love, then the present article deals with the objective status of whether or not the *object* is truly connatural or suitable to the lover. If love denotes “a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good,”⁸⁵⁰ then it must be true that the lover is only perfected by what is suitable to him and worsened by what is not. Thomas could hardly be further from describing love as a passion than he is in this article. Innumerable instances could be cited where we *feel* “love” or attachment to those things that actually worsen or debase us. Part of the confusion of dealing with Thomistic love are the interwoven elements of subjectivity and objectivity, for it is equally as obvious that the previous article concerning zeal has a great deal to do with subjective passions irregardless of their being well-ordered or not.

Thomas is not heedless of these distinctions, and is well aware that love is a passion that can wound the lover. Quoting Hosea 9:10, “They became abominable, as those things which they loved.”⁸⁵¹ *Formally* speaking, love cannot wound the lover.⁸⁵² In

⁸⁴⁹ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a5, sed.:* “*Quod singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative.*”

⁸⁵⁰ *ST Ia IIae, q28, a5, c.:* “*amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum.*”

⁸⁵¹ Thomas quotes Hosea in the corpus of *ST Ia IIae, q28, a5.*

other words, love as the pursuit of an objective good cannot possibly wound the lover. Love is always of a good, and a good always perfects and improves the lover when pursued. It is possible, however, to be mistaken about one's good, to love a good too little or too much, to love a lesser good over a greater good, or allow the goods of the senses to override right reason. In these ways, a man who loves sin can be worsened and wounded by love. Thomas writes simply: "Man is perfected and bettered mostly through the love of God, but is wounded and worsened through the love of sin."⁸⁵³ Materially speaking, love as a bodily passion can cloud the senses regarding the soul's proper judgment of what that good actually is.⁸⁵⁴ It is after clarifying this material aspect of the passions that Thomas writes a single reply to three objections, which is the only time he does such a thing in the context of the *De Amore*. It is in reply to the objections that there seem to be effects of love that wound the lover that he mentions melting (*liquefactio*), languor (*languor*), fervor (*fervor*), and enjoyment (*fruitio*).

Because of the context, we can surmise that these four effects have more to do with the material element of love. Moreover, Thomas mentions that these are *proximate* effects of love.⁸⁵⁵ Thomas writes, "A thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than

⁸⁵² Thomas does not make this distinction in the context of the article on wounding. It is clearer in *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1 that evil is only loved under the aspect of goodness.

⁸⁵³ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, c.: "Unde maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem et deterioratur per amorem peccati." (My translation.)

⁸⁵⁴ One can also love a lesser good more than a greater good, or perhaps love a proper end while pursuing wicked means.

⁸⁵⁵ Neither D'arcy nor Miner mention what Thomas means by "proximate effect."

by its remote effect.”⁸⁵⁶ He also explains that remote effects, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to declare the nature of their cause.⁸⁵⁷ In other words, proximate effects are more immediately observable, though not necessarily declarative of the nature of a thing.⁸⁵⁸ This is not surprising, considering that effects like ecstasy or mutual indwelling do not lend themselves to ready observation, but are, in fact, more indicative of the very form of love. Whether a particular love perfects or wounds a lover is, apparently, observable by observing the intensity and inner nature of the lover’s fervor, languor, joy and melting. We will deal with these effects in their respective order.

The first effect mentioned is *liquefactio* or “melting.” The first point that Thomas makes about it is that it is “opposed to freezing.” The notion of having a “hard heart” is well-known in Scripture,⁸⁵⁹ and the effect of *liquefactio* is directly opposed to it. What is more noteworthy is that Thomas directly associates the state of *liquefactio* with *mutua inhaesio*:

But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above. Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved.⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁶ ST IIa IIae, q45, a6, arg2: “Unumquodque magis manifestatur per proximum effectum quam per remotum.”

⁸⁵⁷ *De Anima*, q16, ad7.

⁸⁵⁸ We may observe that water moves if it happens to be blown by the wind, or if it happens to be a river that flows out to the sea. But water can just as easily be still as to move. “Movement” is a proximate effect of water. It does not indicate the very nature of what water is, but is an accident of how something else is affecting the water.

⁸⁵⁹ Thomas himself has quoted *Ecclus.* 3:27 in ST Ia IIae, q79, a3: “A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.”

⁸⁶⁰ ST Ia IIae, q28, a5, c.: “Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra

What is emphasized with these observable effects is that the lover and beloved are not merely joined but that the beloved is *in* the lover, and that the heart is ready for the entrance (*subintrat*) of the beloved.⁸⁶¹ Speaking specifically of the condition of *duritia cordis* (hardness of heart) Thomas writes, “for that is hard which is constrained within itself, and bound to its own measurement.”⁸⁶² What is further meant by “melting” is that the love-struck person is not destroyed by the love, but merely softened. In the context of responding to the question of whether or not the elements will be destroyed at the end of time, Thomas replies that the elements will *melt* with the heat and not be destroyed.⁸⁶³ Melting does not destroy. This comparison is quite apt in the context of whether or not love perfects or wounds the lover for the reason that melting is often associated with the idea of purifying metal, i.e., making it better or more valuable.⁸⁶⁴

dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, *qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret.*” (Emphasis added.)

⁸⁶¹ Kwasniewski comments, “Is this activity of *mollificatio* then a sort of preparation for *mutua inhaesio*, and in that way a disposition for loving, or is it rather a confirmation that *mutua inhaesio* has already taken place, a sign of love in act? It is in reality both of these things, for it is a continual process of *liquefactio* caused by the warmth of love in opposition to fallen man’s tendency towards *congelatio et duritia cordis.*” (Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 198.)

⁸⁶² *Super Mattheum* 13:3-23: “Durum enim est quod est in se constrictum, et propriis metis arctatum.”

⁸⁶³ Thomas uses 2 Pet. 3, 10, 12 as his authority. (See also *DP* II, q5, a7, ad1)

⁸⁶⁴ This melting of the elements does not mean that their substance will be destroyed but that *they will be refined* by the fire which will go before the face of the Judge. After being thus refined the elements will remain in their substance and natural qualities, as we have stated.

“Quod illa elementorum solutio non est referenda ad destructionem substantiae elementorum, sed ad elementorum purgationem, quae erit per ignem, qui faciem iudicis

Thus, *liquefactio* must be present in some sense before any other effect ensues. It seems that if any kind of union or indwelling is to take place, this “melting” of the lover’s heart is a necessary condition.

From what has already been mentioned about ecstasy, Thomas’s response to the following objection is extremely important (and related to the present discussion on *liquefactio*). In the context of whether a man should love his benefactors above all, he writes: “For Augustine says: ‘Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given.’”⁸⁶⁵ Thomas then responds: “It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through another.”⁸⁶⁶ This adds another dimension to the argument of how truly “ecstatic” Thomistic love is. It seems that though a perfect love exists for the sake of the other as an *alter ipse*, it must be done “of our own accord” and for the sake of the intentions that inhere solely in the intellect and will of the lover. The melting is on the part of

praecedet. Post illam autem purgationem remanebunt elementa secundum substantiam et naturales qualitates, ut dictum est.”

⁸⁶⁵ *ST IIa IIae, q26, a12, arg12*: “nulla est maior provocatio ad amandum quam praevenire amando, nimis enim durus est animus qui dilectionem, etsi non vult impendere, nolit rependere. Sed benefactores praeveniunt nos in beneficio caritatis. Ergo benefactores maxime debemus diligere.” (Augustine, *De Catech. Rud. IV.*)

⁸⁶⁶ *ST IIa IIae, q26, a12, arg1*: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in benefactore est ut beneficiatus provocetur ad ipsum amandum. Benefactor autem diligit beneficiatum non quasi provocatus ab illo, sed ex seipso motus. Quod autem est ex se potius est eo quod est per aliud.”

the subject, not the object. We could even conclude that melting is, in fact, the condition for the possibility of even the first five remote effects of love.

The effect of pleasure or enjoyment (*delectatio sive fruitio*) arises when the beloved is present and possessed.⁸⁶⁷ This point merely repeats an effect that Thomas mentioned in 26, a2, that when the beloved is possessed, there is a “rest which is joy (*quies quae est gaudium*).” According to Dubay, the best definition is that pleasure is “a quieting of the will in some appropriate good.”⁸⁶⁸ Pleasure and enjoyment are the more passionate and sensitive effects of *complacentia*, which is more of a wider designation referring to the general impression that the beloved makes in the intentions and the heart of the lover.⁸⁶⁹ The comparison made in the discussion of pleasure in q28, a2 should be paralleled to the present one on the same proximate effects of enjoyment. We are told that the beloved is in the lover “by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved with the love of friendship.”⁸⁷⁰ Thomas continues: “If, then, the beloved is

⁸⁶⁷ *Delectatio* and *fruitio* arise as a single effect. Kwasniewski supports this as well. (Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 202.)

⁸⁶⁸ SCG III, cap. 26. See Thomas Dubay, “An Investigation into the Thomistic Concept of Pleasure,” *The New Scholasticism* 36:1 (1962): 76-7.

⁸⁶⁹ Complacency broadly considered can refer to the first change wrought in the appetite by the object or to an adaptation of the beloved to the lover (*ST Ia IIae*, q26, a2, c.) as well as to the connaturality or proportion of the beloved to the lover (*ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1, c.). Properly considered, however, complacency refers to a kind of pleasure or rest that the beloved enjoys in the appetite of the lover.

⁸⁷⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: “Prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem *concupiscentiae*; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem *amicitiae*.”

present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise: sadness at its absence, which is denoted by *languor* (hence Cicero in *De Tuscul. Quaest.* III,11 applies the term ailment chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by *fervor*.”⁸⁷¹ In both passages, Thomas emphasizes the fact that when the lover is present there is also *delectatio* that is caused by the intense desire (*desiderium*) of the lover to be with the beloved. In the article on *mutua inhaesio*, however, Thomas does not emphasize the negative effects of *languor* and *tristitia*. We should not be surprised by this. In *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, Thomas is setting up the effect of *mutua inhaesio* as something very positive, whereas in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, Thomas must address the obvious negativity that love can cause to the lover while still upholding love’s ultimate benefaction.

There are two further effects that arise when the beloved is absent: *tristitia* because of the absence of the beloved, and *desiderium* that the lover may possess her or be with her. According to the language of the *Song of Songs*, these two effects are associated, respectively, with *languor* and *fervor*. Thomas was well aware of the following passage in the *Song of Songs*: “Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples, for I am sick with love (*amore languo*).”⁸⁷² Concerning *fervor*, Thomas

⁸⁷¹ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, c.: “Si ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones, scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem (unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione amati, quod significatur per fervorem.”

⁸⁷² *Cant.* 2:5. The Hebrew word used in *Cant* 2.5 & 5.8, *halath*, literally means “to be wounded.”

defines it as the “intense desire to possess the beloved.”⁸⁷³ Fervor is closely connected with zeal. In fact, Thomas specifically notes that zeal denotes the fervor of love.⁸⁷⁴ Zeal and fervor are difficult to separate, though it seems that properly speaking, *zelus* refers specifically to an intensity of love, while fervor has a wider designation, and can refer to anger as easily as it can refer to love.

In conclusion, we are right to suspect whether something that is *laesiva et corruptiva* can be an effect of love. Strictly speaking, the appetite must pursue what is truly *conveniens*, or what is a good for the subject. But in this article, Thomas recognizes that it is quite possible that the misdirected or wicked appetite may choose only what is *perceived* to be *conveniens* – a perception that could be misguided.⁸⁷⁵ Kwasniewski, for example, points out that there is a sense in which fervor, wounding, and languor are positive and a sense in which they are negative.⁸⁷⁶ Ultimately, Thomas tersely claims, “Nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby.”⁸⁷⁷ Though this might beg the question of what precisely is suitable to the lover, the answer to this question must be considered in the light of Thomas’s entire philosophy and theology. Thus, formally considered, love does not wound. But because the absence of the beloved can cause languor and fervor, it may

⁸⁷³ ST Ia IIae, q28, a4, c: “Intensum desiderium de consecutione amati.”

⁸⁷⁴ ST IIa IIae, q108, a2, ad2.

⁸⁷⁵ See Miner, 137-8.

⁸⁷⁶ Kwasniewski, 194.

⁸⁷⁷ ST Ia IIae, q28, a5, c.

seem that love wounds the lover. Additionally, a man may love something that is not suitable to him under the aspect of the good by not truly loving what is proper within himself. In *ST Ia IIae*, q29, a4 on hatred we see a kind of addendum to the *De Amore*.⁸⁷⁸ In that article, Thomas tells us how a man might love what is destructive to himself and thus be said to “hate himself” in a general sense:

But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, “he that loveth iniquity hateth” not only “his own soul,” but also himself.⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷⁸ Thomas does not enumerate hatred in the same way as love, progressing from the question of “quid sit” to that of causes, then to effects. He does claim, however, that hatred (being the opposite of love which has good as its object) has evil as its object (q29, a1). Being the root of all emotions, love causes even hatred (q29, a2). Love is stronger than hatred on account of the fact that even evil does nothing except in virtue of the good (q29, a3). A man cannot hate himself except accidentally (q29, a4).

⁸⁷⁹ *ST Ia IIae*, q29, a4, c.: “Per accidens tamen contingit quod aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principaliter in ipso, unde civitas dicitur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum.”

It is only in such ways that love can be said to wound the lover: 1) by loving something in a particular way that is actually evil (like desiring money, which is good, but it happens to belong to someone else, so taking it is evil) and, 2) when man's lower nature direct his higher nature. In a particular way by the end of a5, we see *amor* emerge as that passion which is the ordering force of the universe. Nature predetermines all things to respond in a certain way in their search for the good, and when that pattern is not followed, a wound ensues. Both the blessing and the curse of human nature is the ability to freely choose his course, and thereby choose both his wounds and their remedy.

IA IIAE, Q28, A6: WHATEVER THE LOVER DOES AS AN EFFECT OF LOVE

In the final article of q28, we see in fact that *amor* is the cause of the lover to do "all things out of love (*omnia ex amore*)."⁸⁸⁰ The first objection alone is longer than the entire corpus, of which Thomas makes short work: "I answer that, every agent acts for an end, as stated above. Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind."⁸⁸¹ This hearkens back to the point he made in *ST I- II, q1, a2*, that "an agent does not move except out of intention for an end,"⁸⁸² that it acts specifically according to that intention (i.e., it is "determinate") and that this determination is effected by the

⁸⁸⁰ *ST Ia IIAe, q28, a6, arg1.*

⁸⁸¹ *ST Ia IIAe, q28, a6, c:* "Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore."

⁸⁸² *ST Ia IIAe, q1, a2, c.:* "Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis."

appetite, which cannot move but by love. We are now in a position to see part of Thomas's theory of love in greater harmony. He reiterates this position in *ST I-II*, q26, a1, on the subject of love as the concupiscible appetite. For to be "determined to an effect" is the same as to be connotated to one. Even God Himself acts toward an end, which we saw in q20 of the *Prima Pars*. The authority of Dionysius in this final article is overwhelming. As in five of the six *sed contras* of q28, he is also the authority in this one: "On the contrary, Dionysius says that all things, whatever they do, they do for love of good."⁸⁸³ This is certainly not a new principle. Thomas mentions it repeatedly, and particularly in *ST Ia IIae*, q27, a1, where we see the good as the preeminent cause of love. We might be tempted to think that there is no new information provided in the objections. If reviewed closely, however, we see that this is not the case.

The first objection indicates that passion cannot be the cause of all that man does because some things are apparently done out of choice (*electione*) or ignorance (*ignorantia*). Passions are not the cause of every action, and love is a passion.⁸⁸⁴ Thus, love cannot possibly be the cause of everything that a lover does. Thomas replies that this objection only considers love as existing in the sensitive appetite; but taking Dionysius as his authority again, the Angelic Doctor makes it clear that "we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chap. iv. of *De*

⁸⁸³ *DDN IV*, quoted in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, sed.: "Propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt."

⁸⁸⁴ This is opposed to a common view that passions are really the cause of everything, and we misname certain choices as reason. This view was made popular in the West by Thomas Hobbes. He writes, "Men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of their passions." (See Hobbes, *Leviathan* I.8)

Divinis Nominibus."⁸⁸⁵ Thomas makes it clear when he writes, "we are speaking of..." that the entire discussion of the *De Amore* is "in the general sense" (*communiter accepto*). The whole analysis has been of *amor* as an architectonic metaphysical force rather than love as simply a passion, even though Thomas identifies *amor* as a passion *strictly speaking* in *ST I-II*, q26, a2. So the first objection in this final article of the *De Amore* makes it clear that we are speaking of *amor* "in the general sense."⁸⁸⁶

The second objection also provides us with some new information. It is objected that if the appetite is the principle of movement as stated in *De Anima* III, 10, then the other passions are simply superfluous. It is a kind of negative objection. It would still be true that love is the cause of everything the lover does, but it would be superfluous to have an article about it because there would be nothing else to say about the matter – all the emotions are merely love by a different name. Thomas denies this claim, stating that despite the fact that *amor* is a specific passion, it is also a first cause and root for the other passions. Therefore, it is not superfluous to speak of the other passions as *proximate causes*.⁸⁸⁷ The final objection is related to the second insofar as it tries to multiply the causes of love. The argument is that since nothing can be produced by contrary causes, and some things are done out of hatred, then love cannot be the cause of everything that

⁸⁸⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a6, ad1: "Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalelem, naturalelem, sic enim Dionysius loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom."

⁸⁸⁶ If one wishes a comparison, we often call every tissue a "Kleenex." But Kleenex is a brand-name, and only Kleenex can properly be called as such. But we often apply the specific name to tissues in general nonetheless. In a similar way, only *amor* as a passion is truly *amor* strictly speaking.

⁸⁸⁷ We can compare this claim to what Thomas said in the previous article *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5, about the proximate effects of love. The effects that are more "at the root" are *unio*, *mutua inhaesio* and *extasis*.

the lover does. Thomas simply states that love is also a cause of hatred, and refers the reader to the following article (Ia IIae, q29) on hatred which supplies a kind of appendix to the *De Amore*. The crux of the argument is that one cannot possibly hate something without first loving something else *on account of which* we hate. We can relate this to the consistent theory that only the good (and therefore only the appetite toward the Good) truly has being. Thomas writes:

I answer that, it must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fall short of its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.⁸⁸⁸

Thus, we must remember that beyond the specific effects listed in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, almost everything is an effect of love in a general sense. Thus, the absolutely formal, remote effects of love are only these:

- 1) Real union
- 2) Mutual indwelling
- 3) Ecstasy
- 4) Zeal
- 5) Perfectivity/improvement

...which proximately cause the following effects:

- 6) Melting
- 7) Enjoyment
- 8) Languor

⁸⁸⁸ *ST Ia*, q49, a1, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod omne malum aliquo modo causam habeat. Malum enim est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi. Quod autem aliquid deficiat a sua naturali et debita dispositione, non potest provenire nisi ex aliqua causa trahente rem extra suam dispositionem, non enim grave movetur sursum nisi ab aliquo impellente, nec agens deficit in sua actione nisi propter aliquod impedimentum. Esse autem causam non potest convenire nisi bono, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi in quantum est ens; omne autem ens, in quantum huiusmodi, bonum est." (Translation modified.)

9) Fervor

Moreover, the sweeping effect of *amor* is:

- 10) "All that the other does" (*omnia ex amore*) and these "other effects [that] ensue [upon the relation of the appetite to the object] (*consequuntur aliqui effectus*)."

As we are concluding our specific comments on the effects of love, a parallel passage to the *De Amore* in the *Commentary on the Sentences* will perhaps shed some light on our analysis. In that text, it is objected that ultimately love is more a divisive force than a unitive one. The objection and the reply are so important for our purposes that we will reproduce them both here. The text admirably describes many of the effects of love that we have already seen in the *De Amore*. We will first quote the objection and then the reply:

Further, in *The Celestial Hierarchy* Dionysius sets down "piercing" and "burning" among the properties of love, and "melting," too, is set down as love's effect, as in the *Song of Songs*: "My soul melted when my beloved spoke (Cant. 5:6)." In chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* Dionysius also sets down "ecstasy," i.e., being placed outside oneself, as love's effect. But all these things seem to pertain to division. The piercing is what divides by penetrating; the burning, what dissolves by exhalations. Melting, too, is a kind of division opposed to freezing. And that which is placed outside itself is divided from itself. Therefore love is more a divisive force than a unitive one.⁸⁸⁹

Thomas replies:

To the fourth, it should be said that in love there is a union of lover and beloved, but there is also a threefold division. For by the fact that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the

⁸⁸⁹ *In III Sent.*, d27, a1, q1, arg4: "Praetera, Dionysius, VII cap. *Cael. Hierar.*, col. 206, t. 1. Inter proprietates amoris point acutum et fervidum; et etiam liquefactio ponitur effectus amoris; Cant. V, 6: *Anima mea liquefacta est*. Dionysius etiam, IV cap. *De div. Nom.*, point effectum amoris extasim, idest extra se positionem. Haec autem omnia ad divisionem pertinere videntur, quia acuti est penetrando dividere; fervidi vero per exhalationem resolvi; liquefactio autem divisio quaedam est congelationi opposita: quod etiam est extra se positum, a seipso dividitur. Ergo amor magis est vis divisiva quam unitiva."

interior of the beloved and vice versa, so that nothing of the beloved remains not united to the lover, just as a form reaches to the innermost recesses of that which it informs and vice versa.⁸⁹⁰ Thus, the lover in a way penetrates into the beloved, and so love is called “piercing”; for to come into the innermost recesses of a thing by dividing it is characteristic of something piercing. In the same way does the beloved penetrate the lover, reaching to his innermost recesses, and that is why it is said that love “wounds,” and that it “transfixes the innards.” But because nothing can be transformed into another without withdrawing, in a way, from its own form, since of a single thing there is a single form; therefore preceding this division of penetration is another division by which the lover, in tending toward the beloved, is separated from himself. And according to this, love is said to bring about ecstasy and to burn, since that which burns rises beyond itself and vanishes into smoke. Further still, because nothing withdraws from itself unless it is unbound from what was containing it within itself, as a natural thing does not lose its form unless the dispositions retaining this form in the matter are unbound, it is therefore necessary that the boundedness by which the lover was contained within his own bounds be taken away from him. And that is why love is said to “melt the heart,” for a liquid is not contained by its own limits, while the contrary disposition is called “hardness of heart.”⁸⁹¹

⁸⁹⁰ This sentence speaks precisely of *mutua inhaesio* without using that terminology. As was stated above, Thomas is much more comfortable speaking of love as a dual alteration in the very form of both lover and beloved. His language in the *De Amore* is not this intense and passionate, but similarities are certainly present.

⁸⁹¹ *In Sent. III, d27, q1, a1, arg4*: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod in amore est unio amantis ad amatum, sed est ibi triplex divisio. Ex hoc enim quod amor transformat amantem in amatum facit amantem intrare ad interiora amati et e contra; ut nihil amati amanti remaneat non unitum; sicut forma pervenit, ad intima formati, et e converso et ideo amans quodammodo penetrat in amatum, et secundum hoc amor dicitur acutus: acuti enim est dividendo ad intima rei devenire; et similiter amatum penetrat amantem, ad interiora ejus perveniens; et propter hoc dicitur quod amor vulnerat, et quod transfigit jecur. Sed quia nihil potest in alterum transformari nisi secundum quod a sua forma quodammodo recedit, quia unius una est forma, ideo hanc divisionem penetrationis praecedat alia divisio, qua amans a seipso separatur in amatum tendens; et secundum hoc dicitur amor extasim facere, et fervere, quia quod fervet extra se bullit, et exhalat. Quia vero nihil a se recedit nisi soluto eo quod intra seipsum continebatur, sicut res naturalis non amittit formam nisi solutes dispositionibus quibus forma in material retinebatur, ideo oportet quo ab amante termination illa, qua infra terminus suos tantum continebatur, amoveatur; et propter hoc amor dicitur liquefacere cor, quia liquidum suis terminis non continetur; et contraria dispositio dicitur cordis duritia.”

The concept of *mutua inhaesio* is pervasive in this passage though the term *mutua inhaesio* is not itself mentioned. It is objected that love is really more divisive than unitive on account of the following facts: that love causes ecstasy which is a divisive leaving of the self, that “burning” and “melting” are kinds of dissolutions and therefore divisive, and that penetration necessarily divides by its very activity. Thomas grants the objection that there are divisive effects to love but that love is ultimately unitive. It is in the context of explaining the “threefold division” of lover and beloved that we enter heart of Thomas’s teaching on the three most illustrative effects of love—union, *mutua inhaesio*, and ecstasy. In the reply to the objection, Thomas actually deals with the threefold division in reverse chronological order. We will re-enumerate them according to their order of execution in an act of love. The three divisions are:

- 1) **The Melting Division** = It is by this division that the lover is unbound from the bounds that contained him so that he might suffer an ecstasy.
 - a. This is called “melting” on account of the fact that a liquid is not contained within its own limits.
- 2) **The Ecstatic Division** = Preceding the alteration of form, there must occur some kind of separation or withdrawing from one’s own form.
 - a. This is called “ecstasy” and “burning” (on account of what burns rises beyond itself and vanishes into smoke).
- 3) **The Division of the Alteration of Form** = The mutual alteration of the form of lover and beloved is a kind of division.
 - a. When the lover penetrates (divides) the beloved, it is called “piercing.”
 - b. When the beloved penetrates the lover, it is called “wounding.”

It is self-evident that neither a mere union as simple contiguousness nor ecstasy as a division from the self can account for the radical nuances of actually changing form so as to dwell intimately in the object of one’s love—indeed, to almost *become* what one loves.

We are now in the position to comment in greater detail on the relation between *mutua inhaesio* and the other two primary effects of love, *extasis* and *unio*. It seems that in the order of execution, ecstasy would have to precede union as an effect of love for the simple reason that one must first *break out* of the self before he is *united* to another in a union of affection; but only after these affective movements would *mutua inhaesio* be possible. Not everyone agrees on this logic. Walter Principe mentions that mutual indwelling, particularly in its *redamtionis* form, “*produces* ecstasy.”⁸⁹² Principe’s explanation might justify why Thomas himself treats the tripartite sister-effects of *unio/mutua inhaesio/extasis* in that order, respectively. Why does Thomas treat *mutua inhaesio* prior to *extasis*, and does this fact mitigate against our thesis that *mutua inhaesio* is a more proper effect than extasis? We think not. The ecstasy of which Thomas speaks in q28, a3 points to an ecstasy whereby the two powers of intellection and appetition commingle in such a way as to make it possible for the lover to experience an external beloved as if she were internal. Does this mean that ecstasy is a superior effect to *mutua inhaesio*? It does not, in our estimation, *for the reason that such an ecstasy necessarily results in deeper mutua inhaesio*. It would have been redundant, however, for Thomas to add an additional article after the one on extasis on the subject of “The *Mutua inhaesio* That Is Produced by Extasis” (as opposed to the one that precedes it). Generally speaking, the human race experiences love (i.e., intimacy), as something *within*. *Mutua inhaesio*

⁸⁹² Walter Principe, “Loving Friendship According to Thomas Aquinas,” 131. (Emphasis added.)

illustrates this experience of intimacy better than *extasis*. Even the word, *intimus*, refers to inner experience.⁸⁹³

Moreover, it is important to note that ecstasy does not even come up as a distinct effect of love in a number of works. Kwasniewski writes, "In the *Scriptum* the topic [ecstasy] surfaces by a happy coincidence, as part of an objection prompted by the definition of love. Aside from the more technical discussions of inspiration and rapture, the term itself is invisible in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and nearly all of the *Quaestiones disputatae*."⁸⁹⁴ Kwasniewski implies that usually Thomas considers *extasis* only in passing in the same way that he treats the proximate effects of love (*liquefactio*, *languor*, *fervor*, and *delectatio*) in q28, a5, whereas he gives ecstasy its own article in the context of q28. In the parallel text on "Love Itself" in *In III Sentences d27, a1*, there is very little on ecstasy whereas mutual indwelling plays a fairly significant role. This does not discount the importance of ecstasy as much as it indicates which effect Thomas himself considered more important.

The problem of love raised by Johann is how can a being—a person—who is radically *exterior* to the self have its root in what is radically our own, or interior to us?⁸⁹⁵

⁸⁹³ Even so, we must be careful about this claim. In order to truly be intimate with another, an ecstasy from the self is absolutely necessary. Our claim is that *mutua inhaesio* is the more proper effect of *amor* on account of the fact that it is the better icon for the nature of love. Thomas usually describes *amor* as a complacency or rest *in* an object rather than a kind of "going out." This is, however a minor point. What is more important is that *mutua inhaesio* better approximates the fact that Thomas describes the goal of love as a kind of rest in an object rather than an active "going forth" from the self. The "resting in" is the goal of the "going out." Insofar as the end or goal can be defined as "better" or "superior," *mutua inhaesio* is generally superior to *extasis*.

⁸⁹⁴ Kwasniewski, "Ecstasy of Love," 166.

⁸⁹⁵ Johann, "Problem of Love," 244.

Merely the way that Johann phrases the problem indicates the truth of our thesis. The problem of love ceases to be a problem when a person can be both exterior and interior to one another. This is found only in the effect of *mutua inhaesio*. We have seen that Thomas agrees with Augustine that love consists of the lover, the beloved, and love itself. When it comes to characterizing the very form of love itself, *mutua inhaesio* comes even closer than union because while union is called “love itself,” it is only *mutua inhaesio* that can be said to encompass all three.⁸⁹⁶ *Mutua inhaesio* goes beyond the unitive aspect of love and makes it *concretive*. If it is true that, “A thing seems to be that which is predominant in it”,⁸⁹⁷ and love is an appetitive activity based on an intellectual activity, and both seem to operate according to indwellings, then it seems evident that *mutua inhaesio* is the most proper effect of love. A passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. It is a “being-affected” rather than an “affecting.” *Mutua inhaesio* more properly represents *amor* as a passion than ecstasy on account of the former’s focus on this kind of “being-in” and “being-affected.” It would seem that ecstasy places more focus on *amor*’s *active* nature rather than its nature as a passion since ecstasy manifests most accurately when a man “wills the good of his friend and works for it.”⁸⁹⁸

CONCLUSION

We began our dissertation wishing to solve the dilemmas of love. Is there truly a philosophical problem with the concept of love? Some philosophers seem to think so.

⁸⁹⁶ See *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, c & ad2.

⁸⁹⁷ Aristotle, *Ethic*. IX, 8, quoted in *ST IIa IIae*, q26, a5, ad1.

⁸⁹⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3, ad3: “vult bona amici et operator.”

We should remind ourselves again what they are. The following is the “Metaphysical Dilemma”:

The philosopher can explain the reality of love either by over-emphasizing the terms of the relationship (the lover and the beloved) or by over-emphasizing the union of the love-relationship itself.

If the philosopher explains love by over-emphasizing the union of the love-relationship, he dissolves the terms of the relationship (the lover and the beloved) at the service of the union.

If the philosopher explains love by over-emphasizing the particular loves of the lover and the beloved, he dissolves the union of the love-relationship into an illusion.⁸⁹⁹

The following is the Psychological Dilemma:

The origin of friendly relations lies either in ourselves or in the other — essentially, it lies either in the lover or the beloved.

If the origin of friendly relations lies in ourselves, then it seems we cannot break from the solipsistic prison of the self and truly love the other.

If the origin of friendly relations lies in the other, then it seems we have no common principle or point of departure to base love upon.

The overwhelming experience of human love is one of union, togetherness, and harmony. But how can this oneness be explained when it is making a unity out of what is not a unity? If we emphasize the unity itself, we seem to dissolve the being of the lovers. If we emphasize the lover and the beloved, we seem to make love some kind of weak relation or accident of their relationship, which flies in the face of human experience. If we recall our introduction and the dilemma presented by the Physical

⁸⁹⁹ Indeed, this “solution” would seem to negate the reality of love altogether into two separate and non-integrated tendencies.

School of love versus the Graeco-Thomist school of love,⁹⁰⁰ we saw that Gilson solved the problem based on analogy. Nygren's solution is that all love for Thomas is essentially egocentric: even when I love with *amor amicitiae*, I still only love what is for me a *bonum*. Rousselot's solves the problem on the basis of a twofold understanding of unity. D'arcy summarizes Rousselot's position well when he writes, "In every unity or whole the part loves itself truly when it loves itself as a part and not as a separate individual."⁹⁰¹ The second principle is that every being is "drawn by its very nature to its source and unity" and therefore loves God before any particular object or beloved.⁹⁰²

Stressing *mutua inhaesio* as the proper effect of love essentially dissolves these dilemmas. The passion of love causes the lover to see the beloved as an *alter ipse*, making them simultaneously one *and* two. Moreover, the dual complacencies of the lover and the beloved cause them to mutually contain the other. We need not lose the real bond of love or dissolve the real being of lover and beloved in love's ocean. The mutual in-being that Thomas describes in *ST* I-II, q28, a2 is one of the closest images that we have to *God as love*, as we saw in the first two chapters. As Thomas writes, "Therefore it is necessary that through the Holy Spirit that God is in us and we are in God."⁹⁰³ If the proper effect of the Holy Spirit (who most properly is love) is mutual in-

⁹⁰⁰ See pp. xxviii-xxxii.

⁹⁰¹ D'arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love*, 91. Etienne Gilson criticizes Rousselot for over-emphasizing the "whole-versus-part solution" of St. Thomas. Gilson prefers to make the psychological analogy between God and man a central element in Thomas's philosophy of love. Gilson, Etienne, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A.H.C Downes (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, 1936), 283-8.

⁹⁰² D'arcy, 92.

⁹⁰³ SCG IV, cap. 21: "Necesse est igitur quod per spiritum sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo."

being, then we can say that by the analogy that Thomas sets up in *ST I-II*, q28, a2 that the most proper effect of love for human beings is mutual in-being as well. Moreover, there is a form of mutual in-being that is the most supreme and most proper called the *via redamationis*. It is this particular effect of love that, when understood, represents the sweetest fruit of *dilectio* in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas writes:

“Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are *capable of returning love*, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised.”⁹⁰⁴

Ecstasy cannot be the most proper effect of love because the only reason one suffers ecstasy is to *be in* the other (or even to be transformed into the other). It is not as immediately evident why union cannot be the most proper effect of love. To prove this, we need only cite another part of the definition of love found in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. The first part of Thomas’s definition, gleaned from Chapter 4 of Dionysius’s *Divine Names*, calls love both a “unitive and concreative power.” It is even objected that to set down both “unitive” and “concreative” as parts of the definition of love is superfluous.⁹⁰⁵ Thomas responds by differentiating the kinds of unions, which we have previously mentioned. One kind of union is merely by contact. The union of love, however, is much more radical than mere contact. Thomas actually likens it to the union

⁹⁰⁴ *ST Ia*, q20, a2, ad3: “Amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad racionales creaturas, in quibus *contingit esse redamationem*, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est.” (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁰⁵ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1, arg5.

of matter and form. Thus, Thomas concludes, Dionysius wisely adds “concretive” to merely “unitive” because “those things are called ‘thoroughly mingled’ which are made to be simply one. A concretive union is a union in the superlative. In fact, it is synonymous with *mutua inhaesio*. If we weren’t convinced by this, Thomas also claims: Thomas replies: “Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. 8.2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.”⁹⁰⁶ Over and above union, Thomas describes true friendship in terms of the *via redamationis*. Thus, *mutua inhaesio* is the most proper effect of love and, in a way, the very form of love itself. Our conclusion is well-stated by Kwasniewski: “...there is no love, however barbaric or unthinking, that does not *in some way* reflect the Love that moves the sun and the stars [so] we can expect to find everywhere, in greater or lesser intensity, the telltale marks of *mutua inhaesio* as well as of the other effects.”⁹⁰⁷ Love makes us all go forth in ecstasy, but it does not rest until it is a being-in. Thus, *mutua inhaesio* is the proper effect of love.

⁹⁰⁶ *III. Supp.*, q47, a4, ad1.

⁹⁰⁷ Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 165.

CHAPTER 7: SELF-POSSESSION AND SELF-GIVING: TOWARDS A THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF INTIMACY

What might be called a philosophy of love is inextricably intertwined with a philosophy of the human person, for it is only persons who are capable of returning love. If we have “proven” anything, it should be that a philosophy of love cannot exist without the concept of *mutua inhaesio* or its equivalent for *love results in a being-in*. Even if love were *not* a form of in-being, the nature of love certainly begs the question of where the lover ends and the beloved begins, and vice versa. Thomas, quoting Augustine, writes, “According to Augustine (*De Trin.* ix, 1, 2), three things are required for love, the lover, the beloved, and love itself.”⁹⁰⁸ As for the boundaries between these three and the modes of their interaction, however, there is much room for debate because the debate about love is always current. What has been written in the preceding pages claims that the Angelic Doctor still deserves a place at the table in that debate.

If we were not convinced that the boundaries between lover, love, and beloved were still a modern philosophical issue, we could point to the alarming divorce rate in couples who seem to either have little idea of how to choose their mates or how to stay together once the choice has been made, the psychological problems of “enmeshment” and “codependency” where one confuses one’s identity with the other to the point where one or both identities are lost, or the problem of the hundreds of existing addictions in which the addict is so ruled by his unhealthy “beloved,” that the addict chooses a lesser Good over a greater to the point of self-destruction. According to

⁹⁰⁸ DP III, q9, a9, c.: “Ad amorem tria requiruntur, scilicet amans, id quod amatur, et ipse amor, ut Augustinus dicit in VIII de Trinitate.”

Mother Theresa of Calcutta, “in the developed countries there is a poverty of intimacy, a poverty of spirit, of loneliness, of lack of love. There is no greater sickness in the world than that one.”⁹⁰⁹ We do not mean to suggest that an improved philosophy of love or of the human person will by any means provide a panacea for these problems, but such a philosophy could go a long way toward finding more discernible boundaries for such problems in such a way that a solution can be found. St. Thomas, realizing that a problem must be first correctly diagnosed before a “therapy” can be offered, comments, “just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.”⁹¹⁰ There is no doubt whatsoever that countless people are trying to find solutions to the aforementioned problems. However, there is *much* doubt that the problem is being diagnosed in a way consistent with Thomas’s Christian view of the dignity of the human person, or even Aristotle’s non-Christian one. The solution for cancer likely already exists somewhere out there. It may be lying dormant in a common weed or flower simply waiting for a great or lucky thinker to correctly diagnose the *problem* of cancer. I offer these thoughts as one convinced that as long as we search for answers to these “problems of love” in pharmacology, pop psychology, or in legions of other “feel-good” experiences, we are like men and women who search for a needle in a haystack; moreover, we are searching in the wrong haystack. The *De Amore* of Thomas Aquinas provides an admirable

⁹⁰⁹ Mother Teresa, quoted in *James Martin, My Life With the Saints* (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2006), 169.

⁹¹⁰ *In Metaphys.* III, 1: “Et ideo sicut ille qui vult solvere vinculum corporale, oportet quod prius inspiciat vinculum et modum ligationis, ita ille qui vult solvere dubitationem, oportet quod prius speculetur omnes difficultates et earum causas.”

foundation for philosophizing about the true nature of love such that the dignity of the human person is not lost.

The individualism of post-modernity laments that true intimacy is not possible. It claims that we are all islands.⁹¹¹ If a metaphysics of being is impossible, we are left with the definition of love as merely a passion that may pass, or at best a psychological assertion of the will. We will restate the beautiful quotation by Hans Urs von Balthasar in our introduction:

Prisons of FINITUDE! Like every other being, man is born in many prisons. Soul, body, thought, intuition, endeavor: everything about him has a limit, is itself tangible limitation; everything is a This and a That, different from other things and shunned by them. From the grilled windows of the sense each person looks out to the alien things which he will never be. Even if his spirit could fly through the spaces of the world like a bird, he himself will never be this space, and the furrow which he traces in the air vanishes immediately and leaves no lasting impression. How far it is from one being to its closest neighbor! And even if they love each other and wave to one another from island to island, even if they attempt to exchange solitudes and pretend they have unity, how much more painfully does disappointment then fall upon them when they touch the invisible bars—the cold glass pane against which they hurl themselves like captive birds. No one can tear down his own dungeon; no one knows who inhabits the next cell.⁹¹²

Is Von Balthasar truly correct that “no one can tear down his own dungeon” and “no one knows who inhabits the next cell”? Similarly, we are left to wonder how true Rainer Maria Rilke’s claim that love consists when “two *solitudes* protect and border and

⁹¹¹ We refer to the well-known egotistical isolation and dualism caused by Cartesian philosophy. It seems odd to the realist exactly how the “problem of other minds” came about. See, for example, C. McGinn, “What is the Problem of Other Minds?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. 58 (1984): 119–37 for a good discussion of the problem.

⁹¹² Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Heart of the World*, translated by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (Ignatius Press, 1980) [originally *Das Herz der Welt*, Arche Verlag, 1954], 19.

greet each other”⁹¹³ or the *Song of Song’s* lament, “My sister, my spouse, is a garden enclosed, a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed up”⁹¹⁴ Are we doomed to be “solitudes,” “garden[s] enclosed” and prisons separated by our unbridgeable individuality? As stated above, Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of love declares that this need not be the case.

All things seek to communicate their form to another. We may call *love* the dynamic desire (or need) for one being to communicate itself with another being(s). This is the cosmic view of love that Thomas Aquinas shared with other great thinkers like Dionysius and Augustine. This is true, even of God. There is, of course, an essential difference. There are two primary modes in which a being seeks to communicate its form: by receiving, because each being is fundamentally *needy*, and by giving, because each being is also fundamentally *generous*. Whether through need or through generosity, each being communicates its form by both completing other beings and being completed by them in a complex legion of mutual indwellings. Even God Himself shares this fundamental desire to communicate his form to the many. However, God’s desire to do so does not emerge from any need within Him. Super-abundance – good measure, filled up, shaken down and running over – need not be filled. But even within the Trinitarian God, who mutually indwells within Himself, there exists a principle of the self-possession of each Trinitarian Person. This chapter seeks to indicate some avenues opened by this dissertation for further research into the concepts of love, mutual indwelling, interiority, and self-possession. We wish nothing more than to

⁹¹³ Rainer Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, #7.

⁹¹⁴ *Song of Songs* 4:12: “Hortus conclusus soror mea sponsa hortus conclusus fons signatus.”

indicate where Thomas's metaphysics admirably connects with a philosophy of love and suggest some concepts that should be further pursued.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT INTIMACY IN DISSERTATION

The problem of love's occasional insanity, powerful attraction, and its source and cause has been considered from the very beginning of the philosophical tradition. Plato's *Symposium* remains an icon of such efforts. Even though St. Thomas did not have direct access to the *Symposium*, he still commented on one of the most popular of its speeches through Aristotle – the speech of Aristophanes (189c-193e). Aristophanes proposed that in earliest times, lovers were combined together as rather comical-looking spherical beings. These beings were powerful, and proposed to attack the gods. In anger, Zeus decided to split them apart in order to weaken them. Thus, when a lover desperately seeks a beloved, he is actually seeking his other primal "half." Speaking of real union, Thomas writes, "Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), 'Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one,' but since 'this would result in either one or both being destroyed,' they seek a suitable and becoming union – to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things."⁹¹⁵ This raises the question of the union of love versus the individuality of separate beings. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that a complete union between lover and beloved is not possible on account of the fact that

⁹¹⁵ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2: "Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., *Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.*" (Emphasis added.)

such a union would destroy one or both of them. Lovers and friends instead seek a kind of union that is possible and suitable: 1) living together, 2) speaking together, 3) sharing similar things together. Thomas recognizes there is a desire within the lover and the beloved to seek a union that verges on the dissolution of individual differences.⁹¹⁶ In other words, this passage indicates that the problem of intimacy – how two can become one and still remain separate – exists for Thomas Aquinas. In *ST I-II*, q28, a1, on union, Thomas states that the intimacy sought between them is found in *real union*. But in the following article, Thomas explains further what we might call an intensification of union in the effect of mutual indwelling. This is proven by the fact that in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas agrees with Dionysius that *amor* is not only a unitive force but also a *concretive* one.⁹¹⁷ The *concretive* is an intensification of the merely unitive on account of the fact that the concretive is “thoroughly mixed.” Moreover, speaking specifically of *caritas* as a form that can intensify in the soul, he writes, “For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its

⁹¹⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: “Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend’s will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend.”

“In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, in quantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici.”

Another interesting passage is *SCG IV*, cap. 21: “Now, it is proper to friendship that a man reveals his secrets to his friend because friendship unites their affections, and of two hearts makes one; consequently, when a man reveals something to his friend, he would seem not to have taken it out of his own heart.”

“Est autem hoc amicitiae proprium, quod amico aliquis sua secreta revelet. Cum enim amicitia coniungat affectus, et duorum faciat quasi cor unum, non videtur extra cor suum aliquis illud protulisse quod amico revelat.”

⁹¹⁷ *In III Sent.*, d27, q1, a1, arg5. (Emphasis added.)

adhering to its subject.”⁹¹⁸ What then, is love? *Love in its most intense form is a concrete inhering of the beloved in the lover and vice versa that is truly mutual and reciprocal.* Among the effects of love listed in *ST I-II, q28*, the only candidate worthy of describing this state is *mutua inhaesio*, particularly in its *via redamationis* form. We have found that *mutua inhaesio* is one of the most important concepts in a Thomistic philosophy of intimacy. Indeed, *mutua inhaesio* is nearly a synonym for what we would call *intimacy* in the English world. We will now indicate some other concepts and insights that are also vital for a Thomistic philosophy of intimacy that could be a rich field for further philosophical development. The love of persons is neither a mere passion where two individuals merely tend toward the other, nor is it a total commingling where they become completely one; it is a mutual indwelling, a virtual embrace of the dual powers of appetite and apprehension, an icon of the perichoresis.

THE MEANING OF INTIMACY

What is intimacy? It is derived from the Latin, *intimare*, which means “to make an announcement” or “to make something known.” In Classical Latin it could be used as a synonym for relating, describing or narrating. In the Middle Ages, an *intimatio* was a kind of announcement, often of a legal nature. The adjective form, *intimus-a-um*, came to

⁹¹⁸ *ST IIa IIae, q24, a5, c:* “Hic enim est modus augmenti proprius cuiuslibet formae quae intenditur, eo quod esse huiusmodi formae totaliter consistit in eo quod inhaeret susceptibili.”

It should be admitted that in the *De Amore*, Thomas seems to somewhat shy away from the language that he used in the *Sentences* of *amor* as an alteration of the form of the lover being somehow changed into that of the beloved. St. Thomas later modifies these claims, replacing the language of *amor* as the alteration of form to *amor* as a kind of *complacentia*, *unio* and *mutua inhaesio*.

mean what is most secret, innermost, or most profound. Presumably, something that can be described as *intimus* “announces itself” (from within) and thus “makes itself known.” Like many Latin adjectives, it could also be used as a synonym for a close friend. “Intimacy” was first used as a sexual euphemism only in about 1676.⁹¹⁹ The root does not often occur in the Thomistic corpus. But it may be helpful to provide a general synopsis of some of these usages as a gateway into the newly formulated concept of *intimacy*.

Rather than forge off into our own etymological speculations, let us begin by allowing Thomas himself to engage in some revealing etymology:

Understanding implies an *innermost knowledge* (*intimam cognitionem*) for “intelligere” [to understand] is the same as “*intus legere*” [to read inwardly].⁹²⁰ This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas intellectual knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as stated in *De Anima* iii, 6. Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things. Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it

⁹¹⁹ On-Line Etymological Dictionary, “Intimacy,” www.etymonline.com (March 20, 2010.)

⁹²⁰ “Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam intimam cognitionem importat, dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere.”

cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding.⁹²¹

Understanding is the unique power to find what is hidden within a thing. Thomas gives us several examples of what he means of the power of the understanding to uncover: 1) the substance of things beneath the accidents, 2) the hidden meaning beneath words 3) the truth within figures and likenesses, 4) the intelligible hidden with the sensible 5) effects in their causes, and 6) vice versa. Again, like the passage above, we are impressed with this overt emphasis on the importance of the *inner* and the *hidden*. It is common sense that the superior intellect is able to either see what is not obvious, or else to see the obvious in a unique way. Thomas supplies us with a list of possibly hidden things that beneath the surface of observable accidents, providing us with an excellent example of what operations a superior intellect can perform. There are other passages where Thomas connects the perfect functioning of the intellect with what is intimate and innermost. Thomas writes, “the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect

⁹²¹ *ST* IIa IIae, q8, a1, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam *intimam cognitionem* importat, dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus, nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei, obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sunt autem multa genera eorum quae interius latent, ad quae oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsecus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rerum substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata: res etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilibus quae exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus. Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis, unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest. Indiget igitur homo supernaturali lumine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet. Et illud lumen supernaturale homini datum vocatur donum intellectus.” (Emphasis added.)

and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is 'what a thing is.'"⁹²² This kind of language is reminiscent of what Thomas writes about the apprehensive *inhaesio* of the lover in the beloved: "the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul."⁹²³

Those who are intimate declare everything that they are to one another, holding nothing back. As in the gift of the understanding mentioned above, intimates search the hidden depths of one another regarding their every aspect. Keeping repetition to a minimum, we will gather together some previously mentioned passages from Thomas's work so that the reader might gain perhaps a greater appreciation not only of Thomas the *philosopher* but of Thomas the *lover*. This is so that Thomas himself may declare what it means to be intimate rather than suffer our speculations about what we think he means. As Thomas states in the article on *mutua inhaesio*, the intimate lover "...is not

⁹²² *ST Ia IIae*, q31, a5, c.: "Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est."

⁹²³ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: "Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem in quantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur."

satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an innermost knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.”⁹²⁴ Though this example has to do with the intellective power, we must remember that the powers mutually contain one another and that the lover would not seek to know the beloved at all unless this “knowledge-seeking” were preceded by the movement of love. In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas’s language is almost poetic as he describes the intimacy of lover and beloved:

For by the fact that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the interior of the beloved and vice versa, so that nothing of the beloved remains not united to the lover, just as a form reaches to the innermost recesses of that which it informs and vice versa.⁹²⁵ Thus, the lover in a way penetrates into the beloved, and so love is called “piercing”; for to come into the innermost recesses of a thing by dividing it is characteristic of something piercing. In the same way does the beloved penetrate the lover, reaching to his innermost recesses, and that is why it is said that love “wounds,” and that it “transfixes the innards.” But because nothing can be transformed into another without withdrawing, in a way, from its own form, since of a single thing there is a single form, therefore preceding this division of penetration is another division by which the lover, in tending toward the beloved, is separated from himself.... Further still, because nothing withdraws from itself unless it is unbound from what was containing it within itself, as a natural thing does not lose its form unless the dispositions retaining this form in the matter are unbound, it is therefore necessary that the boundedness by which the lover was contained within his own bounds be taken away from him. And that is why love is said to “melt the heart,” for a liquid is not contained by its own limits, while the contrary disposition is called “hardness of heart.”⁹²⁶

⁹²⁴ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a2, c.: “Non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur.” (Translation modified.)

⁹²⁵ This sentence speaks precisely of *mutua inhaesio* without using that terminology. As was stated above, Thomas is much more comfortable speaking of love as a dual alteration in the very form of both lover and beloved. His language in the *De Amore* is not this intense and passionate, but similarities are certainly present.

⁹²⁶ *In Sent. III*, d27, q1, a1, arg4.

Thomas does not hesitate to emphasize this absolute declaration of all that is within the self to his friend:

Now it is part of friendship not only that a man share his secrets with his friend, on account of the union of hearts, but the same union requires that he should share his belongings with him; because, since a man regards his friend as his other self, it follows that he will succour him as he would succour himself, by sharing his goods with him. Hence it is said to be a mark of friendship that a man in both will and deed should seek the good of his friend.⁹²⁷

It is not controversial that a friendship that is truly intimate would seek: 1) to share all secrets, 2) to know all that is in the beloved, 3) to spend time with her, 4) to share belongings with her, 5) to speak with her, 7) to seek her good and 8) to be united in like things, 9) to simply be present to her. What is perhaps more controversial is what it means for a friend to be “another self,” as we have mentioned numerous times in this dissertation. Where does one begin and another end? If the two are separate, how are they intermingled? How real is this union of love? How literally do they dwell within one another? Why does friendship depend upon the friend being considered “another self,” and is this truly possible? These are some of the questions that we will begin to answer as we indicate avenues toward a Thomistic philosophy of intimacy.

AMOR AMICITIAE & SUBSTANTIAL UNION

The entire concept of seeing a friend as “another self” stands or falls with Thomas’s understanding of the concept of *amor amicitiae*. We do not need to repeat

⁹²⁷ SCG IV, cap. 21: “Non solum autem est proprium amicitiae quod amico aliquis revelet sua secreta propter unitatem affectus, sed eadem unitas requirit quod etiam ea quae habet, amico communicet: quia, cum homo amicum habeat ut se alterum, necesse est quod ei subveniat sicut et sibi sua ei communicans; unde et proprium amicitiae esse ponitur velle et facere bonum amico.”

ourselves regarding its analysis. It will suffice to provide briefly Thomas's own explanation of it in *ST I-II*, q26, a4:

Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.⁹²⁸

Thomas's philosophy of intimacy is tied up with his notion of being. Simply stated, something can either be loved *per se* or *per accidens*. It is only *amor amicitiae* that can possibly be a candidate for a perfect love. If I love a person on account of myself alone then I am doomed to love her with *amor concupiscentiae*. It is possible to love a number of things *per se*, but it is only with another human being that I can "place myself in her shoes." It is only with another member of my species that I must apply my knowledge of how *I* think and feel to how *she* thinks and feels. In thinking of my Good, I cannot help but extend it to what is her Good. Knowing that I do not possess all the perfections of my species, I must reach out to another member of my species to compensate for that poverty.⁹²⁹ We must remember that one of the effects of love is to seek what perfects

⁹²⁸ *ST Ia IIae*, q26, a4, c.: "Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid."

⁹²⁹ We are excluding here the possibility of reaching out to the supernatural to compensate for one's deficiencies, which adds an entirely new and valid theological

one's self.⁹³⁰ This does not mean that we are doomed to see *nothing but* ourselves when we love the beloved, but it does mean that we cannot escape the fact that that gaze will be colored by one's own interiority – in other words, by one's *substantial union* with one's self.⁹³¹

With Dionysius as his guide, Thomas writes the following text concerning the nature of substantial union. The context is whether or not a man should love himself with charity, which Thomas answers soundly in the affirmative.

I answer that, since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above, we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv*) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in *Ethic. ix, 4,8*, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves."⁹³²

dimension to the discussion. Precisely what amor needs to learn from another human being and what amor must learn from God would make for a fertile discussion.

⁹³⁰ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a5.

⁹³¹ See particularly W. Norris Clarke, "The Self as Source of Meaning in Metaphysics," *The Review of Metaphysics* 21:4 (1968): 597-614.

⁹³² *ST IIa IIae*, q25, a4, c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum caritas sit amicitia quaedam, sicut dictum est, dupliciter possumus de caritate loqui. Uno modo, sub communi ratione amicitiae. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum, sed aliquid maius amicitia, quia amicitia unionem quandam importat, dicit enim Dionysius quod amor est virtus unitiva; unicuique autem ad seipsum est unitas, quae est potior unione. Unde sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma et radix amicitiae, in hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quod ad eos nos habemus sicut ad nosipsos; dicitur enim in IX *Ethic.* quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex his quae sunt ad seipsum."

The concept of substantial unity is pervasive in this text although the term *unio substantialis* is not explicitly mentioned. Considering that he states that a man is “one with himself which is more than being united to another (*unicuique autem ad seipsum est unitas, quae est potior unione*),”⁹³³ but also that self-love is the “form and root of friendship (*amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma et radix amicitiae*)”⁹³⁴ we see that Thomas claims essentially the same thing about substantial union in the *Secunda Secundae* as he does previously in the *De Amore*. We should recall that the text which explains the term *unio substantialis* states the same premises; but the text above is perhaps even more emphatic. This should suffice to substantiate our initial claim that *the nature of the mutual indwelling of persons is entirely dependent upon one’s relationship to the self; even better, substantial union is a cause of love.*⁹³⁵

Unity is a key metaphysical concept Thomas’s philosophy of intimacy. If likeness causes love (*ST Ia IIae, q27, a3*), then it seems to follow that there is nothing more “like” the self than the self. Therefore, it is true that it is naturally impossible to escape one’s self-relation when one extends love toward another. This is why in the context of proving that unity is an effect of love that Thomas lists substantial union as a kind of exception: it is rather a principle and cause of love. Thus, we can see the concepts of likeness, substantial union, and *amor amicitiae* come together in the following vital statement:

⁹³³ *ST Ia IIae, q25, a4, c.*

⁹³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁵ Thomas claims this explicitly, as stated earlier in this dissertation, in *ST Ia IIae, q28, a1, ad2.*

There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above. There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.⁹³⁶

What is more unified is more perfect. The more one is united with himself, the more perfect is his ability to both love himself and extend that love outward toward others.

“TO BE” IS “TO BE INTERIOR”

W. Norris Clarke wrote a very fine article about the relationality of being which he aptly entitles, “To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation.”⁹³⁷ After our analysis here, we might add that for a human to be in love is to be “*in mutua inhaesio*,” and moreover, to be fully human means “to be interior.”⁹³⁸ It is no surprise that existentialist thinkers like Kierkegaard are nearly obsessed with the notion of interiority. Kierkegaard captures the relationship between interiority and reciprocity rather well, noting that is never a “finished” process:

A lover, for example, whose inwardness is his love, may very well wish to communicate; but he will not wish to communicate himself directly, precisely because the inwardness of his love is for him essential. Essentially occupied constantly in acquiring and reacquiring the

⁹³⁶ *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a1, ad2.

⁹³⁷ W. Norris Clarke, “To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation,” in *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 102-122.

⁹³⁸ Other philosophers have certainly recognized the point. See particularly Desmond Connell, “Substance and the Interiority of Being,” *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 25 (1983): 68-85.

inwardness of love, he has no result, and is never finished. But he may nevertheless wish to communicate, although he can never use a direct form, because such a form presupposes results and finality. So, too, in the case of a God-relationship, precisely because he himself is constantly in process of becoming inwardly or in inwardness, the religious individual can never use direct communication, the movement in him being the precise opposite of that presupposed in direct communication.⁹³⁹

Kierkegaard realizes that it is not possible for a person to communicate to another in the same way that he communicates with himself. But it is noteworthy that Kierkegaard identifies love with inwardness; moreover, the very nature of the human person is to become “inwardly or in inwardness.” He recognizes the “gap” between communication with the self and the other. Perhaps we will be more surprised, however, to find that St. Thomas Aquinas claims that interiority is connected with superior being, though with a fundamentally different language than Kierkegaard.

When inquiring into the meaning of generation in God, Thomas formulates what we might say is a principle axiom of intimacy: “...we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way.”⁹⁴⁰ This begs the question of precisely what *emanation* is. It is beyond the scope of this study to answer this large question, but it will suffice to understand that *emanatio* in the thought of St. Thomas means any process by which one thing comes from another, whether by

⁹³⁹ Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 68.

⁹⁴⁰ SCG IV, cap. 11: “Quod secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum.”

creation, generation, or any other “movement.”⁹⁴¹ In the present context, *emanatio* appears to have the denotation of any time the power of a substance is activated and “emanates forth” from itself. Thomas continues his commentary concerning generation in God by describing the mode of emanation in plants, in animals, in humans, in angels, and finally in God. Plants are a higher form of life than inanimate objects because “It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant’s life is imperfect because, although in it emanation proceeds from within, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous.”⁹⁴² Animals are higher still in the hierarchy of being because their powers of sensation and limited intellect, “though beginning from without, terminates within.”⁹⁴³ Human beings are higher still because the human intellect actually has the power to reflect upon itself. The angelic intellect is higher than the human because it “does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself.” God is the highest of all because He *is* His understanding. In Him and in Him Alone does intellect and intelligible, lover and beloved, perfectly coincide.

Emanation in human beings is higher than that of animals because the emanation is circular. It begins and ends within. In plants and animals, the kind of emanation referred to above begin and end in different subjects. Nutrition, sensation, and growth

⁹⁴¹ See *ST Ia*, q45. Deferrari writes that *emanatio* denotes, “a general term for something proceeding from a principle.” (Deferrari, *Lexicon*, 360.)

⁹⁴² *SCG IV*, cap. 11: “In plantis vero hoc indicium vitae est, quod id quod in ipsis est, movet ad aliquam formam. Est tamen vita plantarum imperfecta: quia emanatio in eis licet ab interiori procedat, tamen paulatim ab interioribus exiens quod emanat, finaliter omnino extrinsecum invenitur.”

⁹⁴³ “Etsi ab exteriori incipiat, in interiori terminatur.”

begin outside the substance and terminate within. It is only when the hierarchy reaches the human intellect that the processes of will and intellect reflect upon themselves.

Going out from the self, these powers are like a kind of echo; they are sent forth from the human person into the world, gather the appropriate information, and then return to the original subject in an act of re-creation, self-knowledge, and self-love that no plant or animal can approximate. In this, the human powers are analogous to the power of God.

We are reminded of the verse:

For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and return not thither but water the earth, making it bring forth and sprout, giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it.⁹⁴⁴

Thus, though circular, Thomas can claim that the beginning and the end of the process of emanation in human beings ultimately terminates in the interior of the human person. This process constantly alters the human person in a sublime act of existence by which we constantly learn, change, grow, love, and win our ultimate salvation. This process, because it is capable of penetrating far into the world, therefore penetrates further within the human person. Thomas writes, "the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within."⁹⁴⁵ Thus, the human being is capable of a kind of *interiority* that is qualitatively superior to any animal.

We might initially argue that emanation in human beings is superior to that of the angels on account of the fact that for angels, as for plants and animals, emanation seems to begin and end in the same subject, making them open to the charge that

⁹⁴⁴ Isa. 55:10-11.

⁹⁴⁵ SCG IV, cap. 11: "Et quanto emanatio magis processerit, tanto magis ad intima devenitur.

perhaps angels are not as open to bringing the reality of the whole cosmos within themselves in the human's circular motion of emanation from the self to the world, then back to the self. The angelic intellect is a kind of citadel of self-sufficiency. As Thomas teaches, it "knows itself by itself." Human beings receive information through likenesses, but the mystery of the angelic intellect is that they understand the very intelligibility of the forms themselves.⁹⁴⁶ Simply because there is no need for an angel to learn singulars in the world discursively does not mean that they are not related to the world of singulars.⁹⁴⁷ They simply know singulars through their pure essences, not piece by piece, but according to that capacity granted to them in their place in the angelic hierarchy, they "straightaway perceive as known all consequent conclusions" and "at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them."⁹⁴⁸ Allow me to offer an example. Say a man knows everything there is to know about sailing. He has sailed his whole life on all bodies of water in every kind of vessel. He has read every book possible on the subject. By the end of his life, this man understands the legions of separate concepts and words about sailing through only a few. When he was younger, all of those separate concepts were seen as unrelated bits of information languishing in a semi-intelligible heap. But as he grew older and more experienced, one concept became related to another, subsumed under still a greater one, related to further concepts and categorized under still more sweeping headings. Is this not what the student does when he highlights a text? At first he feels he should underline most of the book, but as he progresses in knowledge, more information is understood in greater and greater unity

⁹⁴⁶ *DVI*, q8, a6, c.

⁹⁴⁷ See *ST Ia*, q57, a2.

⁹⁴⁸ *ST Ia*, q58, a3, c.

and the many becomes one. With this in mind, imagine the interiority of a being who can understand *everything* in this unified manner. Contrary to the argument that simply because an angel “knows himself through himself,” his interiority is inferior to the human, the opposite is the case.

But here, we must ask ourselves what interiority really *is*. If it means anything, it is to have more power to know and to love in one’s interior. Even God himself is within Himself as knower in the known, and beloved in lover. Thomas writes, “As the object known is in the knower, to the extent that it is known, so the beloved must be in the lover, as loved. The lover is, in some way, moved by the beloved with a certain interior impulse. Therefore, since a mover is in contact with the object moved, the beloved must be intrinsic to the lover.”⁹⁴⁹ Interiority implies that there is something significant about what is inside, and the activities of intellection and love are the highest of all activities.

It is noteworthy how much Thomas stresses the interior and the intrinsic as that which is “higher” or directive of other functions. Thomas writes:

“Now, in the case of active and functioning powers what we find is this, that the higher a power is, *the more things does it include within itself*, not in composite fashion but as a unit...”⁹⁵⁰

“For just as the principal healing force is one’s interior nature, so the principle which chiefly causes knowledge is something intrinsic...”⁹⁵¹

⁹⁴⁹ *Comp. Theo.* I, chap. 45: “Sicut autem intellectum est in intelligente inquantum intelligitur, ita et amatum esse debet in amante inquantum amatur. Movetur enim quodammodo amans ab amato quadam intrinseca motione. Unde cum movens contingat id quod movetur, necesse est amatum intrinsecum esse amanti.”

⁹⁵⁰ *De Spirit.*, a3, c.: “In virtutibus autem activis et operativis hoc invenitur quod quanto aliqua virtus est altior, *tanto in se plura comprehendit*, non composite sed unite.” (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁵¹ *De Spirit.*, a9, c.: “Sicut enim principaliter sanans est natura interior, sic principium principaliter causans scientiam est intrinsecum...”

“Life is attributed to the Holy Spirit according as God is said to be the life of things, namely, as He is in all things and moves all things, with the result that all things seem to be moved, in some way, by an intrinsic principle.⁹⁵²

“So too, the human will is not only alive when, by its right intention, it is united to its last end, which union is its object and, as it were, its form – but also is moved by an intrinsic principle to do what is right – when by love man adheres to God and his neighbour.”⁹⁵³

“...everything which is done from love *proceeds from an intrinsic principle*, since what is done from love is voluntary.”⁹⁵⁴

Even prayer, which is arguably one of the most important activities possible for Thomas Aquinas, “consists chiefly in an interior act.”⁹⁵⁵

What it means to live for Thomas is almost co-extensive with what it means to be interior. Thomas writes, “those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves.” Thomas continues by stating that the concept of nature is also tied up with the principle of interiority: “Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to

⁹⁵² *DV I, q4, a8, ad3*: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod vita spiritui sancto attribuitur secundum hoc quod Deus dicitur vita rerum, prout ipse est in rebus omnibus movens eas, ut sic modo quodam omnes res a principio intrinseco motae videantur.”

⁹⁵³ *SCG IIIb, cap. 139*: “Sic igitur et voluntas hominis, cum per rectam intentionem ultimo fini coniungitur, quod est eius obiectum et quodammodo forma, et vivida est; et, cum per dilectionem Deo et proximo inhaeret, ex interiori principio movetur ad agendum recta.”

⁹⁵⁴ *In III Sent., q27, d1, a1, arg9*: “Omne quod fit ex amore *procedit ex principio intrinseco*, quod est voluntarium.” (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁵⁵ *ST IIa IIae, q84, a2, arg2*: “Oratio principaliter consistit in interiori actu.”

which it is most inclined.”⁹⁵⁶ What is *internally proper* to a plant is generation and nourishment, and so this is the proper life of a plant. What is *internally proper* to an animal is sensation and movement, and so this is the most proper life of an animal. And, of course, what is internally proper to the life of the human person is “in their understanding and acting according to reason.”⁹⁵⁷ But Thomas adds to what is internally proper to human life with a rather surprising statement: “Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus *especially* does he wish ‘to associate with his friends.’”⁹⁵⁸ Thomas does not only imply, but states with clarity, that the most intrinsically proper activity possible for the human being is to be with his friends. It is not without reason that we associate the nature of the person with *mutua inhaesio* and the perfection of love.

SELF-POSSESSION

To be truly intimate with another person, that person must first have an interior to give. If he is able to give it, then he must in some way be master of it. We do not connect the ideas of in-being, personhood, and self-possession lightly. Thomas himself

⁹⁵⁶ ST IIa IIae, q179, a1, c. Thomas does not explicitly use the word, *natura*, here, but it is obvious that he is referring to it anytime he refers to what is “proper to a thing.”

See also *De Anima* II, lect. 5, 285. “Inanimate bodies are brought into being and maintained by an exterior moving principle, whereas animate beings are generated by an intrinsic principle, i.e. seed, and are kept in existence by an intrinsic nutritive principle. It seems characteristic of living things that their activities should thus proceed from within themselves.”

⁹⁵⁷ ST IIa IIae, q179, a1: “intelligunt et secundum rationem agunt.”

⁹⁵⁸ ST IIa IIae, q179, a1, c.: “...et in hoc praecipue vult quilibet convivere amico, ut dicitur in IX Ethic.”

asserts the following axiom: "I answer that, man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things."⁹⁵⁹ Robert Johann rightly claims, "It is not sufficient that the value loved in myself be somehow present *in the other*. If I am to love him as myself, it must also be present to *me* – and present, in a sense, as I am to myself."⁹⁶⁰ We will call this privileged "presence to self" *self-possession*. Moreover, Josef Piper has asserted:

To sum it up, then: to have (or to be) an "intrinsic existence" means "to be able to relate" and "to be the sustaining subject at the center of a field of reference." ...Only in reference to an inside can there be an outside. Without a self-contained "subject" there can be no "object." Relating-to, conforming-with, being-oriented-toward – all these notions presuppose an inside starting point.... The higher the form of intrinsic existence, the more developed becomes the relatedness to reality, also the more profound and comprehensive becomes the sphere of this relatedness: namely, the world. And the deeper such relations penetrate the world of reality, the more intrinsic becomes the subject's existence.⁹⁶¹

It might be noted that there is a form of self-possession, i.e. the person's substantial unity with himself, that is outside the realm of choice. The person has no choice but to be an incommunicable individual, comprised of a body-soul composite, that learns, loves and makes moral choices. He has *no choice* but to love himself more than another because he is one with himself substantially.⁹⁶² He has *no choice* but to seek the good for himself, even if that good is objectively destructive to him. But he does

⁹⁵⁹ *ST Ia q96, a2*. "Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis."

⁹⁶⁰ Robert Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 31.

⁹⁶¹ Josef Pieper, *The Truth of All Things*, reprinted in *Living the Truth* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1966), pp. 82-3.

⁹⁶² *ST Ia IIae, q27, a3, c*.

have a choice whether or not he is a fully actualized, virtuous, and responsible person. In other words, there is a self-possession in the general sense called *substantial union* whereby the person simply is related to himself and “has” himself (whether that relation is well-ordered or not). There is another species of self-possession that we might call “virtuous self-possession” whereby virtue is truly the rule and measure of his activity. We saw in q28, a1 that Thomas likens affective union to substantial union. In short, he makes a direct analogy between one’s self-relation and one’s relation with others. There have been other philosophers who see this analogy as the key to Thomistic metaphysics. Quoting Thomas, Bob Hurd indicates that “the higher a nature is, the more intimate to the nature is that which flows from it,” concluding that “*the more perfect the being the more perfect its self-relation.*”⁹⁶³ Norris Clarke argues somewhat similarly that a study of the subjectivity can analogously be applied to the study of metaphysics, basing it on the reality of the dynamic between self-possession and self-gift. He writes:

The only being to which we have direct access from within, which we live existentially and subjectively from within, and not merely know by extrinsic reference, as an object from without, is the conscious human self, the life of the embodied person as lit up from within by the act of self-possession that is self-awareness, on all its many levels. And I do not mean here the isolated Cartesian self, locked in the self-contemplation of pure thought, but the human self as it actually exists in the concrete, in constant intersubjective openness to other selves in the human community. For although other human selves are not as open to direct intrinsic insight as my own inner self, still the best phenomenological analysis shows that, in some way difficult to conceptualize but easy to live, one person has the ability to open himself freely to the other so that they can know each other existentially in a special mode of mediated-

⁹⁶³ Bob Hurd, “Being is Being-Present-To-Self: Rahner’s Key to Aquinas’s Metaphysics,” *The Thomist* 52 (1988): 73. Hurd argues, as the title indicates, that any “emanation” that results in a creature’s relation to what is “outside” of it is based upon a kind of internal emanation that consists of the subsisting creature. I find that this is not only an analogy to the self-possessed man, being the perfect man, but also of the Trinity itself.

immediacy by an inner resonance of affinity or connaturality. Any person who knows human love or friendship deeply can testify to the reality of this inner knowledge of other selves.⁹⁶⁴

The connection between Clarke's speculation that our inner, subjective knowledge could be analogously applied to other realities is directly related to our dissertation on *mutua inhaesio*. The way that I know and love another objectively is directly related to how I know and love myself.

Various commentators on St. Thomas have used other terms to express the mystery of the same concept. Johann, for example, speaks of the "element of *presence*." He rightly claims, "It is not sufficient that the value loved in myself be somehow present *in the other*. If I am to love him as myself, it must also be present to *me* – and present, in a sense, as I am to myself."⁹⁶⁵ Frederick Wilhelmsen eloquently writes:

I have called this "I" "The Man Within," the man to whom we talk even to ourselves. Ego is alter ego. Anybody can try this out on himself: you do not understand until you "say" or "express" what you know and this "expression" is *to* "yourself" in actually knowing. The "yourself" is a function of the reflective phase of intellection. There simply exists no *ego* until there is an other known by the *ego*. This *alter ego* – Rimbaud's "I Is An Other" – is the mask of the spirit, but unlike ordinary material masks this face has no face behind it, no face in the sense of an already molded and subsisting substance or inhering accident. The Thomistic *ego* is neither substance nor, strictly speaking, accident in the order of intentionality.⁹⁶⁶

⁹⁶⁴ Norris Clarke, "The Self as Source of Meaning in Metaphysics," *The Review of Metaphysics* 21:4 (June 1968): 599-600. This notion has a tradition, certainly in the metaphysics of Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson. "Subsistence in the human person implies the notions of self-possession and independence, so much so, Maritain says, that the tradition of Western metaphysics 'defines the person in terms of independence, as a reality which, subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe unto itself.'" (See Donald Haggerty, "Spirituality Via Metaphysics: Maritain on Individuality and Personality," in Catholic Culture Database, (<http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=2700>) (January 11, 2011).

⁹⁶⁵ Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 31.

⁹⁶⁶ Frederick Wilhelmsen, "The 'I' and Aquinas," 189-90.

Wilhelmsen is exactly right. The "I" must be conscious of something "other." One of the first "others" that the ego comes in contact with when it reaches the age of reason is, paradoxically, itself. Wilhelmsen claims that in the sense that we must relate to one another, the ego is already an alter ego. He also recognizes that this ego is neither an inhering accident nor a ready-formed subsisting substance. We claim that this relation between ego and alter-ego-as-ego is, however, a union. It is substantial union. Ego and alter-ego-as-ego is conceptually comparable to substantial *unity* and substantial *union*.⁹⁶⁷ When we say that a man is self-possessed, we are saying that the relationship between his ego (his substantial unity) and his alter-ego-as-ego (substantial union) is somehow *sound*, rightly-ordered, or – dare we use the word – *virtuous*.⁹⁶⁸

The virtuous man is only so if he is in stable possession of virtuous *habitus*. A *habitus*, in order to be such, must be a stable possession of the soul. Wuellner defines a *habitus* as follows: "A permanent quality according to which a subject is well or badly disposed in regard either to its being or its operations; a relatively stable disposition of a living nature or power, inclining it rightly or wrongly to some perfection or end of its own being or of another being."⁹⁶⁹ Can we not then, surmise that the ultimate stable

⁹⁶⁷ The word "ego" is not being used here in a Freudian sense, but more as a existential understanding of one's own subjectivity. The "ego" is the general concept that one has of the self, and though Thomas did not have this precise concept, he surely realized that man was capable of having an identity. See Anthony T. Flood, "Aquinas on Subjectivity: A Response to Crosby," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 84(1): 69-83.

⁹⁶⁸ Is it a surprise that a friend is "another self" when it is also true that one's self is "another self" as well?

⁹⁶⁹ See Bernard Wuellner, S.J., *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1956), 54.

possession is the very personhood *by* which one is virtuous, and then call this virtue *self-possession*?

If it is true that the mutual indwelling of persons is dependent upon substantial union, we might conclude by mentioning that kind of substantial union whereby the *via redamationis* is made possible. We have already mentioned the fact that the person who is capable of the *via redamationis* must possess a modicum of virtue whereby he is capable of *amor amicitiae*. According to Thomas Aquinas, only the man capable of a certain interiority can fulfill this act. Thomas calls the rational man— the one in possession of himself— the “inward man (*homo interior*).” To know one’s self wrongly is to love “the outward man (*homo exterior*),” which is the sensual or corporeal nature. The inward man is he who seeks the goods of his higher nature, perfecting his God-given powers to know and to love. The outward man is the one who seeks what is lower in his nature, meaning those sensitive and corporeal drives that he shares with animals. The outward man, therefore, insofar as he is outward, becomes less of a man. For if it is true that the specific difference of man from animals is his rationality (his inwardness), then to the extent that a man does not fulfill that specific difference, he becomes more bestial.⁹⁷⁰

We are further impressed by Thomas’s consistent association of the violent with a principle that exists exterior to the self:

In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that “he who fed the swine debased himself”; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is

⁹⁷⁰ This precise principle is reiterated in *ST I*, q75, a4, ad1.

withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.⁹⁷¹

Now there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the centre.⁹⁷²

If we were to state it colloquially, Thomas appears to associate the *natural* with the *interior*. When one is truly master of one's interior, he can be said to be the "inward man" or a "self-possessed man."

THE PERICHORETIC ANALOGY OF GOD AND MAN

Not content to merely state that God is the Creator of all things, Thomas specifically relates God's creative power to the interiority of the creature. He writes, "whatever we may take that is within the creature, has being from another."⁹⁷³ It might

⁹⁷¹ *ST* IIa IIae, q175, a2, ad2: "Alio modo, quando, praetermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quae pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem. Et sic ille qui porcos pavit, sub semetipso cecidit, et iste excessus vel extasis plus appropinquat ad rationem raptus quam primus, quia scilicet appetitus superior est magis homini proprius; unde, quando homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi proprium. Quia tamen non est ibi violentia, quia voluntas potest resistere passioni, deficit a vera ratione raptus, nisi forte tam vehemens sit passio quod usum rationis totaliter tollat, sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam irae vel amoris insaniunt."

⁹⁷² *DP* III, q10, a2, ad5: "Non est autem violentia vel coactio in hoc quod aliquid secundum ordinem suae naturae movetur, sed magis in hoc quod naturalis motus impeditur: sicut cum impeditur grave ne descendat ad medium; unde voluntas libere appetit felicitatem, licet necessario appetat illam."

⁹⁷³ *SCG* II, cap. 31: "Quia quicquid accipiatur intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse ab alio."

seem strange to make such bold claims about *mutua inhaesio*, considered that it is only an effect of love, whereas in q26 Thomas deals with “love itself” and in q27, he treats of love’s causes. After all, causes are always superior to their effects. Are causes really greater than *mutua inhaesio*? Thomas writes:

Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Spirit.⁹⁷⁴

The above passage indicates that the love shared between humans, particularly *caritas*, is not merely a relation or an accident. When we speak about *amor*, we are speaking about the very nature of God Himself. The love that humans share is a participation in a higher nature, and so *amor* is greater than they themselves. The very form of God Himself is an indwelling, as we saw in the *perichoresis*, and the entire metaphysical being of the cosmos is an indwelling in God, as we saw from reviewing the influence of Dionysius on Thomas. Thus, in a way, *mutua inhaesio* is not merely an “effect” of love. It surpasses what is said even in q26 and 27 by being even *their* principle, form and ground, for *mutua inhaesio* is itself an image of the Trinitarian God.

⁹⁷⁴ ST IIa IIae, q23, a3, ad3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia substantia est ens per se, accidens autem in alio. Sed secundum rationem suae speciei, accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subiecti est indignius subiecto, sicut effectus causa. Accidens autem quod causatur ex participatione alicuius superioris naturae est dignius subiecto, in quantum est similitudo superioris naturae, sicut lux diaphano. Et hoc modo caritas est dignior anima, in quantum est participatio quaedam spiritus sancti.”

The following passage, however, is one of the most representative regarding the association of indwelling with self-possession:

Note, however, that in *The Causes* the return to one's own essence is called the very subsistence of a thing in itself; for non-subsistent forms are, as it were, poured out upon something other than themselves, and are not in possession of themselves [*nullatenus ad seipsas collectae*]. But subsistent forms reach out to other things, perfecting them and influencing them—in such a way, however, that they still retain their immanence and self-possession [*quod in seipsis per se manent*].⁹⁷⁵

The context of the passage occurs in the question regarding whether God knows or understand Himself. Thomas is responding to the objection that everyone who knows his own essence does so by a certain *exitus* and *reditus*; but since God never leaves himself and therefore never returns, he cannot understand Himself. The above passage is Thomas's reply. Ecstasy is possible, but a more perfect being goes out of himself while simultaneously remaining within himself.⁹⁷⁶ He can dwell in another without losing what is his own, and give himself without being lost. Again, this belongs in a superlative manner to God, of which man is an image: "Nevertheless, the Holy Spirit gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): 'What is more yours than yourself?' Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a

⁹⁷⁵ *DT*, Vol. 1, q2, a2, ad2. Trans. by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952).

"Sed tamen sciendum, quod reditio ad essentiam suam in libro de causis nihil aliud dicitur nisi subsistentia rei in seipsa. Formae enim in se non subsistentes, sunt super aliud effusae et nullatenus ad seipsas collectae; sed formae in se subsistentes ita ad res alias effunduntur, eas perficiendo, vel eis influendo, quod in seipsis per se manent...."

⁹⁷⁶ This explains more fully what Thomas means by a lover suffering a "simple ecstasy" according to *amor amicitiae* in *ST Ia IIae*, q28, a3.

way to the giver.”⁹⁷⁷ Love is a gift. And a man cannot give a gift unless he first *possesses* it to give. Therefore, a man cannot even be said to truly be a lover unless he is self-possessed.

It belongs to God, and to anything subsistent, “not to be in another.”⁹⁷⁸ And yet everything that we have analyzed has attempted to prove precisely the opposite – that indeed, *to be fully human means to be in another*. To be an “individual” means “that concrete state of unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from other beings”⁹⁷⁹ whereas Person is characterized by freedom, transcendence, interiority, and morality.⁹⁸⁰ Thomas Aquinas has these momentous words to say about the person: “I answer that, ‘Person’ signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name ‘Person’ is fittingly attributed to God.”⁹⁸¹ Should we be surprised that directly after asserting that

⁹⁷⁷ ST Ia, q38, a1, ad1: “Et tamen spiritus sanctus dat seipsum, in quantum est sui ipsius, ut potens se uti, vel potius frui; sicut et homo liber dicitur esse sui ipsius. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., *quid tam tuum est quam tu?* Vel dicendum, et melius, quod donum oportet esse aliquo modo dantis. Sed hoc esse huius dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo, per modum identitatis, sicut dicit Augustinus super Ioan., et sic donum non distinguitur a dante, sed ab eo cui datur.” (Emphasis added.)

⁹⁷⁸ SCG IV, cap. 11. See Lawrence Dewan, “Individual as a Mode of Being,” *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 410.

⁹⁷⁹ Jacques Maritain, *La Personne et le Bien Commun* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1947), 9-10.

⁹⁸⁰ See Joseph W. Evans, “Jacques Maritain’s Personalism,” *The Review of Politics* 14:2 (April, 1952): 166-177.

⁹⁸¹ ST I, q29, a3, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Unde, cum omne

person is what is most perfect in nature, he directly ties it to the fact that God contains all of nature? Said another way: *to contain, to be interior, is to be perfect*. This is what we have been trying to prove concerning *mutua inhaesio* all along. Perhaps we might make a modest speculative insight regarding the nature of love and metaphysics: it belongs to the nature of an *individual* not to be in another, but it belongs to the nature of *person* (particularly a human one) to dwell in another according to his powers. For though we know that it is in the nature of an accident to be “in another” and the nature of a substance not to be, it is the privilege of a person to be so interiorized by his powers of intellect and love that he is able to burst the bonds of his individuality to contain all things, like the Author of his nature. It is not a limit to dwell in another according to one’s powers, but a privilege. Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, notes that it is specifically human, specifically spiritual, that “In transcending itself it has itself; by being with the other it first becomes itself, it comes to itself. Expressed differently again: being with the other is its form of being with itself.”⁹⁸² And so we have come full circle. To truly be in another means to truly be in one’s self, and vice versa. No concept better illustrates *amor* in all its intimate splendor than *mutua inhaesio*—the most proper effect of love.

illud quod est perfectionis, Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod eius essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem; conveniens est ut hoc nomen persona de Deo dicatur.”

⁹⁸² Ratzinger, “Person in Theology,” *Communio* 17 (Fall, 1990): 451.

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